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ABSTRACT 
TRANSMITTING REVOLUTION: RADIO, RUMOR,  
AND THE 1953 EAST GERMAN UPRISING  
 
 
Michael Palmer Pulido 
 
Marquette University, 2017 
 
 
This project examines public opinion in the Dresden Region of the German 
Democratic Republic from the end of World War II through the summer of 1953. I argue 
that the Socialist Unity Party (SED) projected its legitimacy through an official public 
sphere by representing publicness to its citizenry. Through banners, the press, and 
choreographed public demonstrations, it aimed to create the appearance of popular 
support. Even more significantly, the SED used radio to ground its legitimacy in a 
burgeoning post-war internationalism that bound residents of the GDR in an imagined 
community of socialist nations under Stalin’s leadership.  
 
At the same time, the regime’s opponents challenged its legitimacy and credibility 
through a rival public sphere. In this space, foreign broadcasters, especially Radio in the 
American Sector (RIAS), chipped away at the regime’s credibility and prestige while 
improvised news and rumor undermined the Party’s state building efforts.  
 
Tensions boiled over in the summer of 1953 when RIAS and rumor helped make 
revolution thinkable. On the seventeenth of June, East Germans took to the streets in 
hundreds of cities and protested the government. RIAS endowed the occasion with 
national imaginings before and after East German police and Soviet forces ended the 
protestors’ hopes for change.  
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TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
ADN   Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst or General East German 
   News Service  
 
Aufklärungslokal  Enlightenment venue / socialist education space  
 
Betriebsfunk   Factory Radio Systems  
 
Bezirk Dresden  Dresden Administrative Region (from July 1952 until October  
   1990) 
 
Bezirksleitung   Regional Directorate  
 
BPKK   Bezirksparteikontrollkommission or Regional Party Control  
   Commission 
 
BPO    Betriebsparteiorganisation or SED party representation in the  
   workplace 
 
BRD     Bundesrepublik Deutschland or Federal Republic of Germany  
   (West Germany)  
 
CDU (& CDU-Ost)  Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands and CDU-East  
   (the GDR Blockparty) 
 
CPSU    Communist party of the Soviet Union  
 
CSR    Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 
 
DDR    Deutsche Demokratische Republik or German Democratic republic 
   (East Germany)  
 
DFD    Dienst für Deutschland or barracked workers service  
 
DGB    Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund or Confederation of German Trade  
   Unions (FRG) 
 
FDGB   Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund or Free German Trade Union  
   Federation (GDR) 
 
FDJ    Freie Deutsche Jugend or Free German Youth 
 
Grosssender   Powerful national/international Radio Station 
 
iv 
 
H.O.    Handelsorganisation or state owned retail outlet  
 
Hetz(en)   popular term used by the SED to denote rabble rousing  
 
KPD    Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands or the Communist Party of  
   Germany  
 
Kreisleitung   County Directorate (under regional administration) 
 
Landessender  Less powerful regional radio station  
 
LOWA   Lokomotiv- und Waggonbaus or locomotive and car factory  
 
LPG    Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaft or communal  
   farm 
 
NDPD   National-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands or National-  
   Democratic Party of [East] Germany (Blockparty) 
  
NSDAP   Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei or National   
   Socialist German Workers’ Party (the Nazi party) 
 
NWDR   Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk or Northwest German Radio 
  
RFE    Radio Free Europe  
 
RIAS    Rundfunk im Amerikanischen Sektor or Radio in the American  
   Sector 
 
SED    Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or Socialist Unity Party  
   of Germany 
 
SMAD   Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland or Soviet  
   Military Administration in Germany 
 
SPD    Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or Social Democratic  
   Party of Germany 
 
Stadtfunk   City radio systems that functioned similarly to a PA system  
 
Stasi / MfS   Common names for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit or   
   Ministry for State Security 
 
VEB    Volkseigener Betrieb or State-Owned Enterprise 
 
VOA    Voice of America  
v 
 
Citations: 
 
 
Archival abbreviations in footnotes are as follows: 
 
BStU MfS:    Ministry for State Security (Stasi) 
 
DRA:    German Radio Archives, Potsdam 
 
SächsHStA:  Saxon State Archives, Dresden 
 
SAPMO-BArch:  German Federal Archives, Lichterfelde (Berlin)  
 
NARA:   National Archives and Records Administration (II), College Park,  
   Maryland  
  
 
Regarding Archival Materials:  
Those names protected under German law (Schutzfrist) have been changed to an initial.  
 
 
German Translations: 
I have included the original German in all instances where it is available. However, there 
are some cases where documents from American depositories lack the original German.  
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Introduction 
  
 
 What follows is an inquiry into public opinion and the origins of a nationwide 
demonstration. I focus on the Dresden Region (Bezirk Dresden) which existed as an 
administrative unit from 1952 until 1990. I therefore project this region retroactively 
when necessary and focus on the capital city of Dresden and the small towns in its 
directorial orbit: Görlitz (the second-largest city); Bautzen; Bischofswerda; 
Dippoldiswalde; Freital; Großenhain; Kamenz; Löbau; Meißen; Niesky; Pirna; Riesa; 
Sebnitz; and Zittau. The events that unfolded here in the summer of 1953 represented an 
historically significant occasion, noteworthy for both its familiarity and its novelty.  
 
Early Dresden and Saxony 
Dresden derives its name from the Slavic “Drezdzány,” or “swamp forest,” which 
referred to a medieval village near an Elbe River crossing. The Elbe runs through a 
section of central Europe that features a rolling green countryside, mild winters, and 
comfortable summers. Drezdzány sat on the Elbe’s north bank and a Germanic settlement 
developed on the south bank before a stone bridge connected the two in 1220. The 
Germanic counts of Meißen (from the Slavic “Misni”) eventually subdued their Slavic 
neighbors in the name of Christianity and established themselves as the area’s dominant 
force. The towns offered a typical central European medieval existence for their residents 
and the fertile terrain would prove especially productive in the development of mining 
techniques.1 
                                                 
1 James Retallack, ed. Saxony in German History: Culture, Society, and Politics, 1830-1933 (Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 2000), xiv; Anthony Clayton and Alan Russell, eds, Dresden: A City 
Reborn (Oxford: Berg, 1999), 2-11; Frederick Taylor, Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945 (London: 
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From the tenth century until 1815, Dresden, as the capital of Saxony, existed as 
part of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. The confederation of over 800 
principalities, imperial cities, and other administrative units ranged wildly in size and 
strength. From the late 1500s, Saxony wielded considerable political power as an 
electorate hosting a prince in Dresden that sat on a committee that selected the Holy 
Roman Emperor. Indeed, this state of affairs formed the basis for Dresden’s very 
existence and it was one of these Electors, Moritz, who helped shape Dresden into a 
notable Renaissance city. One example of his reign includes the city’s first orchestra, the 
Staatskapelle in 1548, which found inspiration in the area’s Protestant church music 
scene. In matters of religion, the region’s inhabitants had cultivated a predominantly 
Lutheran heritage (Electors were Lutheran apart from Augustus the Strong) in the years 
after Martin Luther took refuge at Wartburg Castle in nearby Thuringia. Catholic and 
Protestant tensions boiled over between 1618 and 1648 and the Thirty Years War begot 
disaster that brought an end to most of the city’s cultural developments in this period. 
Saxony, located amid the central European battlefield, experienced pillaging, disease, and 
misery.2 
 
Prosperity and Power 
Not for the last time did a period of prosperity follow one of desolation. Dresden’s 
rulers had built up the city’s physical defenses during the war, attracting those peoples 
from the countryside looking to evade marauding armies. Thus, in contrast to many 
                                                                                                                                                 
Bloomsbury, 2005), 14-20; Drezga means “Sumpfwald” (swamp forest) and Dresdzane means 
“Waldbewohner” and derives from the Wendisch or lower Sorbisch language. The name “Dresdene” first 
appeared in German in 1206. See “Allgemeine Geschichte Dresdens” (SAPMO-BArch DH 2 21413) 
2 Retallack, Saxony in German History, xiv; Clayton and Russell, A City Reborn, 1-30; Frederick Taylor, 
Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945, 14-20; Helen Watanabe-O’Kelly, Court Culture in Dresden: From 
Renaissance to Baroque (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 5.  
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European cities during this period, Dresden’s population actually grew to just over 
21,000 residents, making it a sizeable city for the period. Catholicism returned to the 
court in the early modern era and brought with it the baroque grandeur found in other 
German-speaking cities like Vienna and Munich. The force behind this bombastic build-
up was the colossal personality of Elector Friedrich August II, or Augustus the Strong, 
who famously earned his epithet bending horseshoes to demonstrate his physical 
strength.3 A cruel man who enjoyed the company of mistresses, Augustus’ grand tour had 
taken him to the great Catholic courts of seventeenth-century Italy, Vienna, Spain, and 
France where the grandeur of Louis XIV’s Palace at Versailles had left on him an 
especially lasting impression.4  
Augustus took the throne in 1694 and became an elector following the death of his 
older brother. He also became King of Poland when that nation’s nobility, fearful of an 
absolute monarchy, chose Augustus (an outsider, instead of a compatriot) for the Polish 
throne. Political snarls held things up before Augustus could claim his position, but his 
conversion to Catholicism helped seal the deal. As a European monarch, Augustus now 
needed to project his legitimacy and Dresden’s mineral wealth and the healthy population 
of Saxony and Poland provided the resources to do so. Thus, in the early eighteenth 
century, Dresden, and especially the Old City, which sits on the southern side of the Elbe, 
saw its iconic cityscape take shape with a notable French influence. Augustus constructed 
public gardens that surrounded a palace built in the Baroque style, and like Versailles, 
their tidiness and geometric precision evoked control and domination. The Zwinger, 
perhaps the second-most famous point of reference in Dresden, represented another 
                                                 
3 Ibid. He held several official titles: Elector of Saxony, King of Poland, and Grand Duke of Lithuania.  
4 Taylor, Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945, 16-17; Clayton and Russell, A City Reborn, 2-20. 
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defining feature of the city-scape. In German, the name means “outer ward” and, in this 
case, it refers to an outdoor courtyard enclosed by a palatial construction that functioned 
as a staging grounds for competition as well as royal display and pageantry. Along with 
the Semper Opera House (destroyed and rebuilt in 1869), other landmarks built under 
Augustus’ watch include the Academy of the Arts, and the landmark Church of our Lady 
(die Frauenkirche). Typically, when Saxony’s Lutheran electors died, their bodies were 
taken in a ritual procession from Dresden to their final resting place in St. Mary’s 
Cathedral in Freiberg. In a departure from tradition, when Augustus died in 1733, the 
state placed his body in Wawel Cathedral in Kraków and his heart was placed in the 
newly-completed crypt of the Dresden Cathedral.5 
As before, war and destruction followed a period of cultural expression and 
Dresden’s central location again led to its entanglement in the European conflicts of the 
mid-1700s. Frederick the Great’s designs on Silesia and his greater struggle with Austria 
forced Augustus III to choose an alliance, and he chose poorly. He switched sides and 
watched his Austrian allies loot Dresden and retreat before Prussian conquerors took the 
leftovers. The Seven Years War meant that Saxony’s army belonged to Frederick the 
Great and the artists and craftsmen who arrived in Dresden during its cultural flowering 
vanished followin the city’s military occupation. The Prussians laid siege to, and 
bombarded, the city in 1760, destroying about half of it.6 This, of course, would not be 
the city’s last experience with demolition. Forty-six years later, Napoleon’s dissolution of 
                                                 
5 Katja Doubek, August der Starke (Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 2007), 139. Jan Hübler, 
Dresden: Wo Reiter golden und Wunder blau sind (Meßkirch: Gmeiner Verlag, 2012), 6; Watanabe-
O’Kelly, Court Culture in Dresden, 5. 
6 Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 26-30; Eric Dorn Brose, Modern German History: From 
the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich (New York: Berghahn, 1997), 45-59; Clayton and 
Russell, Dresden: A City Reborn, 19-21.  
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the Holy Roman Empire left Dresden under French occupation and politically affiliated 
within the Confederation of the Rhine until 1813. Saxony experienced less political 
disruption than the southwestern German territories closer to France, although 
Napoleon’s ill-fated Russian campaign and the Elector of Saxony’s decision to side with 
the Emperor nearly destined the state to Prussian rule at the Congress of Vienna. To 
Saxons’ relief, Talleyrand and Castlereagh stepped in and prevented the state’s 
dissolution, although it lost about half its territory.7 
In the course of the nineteenth century, Dresden’s built environment earned the 
city recognition throughout Europe and the sobriquet “Florence of the Elbe,” coined by 
theologian and philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder.8 A number of renowned thinkers 
called Dresden home, including Richard Wagner, Caspar David Friedrich, Theodor 
Körner, Robert Schumann, and Carl Maria von Weber.9 But, once again, revolution 
swept across the continent in 1848, sparking an uprising in the Kingdom of Saxony. The 
following year, a coalition of students, workers, and political activists—democrats and 
liberals—marched through the streets singing the Marseillaise. They decreed a liberal 
government before troops squashed the uprising and political divisions doomed reform 
efforts.10 In 1866, Saxony again found itself on the losing side of history after siding with 
Austria. Sharing the latter’s defeat at Königgrätz, the state emerged a further-diminished 
European power. Thus, with its political influence swept away first with the Old Regime 
and later by the wars of German unification, Saxon cultural and economic endeavors 
                                                 
7 Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13,1945, 26-30; James Retallack, ed. Saxony in German History, xiv,  
8 Olaf B. Rader, Kleine Geschichte Dresdens (München: C.H. Beck, 2005), 43.  
9 Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 30-33. 
10 Clayton and Russel, A City Reborn, 21-22. Andrea Neemann, “Models of Political Participation in the 
Beust Era: The State, the Saxon Landtag, and the Public Sphere, 1849-1864” and “Saxon Forty-eighters in 
the Postrevolutionary Epoch, 1849-1867” in James Retallack, ed. Saxony in German History, 9, 122-126.  
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increasingly defined the region. The final war of unification, between Prussia (and allied 
German states) and France ended in German victory and unity under Prussian leadership 
in 1871.11 
 
Industry and the Working Class Movements  
Considerable economic, demographic, and social changes attended the political 
developments of the nineteenth century. Economically, the Zollverein had laid an 
economic foundation for German unification and Saxony had already established itself as 
one of Germany’s most industrialized regions in the 1830s. In the second half of the 
century, railroads further enhanced Dresden’s position at the heart of Europe both 
culturally and economically. The cityscape in Dresden continued to change, too. As the 
populations of the working classes and bourgeoisie grew, the area witnessed the 
construction of workers’ tenements and tramways that moved residents into, around, and 
out of the city. Workers in the second half of the nineteenth century worked long nine-to-
eleven-hour days in the factories. Otto von Bismarck’s social security system warded off 
any genuine socialist threats and the state tamped down on those that made too much 
political noise. Still, notable socialist leaders appeared in or made Dresden their home: 
August Bebel delivered a speech that cautioned against Prussian hegemony and later 
ascended to parliament through Dresden and Rosa Luxembourg edited the Sächsische 
Arbeiterzeitung.12  
By the time Saxony became part of the German Reich in 1871 it had reached the 
highest levels of industrialization. The textile industries dominated the industrial 
landscape well into the twentieth century, especially in the western part of the state. In 
                                                 
11 Ibid., Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 31-2.  
12 Ibid.  
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the eastern part of the state, the industrial area of Dresden, Pirna, and Meißen boasted 
machine building, tobacco processing, metalworking, and textile production. Dresden 
also had a vibrant consumer goods industry, and could claim that the modern brassiere, 
cigarettes, squeezable toothpaste, and the latex condom had local origins. The region also 
developed a robust precision optics industry where skilled workers ground lenses for Carl 
Zeiss and other manufacturers. Finally, the railways had brought tourists in increasing 
numbers to the city stimulating the construction of hotels and restaurants. By 1900, the 
population had reached 4.8 million; home to an eighth of the German population living 
on just three percent of the nation’s land area. But despite its continuously expanding 
industrial workforce, Saxony experienced little immigration compared to an area like the 
Ruhr Valley and as a result, this population remained overwhelmingly German and 
Protestant.13 
Saxony had long been an epicenter of workers’ movements, and Dresden had a 
history of labor strife, with lockouts and disputes driven by the city’s 60,000 trade union 
members. The skilled and politically conscious workforce had joined the ranks of the 
SPD, founded in 1875, faster than the national average. Still, despite Bismarck’s death 
and the elimination of anti-socialist legislation, the ruling class generally kept the party’s 
political ambitions at bay. However, the exclusionary tactics practiced by the 
Conservative-Liberal coalition also helped deliver the middle classes into the SPD. One 
should note here that Leipzig and Dresden produced different types of SPD membership, 
with the socialists in the former further to the left on the spectrum while the socialists in 
                                                 
13 Toni Pierenkemper and Richard Tilly, The German Economy During the Nineteenth Century (New York: 
Berghahn, 2004); xv, 31; Brose, Modern German History, 168-9; Clayton and Russel, A City Reborn, 24; 
Rosemary H. T. O'Kane, Rosa Luxemburg in Action: For Revolution and Democracy (New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 27; Nathan LaPorte, The German Communist Party in Saxony, 1924-1933 (New York: 
Peter Lang, 2003), 41-4; Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 30-40. 
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the latter looked to build a larger coalition and avoid class antagonisms. But although 
Saxony’s ethnic homogeneity meant that working class movements lacked the usual fault 
lines formed by ethnic and confessional rifts elsewhere in the Reich, a distinct Saxon 
political discord did ultimately develop between the SPD and its sometime ally the KPD 
(Communist Party of Germany or Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, founded in 
1918).14  
 
The Great War and its Aftermath  
The First World War left Dresden physically untouched but politically unstable as 
the imperial government collapsed and food shortages followed. The Bolshevik 
Revolution of 1917 had reverberated in Germany, although the vast majority of workers 
favored its anti-war posture and disavowed its violent means. On November 9, 1918, 
mass demonstrations broke out in Dresden (and elsewhere in Germany), when Kaiser 
Wilhelm II abdicated and Prince Max resigned as Chancellor.15 The region’s industrial 
background and politically active working class meant that the revolutionary fervor that 
erupted elsewhere in Germany in November found fertile ground in Saxony. 
Demonstrators in Dresden established contact with revolutionaries elsewhere in Germany 
by radio—a novel development in revolutionary tactics at the time—and quickly declared 
that Friedrich August II of Saxony’s reign had come to an end on the thirteenth of 
November, deposing a culture of power that had endured for three centuries.16 In its 
                                                 
14 Benjamin Lapp, Politics, Class, and the Rise of Nazism in Saxony, 1919-1933 (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press International – Studies in Central European History, 1997), 1-53. 
15 Sam M. Mustafa, Germany in the Modern World: A New History (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2011), 142-4.  
16 F.L. Carsten, Revolution in Central Europe, 1918-1919 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 
43-45; Martin Kitchen, A History of Modern Germany: 1800 to the Present (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2012), 192-6; Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 36; LaPorte, The German Communist Party in 
Saxony, 48-9. 
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place, the leaders of the demonstrations, in conjunction with the Social Democrats (and 
the Independents that joined), declared a Socialist Republic, ending the decades-long 
political domination of the Conservative-National Liberal coalition. The new union, 
along with workers’ councils operating in Leipzig and Chemnitz, announced a 
revolutionary program of production, expropriation, and the dismissal of government 
official along class lines. The Spartacist Rebellion failed in January, 1919 as did the Kapp 
Putsch of March 13, 1920, after which the national government attempted to retreat to 
Dresden. The military commander there denied this move and in May, following a 
veterans’ demonstration and the assassination of the minister of war, the military took 
control of the situation and declared martial law. Leaders dissolved the revolutionary 
workers’ councils and the political class tried to prod Saxony along a more temperate 
path of parliamentary democracy. Alas, they would not succeed.17 
The politicians that developed the framework for a republic in Weimar felt that 
Germany’s legitimacy now derived from its conception as a state of culture and welfare.18 
This vision failed to come to fruition either nationally or in Saxony. During the 1920s, 
interwar European and global economic trends and emerging industrial regions in China 
and Latin America led to restrictive tariffs on imports, affecting industrialized nations 
and Saxony in particular. Saxony’s higher wages hurt the competitiveness of its industrial 
firms and a regional credit shortage in the mid-1920s (after the stabilization of the Mark) 
helped bring about a recession and structural unemployment that persisted through the 
Great Depression. The economic downturn hit the state especially hard and it suffered the 
                                                 
17 Carsten, Revolution in Central Europe, 43-45; Kitchen, A History of Modern Germany, 192-6; Taylor, 
Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 36-40; LaPorte, The German Communist Party in Saxony, 48-55. 
18 Detlev Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1993), 141.  
10 
 
highest unemployment rate in Germany. Some hopeful signs emerged, especially in 
Dresden where those specialized and advanced industries that produced modern 
equipment—radio, sewing machines, optics— prospered, but in the western half of 
Saxony textile manufacturers found themselves vulnerable to competition from producers 
in emerging economies. Furthermore, during this period even Dresden never truly 
regained its footing as either a premier tourist destination or capital of contemporary 
modern art and culture. Instead, economic conditions deteriorated and the Great 
Depression of the early 1930s exacerbated political divisions in Dresden, with the KPD 
and the National Socialists representing a repudiation of Weimar moderation. Indeed, the 
Weimar government failed to truly legitimize its authority. First, as Detlev Peukert points 
out, the regime had established itself as anti-monarchical, dismissing traditional sources 
(monarchy and church) of authority for Germans, while creating a hospitable political 
space for reactionary actors. The regime also struggled to sell the public on a state 
committed to a generous nationalism (as opposed to the chauvinistic and xenophobic 
nationalism that developed in the latter half of the nineteenth century and middle of the 
twentieth). Constitutional democracy failed to engender national pride, with few feeling 
any genuine dedication to the republic and even the workmanlike civil servants felt more 
committed to the state than the republic. Finally, a charismatic foundation of legitimacy 
for the Republic never had much of a chance, as those who held the highest offices 
generally lacked magnetism. Combined with two economic catastrophes and the loss of 
prestige from the Diktat of Versailles that much of the middle class conflated with the 
new order, the Weimar Republic had poor odds for survival.19 
                                                 
19 Clayton and Russel, A City Reborn, 26-27; LaPorte, The German Communist Party in Saxony, 45-7; 
Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 39-43; Peukert, The Weimar Republic, 217-8.  
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National Socialism and another World War 
Turbulent times pushed voters to opposite ends of the political spectrum and into 
the KPD and the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische 
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei or NSDAP). With the left fragmented by the KPD’s refusal to 
unite with the SPD (whom they considered fascists in disguise), the Nazis, initially 
viewed by the KPD as the petty bourgeois entering its death throes, now had an easier 
path to power.20 Nazi violence, political despair, and an increasingly extremist middle 
class also helped lay a foundation for the NSDAP’s success in Saxony. Violence in 
particular, or even the threat of it, had become normalized in this politically volatile 
milieu, and the communists did not hesitate to engage their far-right opponents. The 
Nazis also presented themselves as the party that would destroy the Weimar structure and 
made appeals to Protestants in Saxony by highlighting socialist godlessness.21 There is 
also evidence to suggest that bourgeois newspapers helped legitimize the NSDAP and 
heighten its “respectability” with flattering coverage.22 The Nazis’ newspaper in Dresden, 
Der Freiheitskampf (The Struggle for Freedom) boasted the largest circulation among all 
daily newspapers in the city.23 The above tactics and the promise of economic salvation 
and national renewal turned Dresden into a Nazi stronghold. The 1932 city council 
elections in Dresden witnessed the KPD win thirteen seats and the SPD and the NSDAP 
22 apiece. While Hitler’s party had lost seats in national elections, his ascension to the 
                                                 
20 Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 42.  
21 Lapp, Politics, Class, and the Rise of Nazism in Saxony, 176, 190-1, 206-7,  
22 Ibid. 207-8.  
23 Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 43.  
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chancellorship in 1933 nullified any short-term trends at the polls and the Enabling Law 
and the Reichstag Fire Decree legalized his dictatorship in 1933.24  
The Nazi seizure of power ushered in an era of carefully choreographed rallies 
and propaganda that aesthetically confirmed a restored German vigor. The Nazi regime 
aligned the education system with its historical understanding of, and vision for, the 
future, and the quickly assumed control of all public media outlets, suppressed opposing 
views, and banned political parties, which disappeared or went underground. Churches 
came under close observation and the party’s persecution of the Jews changed from 
economic discrimination and expropriation to expulsion, enslavement, and murder. The 
state’s needs existed above all else in the National Socialist system. In Dresden this 
meant that the government utilized the city’s Hygiene Museum for its politically driven 
racial studies and renamed some notable locales in Dresden, such as Theaterplatz, which 
became Adolf Hitler Platz. And it all happened with a shocking quickness. As the 
prominent Jewish professor Victor Klemperer noted, “It’s astounding how easily 
everything collapses…complete revolution and party dictatorship. And all the opposing 
forces as if disappeared from the face of the earth…”25  
 
Operation Thunderclap and the Dresden Firestorm 
During World War II, Dresden was of little military importance after briefly 
functioning as a hub during the invasion of Poland. As the tide turned against Germany at 
the end of the war, more pressing needs elsewhere prompted the transfer of Dresden’s 
anti-aircraft guns. This left the city relatively defenseless—something that most believed 
(on both sides) would not pose a problem for a city that the Allies were not likely to 
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target. Indeed, many residents felt Dresden would never suffer the fate delivered by 
strategic bombing experienced in other German cities. This rationale had some basis in 
rumor, which held that Churchill had a beloved aunt living in Dresden or that the English 
remained so enamored with Dresden’s cultural charm that they simply could not bring 
themselves to destroy it. While Dresden had been largely spared the experience of war, 
its citizens would face a devastating change in fortune as Operation Thunderclap and its 
bombing operations commenced. Some scholars speculate that strategists at Yalta drew 
up the plans for Dresden’s destruction, though the reasons behind the decision and 
whether they derived from a military request to destroy transportation and 
communication installations or a desire to terrorize civilians remains a point of 
contention. A more sinister theory posits that the architects of destruction envisioned the 
ensuing inferno as an allegory for the annihilation of Nazism.26  
While inclement weather had prevented this mission for weeks, a spring-like 
sunny day on February 13, 1945 meant that Dresdeners’ string of luck had run out, 
though they had no idea at the time. Shortly after sundown that day, 244 British bombers 
departed England with the instructions to bomb Dresden, whose population of 630,000 
occupied the largest city left in Germany that the Allies had left (mostly) untouched. 
When the air raid sirens sounded at 9:51 p.m. and bombers neared the city, most residents 
ignored what they mistook as another false alarm. The lead planes dropped marker flares 
to identify targets near Dresden’s Old City and the incendiary bombs followed closely 
behind. The bombers spaced the raids to allow a false sense of security to develop among 
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survivors and emergency crews who emerged from the inadequate shelters. American 
bombers completed the Old City’s destruction on the morning of February 14—Ash 
Wednesday. Kurt Vonnegut recalled waking up to a cityscape that now bore semblance to 
the surface of the moon.27 Shocked survivors found that much of Dresden had been 
reduced to rubble—though incredibly, the famous Church of our Lady still stood. And 
then it collapsed the following day. More devastating than the destruction of the built 
environment were the deaths of 25,000 Dresdeners who perished in the attacks. Less than 
three months later, the war ended.28 
 
Sovietization  
Historians have long focused on the origins of Nazism and just how, exactly, a 
sophisticated and cultured people could so quickly discard democratic principles for the 
brutality of National Socialism. More recently, however, historians have increasingly 
concerned themselves with the Germans’ break with Nazism and their successful (and 
astonishingly quick) re-civilization. Richard Bessel and others have suggested that during 
the final months of the Second World War, Germans experienced the brutality of the 
conflict, especially in the eastern territories, to such a degree that the events came to 
define their wartime experience. The sense of victimhood that resulted from traumatizing 
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events like the expulsions in the east, the battle for Berlin, mass rape, and in the case of 
Dresden, fire bombings, developed along with other new attitudes.29  
Dresden’s experience, in particular, did much to cultivate this victim mentality for 
Germans even though other cities that experienced terror bombing such as Hamburg 
could claim to have suffered equally. Dresden’s attack came late, but Würzburg and 
Potsdam, along with a number of other German cities, felt the wrath of Allied bombers in 
the final month of the war, too. Still, Dresden emerged as the quintessential Opferstadt or 
“victim city,” according to historian Tony Joel. He suggests that a number of factors can 
help account for this phenomena, including Dresden’s widely acclaimed beauty; the 
enigmatic rationale behind the Allies’ decision to target the city after having largely 
ignored it for years; the destruction of non-military buildings (in the Old City especially), 
and the devastating efficacy with which the incendiary bombs induced terror and killed 
people. Joel also reminds us that the word Opfer means both “victim” and “sacrifice,” 
and either translation is suitable. This was true especially in the minds of the socialists 
who cast Dresden as both a victim of Western aggression and a sacrifice for the 
recklessness and arrogance of the Nazi period.30  
Such destruction, combined with socialists’ position that recent history had 
proved them right—while discrediting capitalism and the right—inspired a nearly 
unlimited righteousness among East Germany’s future leaders. Capitalist rivalry and its 
fascist offshoots, after all, had spawned multiple depressions and two world wars—how 
much more proof did anyone need that the arrangement was a political dead end? Thus it 
should not have shocked anyone that the socialists advocated for and represented a 
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pacifist internationalism further encouraged by the psychological and physical 
destruction of Dresden. Equally importantly, German politicians who came to rule East 
Germany in the early postwar period readily capitalized on their anti-fascist biographies. 
Indeed, the emotional and political rubble of postwar Germany offered a gloomy but 
fortuitous site into which Old Communists could stake their rightful claim to German 
history.31  
At the Yalta Conference in early February of 1945, the Allies failed to lay out a 
precise vision for Germany’s future other than its division into four zones of occupation 
and the imposition of reparation payments. But at Potsdam in July of 1945, leaders made 
a number of border adjustments, including giving those lands east of the Oder and Neisse 
rivers to Poland—an issue that would fester leading up to the 1953 events in Saxon 
border towns near Dresden. The Soviets, under Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, planned to 
annihilate the capitalistic institutions that had fostered fascism in its zone under SMAD 
(Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland, or Soviet Military Administration in 
Germany).32  
A number of historians have labeled this multi-year revolution from above in 
Eastern Europe as “Sovietiziation.” This term is useful in describing the process by which 
the German communists, with Soviet support, transformed the Soviet Zone of Occupation 
(and other future Eastern Bloc states) into a soviet-style satellite state. Sovietization was a 
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two-part project that entailed imperial domination and the imposition of a Soviet-style 
modernity. Indeed, the project was ambitious in its scope: the initiation of “democratic 
centralism,” which was essentially a synonym for Stalinist Bolshevism; seizure and 
control of the public sphere with concomitant disciplining measures; transformation of 
the countryside alongside; industrial development; and the politicization of daily life.33  
Germany experienced Sovietiziation along a timeline similar to other Eastern 
European states. This includes the arrival of the Walter Ulbricht and his group of exiled 
members of the native communist party in 1945, the electoral disappointments of 1946 
(that proved a turning point as it dashed communist hopes for legitimate political 
hegemony), appeals to patriotism, and the development of “block politics” in an effort to 
attract moderate and right-leaning parties.34 This last development included the creation 
of the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, or SED) out of a 
forced merger of the SPD and the KPD in 1946. The Ulbricht Group’s faith in their 
mission found its clearest expression with the “magnet theory” (Magnetwirkung), 
whereby East German economic successes (which did indeed exist with regard to food in 
the immediate postwar years) would draw broad support. These attempts came up short, 
and as the SED recognized its failure to gain political power at the polls, leadership 
shifted its attention to seizing control of the Soviet zone. This process took place in 
stages, the first of which witnessed Communist Party rule through leftist coalitions and 
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the redistribution of land and the nationalization of industry from 1945 until 1947/8. 
These operations established two core socialist institutions: the communal farms 
(Landwirtschlaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften or LPGs) and the state-owned 
enterprise (Volkseigener Betrieb, or VEB). On October 7, 1949, the GDR formally came 
into existence as a nation state and an escalation of the above policies along with 
establishment of armed forces, collectivization drives, and an emphasis on the 
development of heavy industry characterized Sovietization from 1948 until the summer 
of 1953. Finally, the process by which the SED consolidated single party rule defined the 
second stage politically, which lasted until Stalin’s death in March of 1953.35  
Some historians have called this phase “Stalinist,” but this term’s application in 
the GDR as well as Stalin’s role in the division of Germany is more complicated than 
many in the West might have liked to believe. First, as Corey Ross points out, Stalinism, 
and its politically institutionalized attributes—terror, arbitrariness, and a cult of 
personality—relied on Stalin’s presence and leadership.36 Furthermore, the term 
Stalinism implies a degree of fear, violence, and repression, such as that during the Great 
Terror in the Soviet Union, which simply did not exist in the postwar satellite states.37  
Furthermore, historian Wilfried Loth argues that Stalin never even wanted East Germany 
as a satellite state and that its creation was solely the work of Walter Ulbricht and his 
group. However, Dirk Spilker offers a convincing rebuttal to this claim, noting that it 
only appeared this way, before the Soviets and their East German puppets gave up on 
winning at the ballot box and moved to take direct control of the political situation in 
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their zone.38 But as Carolyn Eisenberg reminds us, partition became reality in the second 
half of the 1940s as American and British leaders constructed a politically and 
economically integrated zone, doing their part to strengthen the division of Germany.39 
Indeed, she sees this division as primarily an American design. However, that too is still 
much too simple. As Edith Sheffer points out, the partition of Germany took place in 
stages after 1945 and in many ways represented the handiwork of not just political 
leaders, but the residents, especially those sharing borders, who did their part to make the 
division an everyday reality by reinforcing the it socially and economically.40 Of course, 
these same GDR residents were probably tempted to give Stalin most of the credit after 
seeing his portraits plastered all over their towns.41 
So while historiographical contention regarding Stalinism and Germany’s division 
lingers, clearly the East German leadership looked to Stalin’s Soviet Union for 
inspiration. To be sure, the GDR’s politicians represented his image and power in the 
early years of the GDR and the Soviet leader cast a long shadow over the East German 
state.  
 
The Politicization of Dresden’s Aesthetics  
Sovietization also extended to the built—and destroyed—environment. In her 
essay “Public Space and Societal Utopia: State planning, Communication, and 
Presentation of Power in the Soviet Union using the Example of Moscow between 1917 
and 1964,” Monica Rüthers reminds us that the environments created by city planners for 
                                                 
38 Wilfried Loth, Stalin’s ungeliebtes Kind: Warum Stalin die DDR nicht wollte (Berlin: Rowohlt,1994), 
Spilker, The East German Leadership and the Division of Germany, 4-6.  
39 Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 485-487.  
40 Edith Sheffer, Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 3-13. 
41 Ibid., 25.  
20 
 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union intended to form a new type of habitat for a 
“new type of human.”42 And, not surprisingly, so it was with East German communists 
and Dresden, which, as an Opferstadt and an urban tabula rasa, often starred in the 
promotion of the socialist program. Consequently, the city, as it fit into the greater 
socialist schema, offers us insights into the SED’s vision for the future.  
 Although one journalist lamented the conversion of the famous sanatorium in 
Weißer Hirsch into a hospital, the city’s Soviet sympathizers—who controlled the 
press—projected its future as a bright one as early as 1946. Strategic bombing had 
toppled a good deal of Dresden’s celebrated Old City silhouette, but much of the city 
appeared in good repair just a few kilometers away. As early as 1946, many of the 
suburbs that had escaped the devastation that befell the Old City witnessed a resumption 
of normal life. Eighty percent of the streetcars reportedly ran and businesses had re-
opened. And even in the Old City, where bombs had left little intact, a sympathetic 
observer put a positive spin on the situation, noting that a wholesale rebuild here would 
be easier than removing and rebuilding toppled structures amidst those in good repair. 
Cars reportedly zoomed through the streets beside the rubble at the busy interchange of 
Postplatz and across the river at Albertplatz. As for entertainment, the city that still 
guarded its reputation as a cultural center already put on shows and hosted premiers.43 
Such rosy perceptions constituted a key part of the vision adopted by the eternally 
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optimistic and forever forward-looking one-party government that ruled over Dresden 
and the surrounding area. The SED detected immense political value in the area’s 
destruction, too: rubble could always be tied to the West, whether, fascists, Americans or 
West Germans.  
In this way, Dresden’s destruction and the remaining rubble allowed the SED to 
represent the malevolence of the West through its press in commemorations and 
harangues when the party highlighted the city and mourned its victims on February 13 
and 14. At the same time, the destruction gave the city a low baseline from which to 
rebuild. Local headlines in the SED’s papers from the early 1950s suggested Dresden 
serve as a reminder for all Germans that the “senseless destructive frenzy” of the Anglo-
American terror bombers had destroyed a portion of “the city of art” and created a 
twelve-square-kilometer pile of ash and rubble within the Old City.44 The deaths caused 
by Allied bombing naturally represented Anglo-American inhumanity. Neues 
Deutschland pointed to thirty-two thousand charred and asphyxiated people—and the 
true number of deaths, which had yet to be ascertained, looked to the party like it would 
reach more than 100,000 (the true number is believed to be around 25,000, as mentioned 
earlier). The 90,000 demolished residences and the other 80,000 that bombing had 
damaged represented the “ruthless balance of a day of imperialist murder rage.”45 One 
former Dresdener who had left his native city in 1939 and returned after the war, 
experienced shock at the extent of the destruction. Walking through the rubble fields of 
his hometown, he came to understand why the GDR used the city’s destruction as a 
pretext to campaign against the English, the Americans, and especially Konrad 
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Adenauer’s remilitarization efforts; his former home served as a morality tale spun from 
a recurring theme that linked the West to capitalism, fascism, and destruction. More 
specifically here, the published letter—genuine or not—reinforced the SED’s position: 
“Dresden [was] the manifest unmasking of Anglo-American war criminals.”46 As another 
former Dresdener put it in a letter published in the Sächsische Zeitung: “From Dresden 
outward—from its delightful and unwavering fostering of the arts, streamed wonderful 
currents through the world and to England and America, who’ve been most receptive. 
Have they forgotten that?”47  
 
Soviet Virtues in the Built Environment 
Dresden’s destruction also functioned as something of an allegory for the political 
vision of the state as it rebuilt with a scheme that would produce—if it had not already 
started producing—socio-economic prosperity for its residents. So while imperialist 
murderers had tried to destroy Dresden and all its treasures while furthering their 
“policies of destruction in Korea…and West Germany,” Dresden had, with Soviet 
backing, begun to rise from the ruins and move in a new and better direction.48 By 1951, 
the SED had its fingers all over the city’s blueprints. Were one to pick up a copy of the 
Sächsische Zeitung or Neues Deutschland prior to a trip to Dresden in the early 1950s, 
one might have arrived in the city with a number of expectations, not the least of which 
would include the opportunity to take in a new and improved urban environment. This 
meant the city and its annual celebrations served to represent the greatness and potential 
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greatness of Soviet-style planning. Prior to July 1952, this new Dresden, according to 
technical and political leadership, derived its character from so-called democratic and 
antifascist-democratic principles. The SED referenced the preamble to the September 
1950 law related to the construction of cities in the newly formed German Democratic 
Republic, noting that it would follow the five-year plan, raise living standards, and create 
a habitat to serve as a “visible manifestation for the economic and cultural advancement 
in the German Democratic Republic.”49 Leadership pointed out the Baroque Old City—
the Dresden, really—had been “built” by the princes, meaning “the people” financed and 
built the city, but the princes’ desires shaped it. Now, the people had at last become the 
employers, financers, contractors, and executives.50 Not surprisingly, the Soviet system 
served as a model for this new type of representative habitat.51  
Authorities from Dresden toured Soviet cities including Moscow, Leningrad, 
Stalingrad, and Kiev, and gleaned knowledge regarding building techniques best suited 
for the working class.52 The party boasted that residents again enjoyed theater and that 
the heavily damaged Zwinger Palace had already been partially rebuilt by February of 
1951, as had the Hygiene Museum and the Academy of Fine Arts.53 Grunaer Street 
evidenced the new type of Dresden emerging, serving as the city’s model street. It 
featured mixed housing that brought together workers and intelligentsia now that the 
quaint notion of a specific workers’ quarter had been relegated to history. In August of 
1952, the SED listed the street among a number of exemplary projects in the GDR, a list 
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spearheaded by the monumental Stalin Avenue in Berlin that represented the new 
democratic principles.54 
In July of 1952 at the Second Party Conference, the SED announced the 
accelerated construction of socialism. As far as any real changes for the future of 
Dresden’s physical layout and appearance, the repercussions here were largely limited to 
the public use of the term “socialism” in lieu of “democratic,” “peaceful,” and other 
softer adjectives. Officially, the SED confirmed that the plan for the future of the built 
environment in Dresden and elsewhere would find guidance in the Soviet experience. 
This plan, now “borne from the knowledge that every citizen in our Republic is ready to 
work and fight for the construction of our home, for the unity of our Fatherland, and for 
world peace” also served to represent a newfound unity, purpose, and prosperity in the 
city and region.55 Political rhetoric intensified in this period, and the Sächsische Zeitung 
noted that as part of the larger effort to rebuild the GDR, the working class, bound 
together with farmers and progressive intelligentsia, now found itself resolved to lead a 
“ruthless campaign against all enemies of the peaceful, socialist rebuilding of Dresden.”56 
According to the chief city architect, the “will of the people” now determined Dresden’s 
appearance.57  
By early 1953, the party claimed that a new Dresden radiated outward from the 
market square where the old “oppressor of the people” had once banned 
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demonstrations.58 Here at the market square, the regime had initiated the construction of 
“representative residential buildings” as part of a larger socialist buildup that would tie 
Dresden’s tradition of prosperity together with contemporary working class optimism.59 
The shops that had ringed the old town were to be replaced with those run by the socialist 
trade organization. These were to be bright and large enough to satisfy an advanced 
consumer culture, which, in the early 1950s, even the most ardent optimists must have 
recognized as wishful thinking.60 Dresden, then, now functioned as a representation of 
SED power—its planning, the prosperity it promised, and the solidarity it would inspire. 
But, as we will see, the built environment was only one sphere where the regime 
projected its power.  
 
*   *   * 
 
The thesis of this study, the key points of which will be elucidated below, is as 
follows: In the East German dictatorship, the SED represented publicness to its people 
while private citizens and their foreign accomplices challenged the regime through a rival 
public sphere, where in the summer of 1953, revolution became thinkable.  
 
The Public Sphere in the GDR 
Any discussion of the public sphere begins with Jürgen Habermas’ classic 
thesis.61 At first glance, the distance between East Germany in the 1950s and the early 
modern setting for Habermas’ research might appear an historical chasm in terms of 
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political structures and social and economic relationships, but there are some fundamental 
similarities. Early modern regimes and the SED (along with other dictatorial and 
authoritarian governments) similarly represented their legitimacy and power through an 
official public sphere, or representative publicness. As Habermas and others have shown, 
alongside this representative culture a new type of publicness emerged in the late 
eighteenth century in which participants deliberated the pressing issues of the period on 
equal terms and produced what we would recognize as public opinion.62 More 
importantly, the new public sphere became a politically potent counterweight to state 
power and, in the French case, gave shape to a space where revolution became 
thinkable.63 Still, the instances are quite different and applying this historical concept to 
the GDR requires explanation and alterations. 
The original conception and translation of “public sphere” merits some 
discussion. Various scholars have challenged Habermas for romanticizing the democratic 
openness of these exchanges while critics also routinely note the clunky translation of 
Öffentlichkeit to “public sphere,” charging that this may have unfairly distorted his 
intended or original meaning. As Hartmut Kaeble points out, Habermas really meant for 
the term Öffentlichkeit (more precisely, publicness) to imply a development less 
particular, encompassing not only assembly and public meetings, but what Kaeble refers 
to as an “imagined translocal public sphere.”64 This is a good starting point to apply 
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Habermas’s historical conception to a modern industrialized society. Similar in function 
and effect, we will see that these spaces for the production and exchange of critical ideas 
existed not in salons or designated areas in the GDR but in the communities bound 
through the ether by radio in the form of radio waves and in ephemeral public and private 
exchanges. But moving from the eighteenth century to the twentieth with these ideas 
requires a number of other clarifications.  
One way to consider the historical relationship between the concept of the 
bourgeois public sphere and its greater socio-political arrangement and that of the GDR is 
to identify a several key political analogies between late-eighteenth century absolutism 
and twentieth century dictatorship. Habermas argues that after the ideal-type public 
sphere disintegrated in the late nineteenth century, the process of what he called the 
“refeudalization of society” took place. This meant that the demarcation between public 
and private blurred as private interests took on political tasks and the state shouldered an 
increasing number of societal functions. Political participation waned, the vigor of the 
public sphere diminished, and the ills of mass society proliferated.65 Thus, the Bolshevik 
Revolution completed the course of refeudalization, with some irony of course, by de-
tangling the partially degraded public sphere from politics and once again plainly 
partitioning state and society.66 Self-governing in name only, the one-party rule that 
emerged under the guise of democratic centralism and the promise of a peaceful and 
prosperous future had no space in its design for a truly adversarial public as it already 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Actually Existing Democracy,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, Ed. Craig Calhoun, (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1993), 113-119. 
65 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 231-2. 
66 Ibid., Ch. 5.  
28 
 
represented the public.67 Thus, as in the late Middle Ages, only one public figure existed, 
at least officially: the regime.68 Of course, one only needs to consider the chants of “We 
are the People” in 1989 that brought the SED’s fundamental failures in this regard into 
sharp relief. To be fair, this was not the intention of socialist leaders who were at least 
professedly humanistic and of course did not see the arrangement in a negative light. 
Instead, socialist leadership viewed its official public sphere as a moderated forum (or, in 
more critical terms, a “simulated public sphere”) that could compromise, but only in 
limited ways as the party always scripted its public political debates.69 The result though, 
especially in the GDR, if one “squints,” is an arrangement that resembles that of the early 
modern world in some respects, with a regime that represented publicness to its subjects, 
and private citizens who aired grievances publicly through (oftentimes) illicit channels. In 
other words, following re-feudalization, things came full circle with a regime that 
claimed and dominated publicness and a competing public opinion that functioned as a 
buffer to the government.  
 
Representational Culture, the Official Public Sphere, and Legitimacy  
I borrow heavily, then, from Jürgen Habermas and those who have followed his 
line of thinking in conceiving of what I refer to as the official public sphere, based on the 
idea of “representative publicness.”70 Tim Blanning’s expansion of this concept, which 
he similarly refers to as “representational culture” or, more clearly expressed as “re-
presenting power before the people,” is likewise instructive and is the meaning I use 
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throughout this study.71 Like Habermas, Blanning points to the court and reign of Louis 
XIV as the pinnacle of representational culture. This differed from the Middle Ages when 
representational culture existed in public places—streets and parks—before it shifted to 
the palace in the early modern period.72 In the eighteenth century, Louis’ Versailles and 
European imitations such as, of course, Augustus’ Zwinger in Dresden came to embody 
this new representational culture that projected the confidence, vigor, stability, and 
legitimacy of the state. The court and its prince were the state, or as Bossuet put it, “the 
whole state is in the person of the prince. In him is found the will of the whole people.”73  
A key to this early modern representational culture was distance: the figurative 
and literal space between royal authority and those who passively observed it. This is one 
area where early modern examples of representational culture and the representational 
culture of the SED diverge: as a socialist party, the SED presented itself as close to the 
people—of the people, and continuously strived to create Verbindung (a connection) with 
the masses through its propaganda. Unfortunately for the party, its claims of legitimacy 
rested on the appearance of democratic representation and popular support that never 
truly existed, although that did not stop the SED from creating an official public sphere or 
what several scholars have labeled a Scheinöffentlichkeit: a “phony public sphere” or 
world of appearances that falsely represented its claims to popular legitimacy and 
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functioned as representational culture, reupholstered and outfitted with electronic 
communication apparatuses for the modern era.74  
The representational culture maintained by the SED existed not in the form of 
elaborate court ritual, but in city planning and the built environment (as we have seen), 
distinct forms of visual propaganda (Sichtwerbungen), choreographed demonstrations 
and, most notably, radio broadcasts designed to represent state power and popular support 
for the socialist program under Soviet guidance. As James Sheehan points out, over time, 
the princely court had lost its facility to represent the state in a corporeal and localized 
manner, and in the modern world, political communities came to exist as imagined 
communities. In other words, they stretched beyond visible representations, or, as 
Sheehan smartly puts it, “the state…must be imagined; that is to say, it becomes a 
projection of what we know on to what we don’t, what we can see on to what we can’t.”75  
This study will show that within the official public sphere, the SED looked to 
establish an imagined community of socialist nations designed to bolster its claims to 
legitimacy. Revisiting Peukert’s three categories of analysis finds that the socialist 
regimes of Eastern Europe could not solely rely on tradition, a rational/legal foundation, 
or charisma for their legitimacy. Historians argue that the USSR and Eastern Bloc 
regimes instead based their legitimacy on historical and inevitable achievements along 
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with the symbolism of the “trappings of communist power,” the eternal promise of a 
better tomorrow, and, of course, the unspoken threat of Soviet intervention.76  
One way in which the SED hoped to accomplish such a feat was through radio 
broadcasts, and more specifically, programming that incorporated the citizenry of the 
GDR into an international socialist community under Stalin’s leadership. In this way, the 
imagined community elucidated by Benedict Anderson—and the basis for this 
argument—must be modified. Anderson’s thesis holds that citizens imagine their nations 
as a “deep, horizontal comradeship” existing within boundaries that separate one’s 
national community from others.77 When restricted to the boundaries of the nation state, 
such nationalist imaginings would certainly run counter to the internationalist tenets of 
Marxist ideology, but Anderson’s idea sheds light on the SED’s attempts to represent its 
legitimacy through radio and print. In doing so, the SED represented (though often 
grossly exaggerated) popular support from below for its policies. The citizens of the 
Eastern Bloc states, bound formally by a professed commitment to a socialist future and a 
steadfast solidarity in defense of it, became the greater imagined community to which 
East Germany now belonged. This new internationalism fit well with core socialist 
political impulses in that it cut across national boundaries, and it served East German 
leaders’ goals particularly well as it helped Germans move away from the brands of 
nationalism cultivated by the German Right since the late nineteenth century. Put 
differently, through radio and print, the SED projected the appearance of popular support 
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through an internationalist approach that meshed with the anti-fascist profile of the Party. 
 Historians can also point to another historical parallel; the attempts of early 
modern states and the GDR to project power and legitimacy also derived from the 
regimes’ need to conceal underlying uncertainties—or as Blanning points out, “the 
greater the doubts, the greater the need for display.”78 And in the GDR there existed good 
reason for doubt—despite the unwavering confidence that characterized the SED’s 
representations. As Mary Fulbrook notes, the words “not yet” (noch nicht) pepper the 
SED’s internal record, evidence of the party’s belief in a persistent and pervasive false 
consciousness infecting the masses that prevented the realization of its socialist vision.79 
And so it was with many of the SED’s claims regarding the physical reconstruction of 
Dresden, the distribution of consumer goods, economic planning, and societal unity. The 
party’s optimistic media productions meant for public consumption could conceal these 
sometimes obvious deficiencies, but the doubts surface with regularity throughout the 
regime’s internal record. Thus, despite some appearances of a cohesive society and a 
popular government, cracks in this façade occasionally emerged in public spaces if one 
looked hard enough.  
For instance, were a visitor to have walked down Grunaer Street—trumpeted as 
Dresden’s first socialist street—in the spring of 1952, they would have seen anti-RIAS 
(Radio in The American Sector) signs hanging from the new housing blocks that 
inadvertently belied any claims to a media monopoly. “Trust your own strength – not the 
war monger – don’t listen to RIAS!” read one of the signs while another urged residents 
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to “Shut the door to RIAS lies.”80 When considered along the lines of the old historical 
axiom that the enforcement of a law often verifies the existence of the outlawed activity, 
one could correctly conclude that RIAS enjoyed some measure of popularity in the GDR. 
As this study will show, such an assumption would have been a safe one. The notorious 
western station, a thorn in the GDR’s side until 1989, represented a powerful and 
relentlessly disruptive force that protested the existence of GDR and advocated for 
German unity. 
 
Protest and Resistance in the GDR 
Germans protested Sovietization and all subsequent governments, institutions, and 
apparatuses to varying degrees from the earliest period of the Soviet occupation until 
1989.81 The nature and success of resistance remains a point of contention among 
historians, as does what we might even consider a “true” act of resistance. In the post-
Wende period, during which the release of documents that have verified various types of 
discontent, questions of what constituted opposition and dissent have stirred academic 
debate. Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk has proposed a categorization of oppositional behavior 
that divides resistance (he uses the terms opposition and resistance interchangeably) into 
subcategories: passive refusal, social protest (partial strikes—which were always 
political, petitions), political dissent, and ultimately, mass protest which, of course, 
defined the summer of 1953 and fall of 1989.82 Corey Ross has endorsed historian 
Hubertus Knabe’s similar, but more comprehensively weighted, ten-point system that 
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also concludes with open revolt.83 Knabe’s scale recognizes risk level for the participant, 
degree of criticism, and public versus private action.84 Ross points out that such a system 
acknowledges the variability of protest and the way in which actions could escalate, 
proving that resistance was often a process, rather than an event. Gareth Dale 
distinguishes between resistance, which he sees as endemic in the GDR and often 
successful, and opposition, which sought political change—actions we really might only 
apply to several cases, notably 1953 and the 1980s. Thus, Dale found himself in 
disagreement with Ross, who argued that even in the final decade of the GDR’s 
existence, activists really only opposed the regime, rather than communism itself, thus 
leading him to label this opposition as “limited.”85 In Revolutions and Resistance in 
Eastern Europe historians Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe acknowledge the 
competing definitions in the wide-ranging literature on the subject and choose to adhere 
to historian Lynne Viola’s definition of resistance, which states that, “At its core, 
resistance involves opposition” and is wide ranging in its execution. Thus, issues of 
terminology remain unsettled in the literature. Still, the regime experienced two episodes 
of resistance that posed existential threats, in the summer of 1953 and the fall of 1989. 
The origins and character of the first incident concern much of this study.86 
 
June 17 and Terminology 
An encyclopedia-like synopsis of the June 17 demonstrations might read as 
follows: In the summer of 1952, the SED initiated an accelerated buildup of socialism 
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along Stalinist lines. Economic planning emphasized heavy industry at the expense of 
consumer goods. “Bourgeois” institutions and those organizations deemed to be enemies 
of socialism by the Party (such as the Church) came under increased pressure to better 
align themselves with the regime’s atheistic model. The regime raised workers’ quotas to 
increase production in the factories and living standards and attitudes deteriorated; the 
regime had gone too far, too fast. Stalin passed in 1953 and his successors, recognizing 
the dire situation in the GDR, called on East German leadership to temper their efforts. 
On June 11, the SED announced the New Course, a planning package that scaled back 
much of the accelerated drive. Curiously, the heightened quotas for workers remained in 
place, rousing resentment among certain sectors of the workforce. In Berlin, construction 
workers began to organize strikes related to the norms in the capital and took to the 
streets on June 16. RIAS broadcasted the news that evening and the following morning, 
demonstrators took to the streets in over five hundred cities throughout the GDR, airing 
demands that had moved on from calls for reform to calls for revolution and 
reunification. That evening, the GDR’s police forces suppressed the demonstrations with 
help from the Soviets. While scholars generally agree with this much, points of 
contention remain, starting with just what we should call this event. 
To be sure, a significant issue regarding the characterization of June 17 is the 
search for a term (or words) that most accurately convey the events that transpired. A 
number of terms have proved divisive or problematic. The SED typically used the terms 
like “anxiety,” “unrest,” “riots,” “enemy action,” “demonstrations,” and “(fascist) 
provocation” as shorthand for the collective actions of those who protested before settling 
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on the ominous-sounding “X Day”87 The regime also used the word “unrest” to describe 
a range of behavior, from discussions hostile toward the state, to moderate confrontations 
with authorities in public spaces, while terming more boisterous public disturbances 
“riots.” Interestingly, terms “revolution” and “uprising,” appear more often when the 
regime is quoting demonstrators or opposing interpretations. The term 
“counterrevolution” appears in the SED’s analysis while some western observers and 
scholars adopted the term “failed revolution.” But the idea of “revolution” proves 
problematic using certain criteria. Historians’ hesitation to use the word probably begins 
with what Charles Maier noted as historians’ general conception of the events as 
“ephemeral and local.”88 Such thinking likely encouraged scholars to shy away from a 
word that suggests a more substantial event. The term “revolution” raises other questions. 
For example, Theda Skocpol and Meyer Kestnbaum argue that the term, since its modern 
designation that developed out of the French Revolution (which has remained static 
since), requires, “sudden, fundamental, and innovative departure in a nation’s social and 
political life.”89 Based on demonstrators’ calls for the removal of the SED and 
reunification, June 17 certainly presented the struggle for major political change, though 
perhaps that the event occurred so soon after Sovietization reminded observers that the 
existing system was not as entrenched as the Old Regime or the SED of 1989. Still, the 
temptation to use the term “failed revolution” might also derive from a pervasive (at least 
among most non-Party members) notion that revolution would have been good: the 
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euphoria of 1989 might have come thirty-six years earlier. As Jack Goldstone notes, the 
theory of revolutions has traditionally characterized them as vehicles for progress where, 
for example, revolutionaries have cast themselves (or been cast) as the proponents of a 
new and better order. The counterrevolutionaries, on the other hand, have been tagged as 
guardians of an undesirable and obsolete arrangement.90 Or, as Eugene Weber quipped in 
a 1974 article, “one never hears of a counterrevolution in automobile design.”91  
 Other terms have become more established in the literature. Among the 
demonstrations’ sympathetic observers and public figures, the most common term used is 
“uprising” (Aufstand), though some historians prefer mass/popular uprising 
(Volkserhebung). The initially popular “workers’ uprising” fell out of favor as research 
uncovered the demonstrations’ broader participation. At least one historian has adopted 
“Uprising with revolutionary traits,” which, while an unwieldy phrase, is accurate in 
some ways.92 Guido Knopp argues June 17 constituted an uprising, a peoples’ uprising, 
and a failed revolution that began as a workers’ revolt.93 At this juncture, I propose that 
“mass demonstrations” fits best as a general phrase to describe what happened in the 
GDR on June 17, as those who took to the streets demonstrated a newfound political 
power.  
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Interpretations of June 17, 1953 
The SED leadership wasted no time in publically blaming the “putsch attempt” on 
reactionary agents, Western actors, saboteurs, and most of all, fascists. The events—
strikes, protest marches, and a slew of demands that called for fundamental change in the 
GDR—were, in the official SED historiography, machinations, and fascist provocations 
that radiated from West Berlin. The SED argued that “Western agents” and fascists 
orchestrated the entire uprising and that it had been planned for some time (just how long 
is never stated). The official story that emerged in the days following the events within 
the SED held West Berlin “string pullers” (die Drahtzieher) responsible for the planning 
and initiating the unrest.94 As Englemann and Kowalczuk point out, the possibility that a 
spontaneous escalation and politicization could grow out of a workers’ protest concerned 
with the issue of the heightened norms simply had no place in the imaginations of the 
regime’s leading functionaries.95 The working, the regime argued, could not protest 
against a government of the working class and the day would be officially 
commemorated in the GDR as “X-Day.”96 
Historians agree that the June 17 events constituted a significant moment of 
conflict in the brief history of the GDR. The literature surrounding the event has followed 
two significant trends. The first involved overturning the SED version’s of the event. Pre-
Wende studies produced in the West such as Arnulf Baring’s Uprising in East Germany 
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from 1957 established an outline of the event, but did not have access to materials that 
could confirm the number of participants.97  
After reunification, historians gained access to previously unavailable archival 
materials and began reconstructing just what happened in June of 1953 in the GDR. A 
wave of publications in the 1990s was followed by a flurry of literature for both popular 
and scholarly consumption for the fiftieth anniversary in 2003. The result of all this work 
is a basic consensus of what led to the uprising, how it transpired, how the authorities 
extinguished the revolt, and its political, economic, and social consequences. Naturally, 
disagreements and areas where further work is needed remain. 
Historians have generally been in agreement concerning the long-term causes of 
the uprising. Heidi Roth and Karl Fricke have convincingly demonstrated in a superbly-
documented case study of Saxony that the development of the East German state, which 
began with the postwar Sovietization process, contained in it the seeds of the June unrest. 
These included the Stalinization of the economy and a shift towards heavy 
industrialization, expropriation of private industries, and a lack of political legitimacy.98 
In his case study of Saalfeld, Andrew Port argues that the postwar housing situation, 
intensified by the presence of SAG (Sowietische Aktiengesellschaft) Wismut, refugees, 
and the evictions and requisitions prompted by the needs of the Maxhütte mill workers, 
led to endemic shortages and anger stemming from perceived (and real) privilege. 99 Ilko-
Sascha Kowalczuk suggests, along with Heidi Roth, that the difficult housing situation in 
Görlitz contributed to the long term frustrations, and also higher concentrations of people 
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that contributed to heightened levels of anger in that city.100 In Waffen gegen das Volk: 
Der 17. Juni 1953 in der DDR, Torsten Deitrich utilizes police records to demonstrate 
that the military build-up (Aufrüstung), including the barracked police units (Die 
Kasernierte Volkspolizei) grew out of the SED’s anti-fascist mentality and deep-rooted 
fear of Western imperialist ambitions that stemmed from Moscow. Diedrich also notes 
that the establishment of the European Defense Community in 1952 hastened the buildup, 
all of which funneled money away from civilian needs, lowering living standards for the 
population which he identifies at central to the events of June 17.101   
Historians have unanimously identified the SED’s decision at the Second Party 
Conference (July 1952) to lurch forward with the “planned construction of socialism” as 
a critical event leading to the uprising. The above-noted military buildup constituted what 
Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuck deemed the highest phase of Stalinism in the GDR, 
accompanied by the construction of social building blocks along the lines of the 
Führerprinzip. The establishment of these building blocks, argues Kowalczuk, led to 
attacks on the Church, increased persecution and arrests of “subversive elements,” and 
tightened border security, which instilled fear among intellectual classes of isolation from 
international peer groups.102  
Historians are in general agreement that the immediate political causes of the 
uprising can be traced to three related events: the SED’s decision to raise production 
norms in early 1953, the implementation of the New Course, which relaxed or canceled 
much of the rushed socialist build-up from the summer of 1952 following orders from 
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Stalin’s concerned successors in Moscow, and the admission of error(s) by the SED 
coupled with the decision to retain the heightened workers norms. Kowalczuk points out 
that this acknowledgement of error had profound and unintended consequences that 
affected SED leadership in a variety of ways. He argues that functionaries who had been 
responsible for carrying out the SED’s orders lost their credibility with the population 
and found themselves in a state of uncertainty. Some, he points out, continued on as 
mindless followers of the SED while others expressed hope for the reestablishment of the 
SPD. Roth and Kowalczuk note the role of rumors (particularly those that alleged 
Ulbricht’s flight and the withdrawal of Soviet troops) in fostering excitement and hope 
among residents and energizing workers. This development, according to Kowalczuk, 
coincided with the permanent angst among the general population, creating a dangerous 
situation for a regime revealing weakness. This study will expand on this subject.  
Historians have rightly observed Berlin as the epicenter of the revolt, while later 
publications, including several comprehensive regional studies have demonstrated that 
unrest had a far greater reach.103 To be sure, all studies point to the construction workers’ 
barracks in the Stalinallee where personnel planned the demonstrations that set off the 
uprising, which then swelled as the demonstrators marched through the city. Dietrich, 
Roth, and Kowalczuk take note of the role of communications—a defense of the decision 
to retain the norms in die Tribune, and the spread of the strikers’ activities on RIAS—in 
fostering the spread of discontent, although the extent of the role played by the latter 
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remains a point of contention. Dietrich also has shown that what began as peaceful 
protests often turned violent when demonstrators became aggressive, although he notes 
that violence was initially directed mainly towards symbolic government buildings and 
prisons that housed political “criminals.” Likewise, Roth has articulated the notion that 
events generally began in a peaceful manner throughout Germany on the morning of the 
seventeenth, as striking workers, who were often led by experienced strike leaders, 
organized marches. However, events often became unpredictable when protestors took to 
the streets and riled-up students and young people joined them. Dietrich argues the 
outbreak of violence can in many cases be traced to the manner in which police and 
military forces were deployed, either in insufficient numbers or by late arrival at sites of 
disorder due to underdeveloped communications apparatuses and protocols. The result 
was that forces agitated the crowds, yet were unable to suppress the agitation. This would 
seem to support Kowalczuk and Roth’s assertion that the regime’s ability to deploy and 
station sufficient numbers troops to Dresden beforehand helped prevent the level of 
violence seen in some other locales.104  
Torsten Dietrich has characterized the uprising as primarily a workers’ revolt, yet 
he concedes that it eventually inspired large cross sections of the population to take 
action. This follows a larger trend wherein historians have expanded the dimensions of 
the uprising to illustrate a spirit that extended beyond the factory floor and reflected 
deeper social and political frustrations. Notably, Gary Bruce has attempted to shift 
emphasis away from the workers and economic concerns and instead suggests that the 
primarily political motives of official dissenters—the Blockparties—and non-
communists inspired the events of 17. June. By examining party archives of the SED, 
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LDPD, and eastern CDU, he demonstrates that the SED’s destruction of any true 
opposition parties and an independent judiciary fostered political antagonism across large 
sections of the citizenry. Thus, Bruce is able to show that the numerous political demands 
made throughout the GDR that called for removal of the SED regime in the latter half of 
June stemmed primarily from political discontent, rather than economic aggravation. In 
the end, he sees the revolt as an anti-communist movement—an assertion to which most 
scholars would not be hostile.  
Roth’s detailed study of the June events in Saxony has emphasized several 
important aspects of the uprising. A central contention advanced (successfully) by Roth is 
that the uprising could take on quite different characters based on local conditions, 
contingencies, and personalities. For example in Leipzig, the police’s decision to raid the 
Free German Youth’s headquarters energized its occupants and sent youths into the 
streets, radicalizing the events in that city. She has also argued that local leadership in 
some places, such as Karl Marx-Stadt, responded to the morning’s strike activity more 
delicately than the leadership of other cities, thus effectively tamping down worker 
discontent and rebellious energies. While Roth’s meticulous reconstruction of the events 
in Dresden is an admirable and useful one, she leaves considerable room for further 
discussion regarding the role of rumor, radio, and the contentious issue of nationalism on 
June 17.105 This study, which approaches the June 17 events with a theoretical framework 
in place and focuses on the local preconditions (Roth begins her survey on June 17), thus 
seeks to build on Roth and others’ empirical research.  
 This study will argue that the 1953 demonstrations represented the first modern, 
electronically transmitted mass demonstration, a critical historical development that 
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allowed events to move at an unprecedented pace. For instance, while historians nearly 
universally reference the way in which the 1848-49 revolutions “spread like wildfire,” the 
events still unfolded rather slowly by twenty-first century standards.106 The banquets that 
led to street demonstrations in Paris on February 22 spread eastward, triggering 
demonstrations in Munich on March 4.107 The news, which took days to travel between 
cities, meant that “wildfire” did not appear in Vienna until March 13, nearby Budapest 
two days later, Venice two days after that, and Milan and Berlin still one day later.108 The 
diffusion of revolt in 1918 in Germany took similar amounts of time to travel between 
cities. Strike waves began that summer in the north leading to the sailors’ revolt in Kiel 
on November 2 and unrest in the form of mass demonstrations spread to other major 
German cities on November 7.109  
The widespread adoption of personal radios prior to the June 17 demonstrations 
showcased how this time lag no longer existed in industrialized areas. While large-scale 
demonstrations in Berlin took place prior to the nation-wide uprising, the June 17 
demonstrations unfolded simultaneously throughout the nation. Participant and activist 
(in Berlin) Rainer Hildebrandt rightfully noted in a 1954 article that until this point, 
experts insisted that an uprising in an entrenched, totalitarian system had hitherto proved 
impossible. That all seemed to change, he argued, suggesting that we had entered a new 
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era—one in which a “leaderless” uprising had become possible.110 Furthermore, he 
suggested that, in this new era, when forty demonstrators took the streets, mere hours 
later, ten thousand would be present. Now, if everyone demonstrated simultaneously, he 
contended, power in numbers would lead to [political] power.111 Hildebrandt’s last two 
points receive further consideration in the present study. On one hand, the June 17 
demonstrations proved a nation-wide demonstration could unfold with unprecedented 
rapidity—a phenomenon that has, in recent years, reached new levels with “flash mobs” 
and “critical mass” events, whereby groups of people coordinate a sudden, unexpected, 
and dominating occupation (typically) of a public space. His second point, that 
simultaneity and the power in numbers bred confidence and power can also be expanded 
to include the role of radio.  
 
The Question of Spontaneity  
The supposed spontaneity of the demonstrations that broke out on June 17 has 
been categorized as spontaneous throughout much, if not nearly all the current 
historiography and this characterization deserves more attention. But, this is also a point 
where modern historiographical consensus and the former official East German 
interpretation diverge. Since 1953, observers and historians have noted the inherent 
spontaneity of the demonstrations. Dealing with this word can be a bit tricky, as one is 
required to deduce one meaning of the word out of several based on the context in which 
it originally appears. For instance, when describing an uprising or demonstration as 
spontaneous, the term generally means “unplanned” or “without preparations.” 
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Considering that the word translates directly between English and German, we might also 
add “unprompted,” or “without premeditation or outside impetus.” As early as June 17, 
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency along with the State Department reportedly 
accepted information that the riots in East Berlin represented “the spontaneous result of a 
planned demonstration” the previous day.112 Contemporary interpretations have 
continued to note the spontaneity of the demonstrations. Gerhard Ritter points out that the 
“organization of the spontaneous Revolt” began in the factories with elected strike 
committees.113 Engelmann and Kowalczuk argue that despite RIAS’s contributions to the 
uprising, political demands “developed in many places spontaneously.”114 Along these 
lines, Fricke contends that “the strikes, demonstrations, and unrest on June 17 broke out 
spontaneously,” but for all their spontaneity and regional differences, a general pattern 
emerges in which workers’ demands regarding the norms turned into political 
demands.115 The “spontaneity” of the demonstrations, according to Fricke, also meant 
that organized preparations and central leadership failed to materialize.116 Roth notes the 
“spontaneous” origins of the work stoppages and demonstrations in Saxony, although she 
also points out that workers had become aware of the events in Berlin on the way to 
work—a key issue.117 Despite this, she offers RIAS a smaller role than some 
interpretations. Participants and witnesses, too, occasionally characterize the events as 
spontaneous, though occasionally disagreement appears, for example, one student who 
later recalled of the demonstration in Dresden: “Whether it was an organized 
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demonstration, I can no longer say. But I think so.”118 Of course, others disagree and one 
always finds it challenging to refute what a participant remembers happening—especially 
when it supports, in some ways, the SED interpretation and it serves as a helpful 
reminder that participants’ experiences, of course, varied. Still, an investigation of the 
demonstrations’ “spontaneity” proves revealing and one could argue that historians have 
been overzealous in dismissing the SED’s major interpretations as fabrications. 
 Another related task upon which historians have yet to reach agreement concerns 
the June 17 events’ historical categorization. Jonathan Sperber has rightfully noted that 
the events of June 1953 remain difficult for historians to categorize and contextualize, 
partially because of the events’ diminished standing in popular memory.119 One might 
also note that the problems faced by citizens in the Dresden region and elsewhere in the 
GDR were not unique or memorable ones: low wages, a government that, according to its 
critics, bungled and misdirected state resources, and the existence of oppressive state 
apparatuses. Citizens saw a regime that kowtowed to a foreign power that undermined 
(what they perceived as) a more authentic nationalism and had made the worst of what 
still seemed to be a temporary arrangement.120 But the methods with which they 
communicated their frustrations in many ways reveal just as much about the period and 
place as the actual demands.  
 The SED’s contention that the demonstrations had been planned far in advance is 
not far-fetched when considered more closely and from a different perspective. In a 
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recent edited volume, Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein have spearheaded an 
investigation into the notion of what they have termed the “revolutionary script.” They 
argue that self-conscious revolutionary actors work from an historically informed 
revolutionary script that serves as a model for action. The actors might deviate here and 
there and improvisation is frequent, but the script provides an outline and a general 
narrative. The authors locate the invention of the first modern revolutionary script in 
France between 1789 and the Congress of Vienna. Following this period of upheaval, to 
proclaim a situation revolutionary or oneself a revolutionary meant carrying out a 
performance that followed the established script. The authors further note that after a 
crisis, whether financial, political, or military, a “critical mass of actors opts for a 
revolutionary diagnosis” and the actions that follow tend to follow a similar pattern.121 
Silvana Toska points out that the periods prior to revolution often witness the formation 
of a “revolutionary culture” whereby certain groups try to exploit unhappiness and 
establish a revolutionary consciousness. The first act in the script calls for reform before 
actors move to calls for revolution. The present study will examine the spaces where the 
revolutionary mentalities and scripts of the June 17 demonstrations originated.122  
 
The Rival Public Sphere  
In Dresden, revolutionary mentalities developed in what I call the rival public 
sphere. The rival public sphere, consisting of unsanctioned communications including 
foreign broadcasting, rumors, and pamphleteering, and other uncontrollable strata, served 
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as a counterweight to SED hegemony and emitted authentic public opinion that 
challenged the credibility of the government.  
Scholars have put forth several arguments regarding the existence of a public 
sphere or spheres in the GDR and in its fellow Soviet satellite states. Some also argue 
that no genuine public sphere existed or could have existed in a closed system, but that 
citizens could retreat in private “niches,” though this concept is probably more applicable 
to later the decades in the GDR.123 Some scholars have pointed out that the public sphere 
had the potential to challenge the regime in the latter half of the GDR’s existence. For 
instance, Peter Hohendahl has argued that a public sphere did indeed exist in what was a 
closed society, and that a “revolutionary public sphere” developed in the turbulent period 
leading up to the peaceful revolutions of 1989.124 Rühle comes to a similar conclusion 
with his study, wherein he attempts to answer the question of how a political publicness 
developed alongside the official or simulated public sphere. His research leads him to 
conclude that no bourgeois public sphere existed in the GDR because the pre-
conditions—a private economy and the search for money and power—did not exist in the 
GDR (though this does require one to disregard black or shadow markets).125 Instead, 
Rühle suggests the existence of a “second public sphere,” independent from the state in 
the 1980s alongside the official one.126 Originating in the Protestant Church before 
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establishing networks and becoming a national network, this space found impetus in 
changing societal values (Wertewandel) and a generational break that led to heightened 
conflict in the 1980s.127 The search for venues outside the home, then, wherein authentic 
and anonymous debate could take place led to the formation of “communicative 
societies” in the Church. Rühle contends that these private exchanges in what he labels 
the “church public sphere” also functioned as identity-forming exercises and fashioned a 
connection between this public (second) public sphere and the lived-in-world and a buffer 
between the second public sphere and the official or simulated public sphere.128 The 
second public sphere transformed into a counter public sphere and became intra-regional 
through calls for solidarity, signed lists, and declarations of protest.129 Despite the 
prominent role of the church and the peripheral role assigned to Western media (more on 
this shortly), Rühle’s model serves as a starting point for a framework of the public 
sphere in the early 1950s.  
Similar to the notion of broader, translocal public spheres proposed by Hartmut 
Kaeble, Gabor T. Rittersporn, Jan Behrends, and Malte Rolf suggest that in order to 
locate a public sphere in Soviet-type societies we must first dispense with government-
generated categories of analysis (such as “peasant” or “intellectual”) and broaden our 
search for spaces where social relations formed. In other words, “secret spaces” where 
individuals could meet privately yielded insufficient results to offer a useful space of 
inquiry and they called on historians to consider any framework provided by the state. 
That is to say, any place where the state allowed people to come together such as city 
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squares or shops functioned as a public sphere.130 In other words, we can simply locate a 
public sphere in the same places where the party expected to educate its citizens. This 
stems partially from necessity, as the pervasiveness of the party meant that arenas free 
from state intervention were exceedingly rare while social standings and political 
leanings prevented the exchanges that distinguish a free society.131  
Monica Rüthers suggests a useful model based on a general dichotomy of 
communications, with legal or “formal communications model” on one hand (or a 
representative type) and the “informal communications model” on the other.132 This 
informal sector then supplemented the formal sector in a fashion similar to the way a 
shadow economy augmented the planned economy. Rüthers points out that informal 
networks formed and people spread information by word of mouth among friends, in the 
workplace and at school—places that became sources of information and as Rüthers puts 
it, came to resemble the bourgeois salons, coffeehouses, and reading societies of the 
nineteenth century.133 Other forms of informal communications included vandalism, 
violence, refusal of participation, laziness, sabotage, graffiti, song, and jokes, samizdat, 
and the consumption of foreign literature. Also pertinent to this study, Rüthers notes that 
the Stalinist regime withheld or falsified information as a method of control during the 
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revolution from above. Secrecy, too, then, though practiced covertly so as not to betray 
the party’s stance as the embodiment of the people (a contrast with absolutist regimes that 
also employed this technique), was part of the regime’s communications repertoire.134 
Such paradoxes were, according to Rüthers, characteristic of the “neo-feudal Stalinist 
system of rule.”135 Secrecy did lead, however, to rumors and to an “unrefined” public 
sphere and public opinion—a development that will get empirical treatment in this 
study.136 While Rüthers imposes these categories of analysis on Soviet Moscow, the 
general arrangement can be profitably applied to the GDR, especially in the case of 
rumors, which formed one component of the rival public sphere.137 
 
Rumors 
 “Rumors are to everyday life in the GDR as bread is to the consumption of food,” 
wrote regime opponent and historian Bernd Eisenfeld.138 Though there is little consensus 
regarding how we might define, categorize, and analyze rumors, scholars have certainly 
recognized that they are a troublesome and powerful phenomena. Jean-Noël Kapferer 
reasons that rumors represent the first type of mass media and despite sharing space with 
print, radio, and electronic media, have lost none of their influence. While agreeing with 
other scholars who regard rumors as bits of information or news relating to contemporary 
affairs, he also notes that rumors exist to convince, rather than stir contemplation or 
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deliberation. And Kapferer also notes that for too long, researchers have emphasized false 
rumors, pointing to numerous cases of true rumors such as the health issues of Reagan, 
Brezhnev, Andropov, and Pompidou. Furthermore, he notes that rumors demand 
categorization that separates them from the authentic diffusion of news.139 Sociologist 
Tamotsu Shibutani categorizes rumors as “improvised” news borne from collective 
conversation. He and others have pointed out that earlier thinkers painted rumors as the 
pathological manifestations of “rumor mongers” rather than something endemic to all 
societies—especially in times of unrest or social strain.140 Along these lines, Timothy 
Tackett views rumors as “statements communicated in times of uncertainty, ambiguity, 
and perceived dangers that help people explain the situation they are confronting and 
develop responses.” 141  
Cass Sunstein argues that people accept false rumors as true based on our hopes 
and fears—emotions that certainly run high in times of great uncertainty. He sees rumors 
spreading in the form of a “cascade,” as we tend to rely on others for information and 
quite often these are individuals who think like we do. The most significant impediment 
to such occurrences is the availability of impartial information, which was not easy to 
access in Stalinist states.142 Such a conception of rumors offers us insight into the volatile 
situation in Dresden in the days before the June 17 Uprising. As this study will show, this 
last theory of the rumor is certainly reminiscent of one put forth by the SED in its 
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analyses of improvised news. Above all, such improvised news helps explain or make 
sense of a situation based on the available information. Tabitha Leigh Ewing has argued 
for the historicity of rumors and their presence in the historical record. While refuting the 
conception of rumors as pathological, she adopts Clifford Geertz’s contention that 
rumors, with all their inventiveness should be construed as “imaginative works built out 
of social materials” and sees them and their production and transmission as a form of 
political participation.143 Drawing from these studies, this study will show that rumors, as 
part of the rival public sphere, constituted improvised news with varying degrees of 
veracity and allowed for a distinct form of political participation in a dictatorship.  
While rumors have received only passing attention from scholars of East German 
protest, other more visible acts and institutions have found ample space in the 
literature.144 GDR-specific forms of protest to add to Ruther’s categories above included 
leaving and visiting the West, though whether this constituted an act of protest has stirred 
some historiographical contention. We can also add notable outside groups that actively 
countered the SED ( at least in the early 1950s) such as the Investigative Committee of 
Liberal Jurists (Untersuchungsausschuss freiheitlicher Juristen), the Taskforce against 
Inhumanity (Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit), the SPD-Eastern Office (SPD- 
OSTBURO), and finally, the notorious RIAS.145  
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Franziska Kuschel’s recent study is a superb examination of RIAS and other 
western outlets as key players in the GDR’s media landscape.146 Like Rühle, she notes 
that Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere and the open, rational, and critical debate it 
engendered is not applicable to the GDR with its governmental restrictions. Instead, she 
introduces the framework of a “rival public sphere.” Building on the work of sociologists 
Jürgen Gerhards and Friedhelm Neidhardt and communications scholar Michael Meyen, 
she further breaks down the categories of publicness as follows: 1) arenas of mass media, 
2) organized groups, 3) smaller, unorganized encounters, and 4.) internal—for instance 
letters and petitions composed by an individual. RIAS, she argues, which constituted one 
of the two major mass mediums in the GDR, influenced the exchanges that took place 
within the other three categories. For example, through communal listening (and later, 
watching), friends, colleagues, and students discussed, during chance encounters, the 
information they heard listening to RIAS.147  
The present study builds on these ideas with an empirical assessment of their 
manifestations in the Dresden region. The rival sphere here constituted local and national 
arenas for the exchange of information outside of the official public sphere and allowed 
for the production of what we can recognize as authentic public opinion. Composed of 
the exchange of illicit ideas and critiques that took the form of rumors, illegal leaflets, 
and other types of informal communications. The records evaluated here bring to light the 
SED’s very real fear that residents undermined the regime when authorities were not 
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present (and sometimes when they were). Ultimately, the criticism, exchanges, and, ideas 
that circulated within these uncontrollable strata allowed the regime to become 
challengeable in the summer of 1953. Thus, we will see that in June of 1953, the rival 
public sphere provided the space where revolution became thinkable and cultivated the 
script for its enactment.  
The study is divided into five chapters. Chapter one examines the official public 
sphere and the methods used by the SED to represent publicness and power in the 
Dresden Region. Drawing on the concepts of representational power hitherto outlined, I 
insist that the SED’s goals bore semblance to those used by early modern rulers, and that 
the ensuing representative publicness should be also understood as a modern and 
distinctly Cold War solution to the age-old challenge of establishing and maintaining 
legitimacy. The chapter will examine the re-founding of domestic radio stations in 
Dresden, the popularity they enjoyed in the region, and the programming they aired. 
Analysis of this programming will show that the SED aimed to construct an imagined 
community of listeners and supporters in national and international realms, thus 
bolstering their claims of popular approval. This chapter also offers an analysis of the 
visual methods used by the SED to project power into public space and concludes with an 
exploration of Stalin’s death and the opportunities it presented the regime to represent its 
authority through choreographed display, ritual, and the publicization of such activities.  
Chapter two examines the rival public sphere in the Dresden region. As a source 
of authentic public opinion, the rival public sphere challenged the vision and planning of 
the SED and thus its authority and legitimacy. Rumors, and to a lesser extent, leaflets, 
also served to undermine the government and adopted an increasingly rebellious tone 
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following Stalin’s death.  The chapter will also examine RIAS’s programming, which 
delivered news that a large portion of the population in the GDR deemed to be more 
credible than that delivered by the GDR and stimulated conversations and action that 
undermined its government. Furthermore, it will show that through this programming, 
RIAS built an imagined community of all Germans that was integrated into the West. The 
survey concludes with an analysis of how RIAS and rumor conceived of Stalin’s death 
and the GDR’s future in March, 1953.  
Chapter three surveys the volatile period between the announcements of the New 
Course and the eve of the June 17 demonstrations. Research here shows that RIAS and 
especially rumors challenged the regime’s ability to maintain an appearance of authority 
and misinformation—often construed as disinformation by the SED—whittled away at 
the prestige of the GDR’s leaders and brought about a crisis of legitimacy for the 
government. Furthermore, analysis will show that the narratives of real events took on 
new life in the imaginations of residents and the chapter will demonstrate that this 
allowed revolution to become thinkable: the rival public sphere became a revolutionary 
public sphere.  
Chapter four examines how East Germans communicated knowledge of events on 
June 16 and 17. Research here investigates the function of rumors and radio in shaping 
collective action as well as RIAS’s role in endowing the demonstrations with all-German 
imaginings, which contributes to the debate surrounding the role of nationalism. Chapter 
five surveys the aftermath of the demonstrations and considers how the regime projected 
authority in the official public sphere and its opposition challenged such efforts in the 
rival public sphere. 
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Chapter One 
 
Representational Culture in the Dresden Region, 1945-1953 
 
 
 
“Dresden and Leipzig radio stations appeared as the primary representatives of Middle-
Germany Radio, and therefore, representatives of Saxony’s political, intellectual, and 
cultural life, once again, through a tribune of the airwaves.” 
 
-Senior Councilor, Department of Popular Education – Radio, GDR1 
 
 
“Who represents Dresden in the airwaves, who carries the name of our city throughout 
the entire world? It’s our regional station, Radio Dresden!” 
 
- Sächsische Zeitung2 
 
 
“It must appear democratic, but everything must be in our hands.” 
-Walter Ulbricht3 
 
 
“Radio—a decisive organ of state power.” 
 
- Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands4 
 
 
 
“A bleak stone desert.”5 So Dresden appeared to one West German journalist in 
1951 who regretted that a city noted for its beauty and cultural history had suffered such 
                                                 
1 Obberregierungsrat (Doberenz), Abt. Allg.Volkserziehung – Rundfunk – an den Betriebsratsvorsitzenden 
beim Landessender Dresden, 7 Dezember, 1947 (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 4521, 0117): “Die Sender Dresden 
und Leipzig traten als erste Represäntanten des Mitteldeutschen Rundfunks und somit als Repräsentanten 
des politischen,- des geistigen und des kulturellen Lebens Sachsens wieder auf die Tribüne des Funks im 
Äther.” 
2 “Unser Landessender – eine Visitenkarte Dresdens” Sächsische Zeitung March 22, 1957 (SächsHStA 
11376 Nr. 4512/0024): “Wer vertritt Dresden im Äther, wer trägt den Namen unserer Stadt in aller Welt 
Hinaus? Es ist unser Landessender Dresden!” 
3 Karl-Wilhelm Fricke, Der Wahrheit verpflichtet: Texte aus fünf Jahrzehnten zur Geschichte der DDR 
(Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2000), 366: “Es muß demokratisch aussehen, aber wir müssen alles in der Hand 
haben.” 
4 “Vorlage Betr.: Verbesserung der Rundfunkarbeit - Beschlussvorschlag,” Sekretariat des ZK Agitation, 
Der/Wi, 23.11.51 (SAPMO-BArch DR 6 Nr. 314): “Der Rundfunk ein entscheidenes Organ der 
Staatsmacht” 
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destruction in wartime bombing. Making their way through the city, the author’s group 
stumbled across a number of depressing sights. The sanatorium at Weißer Hirsch, which 
had attracted guests from around the world, now seemed as if it belonged to a different 
era entirely, as did the city’s status as a cultural center where visitors had lined up to see 
Rafael’s Madonna at the Gemäldegalerie. Dresden, a place Richard Wagner once called 
home and the site of the premiere of Richard Strauss’s Die schweigsame Frau, seemed to 
have been literally and figuratively swept away by war. Trümmerfrauen, along with tired 
and joyless workers charged with rebuilding the city for their “Red Masters” now 
inhabited the city.6 Esteemed cultural institutions appeared neglected in lieu of public 
establishments that provided essential services focused on rudimentary needs or the 
politics of occupation, like the Handelsorganization, or H.O.s—state-run stores—the city 
council, and barracks for Soviet soldiers. Images with the nation’s new leaders, Otto 
Grotewohl, Wilhelm Pieck, and the leader of the future, Joseph Stalin, now hung in 
public spaces.7 In short, Dresden, in the eyes of critics, embodied something along the 
lines of a “tragic city”—a place losing its tradition behind banners and posters that 
(falsely) promised residents a better future under leadership in close association with the 
victorious Soviet Union.8  
A short trip on the streetcar to the Weißer Hirsch neighborhood, perched in the 
hills above the Elbe, revealed to the author’s group that the Albrechtsberg Palace had 
been transformed into a “Pioneer Palace” on the Soviet model and named for Walter 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 K., H., “Dresden verlor sein Gesicht,” Berliner Anzeiger, 25 November 1951 (DRA Potsdam: RIAS 
Ostarchiv Dresden, 3, Standort: 363/7/1): “Eine Trostlose Steinwüste” 
6 Ibid. Trümmerfrauen, or “rubble women” was the name given to women seen moving the rubble 
produced by the war’s destruction—a term used throughout the German speaking cities of Europe: “rotten 
Herren” 
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid.: “Tragödie einer Stadt”  
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Ulbricht, the “best friend of the youth.”9 At nearby Auf dem Meisenberg, one would find 
comfortable villas that housed the Party big-wigs— the so-called Bonzen—and other 
beneficiaries of the adopted Soviet system. Nothing remained of the neighborhood’s 
traditional elegance as Red Army Officers strolled in front of the Spa. Luisenhof, once a 
popular restaurant, still overlooked the Elbe and offered a view of the cityscape, but now 
operated as a state-run eatery. From this point, visitors could see Dresden’s silhouette 
missing some its most recognizable landmarks, most notably the dome of the 
Frauenkirche. The famous church would remain a pile of rubble for the duration of the 
GDR’s existence, an inverse monument to fascism and its destructive powers.10  
Across the Elbe River in the picturesque Old City, the Western visitors noted 
other changes to Dresden’s built environment, such as the disappearance of the King 
Albert monument, recently melted down for scrap metal to help fuel the government’s 
Five-Year Plan. Socialist objectives had compelled authorities to strip the interior of the 
Zwinger palace during the larger rebuilding effort and, according to the visitors, a good 
number of paintings had traveled eastward. Several blocks away visitors would find the 
Postplatz, a traffic exchange and one of the busiest public spaces in the city. Residents 
waiting there for the streetcar experienced Dresden’s new postwar soundscape, 
broadcasted from a loudspeaker hanging above their heads that transmitted slogans from 
the National Front, a forced alliance of the mass organizations and block parties.11 What 
exactly came out of that loudspeaker on that particular day in November of 1951 is 
                                                 
9 Ibid.: “beste Freund der Jugend.” 
10 Barbara Gruening, “Transition, Memory and Narrations in the Urban Space: The Case of East German 
Cities,” in Urban Plots and Organizing Cities, ed. Giovanna Sonda et al. (Surrey: MPG Books, 2010); 
Elizabeth Ten Dyke, Dresden : Paradoxes of Memory in History (New York: Routledge, 2001). 
11 K., H., “Dresden verlor sein Gesicht.” 
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difficult to say, though one can surmise that it probably related to the audible 
representation of the SED’s socialist vision. 
This chapter analyzes how the SED represented its authority and legitimacy in the 
Dresden region from 1945 until 1953. It will examine the regime’s construction of an 
official public sphere or, more cynically, “phony public sphere,” through radio and visual 
display. Analysis pertains to the regional authorities’ re-establishment of local radio and 
(to a lesser extent) print media for the representation of an imagined, transnational public 
sphere designed to impart the legitimacy of the new regime and to orient residents 
eastward by incorporating them into the Eastern Bloc under Soviet leadership. This 
international imagined community, bound by members’ commitment to a socialist world 
order served, to underscore the righteousness of the SED’s vision and its widespread 
acceptance.  
The chapter will conclude that the SED’s efforts to establish its broadcasting 
apparatuses as powerful instruments to disseminate news while representing public 
opinion struggled not only to reach listeners, but also to win their confidence. One traces 
some of the problems attending this process to early technical difficulties stemming from 
wartime destruction and others derived from the SED’s lack of a popular mandate. The 
chapter will then survey other methods by which the SED represented its legitimacy and 
power, such as through banners, images of leaders, “Friendship corners,” and 
“enlightenment centers.” Finally, the SED employed orchestrated and publicized 
demonstrations to project visually an image of mass support in the form of massive 
crowds.12 
                                                 
12 I borrow this phrase, though not its application, from Kaeble, “The European Public Sphere” in Building 
a European Public Sphere, 22. I also borrow from Anderson, Imagined Communities, 4-9. 
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A central component of the new East German nationalism included a focus on the 
formation of an anti-fascist and internationalist citizenry. The state administration in 
Saxony argued that the deeds of fascism had discredited propaganda in the minds of 
Germans, which during the Nazi period amounted to the malicious dissemination of lies 
and slander. Still, the SED recognized the essential role of propaganda, pointing to the 
importance of its propaganda department to the larger nation-building mission while 
trying to distance itself from the negative history of the National Socialists. 
Unsurprisingly, the propaganda of the GDR was to be the “exact opposite” of its 
predecessor and spread “the truth,” even if such truths were difficult ones.13 The GDR’s 
propaganda would also serve as an instrument that would cut through or across any social 
castes and privileged groups to enlighten and educate all Germans. The “spiritual rubble 
of the past” was to be liquidated, and a new people created.14 The socialists would need 
to rely heavily on radio to transmit this new internationalist nationalism—a task made all 
the more difficult by the postwar condition of the region’s broadcasting systems. 
 
Re-founding Local and Regional Radio 
In the months following the war’s end, regional authorities rebuilt and re-
established radio in Dresden as a means by which they could broadcast a political vision 
for the future and build one of the cornerstones of the official public sphere. It took only 
                                                 
13 “Abteilung Propaganda,” Rechenschaftsbericht – Volksbildung, Landesverwaltung Sachsen, 
Herausgegeben vom Landesnachrichtenamt des Bundeslandes Sachsen Vertrieb: Dresden: Landesdruckerei 
Sachsen GmbH [undated document, but before 1952] (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 4504/0074): “genaue 
Gegenteil“ 
14 Ibid.: “die geistigen Trümmer aus der Vergangenheit” 
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five days for Radio Berlin to resume broadcasting amid the rubble, but things took a little 
longer in the Dresden region.15  
Prior to 1945, there existed three regional stations: Görlitz, Dresden, and Leipzig, 
each technically maintained by the postal administration. On May 8, 1945, Dresden’s 
transmitting equipment had been destroyed, although the machinery in nearby Leipzig 
remained operational, or at least in much better shape, and was fully functional by the fall 
of 1945. Led by confirmed anti-fascist Rudolph Pfützner, who oversaw a staff of around 
sixty, the station had begun transmitting programming produced in Berlin on September 
1, 1945.16 At this point, Berlin still received content by courier and SMAD required 
original programming to be routed through censors, which resulted in news that was no 
longer so current. Meanwhile, the non-functioning station in Dresden, which had a rating 
of only 1.5kW, had been temporarily placed in an inn and staff awaited orders and 
approval to begin transmitting Leipzig programming. Those with basic reception 
capabilities within fifty-one kilometers would be able to receive such programming. 
More distant reception was impossible because the radio tower for the station in Görlitz, 
the second largest city in the region, originally constructed of wood, had been damaged 
during fighting on May 8.17 On November 20, 1945, Mitteldeutsche Rundfunk-
Gesellschaft celebrated its founding and on December 7, 1945, and transmitted its first 
                                                 
15 Deutschland Sender was in operation again by fall 1945. For more on radio and nationalism, see Carolyn 
Birdsall, Nazi Soundscapes, especially pages 109-119; Simon Frith, Performing Rites: On the Value of 
Popular Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). For radio in the GDR see Reiner Stein, Vom 
Fernsehen und Radio der DDR zur ARD: die Entwicklung und Neuordnung des Rundfunkwesens in den 
Neuen Bundesländern (Marburg, Tectum Verlag, 2000), 32-48; Klaus Arnold and Christoph Classen, eds. 
Zwischen Pop und Propaganda: Radio in der DDR (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2004); for media as a weapon of 
dictatorship, see Gunter Holzweißig, Die schärfste Waffe der Partei. Eine Mediengeschichte der DDR 
(Köln: Böhlau Verlag 2002).  
16 “Abteilung Propaganda,” Rechenschaftsbericht – Volksbildung. Bl.76; “Rundfunk in der Ostzone,” 
Neues Deutschland Nr. 265 vom 12.11.1948 (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 4512/0068). 
17 Landesnachrichtenamt Abteilung Rundfunk/Landesverwaltung Sachsen Inneres und Volksbildung, 
Kühn, Vizepräsident und die Sowjetisch-Militärische-Administration, z.Hd. des Herrn Obltn. Kudrin, 
Dresden N6, Bautzner Str. 130. 28.11.1945. 
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broadcast to the public out of Leipzig at noon with the words: “This is Middle–Germany 
Radio including Stations in Dresden and Leipzig.”18 
The Landessender Dresden served as the city’s radio station until the GDR’s 
broadcasting systems underwent a massive re-organization in 1952 (more on this later). 
Although designated a Landessender, the station remained underpowered at 1.5kW for 
quite some time and despite plans to boost its transmission capabilities, the station’s 
broadcasts did not reach those beyond the city limits. SMAD ordered that the five 
Landessender (Schwerin, Potsdam, Weimar, Halle, and Dresden) increase their power to 
20kW but this had not happened by the end of 1946 in Dresden, prompting the radio 
department to write the newly formed SED and express their concerns regarding the 
station’s anemic output. Uncertainties with regard to the greater political arrangements of 
postwar Europe also led to concerns within the party and among leaders who felt that a 
functioning radio system would provide influence and protections against reactionary 
elements. The intendant of the station envisioned its role as an institution in the socialists’ 
propagandizing arsenal, and thus more transmitting power could only help, though 
approval had to come from the state executive committee of Saxony.19 
With a basic radio delivery system in place by 1946, the radio department noted 
that efforts to broadcast propaganda had intensified and it appeared some early self-
congratulations were in order, with officials boasting that all strata of society—workers, 
farmers, artists, women, and youths—now received broadcasts.  “That which had only 
                                                 
18 “Mitteldeutsche Rundfunk Gesellschaft in Dresden,“ Volksstimme vom 24.11.45 (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 
4521, 0022); “Erste Sendung der Mitteldeutschen Rundfunkgesellschaft,” Volksstimme Dresden, Nr. 72 
(SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 4521/0021); Werner Doberenz, “Zwei Jahre Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk,” 
Sächsische Zeitung, (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 4512/0019). 
19 “An die Sowjetische Militärverwaltung Im Bundeslande Sachsen Herrn General Dubrowsky, Dresden 
21 Oktober 1946 (SächsHStA 11856 IV/A Nr. 264, Bl.1); “Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk – Sender Dresden an 
den Landvorstand Sachsen der SED, Dresden,” 5.11.1946 Abt. Intendanz. Betr.: Verstärkung der 
Sendestation des Landessenders Dresden (SächsHStA 11856 IV/A Nr. 264, Bl.2). 
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been conceivable in Saxony’s public life [had been] put to use as radio propaganda,” 
noted one report.20 Though the SED did not yet control the region, behind these efforts 
stood the anti-fascist parties and the labor unions with Soviet backing. But first, 
authorities had to overcome several technical matters and although its propaganda 
department claimed that listeners—and voters—had been won over, such a celebration 
proved premature.  
By June of 1947, SMAD controlled two Großsender in the Soviet Zone, Berlin 
and Leipzig, each utilizing 120kW transmitters, while only two of the Landessender 
(Schwerin and Halle) had been upgraded to 20kW.21 At the head of the Dresden station 
sat Dr. Mauthner along with artistic director Richard Walter Hahnewald and conductor 
Hans-Hendrik Wehding.22 Mauthner petitioned the State Executive Committee - Saxony 
(Landesvorstand Sachsen der SED) to upgrade his station from late 1946, and the postal 
administration (Oberpostdirektion) in Dresden had poured the necessary concrete in 
preparation for the upgrade, but the plan to upgrade Dresden to 20kW in the second half 
of 1947 remained unfulfilled.23 Headway towards upgrading Radio Dresden into a true 
Landessender (also designated as an affiliated station to MDR, meaning it would also 
transmit the larger station’s programming) lagged behind peer stations. The listening 
zone for Dresden remained restricted from the SW-NE axis to a 15-20 km listening 
                                                 
20 “Bericht des Rundfunks über den Volksentscheid,” Kühn, Abteilung Rundfunk an das Sekretariat der 
Abt. Volksbildung, 1.7.1946 (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 4508/0097): “und was sonst im öffentlichen Leben 
Sachsens nur Denkbar ist, wurde für die Propaganda im Sender in Anspruch genommen.“  
21 See “Zwei Jahre Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk: “Berliner Rundfunk und seiner sender gruppe der 
Mitteldeutsche Rundfunk mit seinen Landessendern Dresden, Weimar und Halle.” 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid.:“Verstärkung der Sendestation des Landessenders Dresden” (SächsHStA 11856 IV/A Nr. 264, 
Bl.2). 
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area.24 A review of the station in December, 1948 by the Sächsische Zeitung noted that 
the station still operated at 1.5kW and that the power upgrade had failed to materialize 
due to the Berlin Airlift.25 Not until 1950 did Radio Dresden finally received its power 
upgrade.26 
 
Radio’s Potential Sphere of Influence 
 In late November of 1945, estimates put the number of residents in the federal 
state of Saxony at approximately five-to-six million residents, of whom there were an 
estimated 750,000 radio listeners or at least potential radio listeners.27 This estimate is 
based on the 375,000 radio owners registered at the post office and authorities concluded 
that the number of radio listeners could potentially double this figure.28 Another estimate 
by the Saxon government placed the actual number of residents in the region influenced 
by the large stations in Dresden and Leipzig at around two million. The task then, for the 
SED, was an obvious one: to better connect the regime to the people. By the end of 1947, 
more self-congratulations were in order. Authorities boasted that radio, an instrument 
misused by the Nazi regime, had successfully reemerged, with increased listenership, 
under their watch as a tool with which to educate Germans in a democratic fashion. 
Statistics published by the Sächsische Zeitung placed listenership in Saxony at 500,000 in 
                                                 
24 “Betr.: Strahlungsanlage des Landessender Dresden,” Technische Betriebsleitung, Dresden den 5. Juni 
1947 (SächsHStA 11856 IV/A Nr. 264, Bl.5). 
25 Werner Doberenz, “Drei Jahre Landessender Dresden: Im Dienst unserer demokratischen Entwicklung,” 
Sächsische Zeitung Nr. 285 vom 8.12.1948 (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 4512/0069). 
26 “Bericht über Hörerumfrage des Landessenders Dresden,” Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk Landessender 
Dresden, Dresden, 20.1.-4.2. und 5.-17.2.51. (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 4522/0046-47). It is not entirely clear 
from this document if the increased transmitting capacity was the 20kW increase ordered in 1946, but the 
report notes that sending capacity was substantially increased at this time. 
27 “Landesnachrichtenamt Abteilung Rundfunk/Landesverwaltung Sachsen Inneres und Volksbildung, 
Kühn,” Vizepräsident und die Sowjetisch-Militärische-Administration, z.Hd. des Herrn Obltn. Kudrin, 
Dresden N6, Bautzner Str. 130. 28.11.1945.  
28 “Bericht des Rundfunks über den Volksentscheid,” Kühn, Abteilung Rundfunk an das Sekretariat der 
Abt. Volksbildung, 1.7.1946 (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 4508/0097); “Landesnachrichtenamt Abteilung 
Rundfunk/Landesverwaltung Sachsen Inneres und Volksbildung, Kühn.” 
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January of 1946 and almost one million by October 1947.29 Estimates of listenership in 
Saxony could derive from two types of estimates, one based on registered receivers and 
the other based on the volume of listener mail. The latter drew on experience that 
suggested between sixty and ninety listeners existed per listener letter received.30 Of 
course such estimates cannot reliably asses (nor do they attempt to appraise) how many 
listeners might gather around one radio or interpersonally transmit radio broadcasts 
which would extend radio’s reach (more on this in chapter two). Unrepresented in these 
statistics was the number of Saxons who turned in foreign broadcasting from the West, 
which amounted to a direct challenge to the SED’s rule. In other words, these types of 
surveys did not account for what stations listeners preferred. 
 The existing qualitative evidence regarding listenership suggests that technical 
issues negatively affected audience size or at least irritated listeners through at least 1951. 
A listenership survey in the eastern section of Saxony based on 432,000 questionnaires 
distributed to the population in the region that yielded 9,002 responses noted the lack of a 
connection between Dresden radio and its listeners, while the paltry number of letters 
received per month (60) suggested tepid listener interest.31 Note here that this survey 
refers only to Radio Dresden, which often carried programming produced by the larger 
station in Leipzig, though listeners often failed to differentiate between the two. 
Regardless of the broadcast’s perceived origin, 41% of 4007 respondents in Dresden 
complained of interference (a whistling sound) and the number increased to 56% at night. 
Reception difficulties only increased as one moved westward towards Görlitz where 
                                                 
29 “Zwei Jahre Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk.” 
30 “Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk an den Landesvorstand Sachsen SED,” z.H. des. Genossen Hans Schrecker 
24. März 1949 (SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 264 Bl.42).  
31 “Bericht über Hörerumfrage des Landessenders Dresden,” Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk Landessender 
Dresden, 1951, 0047-48. 
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residents needed wired radio or a high-quality receiver.32 In fact, Radio Prague could be 
heard more clearly in this area.33 These concerns may not have directly prompted the 
erection of a wired public announcement system, but the construction of one could boost 
listenership as the audience would be essentially captive. Residents could control radio 
when inside their homes or private spaces but authorities (first SMAD, then the SED) in 
Dresden and elsewhere in the GDR could create an official soundscape by broadcasting 
directly into public space with strategically placed loudspeaker systems 
 
“Stadtfunk:” City Radio and the Construction of a Socialist Soundscape 
The Stadtfunk (localized public announcement systems) and its speaker system 
served as one of the SED’s audible representations of legitimacy in the public sphere and 
a messenger of a new internationalist orientation.34 Political instructions arrived on 
September 9, 1945 in the form of order Nr. 78 from SMAD, which permitted the 
construction of public loudspeaker systems that were capable of transmitting at low and 
high frequencies via wire. SMAD charged the postal service with the system’s technical 
fabrication while the communication department within the Landesverwaltung Sachsen 
managed the studios and developed programming. Such arrangements were to be 
constructed in all the locales of Saxony deemed necessary by administrative survey.35 In 
the Dresden Region, this included communities within Bautzen, Dippoldiswalde, Dresden, 
Kamenz, Löbau, Meißen , Pirna, as well as several in Niesky and Zittau where existing 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 0049.  
33 Ibid.  
34 I will use the German Stadtfunk throughout rather than the English “public announcement system.”  
35 Landesverwaltung Sachsen Inneres und Volksbildung, (gez. Althaus), Abteilung Nachrichtenwesen 
Rundfunk, I/3C, Dresden- A50, den 30..12.45, Fernspr. 52031 (65) an alle Oberbürgermeister und 
Landräte. (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 4513/0264).  
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systems had been damaged.36 The “free cities” of Radebeul and Freital had no equipment 
of their own.37  
In February of 1946, Dresden had seven loudspeakers while Görlitz had five, 
Meißen ten, Pirna three, Riesa fourteen, and Zittau seven.38 By the end of the month, 
officials claimed in the local newspaper that an additional seventy speakers had been 
ordered for Dresden and awaited installation in the city’s busiest traffic points as well as 
in peripheral zones. In Dresden, a studio at Stadthaus Karl-Marx-Platz had been prepared 
and would soon be in operation. Programming was to serve the public by not only 
broadcasting official proclamations, but also news relating to traffic conditions and other 
things of “general interest,” along with of course, political reports, signifying that party 
leaders viewed the Stadtfunk system as an instrument of didactic capabilities.39 
 By 1949, the Stadtfunk system in Dresden had started to take shape, though the 
earlier public estimates of its expansion cited above proved a bit overzealous. Through 
the first of January that year, six new substations for the Stadtfunk were created around 
the city, including units at Neustädter Markt and Grunaer Straße—points of heavy public 
traffic. Each substation consisted of a twenty-watt amplifier, a loudspeaker (either 
directed or omni-directional) and for 1949, two omni-directional speakers per every 
fifteen watts. In Görlitz, too, efforts to improve the Stadtfunk meant a technical 
modernization of the broadcasting capabilities, with new facilities and microphones. Just 
as importantly, engineers worked at that time to connect the Stadtfunk system to the 
                                                 
36 Gez. A. Althaus, Landesverwaltung Sachsen, Nachrichtenwesen, A/? I/3 C, Dresden, den 8.2.1946 an die 
Oberpostdirektion Dresden, Abteilung 2B (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 4513/0240).  Excluding those with fewer 
than 5,000 residents.   
37 Ibid. “Kreisfreie,” or without a county. This arrangement ended after the Second Party Conference in 
1952 and the cities fell under Dresden’s regional administration. 
38 Ibid., Bl.0248.  
39 “Aufbau den Dresdener Stadtfunks,” Auszug aus Sächsische Volkszeitung” Nr. 45 vom 23.2.46 
Dresdener Ausgabe, Seite 6. (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 4513/0270).  
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Betriebsfunk (more on this shortly) at VEB LOWA (Vereinigung Volkseigener Betriebe 
Lokomotiv- und Waggonbau—state-owned factory that produced train locomotives and 
cars), the largest workplace in the city and later the focal point the June 17 
demonstrations in Görlitz.40  
By the beginning of 1952, the SED had installed twenty-two loudspeaker units in 
Dresden with plans for twenty-two more for the year, though it remains difficult to know 
the final number as broadcasting responsibilities shifted quite a bit after the Second Party 
Congress of 1952 and the reorganization and centralization of the GDR’s radio 
activities.41 Important public spaces in the city, including the Postplatz mentioned earlier, 
and Platz der Einheit ( today, Albertplatz), now broadcasted national and local 
programming through twenty-five watt loudspeakers directly at passersby and crowds 
waiting for streetcars.42 By the spring of 1952 Görlitz had 18 functioning public 
loudspeakers.43 Among smaller locales, Bautzen had 26, Löbau 12.44 The SED continued 
to amplify its transmitting power in Dresden and smaller towns in its region thus 
establishing an essential component of the official public sphere.45  
 
 
                                                 
40 Landesregierung Sachsen Minst. f. Volksbildung, H.A. Allgem.Volkserziehg., Presse-Rundfunk-
Aufklärung. VII3 B-D, Dresden, A50, den 16.1.1950, August-Bebel-Str.19 Hausapp. 283/568 Li/Kl, S4 
(SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 4548/0021). 
41 “Volkswirtschaftsplan 1952 (Entwicklungsplan),” Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik – 
Staatliche Plankommission – Dresden – Stadtfunk (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 2323/0004). 
42 “Analyse zum Volkswirtschaftsplan 1952 – Entwicklungsplan der Volkseigenen örtlichen Wirtschaft – 
Stadtfunk Dresden,” 12.3.52. (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 2323/0005).  
43 “Volkswirtschaftsplan 1952 (Entwicklungsplan),” Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik – 
Staatliche Plankommission – Görlitz – Stadtfunk (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 2323/0008). 
44 “Volkswirtschaftsplan 1952 (Entwicklungsplan),” Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik – 
Staatliche Plankommission – Kreis Bautzen – Stadtfunk 5.23.52 (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 2323/0010); 
“Volkswirtschaftsplan 1952 (Entwicklungsplan),” Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik – 
Staatliche Plankommission – Löbau – Stadtfunk 10.5.52 (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 2323/0026). 
45 This did not hold for all cities in the GDR: neighbor-city Leipzig still lacked a working Stadtfunk system 
in early 1950.  
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Betriebsfunk: Representing in the Workplace 
Another method by which the state audibly represented its authority in public 
space included the Betriebsfunk system, or workplace radio systems that broadcasted 
directly to workers within the confines of the workplace. As with the traditional systems 
developed in the GDR, intentions here were also largely political: to influence the labor 
force and the conversations held in the workplace. The erection of the Betriebsfunk 
system under SED guidance dates to 1948, though a detailed overview is largely absent 
from the record as the origins of this endeavor were rather sporadic and the formation of 
the system lacked centralized direction. The impetus behind the scheme likely stemmed 
from the earlier use of factory loudspeaker systems and their employment in certain 
situations to provide what SED termed “supplemental agitation in certain political 
situations” or the transmission of “educational lectures” to prod recalcitrant party 
members. This task at first fell largely to the SED’s Betriebsgruppen and the growth of 
the system could be traced to the labors of the same authorities behind the regional 
broadcasting institutions. The radio authorities thus became the first to impose 
organization along political lines with regard to the Betriebsfunk.46 
The SED received reports out of the most important workplaces in the Zone that 
the programs aired sparked lively conversation among workforces and by the fall of 1948, 
the General Directorship for Radio Stations in the Soviet Occupied Zone (General 
Intendanz der Rundfunksender der sowjetisch-besetzten Zone), perhaps sensing the 
power of this tool, ordered the strengthening of Betriebsfunk systems’ technical and 
political capabilities. The Riesa Steelworks in the Dresden Region [the future Dresden 
                                                 
46 “Betr.: Die Entwicklung des Betriebsfunks” (SAPMO-BArch DY 34 Nr. 1688): “zusätzlichen Agitation 
in bestimmtem politischen Fragen zu benutzen; Schulungsvorträge.” 
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Region, that is] served as the pilot plant, working with Landessender Dresden, the 
region’s main station. At the urging of the directorship, the RFT (Rundfunk und 
Fernmeldetechnik – Radio and Telecommunications) standardized the equipment. 
Regional radio stations took charge of programming and trained broadcasters.47  
By April, 1950, a number of important work places in and around Dresden, 
including Stahl und Walzwerk Riesa, Einsen und Stahlwerk Gröditz, TU Hochshule 
Dresden, LOWA Waggonbau Görlitz, and the massive Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz had 
functioning Betriebsfunk systems that continued to expand. These in particular could 
transmit broadcasts from Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk through a studio receiver (usually by 
radio, rather than wire, with the exception of Riesa Gröditz).48 By 1951, a number of 
workplaces also had the ability to record the conversations that took place, a tool that the 
party recognized as one that could offer insights into workers’ daily lives.49 But the 
Betriebsfunk worked best as a propagandizing method with which to establish Soviet 
strength, for example with the themes such as “Soviet Work Methods” that told the story 
of three Stakhanovites.50 Betriebsfunk also functioned as a means to shoot down rumors 
or what the party perceived as misinformation. One example from 1951 dealt with the 
alleged rumor spread by “enemies of humanity…against progressive humanity” that 
youth from the GDR in Berlin for the [international socialist directed] World Festival of 
Youth had not eaten for three days.51 
                                                 
47 Ibid.  
48 “Betr.: Betriebsfunk An den Landesvorstand der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands,”Abt. 
Massenagitation Dresden, den 26 April 1950 (SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 37 Bl.97).  
 49 ZK der SED Abteilung Agitation an die Landesleitung der SED Abteilung Agitation, SED ZK Berlin 
Abteilung: Agitation, 5 September 1951 (SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 37 Bl.150).  
50 “Sendung: Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft,” Betriebsfunk Sachsenwerk 
Niedersedlitz, Datum: 17.8.1951 (SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 244 Bl.149): “Sowjetische Arbeitsmethoden.” 
51 “Sendung - Musik 1. Das ganze Deutschland, Betriebsfunk Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz,” Zeit: 
12.05/12.40/18.05, Uhr. Datum: 10.8.1951 (SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 244 Bl.100): “Die Feinde der 
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Programming 
 Programming constituted one method by which the party represented its popular 
legitimacy and transmitted a specifically East German internationalism based on 
integration into the Eastern Bloc. With such broadcasting, those who drafted the 
programming beamed messages into public space and aimed to accomplish several things. 
First, programming featured an internationalist component that could help re-orient East 
Germans eastward through the construction of an imagined community based on 
international socialist solidarity with Stalin standing in as the new savior of the German 
people. Second, programming placed German unification along socialist lines—even 
prior to the establishment of two Germanys—as a priority. Above all, through 
broadcasting, the SED aimed to create imagined communities—imagined solidarities or a 
represented Verbundenheit—between two primary groups: East Germans and those living 
in other socialist states and eventually between West Germans and East Germans.52  
 Following the Second Party Congress of September, 1947, prior to the founding 
of the GDR in October of 1949, the SED used broadcasting to publicize its efforts as the 
lead organizational force behind the fulfillment of the Two-Year-Plan.53 The general 
programming plan developed by the Radio Department set in motion an eastward 
orientation philosophically based on peace. At the head of the new order stood the Soviet 
Union above all other progressive (socialist) states in the world. Radio’s task then was to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Menschheit…die fortschrittliche Menschheit.” The Weltfestspiel was a major international gathering of 
youth from socialist nations. Organizers held the event in East Berlin in 1951.  
52 West German politicians and RIAS commentators also recast German nationalism within an 
internationalist framework—more on this in chapters four and five.  
53 “Themenplan Referat Funk zum Halbjahresplan 1948 als Vorbereitung des Zweijahresplanes 1949/50,”  
SED Landesvorstand Sachsen Referat Funk Dresden, den 3.8.48 (SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 267, Bl.8).  
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popularize and support this arrangement.54 For domestic politics, the SED officially 
stated that radio programming would work to support the democratization of government 
and economy, while improving industrial production and living standards. The word 
“socialist” appeared relatively infrequently before the Second Party Conference in 1952, 
though the regime’s political vision and was hardly a secret. To wit, programming 
included a campaign celebrating thirty years of the Soviet Union and impressions of its 
economy, agriculture, transportations systems, along with first-hand reports.55 By the last 
quarter of 1948, GDR radio programming for the Landessender Dresden fell under the 
general theme “Implementation of the Economic plans.”56 This generally included anti-
Western programming that attacked the Marshall Plan while promoting the “magnet 
theory” which held that Soviet Zone economic successes would attract those from the 
Western Zones and lead to German unification with a socialist mandate. Other 
programming efforts included reports of women’s delegations and their missions to the 
Soviet Union and Hungary while negative political attacks highlighted striking workers 
in the West.57  
 Following the establishment of the GDR on October 7, 1949, programming in 
Dresden continued this celebration and representation of Soviet strength, achievements 
and German-Soviet bonds with, for example, the literary musical production “Day of the 
Red Army,” which examined the history of, and paid tribute to, Soviet Military success. 
The program “Aktuelle Worte” (“Current Word”) focused on the Soviet Union and its 
                                                 
54 “Arbeitsbericht des Rundfunksachgebietes nach dem 2 Parteitag,” Abt FUNK, Gez. Schirmer 
(SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 267 Bl.18). 
55 Ibid.  
56 “Bericht über die Tätigkeit des Landessenders Dresden in der Zeit vom Oktober – Dezember 48,” 
Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk an die SED Landesvorstand Sachsen Abt. Werbung, Presse, Rundfunk, 28. 
Dezember 1948 (SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 264 Bl.24): “Durchführung der Wirtschaftspläne” 
57 Ibid. Bl.25-6: “Magnetwirkung” 
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role as a friend of Germany and the strongest factor in the establishment of peace. 
Broadcasts aimed at youths explained what they could learn from the Young Pioneers in 
the Soviet Union.58 A good portion of radio programming produced for the show aimed 
to reinforce the concept of a peace front spearheaded by the Soviet Union. The radio 
station argued internally that East Germans shared this position based on the growth of 
the Society for German-Soviet Friendship (Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische 
Freundschaft) from October 1949 through the spring of 1950 in Saxony. Commentary 
worked to “deepen the friendship of the Soviet Union” and its satellites by promoting and 
publicizing the two states’ newfound relations, evidenced by initiatives such as letter 
writing exchanges between Soviet and East German (Saxon) youths, invitations to Soviet 
workers from local industry, discussions of Soviet film, and various commentaries that 
glorified life and work in the Soviet Union.59  
By April, 1950, almost all such programming related to the growth of the Society 
for German-Soviet Friendship, which publically claimed 75,000 members by the end of 
April 1950. Listeners learned how revolutionary theory could be successfully put into 
practice using examples from Russia and how the moral righteousness of Soviet foreign 
policy would lead to success in Germany in line with the “wishes of the German 
people.”60 In October of 1950 GDR radio celebrated almost daily the thirty-third 
                                                 
58 “Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk Landessender Dresden, Perspektivplan - August –September 1951” 
(SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 265 Bl.117). 
59 “Monatsbericht des Landessenders Dresden für den Monat Februar 1950 Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk,” 
Landessender Dresden an die Generalintendanz der Rundfunksender, i.d. Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik z.H.d.Herrn Generalintendanten Mahle, Berlin W 1 Thälmannplatz 8/9, 20. März 1950 
(SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 264 Bl.164): “Vertiefung der Freundschaft zur Sowjetunion” 
60 “Monatsbericht des Landessenders Dresden für den Monat April 1950” an die Generalintendanz d. 
Rundfunksender i.d.Deutschen Demokratischen Republik z.H.d.Herrn Generalintendanten Mahle, 12 Juni 
1950 (SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 264 Bl.185); Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk, Leipzig, Perspektivplan vom 1 Mai 
bis 31 Juli 1951 (SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 269 Bl.17): “Außenpolitik der SU entspricht Wünschen des 
deutschen Volkes” 
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anniversary of the October Revolution, with “Youth Radio” (“Jugendfunk”) producing 
on-air conversations with young German workers to celebrate the thirty-two years since 
the founding of the Komsomol, the Soviet inspiration for East German youth 
organizations. This newly fabricated bond between Soviet and German citizens played 
out in the program “Our Plan for a Better Life” with continued coverage of the state-
sponsored letter exchange campaign.61  
One theme for 1951 centered on the GDR’s official “Radio Day,” which 
celebrated the bond between MDR (this includes Dresden Radio) and its listeners and the 
station’s continued efforts to promote peace based on socialist principles. Broadcasts 
focused on a “representation of the tremendous economic and cultural development of the 
Soviet people on the way to communism” with the intention of transmitting the solutions 
to national issues to all strata of the East German population.62 Part of this meant, 
naturally, representing the increasingly closer relations between Germans and the Soviet 
Union. Programming cast the Soviet Union as the voice of all people, and the greatest 
ally of Germans, and as the GDR’s strongest trade partner.63 By the second half of 1951, 
programming dedicated to the Soviet Union amounted to about 5.6% of all spoken (non-
musical or Wortsendungen) programming.64 The SED also used radio programming as a 
representational institution to publicize the state’s (and thus its citizens’) blossoming 
relations with its Eastern Bloc allies as well as its own institutions. Radio detailed the 
                                                 
61 “Monatsbericht des Landessenders Dresden für den Monat Oktober 1950,” Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk 
Landessender Dresden an die Generalintendanz der Rundfunksender in der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik 8. November 1950 (SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 264 Bl.234). 
62 Leipzig, den 23 April 1951 (SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 269 Bl.1;12): “der Darstellung der gewaltigen 
wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Entwicklung der Sowjetvölker auf dem Wege zum Kommunismus” 
63 “Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk Leipzig Perspektivplan vom 1 Mai bis 31 Juli 1951” (SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 
269 Bl.14). 
64 “Analyse über die Arbeit des Landessenders Dresden,” Dresden den 30. Oktober, 1951 (SächsHStA 
11376 Nr. 4535 0117). 
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socialist development of these states, comparing for example the simultaneous revival of 
Poland and the GDR while establishing the friendship between the nations.65  
 In November of 1951 the propaganda department in Berlin called on radio 
stations to improve their work through a number of measures with the intention of further 
popularizing the Soviet Union, its development, and the lives of its citizens. Material 
from the Soviet press would be distributed to the GDR’s radio stations and the foreign 
policy discussion from Radio Moscow would air on Sunday evening. Pertinent to this 
chapter’s discussion of an official public sphere constructed to appear democratic and 
inclusive is the radio series of “Public Forum” (“Öffentliches Forum”). In this series, 
working class, members of the intelligentsia, and radio personalities would hold round 
table discussions and discuss the Five-Year-Plan, with planners noting that “progressive 
bourgeois people” should be included.66 Of course at the same time, radio programming 
that promoted the Soviet Union as the “voice of all peoples” suggests open debate was a 
merely a mirage, and all decisions rested, as Ulbricht famously noted, in the hands of the 
SED’s central leadership.67  
After the Second Party Conference in the summer of 1952, the SED reorganized 
the GDR’s administrative bureaucracy to accelerate the construction of socialism. The 
Council of Ministers (Ministerrat) announced the creation of the Staatliches Kommittee 
für Rundfunk (State Radio Committee) and centralization of the GDR’s radio 
                                                 
65 Leipzig, den 23 April 1951 (SächsHStA 11856  Nr. 269 Bl.1;12) 
66 “Vorlage Betr.: Verbesserung der Rundfunkarbeit,” Beschlussvorschlag Sekretariat des ZK, Agitation, 
Der/Wi. 
23.11.51 (SAPMO-BArch DR 6, Nr. 314): “fortschrittlicher bürgerlicher Leute” 
67 “Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk, Leipzig, Perspektivplan vom 1 Mai bis 31 Juli 1951”:“Sprecher für alle 
Völker” 
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programming in Berlin as Berlin I, II, and III.68 The SED looked to strengthen the power 
of radio to contribute to the larger nation-building effort at hand. This meant that 
programming aimed at all Germans, but especially those in the West, moved away from 
the internationalism so popular in the GDR’s other broadcasts. Indeed, the SED charged 
the State Radio Committee with “awakening love of country” and strengthening “national 
consciousness.”69 Programming followed the development of national projects (“We’re 
Building Germany’s Capital” and “We’re Building the Five-Year-Plan”) and analysis of 
American policy and news (“The Truth about America” and “Mass strikes in the 
USA”).70  
 
Representing Popular Support in West Germany 
 One of the self-professed roles of the State Radio Committee as an “organ of state 
power” and “collective propagandist, agitator, and organizer” was to help realize “the 
bond between the working class and [socialist] farmers…and the union of all German 
patriots.”71 It is also important to remember that in the early 1950s Germany’s partition 
still felt to most Germans like a temporary arrangement and the SED openly and 
regularly discussed reunification hopes and scenarios. With this in mind, it comes as little 
surprise that the party used radio to portray protest that occurred in West Germany as 
                                                 
68 “Zusammenarbeit mit dem Staatlichen Rundfunkkomitees—Studio Dresden und Studio Görlitz,” 
Abteilung Propaganda-Agitation, Dresden, den 6.2.1953 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV 2.9.01 Nr. 134. Bl.47).  
69 “Entschliessung der SED-Betriebsparteiorganisation des Staatliches Rundfunkkomitees,” Berlin, den 25 
Januar 1953 (SAPMO-BArch DR 6 Nr. 201, Bl.2 S.3): “Liebe zur Heimat geweckt; das 
Nationalbewusstsein gestärkt”  
70 Ibid.: “Wir Bauen Deutschlands Hauptstadt; Wir Schaffen am Fünfjahrplan; die Wahrheit über Amerika; 
Massenstreiks in den USA.” For more on the Second Party Conference and the acceleration of socialist 
construction that the SED initiated in the summer of 1952, see: Gary Bruce, Resistance with the People, 
chapter 5.  
71 “Entschließung der SED-Betriebsparteiorganisation des Staatliches Rundfunkkomitees”: “In 
Westdeutschland die Aktionseinheit der Kommunitischen, Sozialdemokraitschen, christlichen und 
parteilosen Arbeiter, das Bündnis zwischen der Arbeiterklasse und den werktätigen Bauern und der 
Zusammenschuluss aller patriotischen Deutschen in der Friedensbewegung und der Nationalen Front des 
demokratischen Deutschland zustande kommt.” 
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evidence of anti-FRG sentiment. To accomplish this, the State Radio Committee 
expanded its reporting from West Germany to project its bi-German support. Such 
reporting fell under the broad umbrella term “West-Arbeit” which, in the case at hand, 
entailed placing agents armed with tape recorders at the scene of workers’ protests in 
West German cities. The Committee oversaw these operations after the institution’s 
formation in September in 1952, though the program encountered technical difficulties at 
the outset in the second half of 1952, generously referred to by the commission as a 
learning time for operatives. By October, the nine correspondents had become more 
proficient with their recording equipment and had begun documenting West German 
strikes and demonstrations. The reports focused on social, economic and national issues, 
and, of course, questions regarding national disunity. These recordings (Westbänder) then 
made their way into various GDR programs such as “We Speak for West Germany,” 
“Forum for German Patriots,” and “Behind the Façade,” that the SED broadcasted at 
home and in the Federal Republic.72  
 By the first quarter of 1953, this portion of the GDR’s West-Arbeit had become a 
reasonably well functioning operation, and technical problems subsided. Correspondents 
had been posted in those areas deemed important by the State Radio Committee—North 
Rhine - Westphalia, Hamburg, Bavaria, Baden - Württemberg, Hessen, and Rhineland-
Pfalz—from where they sent the collected materials to a central correspondent. These 
reporters conducted and recorded interviews with striking textile workers in cities such as 
Mannheim, Hamburg, and Düsseldorf. On February 12, 1953 the State Radio Committee 
                                                 
72 “Bericht: Über eingegangene Westbänder und deren Auswertung durch die Redaktionen für die Zeit von 
Juli bis Dezember 1952 Regierung der DDR,” Staatliches Rundfunkkomitee, Leitung, Gesamtdeutsche 
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claimed that the effect of their work on the West German population had become 
palpable, notably through the claimed procurement of new West German listeners. The 
agency focused on the southwestern region of West Germany, with correspondents 
covering strikes and demonstrations in Stuttgart and Lörrach. The State Radio Committee 
quoted Volksstimme (The Voice of The People), which wrote on Friday, February 6, 1953, 
“It gets around by word of mouth: ‘listen to GDR radio, listen to GDR radio stations, 
Berlin, Leipzig, which cover our strike daily.’”73 The paper argued more and more West 
Germans tuned into the East German radio and listened with bewilderment as to “how 
quickly this radio station react[ed] [to events] and the precision with which it reported 
news of the strikes…they are pleased with the calls to solidarity.”74 The efforts here to 
foster rebellion and construct a community of dissent and solidarity through the airwaves 
and across the East-West border unknowingly foreshadowed the modern transmission of 
protest. This was a defining characteristic of the June 17 Demonstrations, with, of course, 
the roles reversed here. 
 
Reception  
  Evidence suggests that the SED was largely unsuccessful in its mission to win 
over the population through broadcasting. Beginning with the SED’s goal of creating a 
connection between radio and citizen, it is highly likely that survey respondents’ 
preference of musical programming and general distaste for serious political 
programming pleased party bosses. In fact, most of those 9,200 respondents in a 1951 
                                                 
73 “Die Wirkung der Sendungen des Staatlichen Rundfunkkomitees nach Westdeutschland,” Abschrift/Soe., 
12 Februar 1953, Pe/Pu. (SAPMO-BArch DR 6 Nr. 199): “Es geht von Mund zu Mund: Hört den 
Rundfunk der DDR, hört den Deutschlandsender, Berlin, Leipzig, die sich täglich mit unserem Streik 
beschäftigen.” 
74 Ibid.: “wie schnell dieser Rundfunk reagiert und wie schnell und präzise er die Streikberichte aus dem 
Bezirk bringt. Man nimmt die Aufrufe zur Solidarität mit Genugtuung auf.” 
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survey had no opinion on how programming could be improved—which could be 
construed as satisfaction but more likely reflected pervasive disinterest. A proportionally 
large number of anonymous respondents stated the party broadcasted too much political 
programming and they wanted more music while many workers specifically requested 
light (conversational) programming in the evening supports the latter conclusion.75 One 
VEB Meyer-Optik worker opined that interference from RIAS (and Radio Moscow) was 
only part of the problem: he could hardly get through a half-hour music program (he 
wanted evening-long shows) when a sudden (and unwanted) political feature interrupted 
his program.76 Another respondent to a November 1951 survey, Herr Berdau, 
underscored the technical challenges facing GDR radio. Berdau, the Schulleiter der 
Betriebsberufschule des VEB Meyer-Optik in Görlitz (and a member of the SED) noted 
that he could only receive MDR radio because he had a wired set. Unwired sets had 
difficulties picking up the East German stations as RIAS and NWDR operated on the 
same wavelengths—a symbolic challenge if there ever was one.  
 Finally (and this will receive more attention in chapter two), East German radio’s 
chief rivals, and especially RIAS, enjoyed a larger and more enthusiastic audience. As 
one respondent from Oelsnitz [not in the Dresden Region, but in Saxony and I can 
confidently say that his opinion matches conditions in the Dresden Region] noted, about 
60% of the population in his region preferred RIAS.77 Statistical evidence from 
                                                 
75 “Bericht über Hörerumfrage des Landessenders Dresden,” Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk Landessender 
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76 “Betr.: Meinung der Bevölkerung über das Abendprogramm des Sender Leipzig – Bericht über die 
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HICOG/DIVO78 reveals numbers that suggest East German stations lagged behind their 
Western competition in listener interest though Leipzig (MDR) was slightly more popular 
than other East German stations in one 1952 survey.79 Furthermore, as the next chapter 
will demonstrate, the regional authorities in Dresden found themselves forced to wage an 
energetic anti-RIAS campaign. In conclusion, the connection between state and citizen 
desired by the SED never materialized, at least to the extent the party might have wanted 
and this situation would reach a nadir in June and July of 1953. The party did, however, 
have other means with which it would represent its legitimacy and the virtue of its 
socialist vision for Germans.  
 
Sichtwerbung: Visual Representations of Power  
 Walter Ulbricht’s infamous directive, “It must appear democratic, but we must 
control everything,” extended to the SED’s representation of power in public space in 
several ways.80 As the SED represented power, community, and legitimacy through radio 
broadcasts, Ray Rühle argues along with Vaclav Havel that in socialist dictatorships such 
as the GDR, no true public sphere existed and ideology formed the basis for maintenance 
of political power (leadership). He points to Havel’s contention that this existed as the 
“bridge between (the) power and the people” and offers the following example: “the 
vegetable merchant places a banner in his shop window between the onions and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Empfangsmöglichkeiten des demokratischen Rundfunkes, Dresden, den 21.1.52 (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 
4535/0007). 
78 A joint U.S. occupation/German research effort: High Commission for Occupied Germany; Deutsches 
Institut für Volks- umfragen (German Institite for Public Surveys). 
79 Some General Patterns of Listening to RIAS, RIAS Coverage and Programming as evaluated by East 
Zone Listeners, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany Office of Public Affairs Reactions 
Analysis Staff, Report 170, Series 2, February 10, 1953 (NARA RG 306, A1 1005, Box 5). 
80 Karl-Wilhelm Fricke, Der Wahrheit verpflichtet, 366.  
83 
 
carrots that reads, ‘Workers of all nations unite!’”81 The key here is not the vegetable 
trader’s belief in the socialist system, but the ritual itself: the sign remains hanging only 
to ward off bothersome authorities. Taken further, Rühle argues that “The political leader 
can also, through the attempt to construct an all-encompassing ‘decoration’ of publicness 
which is constructed so that the ‘world of appearances’ is no longer perceived as a sham, 
but rather becomes interpreted as a part of reality.”82 Such a system stabilizes as 
participants like the shop owner become willing accomplices in the arrangement. In his 
analysis of official public spheres in state-socialist societies, Walter Süß argues that a 
condition of “societal schizophrenia” develops where the phony public sphere helps 
create an amoral and schizophrenic universe wherein participants knowingly lie to each 
other in one space and tell the truth in another.”83 Of course, one needs to guard against 
presenting the population as a monolithic body that always opposed the SED’s every 
move, but RIAS’s popularity, the genuine election returns during early postwar period, 
and the June 17 demonstrations provide the empirical data necessary to suggest that the 
party did not enjoy popular support and this probably helped prompt the construction of 
an official public sphere. 
 The following section considers how the official public sphere of the early GDR 
used visual representation in the public sphere to promote power, legitimacy, German 
unity and a new eastward-looking internationalism.84 Visual enlightenment, according to 
the party, could not be separated from other forms of party communication, an arena in 
                                                 
81 Rühle, Entstehung von politischer Öffentlichkeit, 10: “Proletarier aller Länder vereinigt euch!” 
82 Ibid.: “Die politische Herrschaft kann also durch den Versuch, eine allumfassende ‘Dekoration’ der 
Öffentlichkeit herzustellen bzw. herstellen zu lassen, erreichen dass die so aufgebaute ‘Welt des Scheins’ 
nicht mehr als Schein wahrgenommen wird, sondern als Teil einer Wirklichkeit interpretiert werden kann.” 
83 Süß, “Revolution und Öffentlichkeit in der DDR,” 911.  
84 Ibid.  
84 
 
which the National Front and its Aufklärungsgruppen (enlightenment/clarification task 
forces) worked to create the illusion of a public sphere (Scheinöffentlichkeit) that 
supported and legitimized the socialist regime by attempting to win over the population. 
Ultimately, such efforts functioned as propaganda that represented the authority of the 
regime and its popular support—whether real or not.  
 The SED intended to leave no public space without its presence. In addition to 
outdoor locations, the party naturally observed that thousands of residents regularly 
visited movie theaters, hospitals, stores, restaurants, train stations, post offices and 
doctors’ offices, and the party viewed these as opportunities to make the public aware of 
its efforts to create a unified Germany and a peaceful political situation.85 One way the 
party did this was through what it termed “individual visual propaganda” (individuelle 
Sichtwerbung). The intention here was to demonstrate the extent to which the population 
recognized the seriousness of the political situation (war brought on by the West) while 
confirming the establishment of a “democratic national consciousness.”86 More 
specifically, Aufklärungsgruppen attempted to convince Dresdeners to demonstrate their 
opinions and commitments in a public manner. Sometimes this just meant homemade 
placards with one’s political orientation (obviously favoring the SED) scribbled out, for 
example, “no blood for capitalism” or “I fight for peace.”87 Other times, a simple, 
handwritten poster pleased the party, for instance, that of the mother who proclaimed her 
desire to use her entire strength toward the establishment of peace.88 The party also asked 
                                                 
85 “Anleitung für die Verbesserung der Sichtwerbung in Stadt und Land,” Nationale Front des 
Demokratischen Deutschland; Landesausschuß Sachsen, o.D. (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 4502/0015;0024). An 
ideal type arrangement for Dresden. See appendix, figure three for an example of a proposed arrangement.  
86 “Anleitung für die Verbesserung der Sichtwerbung in Stadt und Land,” 0022.: “Demokratische 
Staatsbewusstein” 
87 Ibid., 0022. 
88 Ibid., 0034. 
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individuals to express themselves in concrete ways rather than with abstract or general 
beliefs, for example, with written calls for inter-German negotiations (Deutsche an einen 
Tisch!) or promises to remember February 13, 1945 (the night of the bombing) and 
campaign against the development of atomic weaponry.89 Other posters expressed 
commitments to community service as a result of that \ night, for example one housing 
community that promised to clear the local playground of rubble.90 
Among public authorities and institutions, those working to establish the visual 
cues of the official public sphere worked closely with transportation authorities at the 
Deutsche Reichsbahn,91 Straßenbahn, and VVB Kraftverkehr and the majority of these 
erected forms of Sichtwerbung. Inside public spaces such as train stations, the SED 
publicized the party’s slogans with banners that tied Germans to the Soviet Union or 
nationalistic slogans calling on “patriots” to defend the peace. In the National Front’s 
Aufklärungslokalen, or “enlightenment centers,” visitors could read slogans from the 
party’s literature, commitments from staff members, and view portraits of local and 
national leaders. In these spaces visitors also found “friendship corners”  
(Freundschaftsecken) designed to create the impression that the Soviet Union was the 
GDR’s best friend and that Stalin represented the greatest leader of socialist states.”92 
 The SED employed communal housing units  as a cheap and easy way to create 
the large, easy-to-read banners announced the collective opinions of the building, for 
instance: “Don’t forget February 13, 1945—fight for peace”; “Our Commitment: every 
                                                 
89 February 13, 1945—the night the Allies destroyed Dresden, though bombing raids continued on 14 and 
15 February. 
90 “Anleitung für die Verbesserung der Sichtwerbung in Stadt und Land,” 0027. 
91 Curiously, the East German train system retained this name. 
92 “Anleitung für die Verbesserung der Sichtwerbung in Stadt und Land,” 0032.  
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three percent of our gross earnings go to the peaceful rebuilding of Berlin.”93 Bulletin 
boards and display cases functioned as so-called “enlightenment” vessels that considered 
the important political questions of the day, and, not surprisingly, held their answers. 
Some posters, for example, made the choice a seemingly obvious one, such as between 
imperialist (Western) destruction and peaceful socialist re-construction.94 Finally, 
returning to the example given at the beginning of the section, the SED and its education 
task forces expected storeowners to use their storefronts as spaces for the visible 
representation of workers’ accomplishments and improving living standards. Authorities 
would persuade shopkeepers that such window decorations, whether handwritten 
opinions, or portraits of socialist statesmen—always arranged with care and with relevant 
text—represented their readiness to take an active role in the SED’s goals.95 The sum of 
these words, displays, portraits, and personal declarations showcased one facet of the 
SED’s official public sphere—a world of appearances. 
 
Theatrical Representations of Party Support 
 “Solidarity knows no borders” claimed one headline in the Sächsische Zeitung 
that promoted East German workers’ declarations of support for West German workers’ 
strike movements.96 Such occurrences became increasingly regular in the GDR’s early 
period as the SED aimed to confirm imagined communities, bound in solidarity and 
public protest that would help legitimize its rule and undermine the leadership of the 
Federal Republic and its supporters.  
                                                 
93 Ibid., 0037.  
94 Ibid., 0039-0040. 
95 Ibid., 0050.  
96 “Solidarität kennt keine Grenzen,” Sächsische Zeitung, 25 Januar, 1951.  
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 The party’s representation appeared in the form of choreographed public 
demonstrations of support for the party—events that participants in, and historians of, the 
June 17 uprising might use as a point of contrast when discussing the authenticity of that 
demonstration. For instance, to celebrate the SED’s fifth year in existence and protest the 
remilitarization of the FRG, the party published detailed plans in the newspaper for the 
day’s event that included the streets along which workers from each city district would 
march before reaching Pirnaischer Platz, a significant public square in Dresden.97 Five 
days later, headlines claimed that more than 200,000 workers demonstrated, representing, 
according to the Sächsische Zeitung, a manifestation of their “faith in their party, the 
party of the working class.”98 The workers approached the square carrying images of 
party leaders and banners with slogans that “made it clear that the will of the people 
fought for peace at the Soviet Union’s side.”99 Such official public demonstrations 
functioned as a political ritual that represented national and international solidarity and 
political strength between not only the citizenry and its regime, but between the GDR and 
other socialist nations. Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953 provided an opportunity to 
practice the theatrics of this type of representation on an especially grand scale. 
As Stalin’s health failed in the spring of 1953, questions surrounding his 
inevitable demise shifted to the forefront of political debate but remained behind closed 
doors.100 Of course, policy shifts as they related to the GDR would not be made available 
                                                 
97 “Am kommenden Sonntag heraus zur Großkundgebung!” Sächsische Zeitung, April 18, 1951. 
98 “Über 200000 auf der Kundgebung in Dresden,” Sächsische Zeitung, April 23, 1951”: “Vertrauens der 
Werktätigen zu ihrer Partei, zur Partei der Arbeiterklasse” 
99 “Über 200000 auf der Kundgebung in Dresden:” “Zeigten klar den Willen unsres Volkes...an der Seite 
der Sowjetunion für Frieden kämpft” 
100 For more on Stalin’s death, see: Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture 
from Revolution to Cold War (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000); Serhy Yekelchyk, Stalin's 
Citizens: Everyday Politics in the Wake of Total War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Georges 
Bortoli, The Death of Stalin (New York: Praeger, 1975). 
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for public consumption for some time, and for several days, Stalin’s status as savior and 
leader of the German people took center stage in the official public sphere. His death 
afforded the SED and its regional leadership in Dresden an occasion to represent its 
political mission in the ritual and pageantry that accompanied the leader’s burial in 
Moscow. Press and radio transmissions provided the means by which to involve the 
regime’s citizens and publicize popular emotion. Of course at the same, Stalin’s death 
offered RIAS and other critics an opportunity to produce and transmit critical 
programming into the GDR that undermined the SED’s attempts to project political 
power and international solidarity (more on this in chapter two).  
Official news of Stalin’s deteriorating condition appeared in regional media via 
ADN Moscow (Allgemeine Deutscher Nachrichtendienst- General East German News 
Service) on March 5 and East German readers would have learned precise details of his 
circulatory problems and blood pressure and thirty-six breaths per minute and 38.2 (grad) 
temperature.101 On March 6, the 16:00 hours update informed East Germans that his 
situation had become even more serious. While the news seemed grave, the SED used the 
opportunity to remind East Germans that they were part of a larger, international, 
socialist community. Neues Deutschland informed readers that Pravda, the official organ 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), reminded its readers that the power 
of the party rested on the communion between party and masses: “The great strength of 
the party of Lenin and Stalin lies in its close bond between the millions of workers; in its 
                                                 
101 “Bulletin über den Gesundheitszustand J.W. Stalins vom 5. März 1953, 2.00 Uhr,” Neues Deutschland, 
6 März, 1953. 
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unbreakable unity with the people.”102 This publicized closeness and community would 
become a recurring theme throughout the mourning period. 
ADN distributed to the newspapers the telegrams of the Central Committee of the 
SED sent to the Soviet Central Committee regarding Stalin’s health. Such telegrams 
functioned as a reminder that East Germans’ imagined community of “peace-loving 
humanity” had also received and been moved by the news. “The Soviet people,” 
according to the version published in the Sächsische Zeitung, “and the working people of 
the entire world have been affected by the news of Stalin’s condition….These telegrams 
from the communist and workers’ parties speak to the resolve…to come together in these 
difficult times.”103 The message from the SED to the CPSU noted that the Soviet leader 
had delivered the German nation from fascist enslavement and its citizenry now “felt 
bound” with the Central Committee of the Soviet Union and with the “great Soviet 
people” with whom Germans would continue to strengthen their bond.104 In a similar 
telegram, the council of ministers communicated with the Soviet government to 
communicate that the entire East German people would fight to strengthen the friendship 
between the Soviet and German peoples and continue the struggle to generate a socialist 
society.105  
The East German media began transmitting expressions of solidarity through a 
transnational public sphere, extending to the other Soviet Socialist Republics and western 
                                                 
102 “Die grosse Einheit von Partei und Volk,” Neues Deutschland, 6 March, 1953: “Die große Stärke der 
Partei Lenins und Stalins liegt in ihrer engen Verbundenheit mit den Millionen Massen der Werktätigen; in 
ihrer unlöslichen Einheit mit dem Volke. ” 
103 “Eng Verbunden mit dem Sowjetvolk,” Sächsische Zeitung, Freitag, 6 März, 1953: “das sowjetische 
Volk und die Werktätigen der ganzen Welt mit der Erkrankung J.W. Stalins betroffen hat. ….Aus den 
Telegrammen der Kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien spricht die Entschlossenheit, sich in diesem 
schweren Tagen noch fester…zu scharen.” 
104 Ibid: “Fühlen wir uns verbunden” 
105 “Ministerrat der DDR an die Regierung der UdSSR,” Sächsische Zeitung, 6 March 1953. 
90 
 
states. ADN published the telegrams of the Polish Unified Workers’ Party which spoke in 
the name of the Polish nation and its expressed empathy regarding the news of Stalin’s 
condition.106 The official telegram from the Czech government communicated that its 
people would, in these difficult times, “work to build socialism alongside the Soviet 
people in still greater unity and brotherly love.”107 The SED also publicized Western 
telegrams of support from France, which claimed that the entire nation had been 
“grievously affected” and affirmed the brotherly bond of the French Communist Party 
and the Soviet people.108 The SED also published similar telegrams from the communist 
parties in Great Britain, Belgium, and Italy, all of which represented the extensive 
imagined community grieving together. 
On March 6, GDR radio broadcasted: “The heart of a comrade and general carrier 
of Lenin’s idea, the wise leader and teacher of the Communist Party of the Soviet People, 
Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, has ceased to beat.”109 Word of Stalin’s passing also 
reached Germans in the Dresden region via 6,000 special editions of the Sächsische 
Zeitung that arrived via courier at one o’clock in the afternoon on March 6.110 Local 
authorities in Dresden received orders to distribute some to political operatives (agitators 
and Aufklärer) and others publically. Dresdeners reportedly ripped newspapers from the 
hands of distributors at the Postplatz.111 Flags outside of workplaces and factories now 
                                                 
106 “Telegramm der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei und der Polnischen Regierung,” Neues 
Deutschland, 6 März, 1953. 
107 “Erklärung des ZK der KPC und der Tschechoslowakischen Regierung,” Neues Deutschland, 6 March, 
1953. 
108 “Telegramm des ZK der KP Frankreichs,” Neues Deutschland, 6 März, 1953: “schmerzlich getroffen” 
109 Available at http://www.17juni53.de/audio/5303_1.mp3 “Das Herz des Mitkämpfers und Generalen 
Fortsetzer der Sache Lenins. Den weisen Führers und Lehrers der Kommunistischen Partei und des Sowjet 
Volkes Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, hat aufgehört zu schlagen.” 
110 Telefonische Durchsage am 6.3.53, 14,40 Uhr, Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung – aufgenommen: Walter 
(SächsHStA 11859 Nr. IV 4.04 Nr.73).  
111 “Es wird vollendet, was Stalin begann,” Sächsische Zeitung, 10 März, 1953. 
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flew at half-mast and comrades had begun preparations for public displays of grief. 
Makeshift Trauerkundgebungen, had already begun before lunch on March 6 after the 
special edition of the newspaper publicized Stalin’s passing. His life works were honored 
and some even featured music.112  
ADN represented the communal grieving spreading over the Eastern Bloc: “All of 
Poland…is in deep mourning,” wrote ADN.113 The message of the official telegram from 
the Polish government, reprinted in the local paper, noted the Poles’ call for unity with 
the Soviet people.114 In Romania, the news reports, apparently, or at least according to the 
ADN report in Neues Deutschland, prompted workforces in the factories, in the city and 
in the countryside, to gather and give thanks to Stalin while pledging their close solidarity 
with the Soviet Union.115 The Romanian newspapers, adorned with a black border to 
signify the nation’s mourning, allegedly, according to the SED, spoke for the entire 
Romanian people whose sorrow at this time cut around across societal lines.116 The SED 
published similar reports from other Eastern Bloc nations. Such communications form 
instructive examples of socialist governments’ representations of a unified and supportive 
imagined community that constituted the most important basis for their claims to 
legitimacy. Stalin’s funeral would offer optimal conditions to create and publicize scenes 
full of imaginings that represented the authority of communist regimes. 
The planning for the scenes that would unfold in Dresden the following Tuesday, 
March 10, began on March 6. Leadership in Dresden held a quick meeting with all the 
                                                 
112 FDGB Bezirks-org. Komitee Dresden, Dresden, den 6.3.1953 (SAPMO-BArch DY 34/25107). 
113 “Die Völker Trauern um Stalin,” Neues Deutschland, 7 März, 1953: “Ganz Polen steht in Zeichen tiefer 
Trauer den Tod” 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
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mass organizations in the region immediately after getting official news of Stalin’s death 
from Moscow. 117 The Central Committee sent out the guidelines for the demonstration in 
Berlin and operational instructions for regional party leaders laid out their immediate 
tasks. Agitators found themselves charged with stirring up materials that could provide 
representational material for the GDR’s media outlets: mobilizing workforces and 
procuring “commitments” concerning production targets, heightened awareness of 
provocateurs and saboteurs, and aid for security apparatuses and the police, along with 
declarations from the politically unaffiliated who planned to join the party.118 
The Monday (March 9) edition of the Sächsische Zeitung revealed the schedule 
for the Trauerkundgebung in Dresden and spoke for the “entire working class of the 
Dresden region” which expressed their sympathies and veneration to Stalin.”119 Stalin’s 
entombment was scheduled for noon that day (Moscow time) and the SED would stage 
parallel ceremonies throughout the GDR (two hours earlier).120 At 9:00 A.M. in Dresden, 
the state was to broadcast grieving music over the airwaves for one hour and everyone 
was to be in place at 9:55 A.M.121 At precisely 10:00 A.M. the GDR’s airwaves were to 
go silent for five minutes. Sirens in the factories in Dresden (district) were scheduled to 
sound at 10:00 A.M. and five minutes after to signal to the workers the beginning and 
conclusion of five minutes of silence. Traffic through the city was to come to a standstill. 
Throughout the region’s places of administration, schools, and other institutions 
concurrent events were to take place. The leader in each space was to deliver a message 
                                                 
117 FDGB Bezirks-org. Komitee Dresden, Dresden, den 6.3.1953 (SAPMO-BArch DY 34/25107). 
118 Telefonische Durchsage am 6.3.53, 14,40 Uhr, Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung – aufgenommen: Walter 
(SächsHStA 11859 Nr. IV 4.04 Nr. 73).  
119 Sächsische Zeitung, 9 März, 1953. 
120 “Beisetzung J.W. Stalins im Lenin-Mausoleum,” Neues Deutschland, Sonntag, 8 März, 1953. 
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sent by the Soviet regime. The secretary of the Party Organization of the SED was to read 
a telegram from the Central Committee of the SED. Shortly after ten, GDR radio would 
broadcast the funeral procession (Trauermarsch) live from Moscow.122 At noon in Berlin, 
residents would take part in a mourning march to Stalin Avenue, the monumental street 
in Berlin under construction as a tribute to the late soviet leader.123 Throughout the day, 
the smaller towns and cities through the GDR were to stage simultaneous demonstrations 
to honor Stalin. Those who marched would present the flags of the GDR along with 
images of Stalin along with Marx and Engels. Such events were to be “scrupulously 
organized.”124  
At 12:00 P.M., GDR radio transmitted the funeral procession live from Moscow: 
“The thoughts of millions convene here at Red Square, at the Kremlin Wall in front of 
Lenin’s mausoleum that will also serve as Stalin’s last resting site.”125 The broadcast 
detailed the funeral procession and the placement of Stalin’s remains as Chopin’s famous 
“Funeral March” (Piano Sonata No. 2) played. In the early afternoon of that cold and 
windy Monday, the residents who had formed Kranzdelegationen (wreath carrying/laying 
delegations) throughout Dresden streamed out of factories and places of work, the 
administrative, and organizational houses toward the Unity Square. The wind billowed 
the banners which had written in gold, black and red the “eternal gratefulness” of the 
                                                 
122 “Sendung des Staatlichen Rundfunkkomittees am 9 März 1953,” Sächsische Zeitung, 9 März, 1953.  
123 The East German government renamed the street “Karl-Marx-Allee” in 1961. “Aufruf der 
Bezirksleitung der SED und des Magistrats von Groß-Berlin zum Trauermarsch anlässlich der Beisetzung 
J.W. Stalins,” Neues Deutschland, 8 März, 1953. 
124 “Die Bevölkerung des Bezirkes Dresden ehrt Stalin,” Sächsische Zeitung 9 März, 1953. See for instance 
the schedule for Radebeul Programm und Organisierung der Trauerfeiern am Tage der Beisetzung des 
Sarges des Genossen Stalin in Moskau, Sekretariat, Dresden, am 7.3.1953 (SächsHStA 11859 Nr. IV 4.04 
Nr. 73): “gewissenhaft organisiert” 
125 Available online at http://www.mdr.de/tv/programm/sendung501990.html: “Treffen sich die Gendanken 
von Millionen, hier auf dem roten Platz, hier an der Kreml Mauer, vor dem Lenin Mausoleum, das auch die 
letzte Ruhestätte Stalins sein wird.” 
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German people to “their greatest friend, their savior from the yoke of fascism and teacher 
who would give them a happy future.”126  
At three o’clock that afternoon Dresdeners packed the square to offer Stalin his 
last honors. The image of Stalin loomed over Dresdeners and the red, black and gold 
banners bowed before his likeness. The eyes of all those in attendance reportedly were 
drawn to the towering image of the “Führer…who was a father to us.”127 The regional 
SED leadership filed through and met with the friends of the Soviet Control Commission. 
All lingered at the Soviet Cenotaph before leaving a wreath at the image of the Soviet 
soldiers. Alongside Stalin’s image, guards, including a Soviet soldier, an officer from the 
East German barracked police force and a comrade from the Society for Sport and 
Technik, stood like statues. Together they formed an “uplifting symbol of the 
determination to defend peace, if necessary with arms, in memory of the great one who 
has passed.”128 The Sächsische Zeitung reported: Greek Pioneers, boys and girls, “who 
had seen the face of battle…move past the blazing flames of the offering cups. 
Awestruck, they lay their flowers down and raised their hands in a pioneer style 
greeting…”129 The streamers attached to the wreaths offered Dresden’s tributes to Stalin: 
“To the leader of the free people of the world,” and “To the best friend of the German 
people.”130 The various mass organizations constructed by the SED streamed by the 
memorial and an elderly woman slowly laid a bouquet of lilacs and paused for a moment 
of silence. As the wreaths piled up in the area of the monument, the workers began to 
                                                 
126 “Unsterblich schlägt sein Herz in unserem Herzen weiter,” Sächsische Zeitung, 9 März, 1953. 
127 Ibid.: “Ja, der uns Vater war” 
128 Ibid.: “Ein erhebendes Symbol der Entschlossenheit, im Sinne des großen Toten gemeinsam, wenn es 
sein muss, mit der Waffe in der Hand, den Frieden zu verteidigen.” 
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130 Ibid.: “Dem Führer des Weltfriedenslagers, Dem besten Freund des Deutschen Volkes”  
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stream into the area, carrying images of Stalin. As the sun set, the demonstrators, 
reportedly numbering around one hundred thousand, headed home.131  
That evening, GDR radio reported the mourning demonstrations from around the 
world.132 Telegrams from Dresden’s workplaces to the central authority in Berlin 
expressed the gratitude of various workforces for Stalin’s leading role in the German 
nation’s liberation from fascism. Reports from the Bezirksleitung in Dresden to Berlin 
indicated that local authorities were pleased with the outcome of the events. The FDGB 
claimed that the publicization (Popularisierung) of the services of “progressive peoples” 
throughout the world and the sympathy telegrams of the different parties and 
organizations had increased awareness among the workforces of these were published in 
the local press.133 The workers at the Rheostat Factory, according to the Sächsische 
Zeitung, for example, held a demonstration and sent their condolences via telegram to the 
CPSU and the Komsomol.134  
In the wake of Stalin’s death, Georgi Malenkov would appear to take the reins of 
a new collective leadership called the CPSU Presidium that included, among others, 
Vyacheslav Molotov, Nikita Khrushchev, Nikolai Bulganin, Kliment Voroshilov, Lazar 
Kaganovich, Anastas Mikoyan, Maksim Saburov, and Mikhail Pervukhin.135 Kaganovich, 
Bulganin, Beria, and Molotov became deputy chairmen. The move away from Stalinist 
policies—accelerated build-ups and an aggressive and paranoid world outlook—came 
less than one week after Stalin’s body had been laid to rest, with Malenkov, speaking to 
the Supreme Soviet, proclaiming that no situation was beyond peaceful resolution. 
                                                 
131 Ibid. 
132 “Sendung des Staatlichen Rundfunkkomitees am 9. März 1953,” Sächsische Zeitung, 9 März, 1953. 
133 Berichterstattung/Statistik, FDGB-Bezirks-Org. Komittee Dresden, Dresden, den 12.3.1953. 
134 “Des Grossen Erbes würdig erweisen,” Sächsische Zeitung, 10 März, 1953. 
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Détente seemed to sprout almost overnight, reflected for instance in the Soviets’ decision 
to temper its media campaign against all things American.136 The Stalinist approach to 
socialist construction, mirrored in the accelerated program adopted by the GDR in 1952, 
ended in early June 1953, though not as quickly as Soviet leadership would have liked. 
Ulbricht and the SED leadership appeared either unaware of this seismic shift or 
willingly ignored it so as to continue along the Stalinist course until they found 
themselves summoned to Moscow in the summer of 1953 and ordered to abandon their 
program. By this point, conditions and attitudes had begun to deteriorate in the GDR and 
the rival public sphere, most notably foreign broadcasting and rumors, increasingly 
chipped away at the SED’s prestige and its claims to legitimacy. The next chapter will 
survey these forces. 
 
Conclusions  
The representational culture developed and practiced by the SED in these postwar 
years constituted a multi-pronged propaganda campaign. Radio broadcasts represented 
the vigor and virtue of the Soviet system under Stalin and the international community, 
including the GDR, which stood to profit from it. Radio also represented imagined 
communities of support in local, national, and transnational spheres, especially through 
the publicization of organized protests. As radio listenership remained unreliable due to 
technical issues and a programming schedule that failed to resonate with listeners, the 
party relied on the construction of public loudspeaker systems and factory radio systems 
to transmit their messages to a more-or-less captive audience. Visually, the party 
represented its legitimacy in the official public sphere with banners, images, and 
                                                 
136 The “Hate America Campaign” 
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orchestrated expression of public opinion. Carefully choreographed demonstrations 
functioned as political ritual and evidence of popular support. The aggregate of these 
activities amounted to a representational culture furnished with modern tools and 
designed to project the confidence and virtue of the SED while simultaneously disguising 
its doubts and lack of genuine support. 
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Chapter Two  
 
The Rival Public Sphere in the Dresden Region, 1945-1953 
 
 
 
“RIAS will fight for the principles until twenty million Germans in East Germany again 
have the opportunity to unite in a political and economic relationship with West 
Germany.”  
 
- from W. H. – RIAS Direktor 
to A.S., a critic of the station in Dresden, 19491 
 
 
“On the territory of West Berlin the American station RIAS constitutes a great espionage 
and subversive organization. RIAS carried special instruction broadcasts for its agents 
on the execution of acts of diversion and sabotage and destructive activities” 
 
- General W.I. Tschuikov 
Chairman, Soviet Control Commission for Germany 
In a letter to High Commissioner Walter J. Donnelly 
October 1, 19522 
 
 
“There are no refugees fleeing the GDR, land of milk and honey; these rumors, lies out of 
the whole cloth, are invented by RIAS, the Northwest German Radio, the Western press 
and other capitalist crooks in order to create a psychological atmosphere for war against 
[the GDR] and the [Soviet Union].” 
 
-Radio Berlin I, II, III, March 4, 19533 
 
 
“I can say without intending to flatter you that the entire East Zone population listens to 
RIAS.” 
 
-Frau A.A., Eberswalde4  
 
                                                 
1 Abschrift - Berlin, am 6 Juli 1949, von W. H. – RIAS Direktor an A.S. (SächsHStA 11856 IV/A Nr. 
2008, Bl.99): “RIAS wird für die Prinzipien kämpfen, bis die 20 Millionen Deutschen von Ostdeutschland 
wieder in der Lage sein werden, sich in politischer und wirtschaftlicher Beziehung mit Westdeutschland zu 
vereinigen.” 
2 Untitled document. RIAS News Clippings, Radio Scripts, Magazine Articles, 1953 (G. A. Ewing 
Collection, G. C. Marshall Foundation, VMI 1/6). 
3  “March 4, 1953: Radios Berlin I, II, III,” RIAS News Clippings, Radio Scripts, Magazine Articles, 1953 
(G. A. Ewing Collection, G. C. Marshall Foundation 1/6).  
4 “Background of RIAS” – RIAS listener mail, RIAS Programming & Organization Information (G. A. 
Ewing Collection, G. C. Marshall Foundation, VMI 1/4, #132).  
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This chapter will advance several arguments, chief among them is that a rival 
public sphere developed alongside the official public sphere discussed in the previous 
chapter. This was the arena where ideas that challenged the SED’s hegemony originated, 
circulated and began to adopt a more revolutionary tone after Stalin’s death in March of 
1953. The rival public sphere existed in the form of foreign radio broadcasts, rumors, and, 
to a lesser degree, leaflets. The ever-popular programming produced by RIAS 
represented an especially powerful element in the rival public sphere. Indeed, the 
station’s popularity and its relentless criticism of the GDR chipped away at the 
legitimacy of the state’s government and eventually helped make revolution thinkable in 
the summer of 1953.  
 
RIAS: Radio in the American Sector 
 
One example of such criticism turned up in the mail at the Görlitz SED office on  
 
December 2, 1953: 
Dear God, make me deaf, 
so I never believe RIAS. 
 
Dear God, make me dumb, 
so I never end up in prison. 
 
Dear God make me blind, 
so that I accept everything as true. 
 
And since I am deaf, dumb, and blind, 
Yep, then I must be Stalin’s favorite child.5 
                                                 
5 Informationsmeldung Nr. 7/53. Dresden, den 20.2.1953 an die ZK für Staatliche Kontrolle Berlin, 
Zentrale Kommission für Staatliche Kontrolle, Bezirksinspektion Dresden (SAPMO-BArch DC 1 6212): 
  
 Lieber Gott mach mich taub 
 Dass ich nie dem RIAS glaub. 
 
 Lieber Gott mach mich stumm 
 Dass ich nie ins Zuchthaus komm. 
 
 Lieber Gott mach mich blind 
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Indeed GDR Radio labeled RIAS the “Pied Pipers of U.S. occupation” in March of 1953 
in reference to RIAS, displaying one side of the Cold War confrontation. 6 The station’s 
architects and fans would have suggested that RIAS offered an objective source of 
information for East Germans and an alternative to the overtly politicized, state-censored 
information from domestic outlets. To a large degree, that was accurate.7 This chapter 
conceptualizes RIAS as a powerful institution in the larger rival public sphere that 
operated as a quasi-forum for the productions of candid critiques and the anonymous 
airing of grievances while providing the framework for an imagined community of 
listeners. On this second point, one notes that the similarity between radio broadcasting 
(or radio listening) and print media did not escape Benedict Anderson in 1983 when he 
wrote that “Radio made it possible to bypass print and summon into being an aural 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Dass ich alles für richtig befind. 
 Denn bin ich erst taub, stumm u. blind 
 Ja dann bin ich Josef Stalins Lieblingskind 
 
6 RIAS News Clippings, Radio Scripts, Magazine Articles 1953, 1/6 (G. A. Ewing Collection, G. C. 
Marshall Foundation, VMI); There is a considerable body of literature examining the Cold war 
confrontation in the air airwaves, though Radio Free Europe gets probably the bulk of the attention on the 
American side. For a recent and excellent history of RIAS and its role in the Cold War radio contest in 
Berlin, see Nicholas Schlosser, Cold War on the Airwaves: The Radio Propaganda War Against East 
Germany (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2015). Other useful general studies include: Herbert 
Kundler, RIAS Berlin: Eine Radiostation in einer geteilten Stadt (Berlin: Reimer, 1994); Donald R. 
Browne, International Radio Broadcasting: The Limits of the Limitless Medium (New York: Praeger, 1982) 
who suggests (correctly) that RIAS served as a prototype for RFE and Radio Liberty; James Wood, History 
of International Broadcasting, Volume 2 (Bath, England: Bookcraft, 2000); Richard H. Cummings Cold 
War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe, 1950-1989 (Jefferson, North 
Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2009); Arch Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War 
Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000); A 
Ross Johnson, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond (Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 2010); Bernd Stöver, Der Kalte Krieg: 1947 – 1991: Geschichte eines radikalen 
Zeitalters 1947-1991 (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2007); A Ross Johnson and R. Eugene Parta, eds., 
Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, A Collection of Studies and 
Documents (Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 2010); Michael Nelson, War of the Black Heavens: The 
Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997); Michael 
Kuhlmann, Kalter Krieg im Äther - Der Ost-West-Konflikt in politischen Radioinformationssendungen der 
beiden deutschen Staaten 1945-1970 (Norderstedt: Grin Verlag, 1988); Thomas Lindenberger, ed., 
Massenmedien im Kalter Krieg: Akteure, Bilder, Resonanzen (Köln: Böhlau, 2006) See Lindenberger’s 
introduction here for an overview of the function of mass media in the Cold War.   
7 See Schlosser, Cold War on the Airwaves.  
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representation of the imagined community where the printed page scarcely penetrated.”8 
Others have drawn parallels between the mass simultaneity of newspaper reading and 
radio listening, whereby millions of Germans performed this daily ceremony that formed 
the basis of Anderson’s model. The division of Germany, which felt so provisional to so 
many in the early years of the GDR, meant that the political boundaries of the two states 
could easily be penetrated and challenged, if not dismissed, by a station like RIAS.9 This 
chapter will show that the imagined community created by RIAS was a protestor nation 
that actively campaigned for a unified Germany. The following sections will present this 
conceptualization of RIAS with a short history of the station’s origins, followed by a 
quantitative and qualitative review of the station’s listenership and its programming, 
reception, and effects on the Dresden region.  
 
Founding RIAS 
RIAS evolved out of the U.S. Army’s “DIAS,” or “Wired Radio in the American 
Sector” and quickly became the dominant force in the rival public sphere.10 Created on 
November 21, 1945 at the order of the U.S. Office of Military Government – Berlin 
Sector, Communications Branch, the station grew out of the Soviet refusal to place the 
                                                 
8 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 56, note 28.  
9 See Michael Lemke’s study, in which he discusses the openness and lingering unity of Berlin before the 
Wall—despite the sides’ politically bellicose governments. Michael Lemke, Vor der Mauer: Berlin in der 
Ost-West-Konkurrenz 1948 bis 1961, (Böhlau: Cologne, 2011). While Dresden, of course existed with a 
very different geopolitical arrangement, residents here regularly traveled to Berlin. For other recent work 
that considers radio’s facility to construct or maintain imagined communities, see Michele Hilmes, Radio 
Voices: American Broadcasting, 1922-1952 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 11-12; 
Susan J. Douglas, Listening In: Radio and the American Imagination, from Amos ‘n’ Andy and Edward R. 
Murrow to Wolfman Jack and Howard Stern (New York: Random House, 1999), 23-4; Carolyn Birdsall, 
Nazi Soundscapes: Sound, Technology and Urban Space in Germany, 1933-1945 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2012), 118.  
10 DIAS or Drahtfunk im Amerikanischen Sektor. 
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Reichsender Berlin under allied control.11 DIAS, under American control, began 
broadcasting on February 7, 1945, to provide a “mass medium of expression for the 
democratic West in Berlin and the Soviet Zone.”12 Early schedules offered seven hours of 
programming and the station changed its name to RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) 
following the switch to over-the-air transmission in September of 1946. Compared with 
the Soviets’ Berlin transmitter that operated at 10,000 watts, RIAS only utilized a 1000-
watt transmitter for a short time before its lack of power quickly prompted the installation 
of more powerful units. Staff size grew and the need for a larger facility landed the 
operation at its headquarters on Kufsteiner Straße in Schoenberg, Berlin, on July 6 1948. 
To offset problems related to a loss of nighttime signal while increasing broadcasting 
power to Thuringia and Saxony, authorities installed a second transmitter (medium wave) 
in Hof, Bavaria. In 1950, the station procured clearer frequencies for the two transmitters 
and thus strengthened its range to include portions of West Germany and other areas of 
Central Europe. Another, smaller power upgrade of twenty watts helped mitigate 
problems related to daytime short-wave transmission in August of 1951 and the power 
was again supplemented with a 300-watt transmitter in January of 1953 to counteract 
Soviet jamming.13 The early development of RIAS, then, looked quite similar to the GDR 
stations as both sought to increase transmitting power as part of an effort to fashion the 
                                                 
11 RIAS was also the official station of the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany 
(HICOG).  
12 “RIAS, Berlin,” United States. Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany, Information Services 
Division. Available at http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?id=History.RIAS. 
Background on RIAS, RIAS Organization and Programming Information 1/4, (G. Ewing Collection, G. C. 
Marshall Foundation, VMI #132, 1/8).  
13 Rüter –Ansprache bei der Einweihung des 300 Rias-Kilowatt-Senders, 15.1.53 Br., RIAS, RIAS, 
Documenta, Sondersendungen, 15.1.53 – 30.11.54 (DRA Potsdam, B304-01-00-0012).  
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largest listening community possible.14 Of course, the messages produced by RIAS 
diametrically opposed those produced by its domestic competition.   
 
RIAS Programming  
 Like the GDR’s domestic radio stations, RIAS attempted to pull listeners into 
aural communion with the fellow listeners and the West by creating instances where the 
audience concurrently consumed political, cultural, and intellectual information. RIAS 
existed primarily as a political instrument and institution and its programming reflected 
this reality. By 1951, the station was on the air around the clock and news and politics 
accounted for 29% of its programming.15 The most popular programs among RIAS’s 
offerings included news (42%) and musical programs (22%), which demonstrates an 
inverse result when compared with listener preferences for the GDR’s programming.16 
The station broadcasted fifteen newscasts daily during the week and one fewer on Sunday, 
all of which ranged from three to fifteen minutes. A 1952 study by DIVO revealed that 
news and political commentaries constituted the most popular types of programming.17 
By 1953, weekly output of program hours included 3.5 hours designed for the GDR, 3.5 
hours for all Germans, and 1.5 hours aimed at West Germans, though the station noted 
that there was a fair amount of cross-listening.18 When asked what shows they listened to 
specifically, “Berlin Speaks to the Zone,” topped the list with 45% of adults (and 34% of 
youth) tuning in five-to-six times per week. This particular show had originally formed 
                                                 
14 RIAS, Berlin 13-4; See also: Petra Galle and Axel Schuster, Archiv- und Sammlungsgut des RIAS Berlin: 
Ein Findbuch zum Bestand im Deutschen Archiv (Potsdam: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2000); 
Schlosser, Cold War on the Airwaves; Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom, 13-4. 
15 “RIAS, Berlin”  
16 Country Report on Radio – East Germany. Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research, 
Reports and Related Studies, 1948-1953 (NARA RG 306 Box 29 A1 Entry 1007A).  
17 “Some General Patterns of Listening to RIAS,” RIAS Coverage and Programming as Evaluated by East 
Zone Listeners, Report 170, Series 2, February 10, 1953. HICOG 170 (NARA RG 306 A1 1005 box 5).  
18 Ibid. 8.; “Country Report on Radio” (NARA RG 306 Box 29 A1 Entry 1007A). 
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the basis of RIAS programming, beginning in the spring of 1949 as the fifteen-minute 
program “Broadcast for Central Germany” that aired twice per week.19 “Current News 
Show” was the next most popular at 15% for each group followed by “Everyday life in 
the Zone.”20 Other popular shows included “It Happened in Berlin,” “About all-German 
Problems,” “Hit Parade” and “Coffee Circle.”21 These programs all paid close attention to 
the GDR and provided residents with information that was not available from domestic 
sources that drove the station’s popularity, with commentators taking care to avoid 
legitimizing the state by simply referring to it as “the Zone” or “The East Zone.”  
Other efforts to undermine the SED’s endeavors were more overt. “Berlin Speaks 
to the Zone,” produced specifically for the GDR and aired daily in ten and fifteen minute 
segments, aimed to help those living under the SED and to create and maintain feelings 
of hope for “liberation from communist rule.”22 The show had earned its reputation and 
listeners by offering information on how to deal with despotic laws while undermining 
the SED and warning East Germans of “soviet agents.”23 In the “unmasking segment,” 
announcers delivered the information as though “pronouncing a death sentence” for the 
exposed agents.24 For example, drawing on information from the East Bureau of the SPD, 
RIAS warned residents in the town of Niesky (Dresden Region) that local man Johannes 
Brückner, who resided at Zisendorferplatz, worked to set up a State Security Service 
Office at the county Economic Enterprise on Königshainer Straße.25 Other programs such 
                                                 
19 “RIAS, Berlin”  
20 “Some General Patterns of Listening to RIAS.” (NARA RG 306 A1 1005 box 5). 
21 Ibid.  
22 “Background on RIAS,” RIAS Organization & Programming Information, 1/4 (G. Ewing Collection, G. 
C. Marshall Foundation, VMI #132, 1/8).  
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid. 
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as “Mirror of the East” surveyed news in the satellite states and the USSR and operated 
as part of the “truth campaign.”26 
With its programming, RIAS aimed to maintain an intellectual connection 
between East Germans and western institutions. To reach all strata of East Germans, 
producers crafted shows aimed at white and blue collar workers (early in the morning), 
farmers, housewives, and a review of the “free” West German and foreign presses. 
Similarly, other programming incorporated listeners into West German conversations and 
functioned as a public through the airwaves. “Berlin Press Review” offered a comparison 
of the presses from East and West Berlin. Literary programs received less airtime than 
programs that used fictional characters to create the image of “man in the Western World 
and the questionability of everything human under totalitarian regimes.”27 Youth 
programs (“Jugendfunk”) similarly contrasted the lives of West German youths with 
those in the East and strived to create for the latter, a “sense of community with the 
West.”28 The program “European Hour,” which aired on Sundays, was also designed to 
create a sense of community for GDR residents, according to the station, by beaming 
news and music from London, Paris, Vienna, Zürich, Stockholm, the Benelux countries, 
Madrid, and Rome. The station also kept East Germans apprised of political affairs in the 
FRG with “Week in Bonn,” which provided a survey of political developments. “Report 
from the Berlin House of Representatives” transmitted recorded bits from the Berlin 
legislature every couple of weeks. Other programs aimed to combat Soviet indoctrination 
of children using fairy tales and stories that encouraged “humanity and tolerance.” Youth 
                                                 
26 “Background on RIAS,” RIAS Organization & Programming Information, 1/4 (G. Ewing Collection, G. 
C. Marshall Foundation, VMI #132, 1/8). 
27 Ibid. “Cultural Programs of Special Interest to Soviet Zone Listeners.” 
28 Ibid.  
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and young people listened to RIAS productions that criticized the Free German Youth 
and recounted youth activities in the West. “Youth in our Times” offered radio plays and 
discussions concerning the “human and political problems” that youth faced in the GDR. 
Finally, “University of the Air” presented lecture series by Western scientists, scholars, 
and other experts in their fields as a response to the “intellectual emergency situation” in 
the GDR.29  
RIAS combined politics and entertainment to satirize the GDR’s politicians and 
political actions. The most frequently listened to of such shows among adults, the 
comedy duo of Pinsel & Schnorchel, voiced by Erich Kestin and Friedrich Steig, 
ridiculed the SED’s various missteps and the Soviet agenda writ large. The show began 
in 1951 and aired on Saturday evenings.30 The eponymous hosts portrayed the roles of 
two communist functionaries, one dedicated and the other comically overzealous. They 
met at a fictitious tavern called “The Old Red Mill” where they figured out how to avoid 
political deviations while reviewing the complexities of the Soviet system.31 The show 
also mocked the GDR’s imagined (in both senses of the word here) bonds with the Soviet 
Union and China forged by its media apparatuses (see chapter one). The station 
sometimes did this with jokes, for example: 
An airplane with a policeman, a Czech, a Pole, and a Russian transferring 
troops from one military exercise location to another suddenly has engine 
troubles. The pilot informs the passengers that three of the four soldiers 
have to jump from the plane. None of the four has a parachute. With a 
salute to President Bierut, the Pole jumps out first. The Czech shouts 
                                                 
29 “Background on RIAS,” RIAS Organization & Programming Information (G. Ewing Collection, G. C. 
Marshall Foundation, VMI 1/4) 
30 “RIAS Coverage and Programming as Evaluated by East Zone Listeners.” Surveys suggested that 66% of 
adults listened to this show once per week.  
31 RIAS Pamphlet, 31; Margarete Wohlan, "Pinsel und Schnorchel" - Kabarettistische Reihe mit Erich 
Kestin und Friedrich Steig, RIAS 1951-1959 Aus den Archiv, Beitrag vom 28.05.2012. Deutschlandradio 
Kultur. http://www.deutschlandradiokultur.de/pinsel-und-
schnorchel.1261.de.html?dram:article_id=190778: "Zur Roten Mühle" 
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“Long live Gottwald” and takes the plunge. The Russian grabs the German 
and tosses him out of the plane, calling out after him, “Long live German-
Soviet Friendship!”32  
 
 
Programming and Action 
 
RIAS took aim at what it perceived as anti-worker maneuvers in the GDR’s 
factories, which in 1951 appeared in the form of labor contracts designed to boost 
productivity.33 The station pointed out that workers in the GDR had no organs of their 
own as the SED had complete control of the nation’s media outlets. The regime had also 
co-opted the associations and clubs that traditionally formed the social basis for workers’ 
organization. Thus, RIAS would “arm” the workers and assume the role of advisor, 
“gathering and disseminating as much news as possible…to break down the isolation of 
the many worker groups” while hopefully “supplanting the lack of a free press.”34 The 
station aimed to operate as an organizational force for the opposition and provide a means 
to “combine the powers of hundreds and thousands of men and women.”35 Finally, the 
station functioned as a forum, boasting that it would “work out a single, strong line of 
                                                 
32 For the audio of this transcription (and other examples), see "Pinsel & Schnorchel" - Spitze Töne - 
Politische Satire des RIAS, available at http://rias1.de/sound4/rias_/pinsel/pinsel_und_schnorchel.html: Ein 
Flugzeug mit einem Volkspolizisten, einem Tschechen, einem Polen, und einem Russen, hat bei der 
Verlegung von einem Truppenübungsplatz zum andern plötzlich Motorschaden. Der Flugzeugführer gibt 
Anweisung: Drei von den vier Friedenskämpfern müssen die Maschine verlassen. Nur eine könnte notfalls 
drin bleiben. Alle vier haben keine Fallschirme. Mit einem Hoch auf Präsident Bierut, springt der Pole erst 
aus. Der Tscheche schreit “es lebe Gottwald!” und stürzt sich in die Tiefe. Da packt der Russe den 
Deutschen, wirft ihn schnell aus der Maschine, und ruft ihm nach: “Es lebe die Deutsch-Sowjetische 
Freundschaft!”   
33 A demand that stemmed from the Five-Year-Plan.  
34 “Special Report No. 1 – 1953 – An Analysis of the RIAS Campaign Against the Soviet Zone Collective 
Contracts for the Director of RIAS,” RIAS, Radio Branch, Information Division, Office of Public Affairs, 
Berlin Germany, February 18, 1953 (G. Ewing Collection, G. C. Marshall Foundation, VMI RIAS Official 
Reports #132 1/5). RIAS reported that the contracts called for a 60% increase in productivity while wages 
were to rise only 20%, so pay would remain the same but workers would have higher quotas.  
35 Ibid.  
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argument from [workers’ and listeners’] individual arguments” in order to present a 
unified front to the regime.36  
While the station had knowledge of the contract issue going back to early 1951, 
the campaign began, in a way, with a single worker about fifty kilometers outside of 
Dresden in mid-March, of that year.37 A man employed at the rolling mills in Riesa, 
which served as the pilot plant for the rollout of the new contracts, had received the 
collective contract for his plant, taken it home with him, and critiqued its content in the 
margins. He then mailed it to “Free Berlin” and it ended up in the hands of RIAS 
employees where it became the basis for a broadcast campaign against the contracts.38 
While station bosses had conceded that the contracts would eventually be forced into law 
everywhere, it aimed, through programming, to, at the very least, create a more genuine 
dialog regarding the contracts through careful evaluation while offering advice to GDR 
workers.  
RIAS went about this in several ways. Above all, hosts presented analyses of the 
factory contracts and pointed out the disadvantages they held for workers while arguing 
that the Soviet Union stood as the principal beneficiary. The station also suggested 
workers avoid negotiating when fewer than 100 persons were present in order to bargain 
from a position enhanced through “safety in numbers.”39 Early morning programs gave 
workers “practical, detailed advice on ways to combat the contracts without serious 
danger” and then capitalized on instances of resistance by publicizing the occurrences, 
                                                 
36 Ibid.  
37 Riesa was in the administrative region of Dresden between 1952 and 1990.  
38 “Special Report No. 1 – 1953 – An Analysis of the RIAS Campaign Against the Soviet Zone Collective 
Contracts for the Director of RIAS” (G. Ewing Collection, G. C. Marshall Foundation, VMI RIAS Official 
Reports #132 1/5). 
39 “Zur Information der Korrespondenten,” Berlin 24. April 1952, Release # 1630, Office of the United 
States High Commissioner for Germany Berlin Element, Information Branch (DRA Potsdam F304-01-
04/0004). 
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creating an imagined community of protestors.40 RIAS reports equipped workers with 
arguments received from colleagues around the GDR and encouraged those listening to 
confront party functionaries, forcing the FDGB into drawn out discussions and debates.41 
Evidence of RIAS’s influence also appeared in SED organs as authors bemoaned workers’ 
use of “RIAS arguments,” which perhaps inadvertently confirmed listenership.42 This put 
the regime on the defensive, forcing it to directly deploy propagandists (“an army of 
instructors”) in workplaces. Interestingly, RIAS encouraged workers to avoid these more 
skilled debaters and instead offer a cold shoulder and silence.43 The station received 
reports from workers that such tactics had shown the efficacy (and this was also 
confirmed in GDR press reports) of such methods, though at least one individual 
conceded that this approach might merely have been the most obvious one and not truly 
the brainchild of RIAS. Still, radio functioned as a surrogate for traditional workers’ 
publications and organization and made the tactics available to workers throughout the 
GDR. By making such information available to an entire nation, workers came to a 
“unified course,” they mitigated risk through collective action, and “the workers’ 
attitudes” according to RIAS’s own assessment, “became a mass-phenomenon against 
which the system was temporarily powerless.”44 This represented a powerful and 
distinctly modern development. 
RIAS appeared quite proud of its work here, further noting that “a major portion 
of the population of the Soviet Zone was brought together in opposition to the communist 
                                                 
40 Ibid.  
41 “Special Report No. 1 – 1953 – An Analysis of the RIAS Campaign Against the Soviet Zone Collective 
Contracts for the Director of RIAS” (G. Ewing Collection, G. C. Marshall Foundation, VMI RIAS Official 
Reports #132 1/5). 
42 Ibid., 32. 
43 Ibid., 26. 
44 Ibid., 28. This is RIAS’s own asessment that is in line with my reasoning.  
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regime and was thereby incalculably strengthened in its adherence to the West.”45 
Though the SED eventually forced through the contracts some six months later in the 
winter of 1951, Gerhard Haas, who led the anti-communist German Trade Union 
Federation advisory office in Berlin for Soviet Zone workers, later boasted: “Last year 
RIAS almost singlehandedly solidified anti-communist resistance in the Soviet Zone and 
turned individual resistance into mass resistance. I think we all ought to recognize this 
fact and implore RIAS to maintain this policy.”46 Such an outcome was indeed closely 
aligned with the station’s stated goal of creating “a new sense of solidarity against the 
rule of the Socialist Unity Party.”47 Later, this statement might seem to corroborate the 
SED’s claims that RIAS orchestrated the June 17 mass demonstrations. But perhaps the 
most striking achievement here was less obvious: by fostering resistance, RIAS 
controlled the optics of the situation and forced the SED to publicly impose the contracts 
against the will of the workers. The regime could have simply written the contracts into 
law overnight and perhaps generated less resistance, but by engaging in a prolonged, 
public—and highly publicized—debate, no matter how scripted the outcome, it came out 
a political loser. Such episodes used up the regime’s political capital—and real capital—
and whittled away its claims of popular support.48 
Only occasionally did RIAS find itself forced into a defensive stance. As 
discussed in chapter one, the “West-Tactics”49 employed by the East German State Radio 
                                                 
45 “Zur Information der Korrespondenten,” Berlin 24. April 1952, Release # 1630, Office of the United 
States High Commissioner for Germany Berlin Element, Information Branch (DRA Potsdam F304-01-
04/0004). 
46 Ibid.  
47 “Special Report No. 1 – 1953 – An Analysis of the RIAS Campaign Against the Soviet Zone Collective 
Contracts for the Director of RIAS” (G. Ewing Collection, G. C. Marshall Foundation, VMI RIAS Official 
Reports #132 1/5). 
48 Ibid.  
49 “West-Arbeit” 
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Committee, which broadcasted worker unrest and strikes in the FRG attempted to achieve 
similar results: create an imagined community of dissidents that could challenge the 
Adenauer government and the status quo of division.50 In the spring of 1953, RIAS 
responded to the reports and headlines that appeared in the SED-controlled press that 
claimed every such strike indicated—in the words of RIAS—“another step towards the 
collapse of the capitalist system.”51 Station editors took care to note that not only did 
these strikes in the FRG aim not to topple the government and that they also 
demonstrated what the SED simply refused to admit: that workers in the West were 
organized.52 
In sum, RIAS programming created an aural and imagined community that 
consisted of GDR listeners and representatives in the FRG while at the same time pulling 
East German listeners westward. The station achieved this by providing an ersatz forum 
for East (and West) Germans and placing East Germans in an everyday aural communion 
with West Germans. And like their communist counterparts, RIAS officials felt they were 
educating or enlightening an audience, although opponents of the SED would point out 
that residents of the GDR did not have access to reliable or non-partisan news. In this 
way, to claim that RIAS merely represented another simulated public sphere has some 
merit. Certainly, the station’s existence began and ended with an unwavering political 
position, but programming claimed it strived for objectivity in its reporting and more 
                                                 
50 “State Radio Committee” (GDR) 
51 “Werktag der Zone” Nr. 577, Freitag, den 6. März 1953, Hauptabteilung Politik, 5.35-5.40 (DRA 
Potsdam, 03 Werktag d. Zone - F003, B 304-01-08 / 0001): “ein Schritt weiter auf dem Wege zum 
Zusammenbruch des Kapitalistischen Systems.” 
52 Ibid.  
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importantly, its audience agreed.53 In that way, these efforts reflected the powerful and 
authentic impulse of a majority of East and West Germans to re-connect with one another 
and the SED appeared to stand in the way of this objective. It thus found itself the target 
of an unrelenting criticism that whittled away at its prestige and legitimacy.54 While the 
partition may not have existed because of the SED, according to at least one historian, the 
Americans and British were successful in establishing this narrative.55 And unfortunately 
for the SED, the Americans’ radio station in the GDR enjoyed a wide-ranging and 
dedicated listenership that appreciated its programs and made it only more difficult for 
the regime to communicate its positions and vision to the masses.  
 
Listenership in Dresden  
Middle-Germany Radio, a load of shit! RIAS… good! 
-written on a bathroom door in Bischofswerda, Dresden Region, 195256 
 
Compared to GDR broadcasting, RIAS programming found a larger and more 
enthusiastic audience. This meant that it more completely and effectively realized its 
mission in establishing an imagined community of listeners bound together in opposition 
to its Cold War adversaries. There are two main ways researchers can quantify and 
                                                 
53 See Nicholas Schlosser, “Creating an ‘Atmosphere of Objectivity’: Radio in the American Sector, 
Objectivity and the United States’ Propaganda Campaign against the German Democratic Republic, 1945–
1961,” German History 4 (2011): 610-627. 
54 One must keep in mind that the SED openly and regularly campaigned for re-unification at this time, but 
on generally unrealistic political terms.   
55 Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, 485-6.  
56 Gen Knorr - Betr.: Auszug aus dem Informationsbericht der Bezirksinspektion der ZKK Dresden vom 
25.9.1952, ZKK - Arbeitsgruppe Eberling, Berlin, den 3.10.1952 (SAPMO-BArch DC1 6212). This quote 
was written in a bathroom in Bischofswerda (Dresden Region): “Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk, große Scheiße! 
RIAS [und RIAS Österreich], gut!” [by “RIAS-Austria” the scribbler probably meant Rot-Weiß-Rot, an 
American-run station in postwar Austria] 
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qualify RIAS listenership in Dresden and the rest of the GDR: through Western surveys 
and functionaries’ observations from the SED record.  
In the early 1950s, RIAS was probably the most popular station in the Dresden 
region and the rest of the GDR. The surveys on the Western side, conducted by DIVO- 
Gesellschaft für Markt- und Meinungsforschung m.b.H., Frankfurt am Main, which had a 
contract with the Evaluation Staff at the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for 
Germany (HICOG) reveal listener preferences for Saxony in the early 1950s. In June of 
1951, in a survey of refugees Berlin found that among radio listeners, 78% of GDR 
residents listened mainly to RIAS while only 6% claimed not to listen at all. In the 
localized survey conducted by officials in Saxony, Radio Leipzig was the most popular 
domestic station among all GDR residents and refugees sampled in the West, attracting 
62% (13% frequent listeners and 49% occasional) of a refugee sample.57 These numbers, 
as pointed out in chapter one, possibly reflect the listening habits of approximately 
seventeen million East Germans with radio ownership in the early 1950s at about one set 
per five residents. In general, radio listening in the GDR was quite popular, with radio 
serving as the primary means by which East Germans received “reliable information” and 
maintained contact with the outside world.58 Among those questioned who came from 
Saxony (105 cases), 79% stated that they listened mainly to RIAS, while a mere 17% 
listened mainly to GDR stations. Listeners revealed that the most popular times to tune in 
were typically after lunch and in the evening hours between 6:00p.m. and 9:00p.m. 
Perhaps most tellingly, when asked if RIAS offered too many or too few political 
                                                 
57 “Country Report on Radio,” 5 (NARA RG 306 Box 29 A1 Entry 1007A). 
58 “East Zone Radio Listening – Trend and Current Evaluation of RIAS,” Report No. 189, Series 2, October 
30, 1953. Evaluation Staff – Office of Public Affairs Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 
HICOG 189 (NARA RG 306 A1 1005 Box 5); “Country Report on Radio” (NARA RG 306 Box 29 A1 
Entry 1007A). 
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broadcasts, only 7% of respondents felt the number should be lower. While the people 
surveyed here are not representative, the results do not contradict other evidence of the 
station’s popularity. For example, these numbers are essentially the opposite of the same 
findings of the Dresden-based survey in chapter one regarding the local station in 
Dresden.59 
Between 1951 and September 1953, RIAS listenership plateaued and eventually 
waned perhaps 20% or so due to Soviet jamming operations (it also did not help that most 
of the radio sets in the GDR were at least ten years old) and the threat of reprisal.60 It is 
difficult to track the decline with much precision though, as authorities in the GDR along 
with the Soviets began jamming on January 21, 1953, and then re-upped their jamming 
efforts following the June 17 Uprising in 1953 (see chapter five).61 There seem to have 
been other issues with reception by the fall of 1951, with 37% noting they often 
experienced interference, 33% sometimes interference, and 41% recalling [refugees] that 
they had clear reception.62 More problems arose in the fall of 1952 when GDR stations 
began broadcasting on the same frequencies as RIAS (and the Armed Force Networks) 
disturbing the signal.63 But interviews revealed that the majority of listeners experienced 
difficulties tuning in and almost all former residents stated that they depended on house 
electricity to power their radios. Only 4% could use batteries to power their sets in the 
event of power outages which remained a part of daily life in the GDR in the early 
1950s.64 The outages remained unpredictable, with 45% noting that they could not 
                                                 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid. 
61 “Country Report on Radio” (NARA RG 306 Box 29 A1 Entry 1007A). 
62 “East Zone Radio Listening” (NARA RG 306 A1 1005 Box 5) 
63 “Country Report on Radio” (NARA RG 306 Box 29 A1 Entry 1007A). 
64 “RIAS Coverage and Programming as Evaluated by East Zone Listeners,” Report #170, Series 2, 
February 10, 1953 (NARA RG 306 AL 1005 box 5). 
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forecast outages and thus these occurrences sometimes kept potential listeners from 
tuning in.65 Finally, the threat of government reprisal loomed, though the situation here 
remained somewhat fluid, since, as we will see, the SED chose not to outlaw the station. 
Despite such deterrents, RIAS broadcasts constituted a critical component in the 
rival public sphere. It offered Dresdeners what they deemed to be reliable news, palatable 
opinion, and popular entertainment. By doing so, RIAS became a significant force in 
public and private life in Dresden and the rest of the GDR. Group listening to RIAS 
appears to have been common, for example, at one banker’s home where up to fifteen 
people listened to RIAS and other western stations and a hospital where patients listened 
to the Voice of America programs RIAS transmitted.66 Or take the example of Comrade 
Otto T., a farmer in the Volksgut Kunnerwitz, who stayed at a spa where he reported 
hearing nothing but RIAS and other western news sources played over the speaker 
system during his five month stay.67 When asked why they listened to RIAS, 
interviewees most often mentioned that they sought alternative news sources that could 
provide “factual” news about political changes in the East and West and secondly, to 
“maintain contact with the free world and to obtain psychological reinforcement of their 
anti-communist attitude and opinions.”68 Interviews with East German refugees in May-
June 1951 showed that 55% of those questioned about word-of-mouth transmission of 
RIAS information stated this happened “very often” with another 25% stating “often.” 
The poll was detailed enough to also show that this communication process happened 
most often at the “opinion-leading level,” meaning “better-educated, professionals, and 
                                                 
65 Ibid.  
66 “Country Report on Radio” (NARA RG 306 Box 29 A1 Entry 1007A). 
67 “Betr.: Kreiskurheim Teicha,” Kreis Niesky an die Kreisleitung der SED Abt Agitation in Niesky. 
3.12.51 (SächsHStA 11856 Landesleitung Sachsen Nr. 271 Bl.12). 
68 “Country Report on Radio” (NARA RG 306 Box 29 A1 Entry 1007A). 
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higher income groups.”69 In some cases, leadership within the mass organizations 
complained that RIAS held an influence over entire units, for example within the 
Democratic Sport Movement in Dresden which prompted leadership to call for members 
to publically declare their intention to refrain from tuning in to RIAS.70 
One can also confirm RIAS listenership at the local level through regional SED 
reports, which reveal officials’ frustration and listeners’ enthusiasm and thus seem to 
corroborate the popularity suggested by the formal surveys. Since the late 1940s, local 
authorities frequently noted the presence of RIAS listening and what they perceived as 
RIAS-stimulated discussions.71 Authorities in Oelsnitz (later absorbed into the Karl 
Marx-Stadt Region that neighbored the Dresden Region), which lay in between the RIAS 
transmitter in Hof and Saxony, reported to leadership in Dresden that the stronger signal 
meant more RIAS “rabble rousing” in the region.72 Other reports from locales in the 
southern portion of what was still Saxony complained that a cross up on the wavelengths 
meant that RIAS had become so powerful that a large portion of the workers were forced 
to listen to the station.73 One comrade tuned into what had been Radio Leipzig and heard 
“Berlin speaks to the Zone” from RIAS—and that was not the only problem. He was 
shocked to learn that the broadcast reflected “exact knowledge of what a Comrade 
Glasser had said in a district committee meeting the previous day.”74 The comrade 
                                                 
69 Ibid.  
70 “Bericht.” Landessportausschuss Sachsen, Sektor Information, Dresden, den 3. April 1952 (SächsHStA 
11856 Landesleitung Sachsen IV/A Nr. 385 Bl.30). 
71 Abschrift - SED - Arbeitsgebiet Langebrück, 30. Juni 1949 an SED Kreisvorstand Dresden – PPA 
(SächsHStA 11856 Landesleitung Sachsen Nr. IV 2008, Bl.109).  
72 SED Kreisvorstand Oelsnitz an den Landesvorstand der SED Sachsen, Sekretariat, 15.3.50 (SächsHStA 
11856 Landesleitung Sachsen Nr. 271, Bl.1). 
73 SED Kreisvorstand Auerbach (Vogtl.) An den Landesvorstand der SED, PKM, 22.3.1950 (SächsHStA 
11856 Landesleitung Sachsen Nr. 271, Bl.3). 
74 “Abschrift - Vertraulich!” - Gez. Sigrid Krause Im Amt für Information Dresden A. L., Winer Str. 44 
Dresden, den 9.11.1950 An die SED Betriebsgruppe, z.HD.des. Gen. Heidler, Dresden A., 50 August-
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broached the possibility of sabotage and called for colleagues to explore how RIAS could 
have known about a meeting that had taken place the same day.75  
RIAS’s popularity manifested its reach in less obvious ways, too. Functionaries 
tuning into the station also presented a problem within the party and substantiated the 
station’s popularity and ability to find secondary transmission. Consider the following 
case that illustrates the source of information and opinion production RIAS had become 
in the small town of Zittau: Comrade L. walks into the room of Comrade M. and hears 
RIAS broadcasts playing in the open. Comrade L. looks into the situation and finds out 
that the Party reportedly instructed Comrade M. to regularly listen to RIAS broadcasts so 
as to better familiarize himself with the arguments of the regime’s opponents and more 
ably defend the SED’s positions.76  
It is difficult to say if the numbers of reports stating that RIAS broadcasts stirred 
up trouble through communities in the Dresden region increased following the 
accelerated construction of socialism in 1952, but such an assertion would hardly be a 
bold one—and this despite the station’s slightly lowered listenership due to political 
threats and jamming. The party quite often viewed rabble-rousing and resistance as the 
obvious byproduct of its accelerated planning packages and by December of 1952, 
individual reports from the counties in the Dresden region confirmed an “intensified class 
struggle.”77 For instance, officials noted that RIAS-rabble rousing had become noticeable 
                                                                                                                                                 
Bebel-Str. 19 (SächsHStA 11856 Landesleitung Sachsen Nr. 271, Bl.11): “Der Sender RIAS war genau 
unterrichtet von dem, was der Genosse Glasser in der gestrigen, also am 8.11.1950, stattgefundenen 
Kreisleitungssitzung gesagt hat.” 
75 Ibid.  
76 “Betr.: Abhören des RIAS-senders in Kreissekretariat Zittau” Kue./Ab. Abt. Agitation Dresden, am 
26.7.50 an Gen Lohagen u. Gen Schön gegeben (SächsHStA 11856 Landesleitung Sachsen Nr. 271 Bl.9). 
77 Zusammenfassung der eingegangenen Berichte über Feindtätigkeit aus den Kreisen auf Grund einer 
Anforderung des Sekretariats, SED-Bezirksleitung, Dresden, Leitende Organe der Partei und 
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to the point that some large-scale farmers now shirked their communal obligations in the 
belief that “the Amis were coming anyways and they would get their estates back 
again.”78  
The extensive influence of RIAS in the GDR suggested by surveys of listeners 
and the SED grumbling about the station’s pervasiveness in the east is further 
substantiated by the sheer volume of letters the station received. From 1948 through May 
of 1953, RIAS received 794,550 mail receipts and monthly listener mail averaged almost 
2,000 pieces from the GDR and West Berlin—which represented a mere 10-15% of the 
total volume received. Prior to March of 1952, one-third of the mail received came from 
the GDR before increased border controls stemmed the flow of letters. The Dresden 
region represented about 10% of the GDR’s population which, based on the average 
listenership levels in the area, suggests that residents there probably composed and 
mailed approximately 200 letters per month.79 RIAS found in these letters considerable 
reinforcement that its programming resonated with listeners in the GDR. “Your station is 
the only thing that gives us hope and confidence – hope that one day things will be 
different for us,” wrote one anonymous resident from Saxony.80 A housewife in Görlitz 
wrote to the station noting that “For a long time it’s been on my mind to thank you for the 
courage and inspiration you give us with your broadcasts….keep on as you are so that we 
                                                                                                                                                 
Massenorganisationen – Sektor Parteiinformation. 1.12.52 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2.5 Nr. 107, Bl.26-
32): “Verstärkenden Klassenkampfes”  
78 Ibid, Bl. 29: “Die Amis kämen ja sowieso, da bekämen sie ihre Betriebe wieder.”  
79 “Background on RIAS” (G. Ewing Collection, G. C. Marshall Foundation, VMI #132, 1/8). RIAS also 
received mail from around the world, including places as far away as Venezuela, South Africa, and New 
Zealand. I base these slightly hazy calculations on the numbers originally reported in Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands, 40 Jahre DDR: Zahlen und Fakten wurden zusammengestellt von Abteilungen 
des Zentralkomitees der SED und der Staatlichen Zentralverwaltung für Statistik (Berlin – Ost: Verl. für 
Agitations- und Anschauungsmittel, 1989). 
80 “Background on RIAS” (G. Ewing Collection, G. C. Marshall Foundation, VMI #132, 1/8). 
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here may someday experience liberation.”81 RIAS’s role as a buffer to the SED was 
apparent to a seventy-year-old woman (name and origin unknown) who thanked the 
station for its service combating its enemies on the air and asked that the station continue 
its work to “keep contact with us as the ‘big friend,’ I mean the real one (not that of 
‘Eastern’ origin), for those of us barred from the West. You are the only one informing us 
of the truth and the world’s events!”82 As administrators hand-picked these quotations 
from the thousands of letters—which does not mean they are not representative of 
audience opinion—they also reinforce our understanding of RIAS’s intention to represent 
a unified German nation. 
 
Dear RIAS,            
Such letters signified points of contact between East Germans and RIAS and thus 
an association in the rival public sphere that the SED worked to sever. Although the 
station received thousands of letters from East Germany every month, some letters never 
made it to West Berlin. In the case of an interception, the sender could expect a visit from 
the police or state security. Such offenses represented a violation of Article Six of the 
GDR’s constitution, which included the penal concept of boycott-instigation 
(Boykotthetze)—utilized by authorities to prosecute those who engaged in discriminatory 
acts, the boycott of democratic institutions and organizations, and war-mongering. 
Together, these categories of offense gave officials significant latitude in their 
accusations.83 The content of intercepted letters leaves little wonder why officials looked 
                                                 
81 Ibid.  
82 Ibid.  
83 Article 6 – Constitution of the German Democratic Republic: 
“All citizens have equal rights before the law. Incitement to boycott of democratic institutions or 
organizations, incitement to attempts on the life of democratic politicians, the manifestation of religious 
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to break the connection between Dresdeners and RIAS. Wrote one Dresdener “Today the 
so-called East Regime does not enjoy the trust of the population; it has no right to speak 
in the name of the eastern population,” whose letter ended up in the hands of the Stasi in 
1950.84 Such a proclamation, conceived and drafted in private would seem to confirm to 
party officials that residents maintained a cloistered dialogue with RIAS that could (and 
would, eventually) allow the SED to become challengeable. Instances of authorities 
intercepting letters intended for RIAS reveal that the party took such correspondence 
quite seriously. A single letter addressed to RIAS could land one in serious trouble with 
the authorities and the interception of such letters and the subsequent statements given by 
the suspects also offer insights into the connections between the station and its listeners—
and how those forced to account for their letters might defend themselves.  
In 1950, a police operation in a small town (thirty kilometers from Dresden) 
turned up a letter addressed to RIAS, setting off an investigation as the communication 
constituted a crime under Article Six.85 Authorities at a checkpoint discovered the letter 
in the pocketbook of a man, N., from Dresden, riding his bicycle home. He (N.) admitted 
that the letter belonged to him and that he had dictated it to a friend (whom he declined to 
name at the time) who composed it on a typewriter. He protested that he had not sent the 
letter to RIAS because the station had morphed into an outlet no different from the Nazi-
era newspaper, Der Stürmer, and that he merely wanted to express his mindset. He stated 
                                                                                                                                                 
and racial hatred and of hatred against other peoples, militaristic propaganda and warmongering as well as 
any other discriminatory acts are felonious crimes within the meaning of the Penal Code. The exercise of 
democratic rights within the meaning of the Constitution is not an incitement to boycott. Those persons 
convicted of such a crime are disqualified from holding public office or a leading position in economic or 
cultural life. They also lose the right to vote and to stand for election.” 
84 “Abschrift – an Rias Berlin.” Neustadt/Sa.den,25.10.50 (BStU Archiv der Außenstelle Dresden MfS BV 
Dresden, KD Sebnitz 3922): “Die heutige sogenannte Ostregierung besitzt nicht das Vertrauen des Volkes, 
sie hat kein Recht in der Namen der Ostbevölkerung zu sprechen” 
85 “Aktennotiz,” Harnisch. Untersuchungsorgan Pirna. Pirna, 15.11.50. Tgb.Nr. E/1608/50 (BStU Archiv 
der Außenstelle Dresden MfS BV Dresden, KD Sebnitz 3922). 
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that he had neither given the letter to anyone nor spoken about it to anyone. He further 
pleaded that he often composed articles concerning how democracy and socialism ought 
to be, but never shared them. In fact, he pointed out that his wife often complained that 
such writings would be his downfall and that she had already thrown a number of these 
letters into the oven. “When I wrote such things, I wanted to vent to my feelings because 
one cannot speak [openly] of such acts,” he concluded.86  
Z., who also ended up in custody, admitted that N., who was the party chairman 
of the local NDPD where they both worked, often dictated letters to him at the office.87 
Typically, he would type materials related to party business, but over time, personal 
letters had become part of a side deal involving small payments and on several recent 
occasions N. had dictated several letters to RIAS. Z. claimed to have warned him that to 
send such a letter meant he was breaking the law and that he knew RIAS as a rabble-
rousing station. Still, he typed the letter anyways as N. paid him ten DM to do so.  He 
concluded his statement by admitting guilt as far as typing the letter and not reporting the 
contents, and claimed he feared doing so would bring reprisal for his small-scale 
profiteering.88   
Three days later, on November 23, 1950, N. amended his previous statement, 
adding that he had sent a letter to his sister in Berlin. In the letter, he discussed family 
affairs but also asked his sister if she had forwarded a previous letter to RIAS. 
Furthermore, he admitted that through his sister he had a connection contact with RIAS, 
                                                 
86 “Vernehmung.” Pirna, den 15.11.1950 (BStU Archiv der Außenstelle Dresden MfS BV Dresden, KD 
Sebnitz 3922): “Wenn ich so etwas geschrieben habe, wollte ich meinen Herzen Luft machen, weil man 
über derartige Handlungen nicht sprechen kann.”  
87 The NDPD was an East German Block Party designed for former Nazis party members, though in reality 
it offered its members no real political power.  
88 “Vernehmung. Untersuchungsorgan Pirna” Pirna, am 20.11.1950 (BStU Archiv der Außenstelle Dresden 
MfS BV Dresden, KD Sebnitz 3922). 
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but stressed that it only concerned a “contest” that he knew about because he habitually 
listened to the station.89 He had titled the letter, “The Question of Germany’s 
Reunification.”90 N. then (again) professed his disdain for RIAS, claiming that he was of 
the opinion that those who supported RIAS’s partisan rumors and rabble-rousing news 
should be designated as warmongers.91 The investigation moved on, and by late 
December, N. revealed the July RIAS contest had been called “The Next Step toward 
German Unity” and he had put his entry in an envelope addressed to RIAS inside another 
envelope addressed to his sister to avoid the censors. When asked if he knew anyone else 
in contact with RIAS, he claimed he did not.92  
 
The Struggle against RIAS in Dresden 
 While action taken in association with RIAS could result in legal consequences, 
dealing with those who simply listened to RIAS prompted a different approach by the 
SED. After all, the Party’s anti-fascist biography meant that to criminalize the availability 
of foreign broadcasts would constitute a massive act of hypocrisy since such a law would 
have been a bit too reminiscent of National Socialist legislation. Consider for instance the 
exchange between colleagues discussing RIAS: the first asked why the party simply does 
not prohibit listening to RIAS. The second colleague clarified: “That is a fascist method; 
our method is to convince.”93 The approach generated by this mentality—which 
                                                 
89 “Vernehmung. Untersuchungsorgan Pirna” Pirna, den 23.11.1950 (BStU Archiv der Außenstelle Dresden 
MfS BV Dresden, KD Sebnitz 3922). 
90 Ibid.: “die Frage der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands” 
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid.   
93 “Betr.: Bericht über die Durchführung der Lektion, die Note der Sowjetregierung und das Seminar über  
Abhören feindlicher Sender.” FDGB Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Landesvorstand Sachsen, 
Zentralschule Ruf Luppa 36 an die Landesleitung der SED, Dresden, 5.4.52 (SächsHStA 11856 
Landesleitung Sachsen Nr. 385, Bl.68): “Ein anderer Kollege stellte die Frage warum man nicht einfach 
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publically seemed to make little reference to the legal measures laid out in article six—
constituted an organized campaign of persuasion to deter those who tuned in to RIAS.  
 The SED hatched a major crusade against RIAS early 1952 that presaged the 
party’s plan to accelerate the construction of socialism later that summer. In February of 
1952, the Agitation Department resolved to unleash an offensive against enemy 
propaganda and, above all, RIAS. Walter Ulbricht recommended that the mass 
organizations and organs take leadership of the campaign. Under their direction, pilot 
brigades that would serve as exemplary units with efforts focused especially in Görlitz 
where “enemy propaganda continuously influenced a portion of the population with 
criminal slandering of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Army, and supposed rabble rousing 
concerning the Oder-Neisse border as the settled boundary.”94 It is highly unlikely that 
RIAS called the border into question, but the regime often tied all types of potentially 
devious talk to the work of outside agitators, especially RIAS. In cases where especially 
dangerous lies, rumors, and defamations spread, the offensive would be more intense. 
Functionaries working on the campaign also vowed to operate in public places such as 
restaurants and workspaces where Dresdeners openly listened to enemy stations. Tactics 
included confronting listeners on the spot and publicly shaming others through a 
coordinated leaflet campaign, by word of mouth, and designating such people as 
                                                                                                                                                 
das Abhören des RIAS verbietet? Die Kollegen Schuler machten ihm klar, dass dies eine faschistische 
Methode sei, unsere Methode aber die der Überzeugung ist.” 
94 Sekretarisvorlage, SED Landesleitung Sachsen, Abt. Agitation, Dresden, den 1.2.1952 (SächsHStA 
11856 Landesleitung Sachsen Nr. 271, Bl.13): “gelingt es der Feindpropaganda immer noch einen Teil der 
Massen zu beeinflussen mit der verbrecherischen Hetze gegen die Sowjetunion und die Sowjetarmee, mit 
der Hetzte gegen die Oder-Neiße-Grenze als Friedensgrenze”  
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warmongers in the local press.95 The second part of the campaign consisted of publicizing 
the anti-RIAS efforts of the citizenry though the SED’s media channels.96 
These efforts, initiated by seminars and publications, began in the spring of 1952. 
The SED identified Görlitz, where “allegedly they only listen to RIAS…and RIAS 
arguments circulated powerfully through the population” as one focal point for the 
campaign.97 Propagandists led so-called seminars in various public spaces such as stores, 
bars, and businesses, with one titled, for example “Who listens to RIAS lends an ear to 
the mortal enemies of humanity.”98 In Dresden, propagandists swooped down on 
Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz—a focal point of the unrest on June 17, 1953. During the 
seventy-minute seminar workers seemed to either have played dumb with officials or 
perhaps they truly had little knowledge of the party’s positions regarding RIAS. 
Employees stated that only “class conscious” workers could safely listen to RIAS; that 
listening was only a problem when one spread the information, and that one must listen to 
better recognize one’s enemy.99 Did the seminar convince workers of RIAS’s political 
noxiousness? Probably not, though the instructor reported that perhaps it helped and that 
in subsequent “lessons,” he took every opportunity to point out the danger involved with 
listening to RIAS. As a result, colleagues now discussed the anti-RIAS article hanging on 
the factory wall during their breaks.100 This probably referred to an article entitled “Those 
                                                 
95 Ibid.: “die die Kriegshetzte unterstützen” 
96 Ibid.  
97 “Plan für den Einsatz der Instrukteurbrigade der Landesleitung” (SächsHStA 11856 Landesleitung 
Sachsen Nr. 316, Bl.107).: “Im Kreis Görlitz ist angeblich nur der RIAS zu hören; Die RIAS Argumente 
kursieren dadurch stark in der Bevölkerung” 
98 Ibid.: “wer RIAS hört, leiht den Todfeinden der Menschheit sein Ohr” 
99 Bericht über das Seminar: über das Abhören feindlicher Sender. Betriebsschule “Paul Gruner” 
Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, Niedersedlitz, am 22.4.52 (SächsHStA 11856 Landesleitung Sachsen Nr. 271, 
Bl.27): “klassenbewusste”  
100 Ibid.: “Paul Gruner” 
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who listen to RIAS help the war mongers!” published by the factory press.101 “Those who 
listen to RIAS (and NWDR) and spread these lies help deliver the war mongers’ 
corrosive poison to our people” claimed the piece.102 This was, essentially—disregarding 
the colorful wording and propagandistic adjectives—RIAS’s entire mission. When one 
considers the resources used by the SED to counter that effort, one can deduce that the 
station experienced considerable success in this regard.  
 The second part of the anti-RIAS campaign, touched on at the beginning of this 
chapter and conceptualized in the previous chapter, involved the SED publicizing the 
actions of those groups who volunteered to campaign against the station and other 
Western outlets. In Dresden, the SED charged the Agitation Department with developing 
two examples to publicize, one of which was the previously mentioned Grunaer Straße 
housing community and the other was, not surprisingly in Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz. 
The department secured pledges from workers—though not without facing questions and 
considerable resistance from various brigades—and popularized the slogan “Don’t Listen 
to RIAS - - All Strengths for Peace.”103 The story ended up in Neues Deutschland under 
the headline “Mass mobilization smothers the poison of the station of lies.”104 It featured 
the Hempel Brigade, which pledged to heighten their productivity—the infamous norms 
that would become an issue in early June of 1953. But the article left out the numerous 
problems that manifested themselves simply by attempting to convert RIAS listeners, 
                                                 
101 “Wer den ‘RIAS’ hört, hilft den Kriegshetzern!” Sachsenwerk – Spiegel, Betriebszeitung der 
Belegschaft des Sachsenwerkes Niedersedlitz – herausgeben von der SED-Betriebsparteiorganisation, 4 
April 1952 – Jahrgang 3 – Nr. 13 5 pf. (DRA Potsdam, Ostarchiv, F304-01-04/0004).  
102 Ibid.: “Wer den RIAS und den NWDR hört und diese Lügen verbreitet, trägt dazu bei, das zersetzende 
Gift der Kriegshetzer in unser Volk zu tragen.” 
103 “Bericht über die Entfaltung des Kampfes gegen Riashetze,” SED Landesleitung Sachsen - Abteilung 
Agitation, Abt. Agitation, Dresden, den 13.5.1952 (SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 271, Bl.35): “Kein Ohr dem Rias 
- - alle Kraft dem Frieden” 
104 “Massenmobilisierung erstickt das Gift der Lügensender,” Neues Deutschland, 28 Mai 1952. 
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notably the “organized enemy activity” in the sprawling factory discovered by the 
propagandists and the threatening letters received by comrades.105 
In the hotspot of Görlitz, a housing community sent a pledge (after government 
prodding) to Radio Leipzig in which the residents of one building promised to refrain 
from listening to RIAS and adorn the façade of their building with a banner to promote 
the cause. In this case, the announcement came with a request for Radio Leipzig to 
develop better programming for the working class and do something about the annoying 
interference listeners experienced.106 Factory workers from LOWA Waggonbau 
Görlitz—another prime source of unrest the following summer—sent their promise to 
cease receiving RIAS broadcasts to Neues Deutschland and GDR radio and called on all 
“peace-loving people to follow their example.”107 
 
Other Elements of the Rival Public Sphere 
 The production and exchange of rumors and anti-party literature further evidences 
the existence of a rival public sphere that functioned as a counterweight to state power. It 
is noteworthy that in the SED’s record, party officials categorized such activity under the 
rubric “enemy activity” which included “open sabotage.”108 Pamphlets and leaflets reveal 
that groups and outside influences succeeded to various degrees in reaching Dresdeners 
with anti-SED literature, though the penetration could not match that of radio. Rumors 
                                                 
105 “Bericht über die Entfaltung des Kampfes gegen Riashetze” (SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 271, Bl.35). 
106 Hausgemeinschaft Neissetrasse, Görlitz, am 27. Marz 1952 an den Intendanten des Mitteldeutschen 
Rundfunks Herrn Adolphs Leipzig – N22, Springerstrasse (SächsHStA 11856 Landesleitung Sachsen Nr. 
271, Bl.29). 
107 SED Betriebsparteiorganisation Lowa Waggonbau Görlitz an die Landesleitung der SED Dresden, 
z.Hnd.d.Gen.Vogel (SächsHStA 11856 Landesleitung Sachsen Nr. 271, Bl.18): “friedliebenden Menschen 
auf ihrem Beispiel zu folgen” 
108 “Aufstellung von uns zugegangenen Information über Feindtätigkeit in der Zeit vom 1.7.-19.8.52.,” 
Organizationskomittee der SED, Bezirk Dresden, Leitende Organe der Partei u. M., Sektor 
Parteiinformation (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.5. Nr. 107, Bl.1): “Feindtätigkeit”; “Offene Sabotage” 
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also represented an alternative form of political participation and an outlet for the 
expression of hopes, fears, and desires. In this way, they offer us insights into the 
political goals and doubts of East Germans as well as the reservations and critical 
positions citizens often adopted concerning the ruling regime. The manner in which the 
SED recorded these exchanges, overheard by functionaries or police, also reveals the 
ways in which residents unofficially participated in government despite lacking 
structured, democratic outlets.  
The record detailing rumors and written dissent also presents a problem because it 
is weighted toward the period following the Second Party Conference of July 1952. This 
could mean that rumors and other dissident activity posed a greater threat to the regime in 
this period, and this is quite plausible considering the economic suffering and political 
pressure exerted by the SED, or it could simply mean that the party began taking rumors 
and political attacks more seriously at this point. Possibly, too, it could mean that the 
SED decided to begin collecting such data whereas before it dismissed it. Plausible as 
well is the anticipation of an increase of activity in the rival public sphere. In other words, 
one should consider the record here with some reservations in mind.  
Following the Second Party Conference in July of 1952, the SED ordered State 
Control to begin reporting immediately rumors, rabble rousing, and provocations. 
Functionaries were asked to keep track of rumors, especially as they led to panic 
purchasing and the withdrawal of savings.109 In December, some five months following 
the initiation of Stalinist planning, the party recognized that dissident activity (the class 
struggle, in its terms) had continued to increase), though one might note that leadership in 
                                                 
109 See the untitled document beginning “Ab sofort ist folgendes zu veranlassen,” [likely July 1952] 
(SAPMO-BArch DC 1 6244).  
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Dresden demonstrated an awareness of known unknowns regarding enemy activity, 
suggesting that the existing evidence is perhaps only the tip of the iceberg. By December, 
1952, regional reports suggest that illegal pamphleteering had steadily increased in 
Dresden as had illegal emigration. Conditions continued to deteriorate in the countryside 
where farmers—especially large scale farmers—discriminated against the collective 
farms. Rumormongers attempted to incite unrest among the population and class enemies 
tried to exploit weaknesses.110 
 
Leaflets 
As it did with RIAS, the SED waged an ongoing battle against the distribution of 
illegal pamphlets, leaflets, and literature that appeared in the region. Unfortunately, as it 
did with rumors, the regime made no effort to systemically catalog these items, so it is 
difficult to chart their availability or production, which, given their illicit nature, is not 
surprising. Some of this literature arrived in Dresden via balloons, so the wind partially 
dictated its destination. The number of balloons discovered by the authorities ranged 
from single balloons to as many as 150.111 Occasionally party functionaries just noted an 
empty balloon, while other times the leaflet from the balloon ended up in the hands of the 
authorities.112 Some of these leaflets came from the Social Democratic Party in West 
Germany. For example, a blue balloon that turned up in Kamenz with the address 
“Freedom – SPD” accompanied by leaflets in the area that read “Administrative reform? 
                                                 
110 “Zusammenfassung der eingegangenen Berichte über Feindtätigkeit aus den Kreisen auf Grund einer 
Anforderung des Sekretariats,” SED-Bezirksleitung, Dresden, Leitende Organe der Partei und 
Massenorganisationen – Sektor Parteiinformation. 1.12.52 (SächsHStA  11857 Nr. IV/2.5 Nr. 107, Bl.26-
32). 
111 “Aufstellung von uns zugegangenen Information über Feindtätigkeit in der Zeit vom 1.7.-19.8.52,” Bl.4.   
112 “Aufstellung von uns zugegangenen Information über Feindtätigkeit in der Zeit vom 20.8.-30.8.52,” 
Organizationskomittee der SED, Bezirk Dresden, Leitende Organe der Partei u. M., Sektor 
Parteiinformation (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.5. Nr. 107, Bl.10).   
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No, Sovietization is the goal. The German people greet Dr. Kurt Schumacher; The SPD 
fights for German unity.”113 Another SPD balloon with “Unity and Freedom” written on 
it appeared in Freital, with leaflets marking the contents’ origin with the SPD East-office 
in West Berlin.114 The only other western group to sign its name to materials it distributed 
in East Germany was the Fighting Group against Inhumanity and the Investigative 
Committee of Free Jurists.115 In one case, functionaries were able to collect the leaflets of 
a fallen balloon before they spread through the population.116  
Quite often though, the source of leaflets remained unclear. The authors of these 
leaflets attacked the GDR and its program in a number of ways while at the same time 
serving as another connection between East and West. Some merely called for a “free 
Europe” while others were more specific, for instance, attacking the GDR’s decision to 
build up its armed forces: “Today it’s pellet guns, tomorrow real guns, the day after that, 
mass graves – not with us.”117 In Zittau at the clothing factory, leaflets appeared asking 
colleagues to refuse their work because the factory produced parachutes while another set 
of leaflets pleaded with residents to avoid reporting to Service for Germany and the 
                                                 
113 “Aufstellung der uns in Monat Januar zugegangenen Information über Feindtätigkeit,” SED 
Bezirksleitung Dresden, Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganisationen, Sektor Parteiinformation. 
6.2.53. (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.5. Nr. 107, Bl.84): “Verwaltungsreform? Nein. Sowjetisierung ist das Ziel. 
Das deutsche Volk grüßt Dr. Kurt Schumacher; Kampf der SPD um die Einheit Deutschlands.” 
114 “Aufstellung der in den Monaten Februar und März eingegangenen Informationen über Feindtätigkeit,” 
SED-Bezirksleitung Dresden, Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganizationen, Sektor 
Parteiinformation, 9.4.53. (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.5. Nr. 107, Bl.113). 
115 “Aufstellung von uns zugegangenen Information über Feindtätigkeit in der Zeit vom 20.8.-30.8.52.” 
Note that they are listed here as Kampfbund freiheitlicher Juristen. 
116 “Monatsbericht für Januar 1953,” Bezirksparteikontrollkommission Dresden, Dresden, den 9.2.1953 
(SächsHStA 11857 IV 2.4. Nr. 025, Bl.80). 
117 “Aufstellung uns zugegangenen Information über Feindtätigkeit in der Zeit von 1. bis 29.9.52,” SED-
Org.-Komitee Bezirk Dresden, Leitende Organe der Partei u.M., Sektor Parteiinformation 29.9.52 
(SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.5. Nr. 107, Bl.13), Freie Europa; “Aufstellung von uns zugegangenen Information 
über Feindtätigkeit in der Zeit vom 1.7.-19.8.52,” Bl.4; “Aufstellung uns zugegangenen Information über 
Feindtätigkeit im Monat Oktober, SED-Bezirksleitung Dresden, Leitende Organe der Partei und 
Massenorganisationen, Sektor Parteiinformation, Dresden 5.11.52 (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.5. Nr. 107, 
Bl.19): “Heute Luftgewehre, morgen Kanonen, übermorgen Massengrab – ohne uns” 
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People’s Police.118 Other leaflets served as warnings, for instance, by suggesting that 
authorities were listening in on conversations—“watch your conversations, the NKVD is 
listening in.”119 Some leaflets targeted specific groups. For example, The European 
Alliance of Youth (Bund Europäischer Jugend) claimed in their leaflets that Western 
institutions like the European Community for Coal and Steel had now brought Europe 
one step closer to integration as a “United States of Europe.”120 Another stated: “We 
acknowledge all of Europe’s youth in a heartfelt bond – every postcard [leaflet] returned 
is evidence of this solidarity.”121 As with RIAS, the goal always remained the same: to 
maintain a connection between east and west while undermining the GDR’s legitimacy.  
 
Rumors in the Rival Public Sphere  
Rumors constituted a powerful component in the rival public sphere that revealed 
authentic public opinion and functioned as an informal type of political participation. 
Between the summer of 1952 and Stalin’s death, rumors dogged party officials and 
undermined their attempts to build their new society. As was the case with leaflets, the 
rumor record requires careful analysis. Whether rumors began as a backlash against the 
accelerated buildup of socialism or had always circulated in a similar manner is difficult 
to determine, because the record begins taking regular stock of their occurrence in the 
summer of 1952. It is probably safe to argue, though, that rumor spreading intensified 
                                                 
118 “Aufstellung uns zugegangenen Information über Feindtätigkeit im Monat Oktober,” Bl.19. 
https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/item/AWBNKAMU7A5UHUMZTHFYYTOZXMT4OWGB 
Dienst für Deutschland was an organization led by the People’s Police that came out of the Second party 
Conference which called on youth to help construct military facilities.   
119 “Aufstellung von uns zugegangenen Information über Feindtätigkeit in der Zeit vom 1.7.-19.8.52,” Bl.4: 
“Achtung bei Gesprächen, NKVD hört mit” 
120 “Aufstellung uns zugegangenen Information über Feindtätigkeit in der Zeit von 1. bis 29.9.52,” Bl.13: 
“Bund Europäischer Jugend”; “Vereinigten Staaten von Europa” 
121 Ibid.: “Wir grüßen die Jugend in ganz Europa in herzlicher Verbundenheit. Jede zurückgesandte Karte 
ist uns ein Beweis unserer Zusammengehörigkeit” 
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during this period and certainly rose following Stalin’s death, which, as this chapter will 
show, engendered political uncertainty.  
Rumors pertaining to food and goods were the most common prior to Stalin’s 
death and reveal how Dresdeners explained and reacted to shortages and the economic 
shortcomings of the newly introduced economic plan. Around Christmas in Meißen, for 
instance, rumors circulated that white candles were no longer going to be produced and 
that residents should stock up at the same time belief spread around Dresden that bakers 
would not offer fruitcakes as that was now the domain of the state-run collective 
stores.122 Rumor also explained that the shortage of canned fish could be traced to an East 
German trawler that had been impounded by the Swedes.123 In a Görlitz factory, workers 
spread the rumor—supposedly based on a RIAS report—that bread cards were to be re-
introduced and that Leipzig had run out of eggs.124 These rumors seem innocuous, but in 
a nation of true shortages, they could lead to runs on goods. For example, rumors that 
butter would not be distributed in Großenhain in December resulted in a number of 
women buying an entire month’s supply all at once.125 Similarly, a rumor that the price of 
schnapps was to rise led to locals reportedly purchasing the drink by the backpack full.126 
Sometimes consumers explained higher prices as a result of greater economic planning 
hatched by the SED. In one area, residents attributed high coffee prices to the deficits 
now run by the state—a reference to the national economic problems that led to 
                                                 
122 Dresden, 25.11.1952, Zentrale Kommission für Staatliche Kontrolle, Bezirksinspektion Dresden Nr. 54 
(SAPMO-BArch DC 1 6212). 
123 “Aufstellung der uns im Monat November zugegangenen Information über Feindtätigkeit,” SED-
Bezirksleitung Dresden, Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganisationen, Sektor Parteiinformation, 
1.12.52 (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.5. Nr. 107, Bl.47).  
124 Ibid.  
125 “Aufstellung der uns im Monat Dezember zugegangenen Information über Feindtätigkeit,” Leitende 
Organe der Partei und Massenorganisationen, Sektor Parteiinformation, 2.1.53 (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.5. 
Nr. 107, Bl.74). 
126 “Aufstellung der uns im Monat Dezember zugegangenen Information über Feindtätigkeit,” Bl.82. 
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significant consumer dissatisfaction.127 The real and perceived fragility of the GDR’s 
economy would grow into a topic that would invigorate the rumor mill in the period 
leading up to June 17. The party took these rumors seriously as the economic plan was so 
closely tied to the political plan, and Joseph Stalin’s death in March of 1953stimulated 
the production of improvised news as national and international politics assumed an 
increasingly greater role in the rival public sphere.  
 
Stalin’s Death 
“RIAS hören – Stalin tot – jetzt mehr Brot” 
- scribbled on a theater wall in Königsbrück, Dresden Region128 
 
 “The dog can go ahead and croak” quipped a young man and “active RIAS 
listener.”129 Known by authorities to spread ideas gleaned from western radio stations in 
his youth group, his subsequent arrest and the investigation into his comments serves as a 
reminder of just how seriously the SED took RIAS’s potential to indirectly undermine its 
leadership.130 Now, Stalin’s death on March 5 offered considerable political opportunity 
for the station. The previous chapter showed that Stalin’s passing presented the SED with 
an opportunity to demonstrate its legitimacy through a distinctly Cold War form of 
representative or theatrical publicness. Choreographed demonstrations staffed by 
functionaries and coerced workers and publicized messages of solidarity designed to 
                                                 
127 Ibid.  
128 “Aufstellung der in den Monaten Februar und März eingegangenen Informationen über Feindtätigkeit.” 
SED-Bezirksleitung Dresden, Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganisationen Sektor 
Parteiinformation. 9.4.53. (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.5 Nr. 107 Bl.115): “Listen to RIAS – Stalin is dead – 
more bread now” 
129 “Informationsmeldung Nr. 12/53,” Zentrale Kommission für Staatliche Kontrolle Bezirksinspektion 
Dresden An die Zentrale Kommission für Staatliche Kontrolle, Berlin. Dresden, den 12.3.53 (SAPMO-
BArch DC 1 6212): “Der Hund kann ruhig verrecken; aktiver Hörer des Rias” 
130 Ibid.  
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create the impression of a community bound in solidarity through Stalin’s leadership 
while grieving his death all represented the SED’s attempt to represent the unity of the 
greater Soviet Bloc. Against this official public sphere, RIAS broadcasted a disparate 
assessment of Stalin’s legacy and raised the possibility of real political change while 
authorities fretted over rumors and jokes and unofficial celebrations that mocked the 
former Soviet leader’s legacy, damaging the SED’s prestige and authority.  
 While the SED and other pro-Soviet outlets boasted that Stalin had bequeathed a 
blueprint to the socialist lands that could leave them little doubt that prosperity lay in the 
near future, RIAS asked more pointed questions and chipped away at the CPSU’s claim 
to rule and, by extension, the SED’s claim to the future. What was to come after Stalin’s 
passing? The station offered no clear answer, but the commentators largely framed the 
situation as one in which a major geo-political shift now appeared possible. Above all, 
the power vacuum meant that Soviet authority had waned, with RIAS commentators 
arguing that Malenkov or Molotov, either of whom might have the last word, could never 
project the authority of their predecessor whose clout simply could not be inherited. 
Certainly, Stalin’s legend would inform their decisions, but they would also come to their 
own decisions and they would do so without a good number of Stalin’s tactical benefits. 
Among these was a widespread forced adoration and the confidence that had permitted 
the Soviets to present any arbitrary decision as an unassailable interpretation based on 
Lenin’s teachings. The superhuman splendor and image surrounding Stalin, an artificial 
creation, and Stalin’s mystique that had formed the basis of a ritualized oath 
(Eidesformel) for the Soviet people and the slavish (blindgehende) functionaries on the 
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Volga and the Elbe also constituted part of the dictator’s strength.131 Even though all of 
this had passed with Stalin, RIAS noted that the party bureaucracy would carry on and 
the factories would continue to produce.132  
 In contrast to the SED’s commemorations and adoring speeches, RIAS offered a 
review of the late leader’s crimes against humanity, likening him in one case to 
Robespierre and the worst excesses of the French Revolution. The station claimed, for 
example, that while Karl Marx had once quipped that violence had become the midwife 
of a new society, Stalin “had made violence the mother of his dictatorship.”133 
Commentators painted Stalin as a man without feelings or sentimentality, who had 
secretly ordered the murder of Leon Trotsky in Mexico and Sergey Kirov in Leningrad, 
before “quickening the guillotine’s pace” in 1936.134 The program concluded with eleven 
million dead from starvation and political purges before commentators turned to Pravda’s 
headlines, mocking the outlet’s claims of a “great unity between party and people.”135 
And when the East Berlin press called Stalin “the greatest son in the history of mankind,” 
the station reminded listeners just how powerful such adoration and “ritualistic 
superlatives” had been.136  
 
 
 
                                                 
131 “Sendung am Tode Stalins,” Hauptabteilung Politik, Werktag der Zone, Freitag, den 6. März 1953, 
19.40 – 20.00 Uhr (DRA Potsdam Filus 03 Werktag d. Zone - F003, B 304-01-08 / 0001): “für kleinen 
Stalintreuen, blindgehende Funktionäre an der Wolga und an der Elbe, war dieser Nymbus wie eine 
zwingende Eidesformel” 
132 “Sendung zum Tode Stalins” – Kommentar / Heinz Frentzel - Freitag, den 6. März 1953 
19.40 – 1945. Hauptabteilung Politik (DRA Potsdam, B304-01-00-0012).  
133 Ibid.: “Stalin machte die Gewalt zur Mutter seiner Diktatur” 
134 Ibid.: “Die Guillotine wird schneller” 
135  “Sendung am Tode Stalins,” Hauptabteilung Politik, Werktag der Zone: “Die große Einheit von Partei 
und Volk” 
136 Ibid.: “Das zeigt, wie fest eingefressen diese Rituellen Superlativen sind und er ist gleichzeitig so etwas 
wie eine der ersten Abweichungen von der neuen Linie, die das vergrößernde Fernglas abzusetzen befiehlt, 
um es in seiner umgedreht verkleinernden Wirkung zu verwenden.” 
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Rabble Rousing and Celebrating 
 Consider for an instant the phrasing from an April 1953 report produced by 
Dresden’s Regional Party Control Commission: “in the past month it was attempted 
through rabble-rousing letters and rumors to influence the population.”137 The lack of an 
easily identified actor or source here (which, of course, I have collectively categorized as 
the rival public sphere) meant that the multitude of outlets from which the population 
gathered knowledge presented a serious and somewhat abstract threat to the SED and its 
control of information in an unstable political situation. So as RIAS speculated that a 
geopolitical change might now be possible and whittled away at the prestige of Stalin and 
by extension those who upheld his system in East Germany, the SED had to cope with a 
rumor mill and anti-SED propaganda that undercut the Party’s official representations of 
national unity following Stalin’s death. Some of this vitriol probably found inspiration in 
foreign broadcasts and certainly the SED felt that they did based on numerous incidents 
in the record. For example, on March 8, per a functionary based in Görlitz, a bakery 
owner and three others gathered at a tavern in the town of Gersdorf. The barkeeper led 
the group to a separate room where guests were listening to western radio broadcasts and 
one of the listeners proclaimed “[the time has arrived] to string up the entire SED.”138 
Authorities in Görlitz encountered more troubling developments when listening in on 
conversations in the area. Workers at the Locomotive and Wagon Factory declined to 
comment on political developments when prompted by functionaries as someone’s 
                                                 
137 “Monatsbericht für März 1953,” Bezirksparteikontrollkommission – Dresden – Dresden, den 13.4.1953 
(SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2.4 025, Bl.107-8): “[Auch] im vergangenen Monat wurde versucht, durch 
Hetzzettel und Gerüchte die Bevölkerung zu beeinflussen” 
138 “Informationsmeldung Nr. 14/53,” Zentrale Kommission für Staatliche Kontrolle, Bezirksinspektion 
Dresden, Dresden, den 18.3.53, An die Zentrale Kommission für staatliche Kontrolle, Berlin (SAPMO-
BArch DC 1 6212): “Jetzt ist die Zeit gekommen, die ganze SED aufzuhängen” 
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brother had reportedly been arrested after thanking God for Stalin’s death.139 An older 
Christian told his colleagues that while Stalin had not been judged on earth, he would be 
in heaven.140 And the churches became a potential thorn in the regime’s side as pastors 
deviated from the SED’s script. For instance, the pastor in Kamenz who (reportedly) read 
from his pastoral letter that “A great socialist leader has returned to Christendom. This 
leader has also written a book in which he instructs all socialists to do the same.”141 
Residents ripped Stalin’s pictures from the wall in Kamenz and other towns.142 Or 
consider the anonymous letter received by the local SED office, wherein the author 
reported that the residents of Seifenhennersdorf celebrated Stalin’s death as he had driven 
them from their native Reichenau, forcing them to give up their houses and farms. “We 
wish him good luck on his journey,” the letter stated, “now he can no longer plunder east 
Germany.”143 
 
A Wind of Change?  
These conversations reveal that the uncertainty articulated by RIAS now 
circulated though the population. On Sunday morning in Sebnitz a priest stated to his 
congregation that God had willed Stalin’s death and Germany now found itself in a 
“profound abyss and deep crisis.”144 This crisis, of course, stemmed from the very real 
                                                 
139 “Aufstellung der in den Monaten Februar und März eingegangenen Informationen über Feindtätigkeit.” 
Bl.115. 
140 Ibid.  
141 “Informationsmeldung Nr. 13/53,” Zentrale Kommission für Staatliche Kontrolle, Bezirksinspektion 
Dresden, Dresden, den 14.3.53, An die Zentrale Kommission für staatliche Kontrolle, Berlin (SAPMO-
BArch DC 1 6212): “Ein großer sozialistischer Führer ist zum Christentum zurückgekehrt. Derselbe hat ein 
Buch geschrieben, worin er alle Sozialisten auffordert, das gleiche zu tun.” The report notes that it is 
unclear exactly to whom the letter refers. The case was passed on to the local Stasi office.  
142 “Aufstellung der in den Monaten Februar und März eingegangenen Informationen über Feindtätigkeit.”  
143 Ibid., Bl.128: “Wir wünschen ihm viel Glück auf seiner Reise….nun kann er nicht mehr plündern.” 
144 “Aufstellung der in den Monaten Februar und März eingegangenen Informationen über Feindtätigkeit.” 
SED-Bezirksleitung Dresden, Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganisationen Sektor 
Parteiinformation. 9.4.53. (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2.5 Nr. 107 Bl.132). 
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question of political leadership in the Soviet Union and Germany, but the answers and 
predictions harbored by the population in the Dresden region reveal that popular opinion 
was quite often a concoction of reality and wishful (or fearful) thinking. Workers in the 
LOWA factory in Görlitz discussed rumors of Malenkov’s resignation (not true yet since 
this conversation occurred sometime before 3.22.53) while a worker at the traffic 
enterprise joked to a colleague that he could now apply for Stalin’s job. Thus, rumors of 
Malenkov’s abdication seems to have gained legs for several weeks in the region. Other 
rumors circulated that claimed Malenkov would now do something about releasing 
prisoners of war.145 Another theory in Riesa held that Malenkov succeeded Stalin because 
he was his son-in-law and a Jew—neither of which was true.146 Workers in Pirna argued 
that Stalin’s death and Malenkov’s succession would bring about more aggressive 
policies.147 All counties in the region reported that the number of illicit pamphlets in 
circulation increased in May.148 Some leaflets of indeterminate origin circulated in one 
town (in Russian) that Russian soldiers were now demanding their freedom since Stalin 
was dead.149 In the countryside around Dresden, leaflets in Russian were distributed by a 
self-proclaimed “Revolutionary Staff” while in Obercunnersdorf, leaflets proclaimed that 
“the emancipation from the Bolshevik yoke was getting close.” 150   
It appears that during the months following Stalin’s death, the rumor mill became 
more serious and increasingly took aim at the SED’s very existence as a state’s governing 
                                                 
145 Ibid., Bl.115-16.  
146 “Gegnerische Tätigkeit: Zentrale Kommission für Staatliche Kontrolle, Bezirksinspektion Dresden,” 
Dresden, den 18.3.53. 
147 Ibid.  
148 “Monatsbericht Mai 1953,” Bezirksparteikontrollkommission, Dresden. Dresden, den 9.6.1953 1953 
(SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2.4 025, Bl.149).   
149 “Aufstellung der in den Monaten Februar und März eingegangenen Informationen über Feindtätigkeit,” 
Bl.118; Bl.120, picture ripped off wall here too.  
150 “Monatsbericht für März, 1953,” Bezirksparteikontrollkommission, Dresden. Dresden, den 13.4..1953 
(SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2.4 025, Bl.122). 
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party. The subject matter turned from the price of goods to the value of money, and for 
instance, in Pirna and Heidenau the rumor now spread that money not in a bank would 
soon become worthless.151 And more troubling for the SED, political leaders now found 
themselves the subject of damaging rumors. The whereabouts, statuses, and health of 
East Germany’s leading politicians increasingly drove public conversations in the period 
prior to the uprising. For instance, in three counties already in the week after Stalin’s 
death, the rumor and unofficial news, respectively, circulated that President Pieck had 
moved to the West or had become quite ill.152 When Stalin’s heirs called on East German 
leadership to retreat from the accelerated buildup of socialism in early June, RIAS and 
the rumor mill would adopt an even more rebellious tone.  
 
Conclusions 
 RIAS existed at the heart of the rival public sphere in Dresden and relentlessly 
challenged the legitimacy, planning, and vision of the Socialist Unity Party. Through 
targeted campaigns, the station influenced and mobilized workers in opposition to SED 
policies and spread news that undermined the SED’s efforts. Indeed, RIAS openly sought 
the dissolution of “the Zone,” and in the meantime established an nation of Germans 
bound together by letters and popular programming. The SED’s determination to 
diminish RIAS’s influence underscored the station’s effectiveness and the weakness of 
the GDR’s media outlets and the state itself. This fragileness became increasingly evident 
following the Second Party Conference and Stalin’s death, when the rumor mill, another 
critical component in the rival public sphere, became ever more hostile toward the party 
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152 “Informationsmeldung Nr. 14/53,” Zentrale Kommission für Staatliche Kontrolle, Bezirksinspektion 
Dresden, Dresden, den 18.3.53, an die Zentrale Kommission für Staatliche Kontrolle, Berlin (SAPMO-
BArch DC 1 6212). 
139 
 
as the political situation destabilized. A number of political missteps in the summer of 
1953 would help turn the rival public sphere into a revolutionary public sphere—the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three  
 
Legitimation Crisis, June 11-16, 1953 
 
 
“It’s getting to be time that the red fat cats in the district also get liquidated.” 
 
-Overheard in Sebnitz a few day before June 171 
 
“Don’t you know that an uprising has already broken out in Czechoslovakia and it’s 
going to kick off here soon, because the workers are only waiting until the revolution 
comes.” 
 
-A worker in Dresden, a day or two before June 172 
 
 
On June 11, everything appeared to change. The SED published and aired a 
Communiqué that announced the Party had made “errors” in the past, forcing the 
Politburo to make sweeping recommendations to address social, economic, and political 
problems. The explosive news was a key act in the events of June, 1953.  
This chapter reasons that the SED’s decision (made for them in Moscow) to 
abandon the hard-line socialist buildup and its weak public relations campaign to explain 
the maneuver allowed rumors—improvised news—to shape public opinion. These 
rumors, sometimes true, sometimes partially true, and sometimes false, which emerged 
from collective conversations reveal a confused and disoriented public. As a result, 
rumors swirled through rival public sphere explaining the present and presenting hope for 
the future. Oftentimes these rumors were rooted in factual news but had taken on a life of 
                                                 
1 Sebnitz - 11,10 Uhr [likely June 14, 1953]: “In Unternehmerkreisen, besonders bei kap. 
Blumengrosshändler wird diskutiert, endlich beginnt der Zuchthausstaat zusammenzubrechen. Es wird Zeti, 
das die roten Bonzen im Kreis auch liquidiert werden.” 
2 “Betr.: Wochen-Analyse zum Kommuniqué des Politbüros,” Dresden, 16.6.53, Abteilung: Sekretariat 
(SächsHStA 11857 Nr.  IV/2/12/011): “unsinnigsten”; “Weißt du nicht, dass in der CSR bereits ein 
Aufstand ausgebrochen ist, auch bei uns wird es bald losgehen und die Arbeiter warten nur darauf, bis die 
Revolution kommt.” 
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their own, reflecting official news sources’ lack of credibility among the reading and 
listening public. The improvisational nature of the information also revealed the 
ideological media polarization in the GDR during the Cold War. As Cass Sunstein notes, 
rumors are often more prevalent in times of uncertainty. This certainly seems to have 
been the case here during the week before the demonstrations, as functionaries often 
noted the sheer volume and tenacity of the rumors in circulation. In other words, these 
rumors “cascaded,” to borrow again from Sunstein. Furthermore, many of these rumors 
contributed to a situation where an already-weakened regime became increasingly 
challengeable and the existing political arrangement appeared evermore untenable.3  
The period between the regime’s proclamation of the New Course and the events 
of June 17 represented a crisis of legitimacy for the SED. The GDR’s legitimacy, which 
opponents could never officially call into question, rested on the appearance of 
communal, national, and international solidarity as well as the widespread belief in the 
SED’s vision for the future. Thus, the regime was essentially self-legitimizing; it alone 
needed to recognize itself as it did not acknowledge domestic political challenges. Once 
again, dependence on the Weberian construction of a constitutional-rational state renders 
the idea of a legitimation crisis unsuited for application to the former Eastern Bloc 
nations and calls for modifications to the notion of legitimacy. Instead, we might 
recognize “weak forms” of legitimacy behind the Iron Curtain: people did not like what 
was happening, but they could not imagine things being different and therefore they 
accepted their fate. Thus, such states only rarely suffered legitimacy crises except during 
occasional public outbursts as it was during these moments when citizens did imagine 
                                                 
3 Sunstein, On Rumors, 1-15; Timothy Tackett, “Rumors and Revolution;” Tamotsu Shibutani, Improvised 
News: 8.  
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their situation changing. Thus, this chapter will show that the rival public sphere, 
increasingly energized by the announcement of the New Course on June 11, 1953, helped 
make revolution thinkable and in some cases, appear imminent or even as having already 
begun.4   
Research based on the public “mood reports” (Stimmungsberichte) in Dresden 
after the announcement reveals a regime that had lost its ability to effectively 
communicate with the masses and found itself in a precarious political position.5 This 
chapter will examine how this happened.  
 
Background to the Resolution   
The political background of the SED’s course change, formulated in the Soviet 
Union by Stalin’s succession team of Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, and Bulganin, called for 
a retreat from their predecessor’s hardline tactics. In early June 1953, they summoned the 
East German leadership trifecta—Walter Ulbricht, Otto Grotewohl, and Wilhelm Pieck—
to Moscow where they received instructions for a new planning package that would 
replace the accelerated buildup in the GDR that had focused on heavy industry.6 
The East German government now found itself in the awkward position of 
retracting its uncompromising mission statement and pronouncing a softer platform as the 
way forward. The publicization of this political retreat proved perilous for the SED and it 
                                                 
4 There are problems with applying Habermas’ conception of a legitimation crisis to a Soviet type society, 
as traditional concepts of legitimacy cannot be readily applied here. See Atilla Ágh, “The Failure of the 
Socialist Project in East-Central Europe: The Legitimation Crisis of ‘Real Socialism,’” Aula 12 (1990): 7-
16; Ferenc Feher, Agnes Heller, and Gyorgy Markus, Dictatorship over Needs (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1983), 137-8.  
5 For a similar review of the mood reports generated following the announcement of the New Course, see 
Udo Wengst, “Der Aufstand am 17.Juni 1953 in der DDR. Aus den Stimmungsberichten der Kreis- und 
Bezirksverbände der Ost-CDU im Juni und Juli 1953,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 41 (1993): 277-
321, 280. Wengst finds a similar mixture of confusion and rejoicing detailed in this chapter.  
6 Christian Ostermann, Uprising in East Germany, 1953, 18-19. 
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found itself needing to maintain legitimacy while simultaneously admitting that its 
previous goals and tactics had been the wrong ones. The party thus put its 
communications apparatus to work along with political agitators to promote the new line. 
Nevertheless, this account was not the only information source available to East Germans. 
RIAS and other foreign broadcasters supplemented the official news and much of the 
population received a distorted edition of the SED’s official message. This was especially 
true in the Dresden region, where the regime found it nearly impossible to convince 
audiences of what it considered factual news. Instead, in mid-June, sudden political 
change combined with rumors, misinformation, and genuine news of events, to create 
widespread doubt of the regime’s viability.  
 At a glance, one might find it strange that unrest broke out in East Germany when 
it did. After all, the policies that had produced the rather devastating effects on the social 
and economic well-being of the country had been abandoned, and the regime fully 
expected that its call to implement many of the policies that East Germans desired would 
stave off attempts at revolution from below. But this was, of course, not the case.  
 
The News 
Despite announcing news of its own making, the SED probably found itself in 
many instances “scooped” by the more popular RIAS.  Early on June 11 the station 
broadcasted the most important points of the reforms including the relaxed rules 
regarding travel restrictions for both East and West Germans while noting the 
unusualness of this new policy, pointing out that this would allow families to reunite. 
RIAS also noted the new ability for those in the West to get a first-hand look at life in 
East and vice versa—timed perfectly for the traditional holiday season that had just 
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begun.7 “So what can the population do now?” queried the announcer. His answer was: 
“in any case, more than before.”8 The station presented the New Course as a moment 
when the SED lost political capital. Those who had been under the pressure of the SED—
the middle-sized farmers, private businesses, and Christian youth groups could now, in 
the words of the station, again become active, and “insist the communists meet them face 
to face/take a stand.”9 This initial assessment of the issuance concluded that it represented 
a blow to the SED and offered East Germans an uncommon chance—one that should not 
remain unused.10 The broadcast concluded with some advice for the station’s listeners, 
urging them to get a hold of a copy of Neues Deutschland and read it closely.11 
The Party revealed the resolution to its citizenry on the morning of June 11 on the 
front page of Neues Deutschland and through the airwaves, the factory radio systems in 
those workplaces that had them in place, and through the Stadtfunk. Those who 
purchased or got hold of a copy of the Sächsische Zeitung or Neues Deutschland on June 
11 learned of the regime’s change of course, which was the official version of what they 
might have heard on RIAS. The announcement proclaimed the different efforts on the 
part of the SED to improve the living standards of GDR citizens, while admitting that 
errors had been made in the past with respect to taxes (too high), food rationing cards 
(not enough), and the repression of targeted portions of society, including the 
intelligentsia, individual farmers, and private merchants. Following this admission, the 
Politburo reiterated its goal to unite Germany, which, it claimed, would require a 
                                                 
7 “Berlin Spricht zur Zone” 11. Juni 1953 (DRA Mikrofilm F0055 Hauptabteilung Politk Nr. 1014, 63.2). 
8 Ibid.: “Sprecher: was kann die Bevölkerung tun? Auf alle Fälle mehr als bisher” 
9 Ibid., 6: “ja sie müssen wieder aktiv und fordern den Kommunisten gegenübertreten.” 
10 Ibid., 6. 
11 Ibid., 6: “Kommuniqué des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees der SED vom 9. Juni 1953,” Neues 
Deutschland, June 11, 1953. 
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rapprochement of both its halves. In connection with this statement, the resolution 
pointed to a new, more relaxed approach to the policing of traffic between the two states 
and offered those who had fled the GDR a chance to return to their homes and reclaim 
their property or receive compensation for their losses. Other sweeteners included 
lowered prices for marmalade, honey, sweets, and baked goods. Curiously, the hated 
workers’ norms remained in place. Still, the resolution pointed to a radical shift in the 
Party’s position. As the population came to recognize the gravity of what the regime had 
proposed, everything appeared to change in the popular imagination.12 This is a 
significant point because the New Course raised hopes for fundamental change, not 
unlike the calling of the Estates General, which as George Lefebvre pointed out, 
heightened expectations for positive changes among common people.13 Such a 
development would seem to set the stage for the enactment of a revolutionary script.  
 
The Receptions of the News, Nationally 
  Workplaces around the GDR buzzed with the news and what it all meant, with 
workers even speculating whether the heightened norms would be revised. Some workers 
now claimed that the Politburo had finally listened to its critics and accepted their 
objections. Factory workers discussed the resolution’s importance in unifying Germany 
and easing the restrictions on travel, which would now allow East Germans to personally 
get in touch with their relatives in the West. Also, internal reports seemed to reveal that 
colleagues regarded the Communiqué as a sign of the SED’s strength; the Party 
publically admitted past mistakes raising hopes that the Party would build a stronger 
                                                 
12 “Kommuniqué des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees der SED vom 9. Juni 1953,” Neues Deutschland Juni 
11, 1953. 
13 Peter McPhee, ed., A Companion to the French Revolution (Malden, MA, Blackwell, 2013), 233. 
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relationship with the masses.14 These mistakes, some argued, could have been avoided 
had the Leninist theory of “an ear to the masses” been upheld.15 At the same time, rumors 
began to swirl around the GDR: Pieck had fled the country; Ulbricht and other ministers 
had been arrested; Pieck had died; and a range of other false reports that seemed to 
undermine or counter what the SED was saying.16 Similar rumors would appear in the 
communities in and around Dresden in the week leading up to the uprising. 
 
Communicating the Resolution in the Dresden Region 
A sense of elation and newfound hope appeared to grip the nation. The local 
government in Dresden almost immediately began to receive reports indicating the 
population took a keen interest in the news of June 11. People lined up at the newspaper 
stand to purchase Die Union, Neues Deutschland, and other publications that published 
the Communiqué.17 In the course of a few minutes, the post office recorded fifty-four 
telephone calls with requests for the special edition of the Sächsische Zeitung presenting 
the Communiqué.18 A newspaper saleswoman, whose stand was located at the 
waterworks in Dresden-Tolkewitz heard the resolution on the radio and immediately 
jotted down the news in shorthand so she would be able to read it to her early morning 
                                                 
14 “Thema: Kommuniqué des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees der SED vom 9. Juni 1953,” FDGB-
Bundesvorstand Org.-Instr.-Abteilung, Sektor Information, den 12. Juni, 1953, Information Nr. 21 
(SAPMO-BArch DY 30/IV/2/5 543).  
15 Ibid. 
16 “Thema: Kommuniqué des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees der SED vom 9. Juni 1953,” FDGB-
Bundesvorstand, Org.-Instr.-Abteilung, Sektor Information, Den 13. Juni, 1953 Information Nr. 22 
(SAPMO-Barch DY 30/IV/2/5 543). 
17 See the untitled document beginning “Der Anteil der Bevölkerung verstärkt sich laufend” Nationale 
Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, Bezirksausschuss Dresden, Sekretariat. 12.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 
Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
18 See the untitiled document beginning “Die Bevölkerung nimmt regen Anteil und zeigt großes Interesse 
für den Beschluss des Politbüros.” Nationale Front des Demokratischen Deutschland Bezirksausschuss 
Dresden, i.A. Hempel, Sekretariat 11.6.1953 Wa/Bö (SAPMO-BArch DY 6 5005). 
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customers.19 The enormity of the news was likewise not lost on at least one worker in a 
VEB, where someone recorded the wording of the Communiqué (as it aired over the 
radio) and shared the news with the entire staff during the morning break.20 In nearby 
Riesa, as in other locations, the factory broadcast system announced the Communiqué to 
the majority of the factories while the same information went out over the SED’s radio 
waves.21 This happened, for example, at VEM Transformatoren-und Roentgenwerk and 
Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz early in the morning of June 12.22 As the news blasted over 
the Stadtfunk system residents in Dresden and Bautzen gathered around the loudspeakers 
and chatted about the details of the news—perhaps planning a visit to West Germany.23  
 
Preparation and clarification efforts 
After the Communiqué officially aired over the radio systems and through the 
local party publications, the SED rushed to explain its political maneuvers to confused 
party functionaries, deploying campaigners to explain positions to workforces and other 
communities. 
  In a number of enterprises, the BPO (Betriebsparteiorganisation or SED party 
representation in the workplace) gathered campaigners, instructors, organizers, and others 
between the early hours of the morning and the afternoon on Wednesday to relay directly 
                                                 
19 Ibid.  
20 “Betr.: Situationsbericht – Kommuniqué vom 9.6. / 1.Bericht SED-Stadtbezirk III,” Dresden-A17. Den 
11.6.53 Parteiinformation, Schulstr. 11 an die Kreisleitung der SED, Parteiinformation (SächsHStA 11857 
Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
21 See the untitled and undated document beginning “Sofort nach Bekanntwerden des Kommuniqué durch 
den demokratischen Rundfunk,” Riesa, Genosse Möbius (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
22 “Betr. Stimmungsbericht uber die empfehlung des Polit.-Buros and die Regierung vom 9.6.1953,” VEM 
Transformatoren-und Roentgenwerk Dresden, SED Betriebsparteiorganisation an die Bezirksleitung der 
SED Abt. Information (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
23 “Stellungsnahmen zum Kommuniqué des Politbüros des ZK der SED vom 9.6.1953,” “Nationale Front 
des Demokratischen Deutschland Bezirkausschuss Dresden, Sekretariat. den 13.6.1953 Wa. (SächsHStA 
11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011); “Betr. Stimmungsbericht über das Kommuniqué dzk der SED” v. 9.6.1953, 
Bezirksvorstand Dresden, Kreisvorstand Pirna. DPD 12.6.1953 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
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to them the Communiqué after it aired over GDR radio. In such meetings, the BPO 
sought to convince those present of the measures’ necessity—particularly more abstract 
concepts such as the renewed struggle toward a unified Germany and the establishment 
of peace. Following such consultations, comrades in attendance received orders to visit 
workplaces and generate reports that gauged opinion in the workforces.24 Additionally, 
the consultations were to equip them with the arguments and knowledge necessary to 
clarify any misunderstandings that arose.25 Similarly, functionaries throughout the 
Dresden region received the party line on June 11 from county committees and 
instructions to popularize it in key areas.26 As the various departments around the region 
began attempting to defend and promote the regime’s new position and gather 
information, the complexity of their task became apparent. 
 
Approval and Relief 
On one hand, the proposed measures spelled out in the Communiqué met general 
approval, as after all, they seemed to rectify the most common complaints about the 
SED’s governance of the GDR. Reports in Dresden declared that the majority of the 
working class, members of the intelligentsia, artisans, and businessmen greeted the New 
Course and the “self-criticism” of the Politburo as evidence that the government was 
                                                 
24 “Betr. Stimmungsbericht über die Empfehlung des Polit.-Buros und die Regierung vom 9.6.1953; 
Stimmungsbericht zum Beschluss des Politbüros vom 9.6.1953, SED – Betriebsparteiorganisation, Rat des 
Bezirkes Dresden, Dresden, den 12.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011); “Betr.: Diskussionen über 
das Kommuniqué des Politbüros,” An die Abt. Leitende Organe - Sektor Parteiinformation - im Hause 
(SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011); “Betr.: Situationsbericht – Kommuniqué vom 9.6. / 1.Bericht,” SED-
Stadtbezirk III Parteiinformation an die Kreisleitung der SED, Parteiinformation - Dresden-A17 den 
11.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
25 Ibid. 
26 “Operativ Information: Über das Kommuniqué des Politbüros vom 9.6.53, Bericht I,” SED Kreisleitung 
Dresden Stadt, Abt. P.u.M., Parteiinformation, Dresden, den 12.6.1953 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. 
IV/2/12/011); see the document beginning “Vom Kreissekretariat ist eine Besprechung mit den Genossen 
Abteilungsleiter,” Freital - - Gen. Schossig – Kommuniqué Likely 12.6 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. 
IV/2/12/011).    
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honest with the working people.27 In Riesa, the Communiqué had at first the effect of a 
“cold shower” although comrades as well as the general population generally greeted the 
Politburo’s resolution.28 In Kamenz, on June 12, many reacted positively to the news, 
with the mayor noting that “now the masses could exhale.” 29 In Zeisholz, party officials 
found that residents had argued “it was high time that one took into account the mood of 
the masses.”30 District Committees reported similar news in Görlitz where workers 
greeted the resolution’s call to end political persecutions.31 Still another comrade stated 
on June 12 that she had heard the notification the previous day and was shocked, thinking 
that the news suggested a political Wendung—a notion that would prove a double-edged 
sword and recurring theme over the next week.32 After the resolution went out over the 
radio, the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR (National Council of the National 
Front of the GDR) noted that joy and approval dominated.33 Examples include one 
politically unaffiliated worker at the chemical pulp factory in Pirna who reportedly wept 
with joy, not only because sweets and marmalade would now be cheaper, but because the 
resolution had been concocted in the interests of the working class and provided evidence 
the SED would do everything possible to reunify Germany—a popular topic of 
discussion in those days.34  
                                                 
27 “Operativ Information: Uber das Kommuniqué des Politbüros vom 9.6.53,” Bericht I.  
28 See the document beginning “Kommuniqué anfangs wie kalte Dusche gewirkt” Kreisleitung Riesa 
(Genosse Möbius, Information) 14.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
29 See the document beginning  “Das Kommuniqué des Politbüros vom ZK hat in der gesamten 
Bevölkerung” Kreisleitung Kamenz - Gen. Zschornack (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011): “Es ist Zeit, 
das Volk atmet auf.” 
30 Ibid.: “es ist höchste Zeit, dass man der Stimmung in der Bevölkerung Rechnung trägt.” 
31 See the document beginning “Im Großen und Ganzen kann gesagt werden” Görlitz Stadt (SächsHStA 
11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
32 “Das Kommuniqué des Politbüros vom ZK hat in der gesamten Bevölkerung.” 
33 “Die Bevölkerung nimmt regen Anteil und zeigt großes Interesse für den Beschluss des Politbüros.” 
34 Ibid.  
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Economic concessions in the announced New Course meant that people now 
expected more in the way of consumer goods and lowered prices. A number of Germans 
greeted the lower prices the regime now planned for goods, as did participants in a 
pensioners’ house meeting in Dippoldiswalde who anticipated cheaper marmalade, sugar, 
and other privileges.35 The German Democratic Association of Women reported that 
women dramatically rejoiced, stating that they had felt cut off from the regime due to 
issues surrounding the ration cards. “We had lost faith in the regime” stated one 
interviewee, “We wept at the radio as the new information aired.”36 Many were grateful 
for the lower priced tickets for public transportation, while others did note that residents 
expressed less interest in the cheaper sweets and more concern regarding the causes and 
greater ramifications of the proposed political turn.37 Still, according to a math professor 
at the Technical College in Dresden, he had, through conversations with the population, 
come to believe that people reacted positively to the measures concerning price 
reductions and the reintroduction of ration cards.38 Other reports out of Dresden note that 
workers similarly took keen interest in the recommendations of the Politburo, and despite 
a significant negativity toward the regime in these places, workers welcomed price 
reductions for sweets.39 
 
                                                 
35 See the document beginning “Vor allem herrscht in den Betrieben noch ein Durcheinander” Kreis 
Dippoldiswalde, Gen. Nitzsche, 12.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
36 “Betr.: Stimmungsbericht über das Kommuniqué des Politbüros der SED vom 9.6.1953,” 
Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands Bezirkvorstand Dresden, 1. Bezirkssekretärin an die 
Bezirksleitungen SED, Sekretariat, Dresden A1 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011): “Wir hatten das 
Vertrauen zur Regierung verloren, wir glaubten wir sind ausgeschaltet. Wir haben am Radio geweint als die 
neuen Mitteilungen herauskamen” 
37 “Betr.: Situationsbericht uber das Kommuniqué, 3.” “Bericht, SED-Stadtbezirk III, Dresden – A.17, Abt. 
P.u.m. – Parteiinformation an die Kreisleitung der SED Parteiinformation,” Dresden, den 13.6.53 
(SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011).  
38 Stellungnahme des Herrn Prof. Dr. phil. Dräger (SAPMO-Barch DY 27 1588, Bl.10).  
39 “Betr.: Situationsbericht uber das Kommuniqué, 3. Bericht.” 
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Reaction in the Workplace 
As in most places throughout the GDR, the news, above all, created an 
atmosphere of hope and confusion and encouraged conversations predicated on the 
assumption that fundamental change now seemed possible. However, dissent also began 
to percolate. At Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, a number of politically unaffiliated workers 
concluded that they no longer had confidence in the regime’s ability to run the state after 
learning of the proposed measure. The infamous workers’ norms, a volatile point of 
contention between labor and government remained unchanged from their existing levels. 
As with most of the recommendations proposed by the Politburo, the issue took on a life 
of its own. And at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, workers had become convinced as soon as 
the Communiqué aired that the heightened norms would soon be revised in their favor.40 
Elsewhere, workers took matters into their own hands, such as in Elektrowärme 
Sörnewitz, where comrades from a range of departments drafted protest letters against the 
heightened norms and took part in a sit down strike on Saturday.41 Sometimes, the 
conversations that broke out in the wake of the news demonstrated the workers had 
become more vocal, for instance, when a boisterous group declared that they had been 
working on a “dictatorial basis, rather than a persuasion basis,” before leadership 
intervened and brought order to the meeting.42 
Already on Thursday, June 12, evidence of “serious” confusion existed in the 
Meißen  area factories, where reports indicated that many of the workers had no real 
knowledge of the Communique’s content and knew “only the snippets of information” 
                                                 
40 FDGB Dresden, 12.6.53, 17.xx  18.40 uhr kr, Sekretariat (SAPMO-Barch DY 34 2509). 
41 Ibid. 
42 “Informationsbericht am 13.6.- 12 uhr,” SED- Betriebsparteiorganisation des Sachsenwerkes 
Niedersedlitz Dresden, den 13.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011): “nicht auf Überzeugungsbasis, 
sondern diktatorisch arbeiteten.” 
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they get from colleagues. For instance, some argued that the Party had done a one-
hundred-eighty-degree turn or “the working class had handed over the reins of power.”43 
Such reactions reflected the regime’s inability to adequately control the message and 
therefore the situation—a serious problem that allowed the news to take on lives of its 
own. 
 
Communicating Power 
Meanwhile, the SED attempted to present their political retreat as one that 
demonstrated the Party’s strength. One tactic included admitting guilt as far as “errors” 
related to the accelerated socialist buildup, while publicizing the regime’s forthrightness 
in owning up to the mistakes of the past, and often claiming such a feat had no historical 
precedent. A second tactic included drawing parallels to the Soviet Union’s triumphs, 
which like the previous two claims, would hopefully shore up the SED’s waning 
legitimacy and credibility.  
The BPO council in Dresden, which oversaw SED political activity in state-
owned enterprises, had a special meeting on June 12 with all party secretaries, 
campaigners, and comrades after the Communiqué officially went out over the radio. A 
number of functionaries looked to draw comparisons between the present situation in the 
GDR and those in the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. One 
contemplated whether the New Course might be likened to the Soviets’ New Economic 
Policy or if one could speak, like Lenin, of a type of “Two steps forward and one step 
                                                 
43 “Betr.: Bericht über das Kommuniqué des Politbüros vom 9.6.53,” SED Kreisleitung Meißen 
an die SED Bezirksleitung – Sekretariat – Dresden. Meißen, den 16.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. 
IV/2/12/011): “sie nur Auszuege von Kollegen erfahren; “die Arbeiterklasse hat das Heft aus der Hand 
gegeben.” 
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back” sort of progress.44 Another party member agreed, suggesting that in the creation of 
a dictatorship of the proletariat they had taken two steps forward and had now taken a 
step back, but also that, in a “struggle for peace” they had fallen a step back, but also 
moved ten steps forward.45 The meeting’s report concluded that the majority of the 
colleagues and comrades in attendance here quickly recognized the righteousness of the 
Party’s line in connection with the international situation and its inherent political 
strength.46   
In reality, party departments and staff often told those gathering opinions what 
they wanted to hear, likely contributing to a sense of false confidence within the Party. 
The Organisation Instrukteur Abteilung, which since 1949 had been charged with 
continuously controlling the implementation of resolutions while instructing lower 
organizations and basic units, for example, expressed the view that the Communiqué 
proved the strength of the regime and the SED; such an admission, the department’s head 
manager averred, would never have been possible in a capitalist land.47 Elsewhere, the 
chairman of IG Textil-Bekleidung-Leder agreed that the measures taken would 
“strengthen the power of the Party” and the confidence (Vertrauen) of not only party 
members, but the entire population.48 One comrade in Freital greeted the “open and 
honest” position of the Politburo and the central committee while a leader from a 
                                                 
44 “Stimmungsbericht zum Beschluss des Politbüros vom 9.6.1953,” SED Betriebsparteiorganisation 
Rat des Bezirkes Dresden, Dresden, den 12.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 IV 2.13 Nr 6). 
45 Ibid.: “Friedenskampf”  
46 Ibid.  
47 Friedericke Sattler, Wirtschaftsordnung im Übergang: Politik,Organisation und Funktion der KPD/SED 
im Land Brandenburg bei der Etablierung der zentralen Planwirtschaft in der SBZ/GDR 1945-52 (Berlin: 
LIT Verlag, 2002): 782; “Stimmungsbericht zum Beschluss des Politbüros vom 9.6.1953,” SED 
Betriebsparteiorganisation Rat des Bezirkes Dresden, Dresden, den 12.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 IV 2.13 Nr 
6). 
48 See the document begining with “Vom Kreissekretariat ist eine Bespruchung” Freital - - Gen. Schossig - 
- Kommuniqué (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
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communally-owned factory stated that the party demonstrated “great strength and power” 
through its openness and honesty, adding that, “Such a self-critical position had never 
before been demonstrated and in doing so, a decisive step in the struggle for peace and 
German unity had been taken.”49 The SED also promoted this position over the airwaves 
as evidenced on June 11 at 7:15 A.M., when functionaries at Sachsenwerk Radeberg 
gathered in the factory dining area where the functionary had stenographically recorded 
the slogan as it aired over GDR Radio: only a regime of the working class could take the 
position of openness with regards to its errors, something that hitherto had never 
happened in Germany’s history—powerful claims indeed.50  
In the days that followed, reports concluded that party functionaries could see the 
strength of the regime and the party in such self-criticisms, the traditional communist 
penance.51 In Dresden, the District Committee compiled evidence that the Communiqué 
was generally greeted by party members, with one claiming, typically, that the Party’s 
decision to ruthlessly post its errors showed the “strength and simultaneous growth” of 
the Party, which could be tied to the experiences of the Soviet Union. “After all,” 
commented one party member, “not for nothing had they coined the phrase ‘to learn from 
the Soviet Union means to learn victory.’”52 
                                                 
49 Kreisleitung Freital (Gen Schossig) Aufgenommen: Elsner, 13.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
“solche selbstkritische Stellungnahme von keinem System bisher aufgezeigt wurde und dass dadurch ein 
entscheidender Schritt im Kampf um Frieden und Einheit Deutschlands getan wurde.” 
50 “Bericht über den Vorschlag des Politbüros an die Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,” 
VEB an die SED - Kreisleitung – Land – Partei – Information - Dresden N6, 11.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 
Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
51 “Betr.: Stimmungsbericht über das Kommuniqué des Politbüros,” SED-Stadtbezirksleitung 6, Abt. 
P.u.M. Parteiinformation Dresden den 12.6.53 an die SED-Kreisleitung Dresden Stadt Abt. P.u.M. 
Parteiinformation (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
52 Ibid.: “die Stärke und gleichzeitig das Wachstum”; “Nicht umsonst haben wir die Losung geprägt: von 
der SU lernen – heißt siegen lernen” 
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Things appeared to be going according to plan with the public, too. In Pirna, 
residents were reported to have commented that they respected the regime’s admission of 
guilt when it came to mistakes that had been made, but also that things were looking up 
as the regime, after all, “had an ear to the masses.”53 Similarly, in the streetcars in Freital, 
passengers discussed the correctness of the measures and that the population was 
impressed that the errors had been dealt with in an open and clear way.54  
Representing the intelligentsia’s opinion in these matters, Professor Dräger at the 
Technical College in Dresden noted in his discussion with a party functionary that the 
positives outweighed the negatives and that East Germans should have “complete trust in 
a regime that has the courage to openly admit its mistakes.”55 Engineers at Sachsenwerk 
Niedersedlitz discussed the political posture of the regime in conversations with 
functionaries and agreed that a capitalist regime would either be forced to step down in 
such a situation—or cover things up. The SED on the other hand, they continued, openly 
admitted its mistakes and the people’s confidence continued to grow through such 
actions—evidence of the regime’s power.56 The issue of the regime’s honesty became a 
key issue for campaigners and Party members. For example, in Pirna, comrades reported 
that while their clarification efforts had become easier since workers had been promised a 
better living standard, it had also become apparent that many comrades remained 
convinced that the Communiqué suggested the regime’s weakness. How, then, to set such 
false views straight? The party members who led the consultations noted to non-believers 
                                                 
53 “Betr. Stimmungsbericht über das Kommuniqué dzk der SED v. 9.6.1953, Bezirksvorstand Dresden 
12.6.1953, Kreisvorstand Pirna. DPD (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
54 “Vom Kreissekretariat ist eine Besprechung mit den Genossen Abteilungsleiter,” [Likely 12.6]. 
55 “Stellungnahme des Herrn Prof. Dr. phil. Dräger” (DY 27 1558, Bl10): “Er selbst ist der Meinung, dass 
das Positive vorherrscht und wir zu einer solchen Regierung, die den Mut hat, ihre Fehler offen 
einzugestehen, restloses Vertrauen haben können.” 
56 “Unterredung mit den Herren Ingenieuren Franke und Singer vom Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz durch 
unseren Kollegen Diessner am 13.6.1953,” Dresden, am 13.6.53 (SAPMO-BArch DY 27 1558).  
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that the confession of errors “could only be strength for the Regime and the Party” as it 
demonstrated honesty.57  
But to turn the SED’s track record, which, in reality, exhibited little success, into a 
source of political strength was easier said than done. Indeed, in some ways, the New 
Course seemed to stimulate the wrath of the public. Some residents pointed out that if 
they exercised criticism by earlier pointing to these mistakes, the Party designated them 
as opportunists and conciliators and their criticisms were not recognized.58 In Dresden, 
the public conversations reportedly revealed mixed opinions, where in the streetcars and 
among those waiting in lines for goods, some now spoke openly of the “great 
weaknesses.”59 Others, like the residents of Pirna, wanted to know why change took so 
long. The region’s factory workers continued to question the Party’s tardiness in 
admitting its mistakes and expressed confusion regarding the situation.60 In Freital, 
unaffiliated teachers viewed the measures taken by the Party as a sign of weakness, with 
one LDP member stating that while he greeted that Communiqué, he felt the errors had 
been, sadly, recognized a bit late and that “open self-criticism” testified to the strength of 
the working class rather than the regime.61 Still, some struggled to understand why the 
party had not heeded the clues it got from the people earlier, further noting that had the 
                                                 
57 “Betr.: Bericht über das Kommuniqué des Politbüros vom 9.6.53,” SED – Kreisleitung Meißen an die 
SED Bezirksleitung - Sekretariat – Dresden, Meißen, den 16.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011); 4. 
Zwischenbericht über die Stimmung zum Kommuniqué des ZK vom 9.6.53, Kreisleitung Pirna (Gen. 
Ender) 15.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011): “dass Fehler eingestehen für  unsere Partei und 
Regierung nur eine Stärke sein kann, dass sie damit ihre Ehrlichkeit beweist” 
58 “Betr.: Kommuniqué ZK vom 9.6 1953,” SED Kreisleitung Dresden Land an die SED Bezirksleitung, 
16.6.1953 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011).: “Oppurtunisten und Versöhnler” 
59 “Betr.: Kommuniqué des Polit-Büros des ZK der SED vom 9.6.1953” Betriebsparteileitung der SED – 
Betriebsgruppen Stadtverwaltung Dresden, Neues Rathaus, Abschrift/Hä, Dresden, den 12.6.1953 an die 
SED Betriebsparteileitung, Gen. Manfred Bürger (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV 2.13 Nr. 6): “Große 
Schwächen” 
60 “6. Lagebericht über den Beschluss des Politbüros vom 9.6.53.,” SED Bezirksleitung Dresden Leitende 
Organe der Partei und Massenorganisationen Sektor Parteiinformation, Dresden, den 16.6.1953 
(SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
61 Kreisleitung Freital (Schossig), 14.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
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measures not been implemented an uprising would have broken out and those responsible 
would have to be brought to justice.62 
The SED also endured criticism from its supporters because of its admission of 
errors. While a good number of comrades had fallen in line with the regime’s political 
strategy, many remained skeptical of the situation and felt that the Party’s admission of 
errors and its self-critical position revealed weakness and amounted to an admission of 
political bankruptcy. Party members in the court in Dresden reportedly expected a 
Slansky Trial, suggesting that those who deviated would be ousted from the Party, similar 
to what had happened in the Czechs’ show trial.63 Similarly, in the Dresdner animal feed 
plant, workers on Monday argued that those who make mistakes should find themselves 
behind bars and wondered why those in the regime, having admitted mistakes, faced no 
consequences.64 One worker at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, an alleged left-radical, 
displayed disappointment from that side of the political spectrum and argued that the 
resolution was RIAS rabble-rousing, since the SED would never allow such a thing.65   
 
Explanations behind the New Course  
The impetus behind the regime’s about-face remained something of a mystery to a 
vast majority of the population. The radical change of course provoked a range of 
                                                 
62 “Betr.: Kommuniqué ZK vom 9.6 1953,” SED Kreisleitung Dresden Land an die SED Bezirksleitung, 
16.6.1953. 
63 “Bericht von der Bezirksleitung Dresden über Kommunique des Politburos vom 15.6.53,” Angesagt von: 
Genn Schöder, Unterschrieben von Brosselt, Geschrieben von Erika Stübner (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 
IV/2/5/528). 
64 “Unterschreiben vom 2. Sekr. Gen. Rebsch, Kreisleitung Zittau,” Gen. Jähne, Uhr 1045 (SächsHStA 
11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
65 “Kurzinformation über die Stimmung zum Kommuniqué des Polit.-Büros im Bezirksverband Dresden,” 
Freie Deutsche Jugend, Bezirksleitung Dresden, Sekretariat, Dresden, den 15.6.1953 (SächsHStA 11857 
Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
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theories hashed out collectedly regarding just who or what might have been behind the 
SED’s moderated position. 
 In Dresden, functionaries noted negative discussions in the city’s streetcars on 
June 11, which, according to the responsible agent, were purportedly concentrated among 
passengers who hailed from those strata of the population that were indifferent to 
political developments.66 One politically unaffiliated shepherdess declared to the 
strangers around her that now she could speak out and declared that the SED wanted 
“Spitzbart (“pointy beard,” meaning Walter Ulbricht) out because he had been too eager 
to follow Russian orders and that Malenkov was now calling for an entirely different 
direction than the previous Stalinist line.67 It appears sometimes residents correctly 
recognized that the SED had simply done what Soviet leadership demanded, but then 
often put their own spin on the story.68 For instance, at a spinning and weaving mill in 
Ebersbach, fifty kilometers from Dresden, workers discussed whether the Soviet Union 
owed the U.S money and had taken out a new line of credit. This might have resulted, 
they argued, in the High Commissar in the USSR ordering a change in its policy toward 
Germany.69  
Some believed the SED’s political retreat stemmed from foreign powers, but the 
explanations voiced by ordinary people varied. On occasion citizens tied the change to 
the Americans, as in Meißen, where functionaries reported a rumor circulating over the 
weekend that the Politburo’s proposals only occurred because of pressure from the 
                                                 
66 See the document beginning “Der Anteil der Bevölkerung verstärkt sich laufend” des Demokratischen 
Deutschland, Bezirksausschuss Dresden, Sekretariat. 12.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011) 
67 Ibid. “Die (gemeint ist die SED) den Spitzbart weghaben wollen (gemeint ist Walter Ulbricht), weil der 
zu viel den Russen nach Pfeife getanzt hätte” 
68 “Betr.: Kommuniqué  des ZK vom  9.6.1953,” SED – Kreisleitung Dresden Land an die SED 
bezirksleitung Sekretariat, Dresden A1. 14.6.1953 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
69 Kreisleitung Löbau (Genn. Hennig), Aufgenommen: Elsner 13.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. 
IV/2/12/011). 
159 
 
United States. This pressure, so the rumor went, included the American threat of military 
intervention in the GDR should the regime fail to implement the proposals in the 
Communiqué in short order.70 In Riesa similar rumors circulated, but here, some believed 
that the Americans would arrive by the middle of the week.71 Along these lines, a 
brigadier in Bautzen claimed to have seen an unmarked sedan on June 12 with American 
flags on the fenders cruising through town, and he even produced for local officials a 
sketch of the occupants, whom he claimed to have been dressed in both civil and army 
uniforms. A later report revealed the car to have been from an Eastern Bloc state.72 
Similar arguments also appeared in Dresden, where one worker argued the New Course 
was the result of American pressure while other colleagues contradicted him, pointing to 
the Russian “Peace Offensive” (Friedensoffensive) and argued that the Russians were 
craftier than they (East Germans) were.73 In Görlitz, a housewife echoed these sentiments, 
declaring that the New Course stemmed above all from Western lobbying.74 In addition, 
as always, radio tied into perceptions, with some in Dresden arguing that since RIAS 
aired the news of the Communiqué before the local stations West Germany must have 
been behind everything.75 
It should be noted that the party elected not to articulate or publicize the true 
reasons behind the New Course, which was the poverty and unrest brought about by the 
                                                 
70 See the document beginning “Einige Handwerker stehen der Erklärung” 12,30 Uhr 
Unterschr.: Gen. Nitzsche (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
71 “Sofort nach Bekanntwerden des Kommuniqué  durch den demokratischen Rundfunk,“ Riesa, Genosse 
Möbius. 
72 Bautzen, Gen. Letters. (see “7. Typische Erscheinungen”) (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
73 “Information über die Stimmung in den Betriebn zu dem Kommuniqué über die Stizung des Politburos 
der SED am 9.6.53 sowie Sitzung des Ministerrats am 11.6.53,” FDGB-Bezirksvorstand Dresden, Statistik/ 
Berichterstattung, Dresden, den 13.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
74 Görlitz Land, Lykowski (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
75 “Kurzinformation über die Stimmung zum Kommuniqué des Politburos im Bezirksverband Dresden,” 
Freie Deutsche Jugend, Bezirksleitung Dresden, Sekretariat, Dresden, den 16.6.1953 (SächsHStA 11857 
Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
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accelerated drive to socialism. Furthermore, one could conclude that the party leaders 
seemed to be interested in hearing what they wanted to hear—that they (and only a party 
like their own) made the right decision to correct their “errors,” a catch-all phrase that 
avoided any genuine political admission of guilt while opening the regime to criticism 
and partially-informed speculation.  
 
Heightened Expectations  
It now seemed that everything was changing, and the future, which had seemed so 
certain several days earlier, was once again an unknown. Although the announcement had 
been rather explicit in certain areas, it left enough details to the imagination as that the 
masses readily filled in the blanks. In place of concrete information, people began to 
speculate as to what was happening or what the future held. Annelies Zickermann, an 
employee at the Görlitz polyclinic, declared that the year (1953) would mainly see turns 
for the better, since, one hundred days after Stalin’s death, something good had happened 
(the Communiqué), and she prophesied that on August 8 Germany would be reunified. Of 
course, she had apparently heard this from a fortuneteller, but, as we will see, rumor that 
yet another major change would come in August circulated in other places.76 Others 
predicted the end would come perhaps a bit sooner, such as the farmer in Kamenz who 
stated in a public gathering that the SED was now hanging by a thread and it would not 
be long until the time came when comrades had their party insignias ripped from their 
lapels—which, according to him, had already begun in Dresden.77 
                                                 
76 Görlitz Stadt, S.2 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011): “In der Poliklinik diskutierte die Angestelle 
Annelies Zickermann: Dieses Jahr wird überhaupt eine gute Wende, dass hat man schon [illeg.] das 
Hundert Tage nach Stalins Tod eine Wende kommt, die für  uns zum Guten ist, am 8.8. werden wir die 
Einheit Deutschlands haben. (Angeblich Wahrsager erzählt).”  
77 Kreisleitung Kamenz, Gen. Zschornack 10:30 Uhr (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
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Economy and Currency 
The announcement of the New Course raised expectations and sometimes rumors 
carried specific suggestions about the nation’s future. As far as the GDR’s economic 
future, residents imagined various scenarios. For instance in Großenhain a rumor 
circulated on Saturday that currency needed to be spent quickly as it would soon 
disappear. Later that evening, the local bank recorded only one deposit with every other 
customer making withdrawals, demonstrating the potential of rumors to spread quickly.78 
In Riesa, rumors circulated that the political situation had swept away the regime and that 
the Americans were scheduled to arrive at the beginning of the week, all of which would 
lead to currency reform after the borders fell.79 Rumor in Freital held that it was the 
currency reform that would provide the necessary funds for the New Course.80 The New 
Economic Policy of 1920s Soviet Russia helped convince a farmer in Löbau that, as in 
that country’s past, the relaxation of economic controls would remain in place for only a 
bit before the regime reinstated socialism.81  
 
The Reunification Question: a Source of Power and a Source of Weakness 
The Communiqué’s rhetoric regarding reunification raised hopes and inspired 
visions of national unity. As Karl Fricke reminds us, Germans did not fully accept the 
nation’s partition in 1953 and reunification remained a central part of the SED’s political 
                                                 
78 “5. Lagebericht über den Beschluss des Politbüros vom 9.6.1953,” SED-Bezirksleitung Dresden, 
Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenogranisationen, Sektor Parteiinformation, Dresden, den 15.6.1953, 
Schr.-Schu. (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
79 Kreisleitung Riesa (Genosse Möbius, Information) 14.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011): 
“Kommuniqué anfangs wie kalte Dusche gewirkt” 
80 Ibid.  
81 “Betr.: Kommuniqué  des Politbüros vom 9.6.53” - Durch genossen der Abt. Staatl. Organe wurde 
gestern in 3 Kreisen folgendes festgestellt: “- Abt. Staatliche Organe – Dresden, am 16.6.53 (SächsHStA 
11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
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discourse.82 The Communiqué reaffirmed this position and declared reunification 
fundamental to the Politburo’s goals. Of course, little had been accomplished in previous 
years aside from political posturing, so when the party announced the New Course, to 
many it seemed that the moment for change had finally arrived. Some GDR citizens 
welcomed looser border controls while others anticipated a unified Germany within days. 
Perhaps fittingly, on the night of the Communiqué’s announcement, a Dresden resident 
who lived across the street from a residence in which a radio was blasting the German 
national anthem concluded it was “Probably RIAS.”83  
The New Course stimulated national, all-German imaginings as residents looked 
forward to relaxed border controls that would immediately soften Germany’s partition. 
Reports indicate that these new rules became one of the week’s most discussed topics. 
The morning of the announcement, an older woman expressed delight that she would 
soon be able to visit her son in West Germany.84 Other East Germans similarly 
anticipated the issuance of residence permits for stays in the GDR by West Germans and 
the disbursement of inter-zone passes.85 The elderly discussed the opportunities they 
would now have to get together with their children and relatives.86 A pensioner welcomed 
the measures of the Politburo, proclaiming, “We’ve now been given a further possibility 
                                                 
82 See Friecke in Roth, Der 17 Juni in Sachsen, introduction.  
83 See the document beginning “Werte Genossen! Soeben erreichte uns folgende Nachricht:“ SED-
Stadtbezirksleitung 6 Abt P.u.M. Information an die SED-Kreisleitung Dresden Stadt, Abt. P.u.M. 
Information Dresden 12.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011): “Wahrscheinlich Rias“ 
84 “Betr.: Informationsbericht über die Stimmung unter der Bevölkerung und der Kollegen unserem 
Betrieb,” 11.6.1953. 
85 Ibid.  
86 Kreisleitung Dippoldiswalde, Gen. Nitzsche Kenntniz v.d. Bericht 1. u. 2. Sekretär (SächsHStA 11857 
Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
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to take a concrete stance on the question of German unity.”87 Indeed, reports from the 
countryside around Dresden alleged that residents were especially pleased with the 
relaxed travel restrictions and they were ready to begin making plans of whom they 
would visit first.88 In Bischofswerda, a master watchmaker felt that the resolution 
represented a “new direction” in German national politics and that now, “nothing stood in 
the way of reunification.”89 At least one comrade at LOWA Niesky “did not care as to 
what, how, or why” the Communiqué emerged from the Politburo; he just knew that the 
New Course was a necessary step toward the unity of Germany that had to be 
implemented soon.90 The admission of errors seems to have led some to believe that the 
GDR amounted to a failed, short-lived project, which disavowed by its architects, 
brought German unification that much closer. 
 
Eastern Issues 
On towns near the Oder-Neisse line, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the 
Communiqué raised expectations among residents of these areas in more immediate and 
tangible ways. On a train between Ebersbach and Löbau passengers averred that it was 
now “certain that they would get Silesia back.”91 Others believed they would now return 
                                                 
87 “4. Die negative Stimmung im Stadtkreis Görlitz ist in der Hauptsache durch Riashetzte entstanden,” 
Görlitz -Stadt, Gen. Lange, 15.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011): “Nun wird uns eine weitere 
Möglichkeit gegeben, zur Frage der Einheit Deutschlands konkret Stellung zu nehmen.” 
88 “Betr.: Kommuniqué des ZK vom 9.6.1953,” SED – Kreisleitung Dresden Land an die SED 
Bezirksleitung Sekretariat Dresden A1, 14.6.1953 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011); Betr.: 
Kommuniqué des ZK vom 9.6.1953, SED Kreisleitung Dresden Land an die SED Bezirksleitung 
Sekretariat, 13.6.1953 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
89 Bischhofswerda, S2, [likely 12.6.53] (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011): “neue Wendung”; “steht nicht 
mehr im Wege” 
90 Kreisleitung Niesky, Gen. Hartmann 10.40 Uhr (likely 14.6) (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011): “Was, 
wie und warum interessiert mich jetzt nicht, ich weiß dieser Schritt ist zur Einheit Deutschlands notwendig 
und die muss jetzt bald hergestellt werden.” 
91 “Stellungnahmen zu den Maßnahmen der SED und der Regierung der DDR: Vom Kreisausschuss 
Dresden Stadt gehen uns folgende Diskussionen zu:,” Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschland 
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to their old homes.92 Reports out of Zittau, Löbau, and Niesky also noted that residents 
had now begun discussing what they saw as the very real possibility that the Oder-Neisse 
border might be revised, which in many of these cases, meant potentially returning to 
their homes that now sat in Poland. These conversations, which took place in inns and 
other locales reportedly died down when party functionaries entered such establishments, 
suggesting such ideas remained reactionary and dangerous ones in the eyes of the SED—
and that these conversations may have been more widespread than reported here.93  
Conversations in the east of course further fed rumors of reunification. These 
ideas circulated in the Dresden Theater and from the director of the Dresden Zoo, who 
argued that the coming relaxation in foreign policy would facilitate negotiations in 
connection with German reunification.94 The director also noted that members of the 
intelligentsia, who had earlier expressed their desire to attend more conferences in West 
Germany now believed the regime had responded to their wishes. In their opinion, 
German-language scholarship would receive a boost from the proposed measures.95 
Similarly, engineers from Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz imagined themselves reuniting with 
West German scholars as well as the international scholarly community.96  
By raising the issue of reunification, however hollow or symbolic it may have 
been and presenting it in conjunction with a major political overhaul, the regime 
                                                                                                                                                 
Bezirksausschuss Dresden, Sekretariat, 15.6.53 an die Bezirksleitung Dresden (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. 
IV/2/12/011). 
92 Ibid., “Jetzt bekommen wir bestimmt Schlesien wieder“ 
93 “Lagebericht von 15.6.53” (SAPMO-BArch IV/2/5/528); See the docuemnt begining “ In Dresden und 
Bischofswerda war zu verzeichnen” Gewerkschaftshandel, Bezirkirksvorstand Dresden, Dresden A 1, 
Ebertplatz 14. 
94 “Betr.: Situationsbericht uber das Kommuniqué, 3. Bericht,” SED-Stadtbezirk III, Dresden – A.17, Abt. 
P.u.m. – Parteiinformation an die Kreisleitung der SED Parteiinformation, Dresden, den 13.6.53; 
Stellungnahme des Herrn Prof. Dr. phil. Dräger. 
95 Ibid.  
96 “Unterredung mit den Herren Ingenieuren Franke und Singer vom Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz durch 
unseren Kollegen Diessner am 13.6.1953,” Dresden, am 13.6.53 (SAPMO-BArch DY 27 1558).  
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encouraged the population to imagine a unified Germany. Such imaginings threatened the 
state’s legitimacy for, were Germany to reunify, the GDR would obviously cease to exist.  
 
A Contentious Citizenry 
While the party noted the happiness engendered by the announcement, “negative” 
discussions also followed the publication of the Communiqué, and the rival public sphere, 
driven by an increasingly confident and angry citizenry, became a clearinghouse for 
criticisms of the government. Thus, in addition to expressions of hope and satisfaction 
many now felt more comfortable airing their grievances—and demonstrating a newfound 
political power.  
On the day the announcement went out, streetcar passenger remarked that “had 
the masses not complained, nothing would have changed.”97 Such complaints were 
commonplace. Within days of the announcement, one employee in Sebnitz declared 
“Now our time is here again,” while others discussed the “beginning of the collapse of 
the prison-state.”98 Similarly, in the days before the uprising in Niesky, mood reports 
indicated that while outspoken criticisms of the regime were little-known, some argued 
that the regime “had waved the white flag and those in other nations are mentioning that 
the regime has stepped down.”99 In Großenhain, an innkeeper rejoiced that she was no 
longer a member of the “BDM,” or, the “Bund der Markelosen” (association of the 
penniless)—probably a riff on the matching acronym from the Nazi period that stood for 
                                                 
97 “Betr.: Kommunique des Politburos vom 10. Juni 1953,” Abt Staatliche Organe, Dresden, am 11. Juni 
1953 an die Parteiinformation, im Hause (SächsHStA 11857 IV 2.13 Nr. 6): “Wenn von den Volksmassen 
nicht gemurrt worden wäre, hätte nichts geändert.” 
98 Sebnitz - 11,10 Uhr [likely June 14, 1953] (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011): “Ein Angestellter, 
dessen Name uns noch bekanntgegeben wird, aus dem Umspannwerk Langburkerdorf, erklärte dem 
Sekretär der OPO: “jetzt kommt die Zeit für uns wieder;” “In Unternehmerkreisen, besonders bei kap. 
Blumengroßhändler wird diskutiert, endlich beginnt der Zuchthausstaat zusammenzubrechen.”  
99 Kreisleitung Niesky, Gen. Hartmann, [likely June 16, 1953]; “Jetzt habt Ihr die weiße Fahne 
herausgesetzt, in anderen Ländern nennt man das, die Regierung ist zurückgetreten.” 
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Bund deutscher Mädel.100 Furthermore, she reportedly uttered in a threatening voice, 
“until now you all [the regime] have eaten the butter. Now it’s all gone; now we’re eating 
it all.”101 The mayor of Rauschwitz in the same county fled to West Berlin early in the 
morning with his family, likely after receiving a threatening letter.102 Some threats were 
more cryptic, such as an incident in which a horse’s head was hung up in a concrete 
factory by workers.103  
High school students in Meißen became unruly and openly declared that they 
would never engage socially. During lessons, a student, when asked to form a sentence, 
stated, “I would like to know, which way the wind blows,” whereupon the other students 
interjected, “from the West.”104 At this same high school, one teacher had apparently 
claimed that all works from Stalin and Lenin were to be destroyed. Artisans in Meißen  
also demonstrated stubbornness, arguing with party representatives that the German 
question would need to be dealt with through a four power conference and that they were 
waiting on free elections, which would decide just who would be in control.105 One 
particular painter felt he could not forgive the regime for its transgressions, arguing that it 
had ruined the lives of those who “tilled the soil through the generations and left their 
                                                 
100 Großenhain, Unterschrieben: Gen. Siegert, 2. Kreissekretär, 10,10 Uhr [likely June 16, 1953] 
(SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
101 Ibid., “In der Gemeinde Lockwitz äusserte die Gastwirtin Eissler: “Wir sind nicht mehr im BDM (Bund 
der Markelosen) und sagt in drehender Art; “bis jetzt habt Ihr die Butter gefressen. Jetzt ist es aber aus, jetzt 
fressen wir sie selber.” 
102 Ibid. 
103 “Betr.: Kommuniqué ZK 9.6.1953,” SED Bezirksleitung, Sekretariat, Dresden – A1, Devientstr.4, 
17.6.1953 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011 S5): “Im Betonwerk Cossebaude haben die Arbeiter einer 
Produktionsabteilung einen Pferdekopf aufgefangen. Auf die Frage des Parteisekretärs, was das zu 
bedeuten habe, wurde ihm gesagt, “nun, der wird bald überall rausgehangen, denn bei uns hängst doch 
draußen!” 
104 “Betr.: Bericht über das Kommuniqué des Politbüros vom 9.6.53,” SED – Kreisleitung Meißen an die 
SED Bezirksleitung - Sekretariat – Dresden, Meißen, den 16.6.53: “ich möchte wissen, woher der Wind 
weht; Aus dem Westen” 
105 See the document beginning “Wie uns der Instrukteur dur dass Arbeitsbereich Langebrück” SED 
Kreisleitung Dresden Land, Abt. Partei-u. Massenorganisationen, Mitteilung für die Parteiinformation, Am 
11.6.1953 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
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land because of fear and threats,” while pointing to “those who had been imprisoned for 
up to three years because of economic misdoings.”106 He also brought up a former 
professor, who, like many, had been silenced because of reactionary positions. And then 
there were his neighbors, who had their market garden taken away, merely for failing to 
meet quotas and purchasing from those who had overfilled theirs. “I am of the opinion,” 
he concluded, “that it should not have been allowed to come to this!”107 
  In Dresden’s streetcars, passengers openly discussed who was responsible for the 
regime’s errors—with many pointing their finger at Walter Ulbricht, “who is hated by the 
entire German people because he is a radicalist.”108 Propertied citizens, when asked their 
opinions, similarly argued that they could only have confidence in the regime’s measures 
if Ulbricht was relieved of his duties, prompting the reporting functionary to note that, in 
his estimation, Grotewohl and Pieck did not draw the same ire, perhaps because people 
viewed the latter two as merely Ulbricht’s subordinates.109 
 
Trouble in the Countryside  
Following the announcement of the Communiqué on June 11, local government 
leaders held meetings to gauge the mood of farmers in an attempt to clarify the 
government’s current and future policies. In these meetings, the SED’s inability to 
effectively communicate its position became a recurring issue as tempers flared and the 
                                                 
106 In einem Gespräch mit Kunstmaler Kröner aus Radebeul, brachte der Gennante folgende Gedanken zum 
Ausdruck, 13. Juni 1953 (SAPMO-BArch DY 27 1558): “Wenn Menschen, die oftmals Generationen 
hindurch auf ihrere Scholle sassen, ihren Boden aus Fürcht und Bedrohung verlassen mussten? Oder wenn 
man jetzt die Menschen frei lässt, die bis zu 3 Jahren Gefängnis wegen Wirtschaftsvergehen verurteilt 
wurden?” 
107 Ibid.: “Ich bin der Meinung, dass es erst soweit gar nicht kommen durfte!” 
108 “Betr.: Kommuniqué des Politbüros vom 9.6.53 - Durch genossen der Abt. Staatl. Organe wurde gestern 
in 3 Kreisen folgendes festgestellt”: “als Radikalist vom ganzen deutschen Volk gehasst werde” 
109 Ibid.  
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collective imagination generated rumors that threatened the existence of the socialist 
farming arrangement.  
The Communiqué and all its promises posed serious problems in the district’s 
LPGs as rumor often distorted genuine news. For example, the New Course proposed to 
return the homesteads to those farmers who fled the GDR while those who could not 
make it back due to exceptional circumstances would receive compensation.110 But this 
spawned the rumor circulated by some farmers that they would soon have to give up their 
farmsteads to the former great landowners (Grossbauern) who would be returning.111  
This was the case in Bischofswerda, for example, where new farmers believed that they 
would soon have to give up their farmsteads to these Grossbauern, whom they expected 
to return in short order.112 And in Meißen , the announcement of the Communiqué 
triggered considerable panic within the LPG as members now thought all Grossbauern 
were returning and thus there was no possible way that things could continue as they 
were.113 In the area around Dresden, one comrade was of the opinion that when it came to 
the possible return of the Grossbauern, the Party would have to consider whether they 
had left in order to sabotage the GDR’s food supplies or because of RIAS propaganda.114  
And members of a motor and tractor station outside of Dresden were understanding of the 
majority of the Party’s decisions, but questions regarding the Grossbauern remained as 
did the issue of whether the LPGs would be diminished or totally dissolved, 
                                                 
110 “Kommuniqué des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees der SED vom 9. Juni 1953,” Neues Deutschland, 
June 11, 1953. 
111 Bischhofswerda, S2, [likely before June 18] (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
112 “Zu 1: Bekanntgabe des K. Durch Betriebsfunk in den Schwerpunktbetrieben des Kreises und 
Agitatoreinsätze,” Bischofswerda, durchgeg.: Gen. Phillip, untersch.: Gen Möschler, 8,000 Uhr [likely 
before June 18] (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011).                            
113 “Betr.: Bericht über das Kommuniqué des Politbüros vom 9.6.53,” SED Kreisleitung Meißen 
an die SED Bezirksleitung – Sekretariat – Dresden. Meißen, den 16.6.53. 
114 “Stimmungsbericht zum Beschluss des Politbüros vom 9.6.1953,” SED Betriebsparteiorganisation, Rat 
des Bezirkes Dresden, Dresden, den 12.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 IV 2.13 Nr. 6).                            
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demonstrating how a single pledge led farmers to believe that the system might 
collapse.115 
Other forms of improvised news emerged in these farmers’ meetings, which the 
SED labeled as “negative forces.” For example, some attendees claimed that the planned 
economy had been a failure and soon the free-market economy would be re-
introduced.116 In Freital rumor had it that the management of the LPG had recently fled to 
the West.117 Such confusion may have stemmed from foreign broadcasts, as members of 
an LPG in Sebnitz admitted misunderstandings regarding the regime’s measures and 
claimed to have heard on the radio that the LPGs had been dissolved. Whatever the cause 
of the misunderstandings, desires and fears sometimes mixed together with authentic 
news.118 Within days, other regions reported similar situations in farmers’ meetings. After 
the Communiqué went out, a rumor began spreading, which allegedly had its origins in 
the Putzkau LPG with one Frau Eckert, that all the LPGs would be dissolved.119 In three 
separate LPGs, members reportedly called for work stoppages as their efforts no longer 
had any purpose. A fourth LPG declared that if any “Kulaks” returned they would kill 
them.120   
On Monday, June 15, reports out of Meißen noted that efforts to clarify the 
Communiqué and the Regime had proved inadequate and this had led to panic in the 
                                                 
115 “6. Lagebericht über den Beschluss des Politburos vom 9.6.53, 16.6.1953” (SAPMO-BArch IV/2/5/528) 
116 “Betr. Stimmungsbericht über die Empfehlung des Polit.-Büros und die Regierung vom 9.6.1953,” VEM 
Transformatoren-und Röntgenwerk Dresden, SED Betriebsparteiorganisation an die Bezirksleitung der 
SED, Abt. Information (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011): “negative Kräfte” 
117 “Kreisleitung Freital (Gen Schossig) Aufgenommen: Elsner,” 13.6.53: “Alle Erfolge in der LPG werden 
systematisch abgeleugnet”; “in vier Stunden runter von seinem Gut und jetzt kämen in 4 Stunden die 
anderen wieder drauf.” 
118 “Bericht von der Bezirksleitung Dresden über Kommunique des Politburos vom 15.6.53.” 
119 Zu 1: Bekanntgabe des K. Durch Betriebsfunk in den Schwerpunktbetrieben des Kreises und 
Agitatoreinsätze, Bischofswerda, durchgeg.: Gen. Phillip, untersch.: Gen Möschler, 8,000 Uhr [likely 
before June 18] (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011).                            
120 Ibid.: “wir lassen keinen Kulaken mehr auf den Hof, wenn einer zurückkommt, den schlagen wir tot.” 
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population.121 In more than one LPG, re-settlers from the lost eastern territories 
drunkenly celebrated what they believed to be the imminent return to their homeland.122 
In Großenhain, serious alarm had also broken out after the Communiqué aired due to the 
misapprehension that the Grossbauern had been notifying the LPGs of their coming 
liquidation.123 The Party reacted to the situation here by initiating more group meetings 
with the instructors in an attempt to clarify the situation.124  
On June 16, the Regional Committee in Dresden reported to Berlin that problems 
remained in the LPGs, where in addition to a lack of leadership, the population remained 
anxious, especially the communal farmers. Members of various LPGs also expressed 
interest in bringing hay to their own farmsteads and still others discussed packing up their 
things, unsettling their neighbors. Still others drank in celebration of their “victory.”125 
Functionaries continued to receive insults while one report noted that “in some cases it is 
uttered, that such a breakdown of the government has never before happened.”126 In 
Löbau discussions had taken on an aggressive character, especially within LPG meetings; 
the farmers now exhibited provocative behavior as they believed the New Course 
signaled the regime’s end. Farmers proclaimed that functionaries represented a party at 
the end of its rope while one farmer taunted officials as “Lumpen, dogs, criminals, and 
crooks.” And a barkeeper in Kleinmeritz told functionaries that any words from the SED 
meant nothing since, as he told the regime representatives, “You are all are finished.”127 
                                                 
121 “Betr.: Kommuniqué  des Politbüros vom 9.6.53 - Durch genossen der Abt. Staatl. Organe wurde 
gestern in 3 Kreisen folgendes festgestellt,” 16.6.53. 
122 Ibid.  
123 Ibid.  
124 Ibid. 
125 Bezirksleitung Dresden, 16.6, 16.30 Uhr (SAPMO-BArch IV/2/5/528). 
126 Ibid.: “teilweise wird geaussert, solchen Zusammenbruch an der Regierung habe es noch nie gegeben.” 
127 Löbau, Genossin Hennig, 16.6.53 (SächsHStA Dresden 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011): “Lumpen, Hunde, 
Verbrecher und Gauner;“ “Was ihr da redet, hat ja sowieso keinen Zweck, Ihr habt ja sowieso ausgespielt.” 
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Improvised News: Revolution Next-Door  
 By the time Soviet leadership moved to assuage the increasingly troubled 
situation in East Germany in the spring of 1953, Stalinist policies had created problematic 
situations throughout the Eastern Bloc. The proximity of the Dresden Region to 
Czechoslovakia meant that when unrest developed in Pilsen in late May-early-June, East 
Germans who listened to foreign radio broadcasts heard about it.128 Radio Free Europe 
reported on the Czech events as did RIAS, with the latter noting that the East German 
police had been called in to help quell the disturbances, in which the city fell to 
demonstrators for two days before the government regained its footing. Forty protestors 
died and the regime arrested hundreds in the days after.129 The reception (or ignorance) of 
this story in Dresden illustrates how individuals could construe an event as genuine news, 
improvised news, or (false) rumor, depending on their political orientation.  
 While police forces suppressed these riots by June 3, news of their occurrence—
always designated as rumor by reporting functionaries, regardless of the information’s 
validity—continuously spread like wildfire in the area. These stories do not appear as 
often in the reports from other regions sent to Berlin, which suggests that such 
information circulated more frequently in the southeastern region of the GDR.130 It also 
contributed to an atmosphere of political unrest in the Dresden region, helped generate 
political instability, and revealed the hopes and fears of East Germans in the days before 
the mass demonstrations.  
                                                 
128 Ivan Pfaff, "Weg mit der Partei!" Die Zeit 22. Mai 2003; Ostermann, Uprising in East Germany, 15-17. 
129 Michael Nelson, War of the Black Heaven: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 67-8. Ivan Pfaff, "Weg mit der Partei!" 
130 This is based on a partial sampling I conducted in Lichterfelde. 
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As mood reports piled up on the SED’s desks, the nature and scope of the “rumors” 
regarding foreign upheaval became plainly evident to the regional directorate in Dresden. 
These rumors appear to have been rather widespread in the region and not confined to 
locations near the Czech border. In Dippoldiswalde, for instance, a functionary reported 
that a comrade at the glassworks informed him that a “state of siege” existed in 
Czechoslovakia, that chaos now reigned as the government there no longer existed, and 
that the Americans had been called in to help. This comrade, when asked how he knew 
this, cited the (Swiss) Beromünster radio station.131 In Heidenau, 13 kilometers south of 
Dresden, the FDGB reported hearing more specific accounts of events in Czechoslovakia. 
In the paper factory there, a rumor alleged that riots were soon to break out because of the 
currency reform and the abolition of ration cards (true news, but it had already 
happened).132 The FDGB functionary who recorded this rumor investigated the veracity 
of the news by getting in touch with the factory manager, who happened to be in 
Czechoslovakia at the time. This manager, according to the report, claimed to have 
dispelled the “rumor” by recounting the “joyful approval of the Czechoslovakian people” 
he personally met.133  
But his story sounded little like the news that circulated in the rival public sphere. 
In Riesa, rumors circulated that a state of revolution existed in Czechoslovakia as well as 
in Poland—a rumor that also appeared in Dresden and held that street battles had broken 
out there and that the Soviet Union and the SED had only issued the Communiqué to 
                                                 
131 Kreis Dippoldiswalde, Gen. Nitzsche, am 12.6.  
132 “2. Information über die Stimmung in den Betrieben zu dem Kommuniqué über die Sitzung des 
Politbüros der SED am 9.6.53 sowie Sitzung des Ministerrats am 11.6.53.” There had indeed been a 
currency reform in the CSR and this news made it to the back pages of Neues Deutschland. 
133 Ibid.: “Der Werksleiter, der zur Zeit in der CSR war, konnte diese Gerüchte sofort zerschlagen, indem er 
über die freudige Zustimmung des tschechoslowakischen Volkes seines eigenen Erlebnisse schilderte.” 
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prevent such a situation from arising in the GDR.134 So-called class enemies in Sebnitz 
inquired about the coup that had taken place in Czechoslovakia, and the Saxon troops 
who helped contain the revolution—news they believed since they heard it on the radio 
(the station is not noted). Again, this part is not too far off—though the rebellion had 
ended almost two weeks prior. However, unverified rumors here also purported that 
corpses had already begun floating down the Elbe.135 These alarming stories also 
appeared in Dresden where residents argued that the situation was so bad in 
Czechoslovakia that “corpses were now swimming along the river!”136 These rumors 
were probably exaggerations and possibly fabrications.  
In the countryside around Dresden, improvised news of large uprisings in 
Czechoslovakia had persisted through the weekend and into the beginning of the week, 
with people now (correctly) claiming that the East German police force had been enlisted 
to help restore order.137 Improvised news continued to swirl elsewhere on Monday. A 
woman in Dresden reported that Radio Prague had reported on the previous Friday that 
authorities had cleared the streets in the capital at 9:00 p.m., leading Dresdeners to 
conclude that there was indeed an uprising in progress (it had already ended, of 
course).138 Another report from the countryside around Dresden stated that the news of 
indeterminate Czech origin held that revolution had broken out and the police and 
military had taken opposing sides.139 Other versions of this story circulated in Dresden 
                                                 
 
135 Sebnitz, Unterschrieben: Genosse Wabst, 12,30 Uhr [likely June 14] 
136 “Betr.: Kommunique ZK 9.6.1953, SED Bezirksleitung,” Sekretariat, Dresden – A1, Devientstr.4, 
17.6.1953 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011).                            
137 “Betr.: Kommuniqué ZK vom 9.6 1953,” SED Kreisleitung Dresden Land an die SED Bezirksleitung, 
16.6.1953. 
138 “Kurzinformation über die Stimmung zum Kommuniqué des Polit.-Büros im Bezirksverband Dresden,” 
15.6.1953. 
139 “Betr.: Kommuniqué des ZK vom 9.6.1953,” SED Kreisleitung Dresden-Land an die SED 
Bezirksleitung, Dresden, 15.6.1953 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011).                            
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alleging that the Czech uprising had led to states of siege in Pilsen and Prague and 
thousands of party functionaries had been arrested (partially true).140 These rumors 
surfaced at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz where one worker reported hearing that there had 
been multiple deaths at the Skoda factory, in this case a true rumor.141  
By the beginning of the week, stories of sizeable uprisings in Czechoslovakia—
where the Volkspolizei now worked to restore order—continued to circulate in the 
countryside around Dresden.142 It is possible that such information stemmed from earlier 
Czech sources, which Dresdeners identified as the source of the news on June 15.143 The 
same day, one disbelieving comrade in Riesa (45 Km northwest of Dresden) noted that 
the “craziest” rumors in connection with the Communiqué circulated through the 
population, above all, in places and factories where they listened to RIAS and other 
foreign stations. These listeners, he added, were asking party members provocative 
questions, as for example, in Lichtensee where a farmer stated to a functionary, “Don’t 
you know that an uprising has already broken out in Czechoslovakia and it’s going to 
kick off here soon, because the workers are only waiting until the revolution comes.”144 
Similar news was also tied to RIAS by a comrade when a farmer from Kipsdorf 
(Dippolidiswalde area) recounted to the secretary of the BPO that a broadcast had stated 
                                                 
140 “6. Lagebericht über den Beschluss des Politbüros vom 9.6.53.,” 16.6.1953. 
141 “Informationsbericht am 16.6.1953,” SED-Betriebsparteiorganisation des Sachsenwerkes Niedersedlitz, 
Dresden, den 15.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
142 “Betr.: Kommuniqué ZK vom 9.6 1953,” SED Kreisleitung Dresden Land an die SED Bezirksleitung, 
16.6.1953.  
143 Ibid. 
144 “Betr.: Wochen-Analyse zum Kommuniqué des Politbüros,” Dresden, 16.6.53, Abteilung: Sekretariat 
(SächsHStA 11857 Nr.  IV/2/12/011): “unsinnigsten”; “Weißt du nicht, dass in der CSR bereits ein 
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that workers in the CSR had not received pay for four weeks and that four-hundred (an 
exaggeration) were already dead.145 
That this improvised news of violent upheaval continued to circulate even after 
the events of June 17 in Dresden, and that the regime was apparently helpless to combat 
such stories demonstrates just how powerless the government was in refuting information 
circulated in the rival public sphere. Finally, such improvised news also suggests that the 
idea of a revolution was not, in the minds of many, far-fetched, thus perhaps revealing the 
collective hope and imagination in the days leading up to the June 17 events.  
 
Chipping Away at the Leadership’s Prestige 
Following the announcement of the New Course, rumors circulated that stripped 
away the authority and prestige of the regime. State agencies such as the FDGB noted 
that throughout the GDR, SED’s figureheads and architects of the state, Otto Grotewohl, 
Walter Ulbricht, and Wilhelm Pieck, increasingly came under attack in the rival public 
sphere. The rumors—once again, often in the form of improvised news—undermined the 
SED’s credibility and bolstered the popular notion among the masses that everything had 
begun to fall apart.  
But when reports trickled back to Berlin that East Germans believed that President 
Pieck had fled with his daughter to Switzerland and that Otto Grotewohl and other 
ministers had been arrested, the SED appears to have accepted these rumors as mere 
inconveniences or fallout from their about-face.146 Indeed, it was not until after the events 
                                                 
145 Kreisleitung Dippoldiswalde, Gen. Nitzsche, Kenntniz v.d. Bericht 1. u. 2. Sekretär. 
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of the following week that the Party’s inability to communicate its message clearly, and 
thus project its power, became apparent. Only then did officials realize that these rumors 
held the potential to incite unrest on a mass scale.  
In the Dresden Region, rumors that damaged the prestige and “presence” of the 
leadership began to swirl shortly after the announcement of the New Course had been 
made. Surely these existed before June 11, but the surprise expressed by the authors who 
generated mood reports and the evidence that these stories continuously grew and spread 
through the population strongly suggests that the intensity of rumors surged in the days 
before the demonstrations. In Kamenz, for instance, district leadership reported to 
Dresden that a basic estimate regarding the mood of the population could not yet be 
established on June 11, but that a “powerful movement” now affected the population and 
the “wildest rumors circulated.”147  
While the origin of these rumors is difficult to discern, the situation showcases the 
inability of the government to shape the popular narrative through the official public 
sphere. The authorities were unable to insert their version of the story into the public 
discourse, thus the rumors persisted. These rumors, which were “quite hostile,” purported 
that although the masses now seemed directionless, the opposition seemed to be 
acquiring at least local “leaders” while the SED’s true leadership in many cases 
“disappeared” in the collective imagination of the rival public sphere. Indeed, in Wismut 
a comrade declared that all pictures of Walter Ulbricht and Wilheml Pieck were to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
vom 9. Juni 1953,” FDGB-Bundesvorstand, Org.-Instr.-Abteilung, Sektor Information, den 13. Juni, 1953, 
Information Nr. 22 (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 4/2/5/543). 
147 “Informationsbericht Durchsage gemäß den Anweisungen der Bezirksleitung”: “Aus Informationen aus 
den verschiedenen Orten kann nur gesagt werden, dass eine mächtige Bewegung durch die gesamte 
Bevölkerung geht und dass die wildesten Gerüchte im Umlauf sind.” 
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“removed and burned in front of the soviets”— excepting images of Stalin.148 Here, 
Stalin’s picture remained in place, but all the symbols and slogans were reportedly taken 
away, including the Soviet star.149 Reports from the factories in Wismut on June 12 noted 
that chaos still reigned here and that the Communiqué had generated in the general 
population a sense of victory. Furthermore, the people here—“Sitting on the high 
horse”—were of the opinion that the GDR was soon going to collapse.150 In countryside 
around Görlitz, “hidden” rumors appeared that attempted to stop elections for house and 
farm communities and when functionaries chatted with school children, they revealed 
that their teacher had told them images of Wilhelm Pieck should be taken down, while in 
the LOWA factory rumors circulated that Pieck’s “books and booklets should be 
burned.”151 The alleged order to remove the leadership’s images also appeared in schools 
in Bautzen, where stories circulated that all pictures of Pieck had to be removed from the 
schools.152 Similar rumors circulated in Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz at the beginning of 
the workweek, where Pieck’s images had been disappearing. One comrade heard from his 
mother, who had heard at the store that the Soviets had picked up Pieck and taken him 
back to Moscow and that his image had been removed from the banks.153 Again, a kernel 
of truth existed here: Pieck was in Moscow, but for physical rehabilitation. Whether 
anyone had removed images at the bank is unknown and probably unknowable.  
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In Sebnitz, functionaries heard the rumor calling for the removal of Pieck’s image 
on the bus en route from Pirna, where workers reportedly awaited American intervention 
and claimed to have heard orders to remove Pieck’s pictures from the Stadtfunk and 
through party orders.154 This, of course, was highly unlikely. Three members of the forest 
service who had been in Bautzen, where they had picked up rumors, now spread the “lie” 
that all pictures of Pieck had been collected, signifying his removal from office.155 In 
Görlitz, the order reportedly came from Wismut, while Pieck’s actual whereabouts and 
status continued to confound the regime’s local functionaries. 
Other rumors circulated that alleged leading comrades’ writings were to be (the 
passive construction is necessary and intentional here and elsewhere when discussing 
such rumors) removed from libraries and bookstores or destroyed. Thus, for example, at 
the LOWA factory rumors had it that Ulbricht’s booklets and books were to be burned.156 
The source of the news here might be traced back to radio; on June 12, a machinist at the 
textile and rubber factory Neugersdorf declared that at 7:30 in the morning of the 
previous day—the same time the Communiqué had gone out over the airwaves—he had 
heard a “special announcement over the radio.”157 He did not identify a station, but 
reported hearing that all of Walter Ulbricht’s writings were to be removed and that the 
personal driver of President Pieck had gone to West Germany.158 
The swift deterioration of public confidence in the regime became ever more 
evident as a profusion of rumors about the exodus or death of its leadership spread. On 
June 12, in Dresden, a party member heard from a coworker that Otto Grotewohl now 
                                                 
154 Sebnitz - 11,10 Uhr [likely June 14, 1953]. 
155 Bautzen, Gen. Letters. (see “7. Typische Erscheinungen:) [likely 6.12.53]. 
156 Görlitz-Land, Gen. Rokos. [likely before 6.18.53]. 
157 Bautzen, S5: “Sondersendung über den Rundfunk” 
158 Ibid.  
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found himself in protective custody (not true) and that Walter Ulbricht had retired from 
his position (not true).159 Another party member added that he had also heard this, but 
that he could not discuss it in public since the story could be true.160 In the countryside 
around the city of Dresden the most prevalent report related the death or abdication of 
Wilhelm Pieck, with variations that replaced him with Grotewohl or Ulbricht.161 In the 
IFA Radeberg, for instance, Pieck had been shot during his escape, but the most popular 
rumor alleged he had made it to Switzerland while his children were in Sweden.162 
Sometimes the rumors held that the children had been apprehended before making it to 
Sweden and had been found to be in possession of nine million Deutsche Marks.163 Other 
rumors here alleged he had “had a leg amputated” while Grotewohl, at least according to 
rumor in Pirna, had shot himself dead on June 10.164  
  Some of these rumors may have originated with foreign radio broadcasts. An 
FDGB report from June 16 noted that in multiple factories discussions of Pieck’s death 
were alleged to have stemmed from Swiss Radio (Sender Schweiz), while in some cases, 
specific people were noted to have spread the rumor by word of mouth.165 A report from 
the countryside notes that discussions inspired by an unnamed German station continued 
to swirl around Pieck’s whereabouts, with one rumor alleging that Ulbricht had been 
                                                 
159 See the document beginning “Werte Genossen! Soeben erreichte uns folgende Nachricht:“ 12.6.53. 
160 Ibid. 
161 “Betr.: Kommuniqué des ZK vom  9.6.1953,” SED – Kreisleitung Dresden Land an die SED 
Bezirksleitung Sekretariat, Dresden A1. 14..6.1953: “Diese Spannung soll bereits seit dem vergangenen 
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162 “Betr.: Kommuniqué des ZK vom 9.6.1953,” SED Kreisleitung Dresden Land an die SED 
Bezirksleitung Sekretariat, 13.6.1953. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid.: “Otto Grotewohl habe sich vorgestern erschossen” 
165 Kurzinformation über die Stimmung zum Kommuniqué des Politburos im Bezirksverband Dresden, 
16.6.53. 
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placed on leave and that the regime was resigning.166 Meanwhile, a different rumor 
surfaced in a tavern in Ottendorf-Okrilla, where “Londoner Rundfunk” was said to have 
brought the news of a GDR bigwig’s death—by which at least the functionary deduced 
this referred to President Pieck.167 Others in the bar claimed that Pieck had already been 
dead for fourteen days, either shot during his escape or because he wanted to admit the 
GDR’s bankruptcy. And there were reports that he was now in Mecklenburg “on ice”168 
By the end of the weekend, reports out of Meißen indicated that rumormongers continued 
to voice their “slogans” in discussions. And here, popular accounts alleged that Pieck had 
been killed in the Soviet Union.169 
 
Political Deaths and the Flight of the Comrade 
Once again, some popular information was improvised news and Pieck’s health 
made him a popular topic for improvisation in the rival public sphere. For instance, the 
real news was that Wilhelm Pieck had fallen ill and missed Stalin’s funeral in March, but 
had become the basis for rumor as East Germans attempted to make sense of their 
political world based on hearsay, secrecy, and probably foreign broadcasting. Thus, it is 
hardly surprising that some East Germans repeatedly asked what was going on with the 
President and wanted to know why they rarely heard from him anymore.170 In Görlitz, 
residents continued to ask about Pieck’s whereabouts and why no one had heard anything 
from him while housewives out shopping wanted to know just who the “criminals” were 
that had created the mess in the first place. They also argued that Pieck’s fate was 
                                                 
166 “Betr.: Kommuniqué des ZK vom 9.6.1953,” SED Kreisleitung Dresden-Land an die SED 
Bezirksleitung, Dresden, 15.6.1953. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid.  
169 Meißen, 12,30 Uhr, Unterschr.: Gen. Nitzsche (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
170 Kreisleitung Freital (Schossig), 14.6.53. 
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banishment to the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, in Pirna, various accounts alleged Pieck was 
now in custody after apprehension at the Swiss border while others believed he wanted to 
flee to Switzerland with his daughter and large sums of money.171  
Authorities and sources blamed some rumors on radio broadcasts. A version of 
the Pieck rumor, overheard in a bar in Zschachwitz held that Pieck was in Switzerland 
with three million marks and West German radio was threatening to tell the whole story 
if East German radio failed to do so by Tuesday.172 One rumor had it that a British radio 
station had given the GDR an ultimatum which allowed the SED until Sunday evening to 
disclose the situations regarding Pieck and Ulbricht. If the SED chose not to, foreign 
states would inform the population of the GDR of the situation on Monday.173 Another 
case of foreign radio influencing the conversation occurred in Kamenz.174 W. Schwede 
from Panschwitz stated that his boss had heard from London Sender that “Wilhelm Pieck 
wanted to flee to Switzerland, but was apprehended by Soviet occupation forces.”175 
“That he has been on vacation since the end of April is only a cover-up,” stated the 
worker, who had also heard from his boss that Pieck’s daughter had spoken on the radio 
in Switzerland.176 
A report from Tuesday, June 16, out of Riesa noted that in this area, rumors 
continued to spread: Pieck was “on ice” in Moscow; Pieck had been arrested and put on 
trial; Pieck had been shot near the Crimean Peninsula; Grotewohl had been arrested; 
                                                 
171 “Die negative Stimmung im Stadtkreis Görlitz ist in der Hauptsache durch Riashetzte Entstanden,” 
Görlitz -Stadt, Gen. Lange, 15.6.53; Situationsbericht vom 12.6.53, 14 Uhr., Kreistleitung Pirna (Genosse 
Ender). 
172 “Informationsbericht am 16.6.1953,” SED-Betriebsparteiorganisation des Sachsenwerkes Niedersedlitz, 
Dresden, den 15.6.53. 
173 “Kurzinformation über die Stimmung zum Kommuniqué des Politburos im Bezirksverband Dresden,” 
Freie Deutsche Jugend, Bezirksleitung Dresden, Sekretariat, Dresden, den 16.6.1953. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid.: “Dass er sich seit Ende April in Urlaub befindet, ist nur eine Vertuschung der Angelegenheit.” 
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Ulbricht was no longer in power and his writings had been removed from libraries.177 By 
June 16 in the countryside around Dresden, the rumors continued, as always, with Pieck’s 
death reported in various ways—sometimes via his daughter in Switzerland, sometimes 
aired by Londoner Rundfunk, while sometimes he had been caught crossing the border 
and arrested carrying large sums of money. Sometimes Ulbricht replaced Pieck in these 
stories. Meanwhile, the functionaries tried in vain, without, it seems, the help of mass 
media, to convince residents that such news represented hoaxes concocted by RIAS.178  
Rumors connected to Walter Ulbricht and Otto Grotewohl also circulated, 
reflecting residents’ hopes for change. Some were simple, such as in Bertheldorf, where 
an older woman claimed that she had heard on the radio the night before (probably the 
night of June 13), on a station that she did not recall, what she herself wanted to hear: that 
Ulbricht had stepped down (not true).179 More specific rumors appeared on the streetcars 
in Dresden where passengers suggested that Grotewohl had figuratively “put a gun to 
Ulbricht’s head” and taken over the political decision making (certainly not true).180 
Other passengers affirmed that the Communiqué signified the end of the regime’s 
policies (partially true) and thus President Pieck would never again return (not true), 
while Grotewohl was “up to his neck in water” (not true).181 Locals in Görlitz supposed 
that Walter Ulbricht would be “brought to justice” and “Pieck had been banished” (not 
true, see above).182  
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It is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of local authorities’ efforts to counter 
rumors and alternative news, but it is likely they had little effect, considering that reports 
from June 16 mention that the same rumors persisted and as we will see, some still 
circulated in the weeks after the June 17 events. In nearby Löbau, for example, where the 
Party made efforts to explain the “triviality” (Haltlosigkeit) of the rumors spread by class 
enemies regarding the alleged arrests of Pieck and Ulbricht, they still noted on Sunday 
that such information was current throughout the entire district.183  
Groups continued to discuss the apparent dissolution of various parts of the state 
and of the GDR itself in the days before the demonstrations.184 News of the dissolution of 
the KVP (barracked police) continued to spread through at least Freital and Dresden.185 
This may have originated with RIAS, which had guessed that the SED would perhaps 
dissolve the People’s Police when reporting on the Communiqué.186 Indeed, RIAS 
continued to influence locals’ perception of events. Passengers on a train traveling 
through the Görlitz countryside claimed that “[the SED] still had to go back [politically], 
and go back even further.”187 These passengers also felt that the West German course was 
indeed the correct one while other travelers discussed how they “now had to listen to 
RIAS to know what exactly was going on.”188 One report concluded that it would be the 
task of the local press to stomp out these types of rumors as quickly as possible, so that 
                                                 
183 Kreisleitung Löbau  (Gen. Schubert, Inform.) 14.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011). 
184 “Betr.: Kommuniqué des ZK vom 9.6.1953,” SED – Kreisleitung Dresden Land an die SED 
Bezirksleitung Sekretariat Dresden A1, 14.6.1953. 
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187 Görlitz-Land, Gen. Rokos. 
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“class enemies and RIAS-listeners along with their hostile arguments are annihilated.”189 
Indeed, during these times, outside news continued to be a problem, with this report 
noting that, “The population, during the current situation, is especially receptive to the 
lies of RIAS and the rest of the Western stations, and those that do listen largely spread 
the lies further.”190  
 
Conclusions 
 In the absence of accurate political polling, the mood reports do much to reveal a 
regime that had lost its connection to the masses and to a certain extent, its own 
functionaries. RIAS’s announcement presaged East Germans’ reception and acceptance 
of the Communiqué. The station’s prescient remark that East Germans could now 
confront functionaries face-to-face came to pass as emboldened residents openly 
challenged SED functionaries, who now confronted the masses from a point of weakness. 
An ascendant public, to be sure. Meanwhile, the SED failed in its quest to present its 
political retreat as a maneuver that reflected its sincerity and courage. The weakness of 
the regime that its critics sensed in the withdrawal from accelerated socialism was 
similarly regarded as a failure by those functionaries who might be labeled true believers. 
The question of German unity, central to the Politburo’s Communiqué, became a 
predominant theme in not only conversations that praised the regime, but in those that 
called for, or planned for, the SED’s demise. The Communiqué’s vague references to 
reunification and the practical considerations concerning inter-zone traffic inspired 
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grander hopes and ideas. Real news and rumors that reflected the hopes of East Germans 
energized the rival public sphere and raised expectations. What once seemed highly 
unlikely now seemed probable and even imminent, representing a legitimation crisis for 
the government.  
Rumors and improvised news severely undermined the government’s prestige and 
authority. To suggest Pieck, Ulbricht, and Grotewohl garnered approval ratings before 
June 11 that could have supported the popularity they claimed to enjoy would be false, 
but the mood reports, if considered as a barometer of public popularity for the East 
German leadership, reflected an almost impossibly low approval rating. Rumors 
eviscerated the leadership’s socialist biographies that the party crafted (not that they were 
fiction, of course) as the basis for the power they represented, and the three became 
corpses, prisoners, or crooks on the run in the popular imagination. The rumored call for 
the removal of the leaderships’ images from public spaces—an ersatz statue toppling—
signaled the masses’ sense that the regime was on its last legs. That the regime and those 
who heard and repeated these rumors often tied them to radio broadcasts suggests that the 
line between credible news and incredible news often blurred. Perhaps this should not 
surprise, as the bifurcated media spheres served in many ways to reinforce political 
preconceptions.  
Above all, the regime had become challengeable and the exchanges within the 
rival public sphere made revolution thinkable. That the population often relied on RIAS 
for what they believed to be real news also meant that a localized rebellion the regime 
might otherwise keep secret, could, in the rival public sphere, find a global audience. This 
is the subject of the next chapter.  
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Chapter Four 
 
 The Wildfire: Transmitting Political Power on June 17, 1953 
 
 
 
“Today is the first time in a long time we can again freely and openly express our 
opinion.” 
 
-Wilhelm Grothaus, in a speech to workers in Dresden on June 17 as quoted by a Stasi 
agent1 
 
 
 Workers’ strikes occurred in the GDR sporadically in the weeks before and after 
the June 17 demonstrations, but the occasion’s name has always been tied to a single day. 
On that Wednesday in 1953, nationwide public demonstrations unfolded in the GDR and 
briefly appeared to threaten the nation’s existence.  
 What follows is less an investigation into what happened on June 16 and 17 than 
it is an inquiry into how East Germans and RIAS experienced and communicated the 
days’ events. In other words, it is an exploration into how participants and observers 
heard about what was going on. Historians have largely pieced together the narrative, but 
analysis of certain aspects of the June 17 events remain inadequately studied or disputed, 
particularly the roles of nationalism and radio in shaping the occasion.  
 This chapter advances several arguments. First, contrary to what many have 
argued, the events of June 17 were not entirely spontaneous. The localized 
demonstrations that unfolded in Berlin on June 16 could probably be categorized as such, 
but that evening, RIAS spread the news of their occurrence. Of course, since the 
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am 17.6.53 zwischen 15,00 und 16,00 Uhr auf dem Werkhof im N.S. Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, Dresden, 
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announcement of the New Course, RIAS programming and improvised news had 
diminished the prestige, legitimacy, and credibility of the government and rendered it 
challengeable. So that Tuesday night when RIAS broadcasts discussed the Pilsen 
rebellion and the mass demonstrations unfolding in Berlin they helped make revolution 
thinkable throughout the GDR. Indeed, the station reported declarations of solidarity 
from East and West Germany that endowed the occasion with national imaginings and 
stirred hopes for reunification. In short, RIAS helped transform protest related to workers’ 
norms into questions that revolved around East Germany’s future. These broadcasts 
stimulated conversations in the rival public sphere and came close to openly encouraging 
protest. When employees arrived at work the next morning, they arrived armed with a 
script for action and things unfolded nationally at a never-before-seen pace—radio had 
changed everything. Throughout that morning, workers and residents gathered in public 
and private spaces, aired grievances, and debated the nation’s economic and political 
course. That afternoon, mass demonstrations marked the occasion when large sections of 
the East German citizenry exercised “open, critical reasoning as an instrument of public 
self-assertion.”2 
 This chapter will argue that the events on June 17 represented a distinctly modern 
occasion as mass demonstrations endowed and guided by national imaginings. The 
modern public demonstration, defined here as the occupation of public (or private) space 
by a group of people that express political opinions—had its origin in the nineteenth 
                                                 
2 Benjamin Nathans, “‘Public Sphere’ in the era of the French Revolution” French Historical Studies 16 
(1990): 625; 620-644; Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Interestingly, the 
Marxist argument against Habermas’s “critically reasoning public” suggests that this is a social 
construction that represents nothing more than bourgeois desires masquerading as something else. This is 
similar, of course, to the SED’s claim that critics of its regime usually had fascist backgrounds or 
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century.3 Contrast this with the early modern riot where the collective action often took 
place at the site of the perceived offense. In these cases, observers would likely identify a 
direct link between cause and objective and the actors typically operated at the scene of 
the offense. Modern demonstrations, on the other hand, feature collective action that 
affirms a group’s identity and demonstrates strength while communicating political 
demands. Another development to consider, according to Fillieule and Tartakoswky, is 
that the demonstration “implies the existence of organizations that have, if not a strategy, 
at least some capacity to control what is no longer a mob, and authorities prepared to 
acknowledge its specific nature, or at least the existence of a public sphere.”4 
 Modern communications thus helped rally popular discontent so quickly as to 
create the illusion that a nation erupted in a unified and “spontaneous” fashion. RIAS 
allowed listeners to anticipate and envision collective action when it publicized and 
helped nationalize the demonstrations in the days and hours leading up the seventeenth. 
Radio broadcasts, rumors, telephone calls, and “whisper campaigns” characterized the 
rival public sphere during the events in Dresden. These whisper campaigns, or 
improvised news often unfamiliar to functionaries, circulated in the rival public sphere as 
Dresdeners discussed the news out of Berlin and deliberated action.5 
 Internally, evaluations by the regional SED leadership in Dresden of the situation 
argued that the West had planned the provocation well in advance.6 Enemies, they argued, 
had skillfully exploited the crisis of confidence that existed between the workers and the 
                                                 
3 Olivier Fillieule & Danielle Tartakowsky, Demonstrations (Halifax and Winnipeg: Fernwood, 2013), 11-
12; Charles Tilly, The Contentious French (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1986). 
4 Ibid., 12. 
5 “Flüsterpropaganda” 
6 “Einschätzungen und Berichte über den 17. Juni 1953 aus allen Kreisen und Abteilungen der 
Bezirksleitung” Juni-Aug 1953, SED Kreisleitung Dresden Stadt, Dresden, am 2.8.1953, Situationsbericht, 
14.00 Uhr (SächsHStA 11857, IV/2.12 Nr. 9). 
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party in order to call for strikes and demonstrations.7 The SED insisted that the rapid 
spread of the unrest, especially in Dresden and Görlitz, could be attributed to the long-
term discontent among the workers, the weak ideological influence the Party had on these 
workers, the Party organs’ lack of a foundation of trust with the masses, and functionaries’ 
inability to stem the tide of events during morning meetings.8 Among other methods, 
according to the party, demonstrators used the telephone system, delegations, and strike 
committees to attempt a fascist putsch.9 State security analysis noted that the tactics and 
methods of the demonstrators [enemies] followed a consistent pattern. Ringleaders and 
their helpers organized meetings whereby they spread the news that strikes had broken 
out throughout the GDR. Then, workers’ rabble-rousing speeches called for abdication of 
the regime and free elections and other similar demands. Organizers and speakers then 
led marches to a particular location in the city where they incited the crowds with more 
speeches and banners. Demonstrators called neighboring workforces to join by 
demanding solidarity with striking workers and those who had been wounded in Berlin. 
Youth reportedly went from workplace to workplace organizing the general strike. Inter-
workplace telephone calls and the notion of solidarity helped bring more demonstrators 
into the fold and misleading rumors regarding the GDR’s leadership continued to 
spread.10 The regime’s characterization of the demonstrations as the long-term work of 
fascists remained the party’s official line until the 1990s.11 Considering these supposed 
                                                 
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid.  
10 “Gesamtbericht: Uber die Vorgänge vom 17- 19.6.53. im Bezirk Dresden” Dresden den 1. Juli 1953, 
S.21-22 (BStU Archiv der Aussenstelle Dresden MfS BV Dresden 1. Stellvertreter d. Leiter Nr. 4, Teil 1 
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preparations and tactics, it is little surprise that the notion of a “spontaneous uprising” did 
not correspond with the SED’s interpretation. 
 
News from Berlin 
The June 17 demonstrations in Dresden had their immediate roots and inspiration 
in the workers’ protests that began in Berlin several days earlier. The workers here, like 
elsewhere in the GDR, took considerable issue with their norms, which remained 
heightened (essentially the communist version of a pay cut) despite the New Course’s 
generally lauded concessions. Demonstrations, some of which brought around 5,000 
workers in Berlin into the streets, began in earnest as a response to the norms. During a 
weekend retreat, a number of workers planned further demonstrations for the coming 
week. When the SED held party meetings at several work sites on Monday, June 15, to 
adopt “resolutions of gratitude” for raising the norms, protests broke out. By Tuesday, 
June 16, an article in Die Tribüne, the state-controlled union paper of East Germany, 
doubled down on the heightened norms and restated their importance to the East German 
economy, sending workers streaming toward the center of Berlin. Carrying banners and 
employing the use of several trucks with loudspeakers, the workers called for a general 
strike and planned a demonstration for June 17, the next day.12 That evening, the SED 
revoked the heightened norms. RIAS had carried the news of the June 15 and June 16 
demonstrations and the protest resolutions that workers in Berlin had drafted and 
forwarded to the East German government.13 A commentary by Eberhard Schütz pointed 
                                                 
12 Ostermann, Uprising in East Germany, 1953, 163-164. 
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to the recent anti-government demonstrations in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, which, he noted, 
many at the station had been reluctant to discuss because of the events’ seeming 
impossibility. But now, it seemed possible, according to those at the station, for 
fundamental change to take place behind the Iron Curtain. Without explicitly calling for a 
general strike, the station, as Christian Ostermann notes, “came close to open 
encouragement” of protests.14 In an interview thirty years later, Schütz (correctly) noted 
that the station never uttered this word[s] “General strike.”15 In fact, according to Schütz, 
the station carefully guarded against fabricated slogans and reports. No one who visited 
the station from East Berlin asked the staff to call for a general strike, and Schütz stressed 
that broadcasters avoided word. Rather, RIAS reported only news of protest strikes and 
work stoppages. Still, despite the word Generalstreik’s absence from RIAS broadcasts, 
the idea that such an event had been planned or was imminent began to make its rounds 
on June 17.16 For instance, the SED’s statement that the demonstrators in Dresden that 
“marched in unison under the slogan: ‘General strike,’” suggests that such participants 
had certainly adopted the idea.17 
That evening, RIAS began to see in the demonstration’s potential for change in 
Germany and broadcast declarations of solidarity. Schütz noted the recent victory 
regarding the norms was one that the East Berlin workers shared with the entire East 
                                                 
14 Ostermann, Uprising in East Germany, 1953, 173.  
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use of the term “general strike” can be found in Manfred Rexin, “Zur Rolle Westdeutschlands und West-
Berlin” in Engelmann and Kowalczuk, Volkserhebung gegen den SED Staat, 88-89. As Charles Hulick, a 
confidant of station boss G. Ewing noted, “My God, Gordon, be careful, you can start a war with this 
station.” (“Mein Gott, Gordon, sei vorsichtig, du kannst einen Krieg mit dieser Station auslösen.”) 
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German population.18 “We feel bound with our listeners in East Berlin and throughout 
East Germany in the effort to accomplish the most possible; to exploit the insecurities of 
the [SED] functionaries.”19 Following Schütz’s commentary on the night of June 16, 
Jakob Kaiser, Minster for All-German Issues (Minister für gesamtdeutsche Fragen) 
reminded listeners in East Germany that “everyone in West Germany, just as in the entire 
free world, is bound in solidarity with you.”20 “We appreciate the meaning and the 
courage of your demonstrations,” he continued, “and we appreciate your demonstrations, 
but please, trust in our solidarity and remain prudent.”21  
 At ten o’clock that evening, RIAS offered short reports on the various 
demonstrations that had occurred throughout East Germany that day.22 From eleven P.M. 
through six-thirty A.M., the station repeated the East Berlin workers’ (from all branches 
of industry) call for a demonstration on Wednesday, June 17 at seven A.M. at 
Strausberger Platz.23 These broadcasts repeated the above message while adding 
numerous declarations of solidarity from West Germany, West Berlin, and West Berlin 
workplaces.24 
 “Workday in the Zone” aired between five and six A.M. on June 17 and reported 
on the struggles of the East German workers: “In the previous weeks we’ve reported to 
you, dear listener, about the work stoppages in all districts of East Germany…because of 
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uns mit unseren Hörern in Ostberlin und der Sowjetzone verbunden in dem Bestreben, das möglichiste zu 
erreichen, die Unsicherheit der Funktionäre auszunutzen” 
20 “Die Sendungen des RIAS am Dienstag, 16. Juni 1953”: “Dabei brauche ich nicht zu betonen, dass sich 
jedermann in der Bundesrepublik wie in der ganzen freien Welt mit Euch in Solidarität verbunden weiss.” 
21 Ibid.: “Wir wissen den Sinn und wir wissen den Mut Eurer Demonstrationen zu würdigen, bitten Euch 
aber, im Vertrauen auf unsere Solidarität Besonnenheit zu wahren.” 
22 Ibid., 6. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid.  
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these protests the regime [that is, the SED] has been driven back, step by step.”25 The 
station also declared that on June 16, the protests, having gotten the norms lowered, had 
now turned political and workers had begun demanding free elections and the resignation 
of the regime. According to RIAS, the day’s “spontaneous” protests had produced a 
slogan: “Tomorrow it continues.”26 From 5:36 until 5:42 A.M., Ernst Scharnowski, 
chairman of the Berliner DGB (the West Berlin Workers’ Union), characterized the East 
German workers’ democratic actions to improve their lot as “A natural right belonging to 
all oppressed people.”27 Scharnowski concluded by stating the FGB’s solidarity [WC] 
with the East German workers’ struggle to secure basic rights.28 This broadcast aired 
again from 6:40 to 6:45 while the station also began reporting Wednesday’s planned 
demonstration that began, on time, at 7:00 A.M., at Strausberger Platz.29  
 At 7:20 on Wednesday, June 17, “Berlin Speaks to the Zone” aired on RIAS and 
recounted once again the protesters’ actions in Berlin from the previous day, which, 
intentionally or not, served as a script in other areas of the GDR. Listeners throughout the 
GDR learned from the station that “[workers] formed discussion groups and communist 
functionaries were shouted down.”30 The reporter noted the demonstration columns 
formed by the workers that subsequently moved through the city while protestors ripped 
down communist slogans and carried their own banners. As the demonstrators moved 
                                                 
25 Ibid.: “Protest gegen das gesamte Regime” 7. In den letzten Wochen konnten wir Ihnen, liebe Hörer, 
über Arbeitsniederlegungen in allen Bezirken der Sowjetzone berichten;” “Vor diesen Protesten ist das 
Regime zurückgewichen Schritt um Schritt.” 
26 Ibid., 8: “Morgen geht es weiter” 
27 Ibid., “Der DGB steht zu euch,” 8: “Eure demokratischen Selbsthilfemassnahmen, geboren aus dem 
Naturrecht jedes bedrückten Menschen” 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid. 
30 “Berlin Spricht Zur Zone” (11) Nr 296, Mittwoch, den 17 Juni 1953 7:20-7:30 Uhr (DRA Potsdam: 
F0112 Film 1, Sendunterlagen von besonderen Ereignissen, A104-00-05/0002): “Es bildeten 
Diskussionsgruppen, und kommunistische Agitatoren wurden niedergeschrien” 
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through the city, Berliners jammed the streets and expressed their solidarity with the 
workers with shouts of encouragement. Listeners heard of the demonstrators’ demands—
lowered norms, cheaper goods, resignation of the regime, and free elections. Finally, the 
demonstrators commandeered two sound trucks that demanded the protestors disperse 
and used them to broadcast their demands: “If you are a son of the nation [Volkes], join 
us!”31 
  While the demonstrations prior to June 17 in Berlin might be considered 
spontaneous, June 17 was different; specific criticisms, general themes, a place, and a 
time had been set the evening before. The demonstrations that unfolded in Dresden, while 
not planned in the same way as those in Berlin, should be understood as deliberate events, 
prompted and inspired by the demonstrations in the capital. The rival public sphere 
produced critical debates, whisper campaigns, speeches, written demands, or shouts in 
unison, showcase the character of the demonstrations. In addition to undermining the 
regime, unsanctioned communications confirmed communities—workers; East Germans; 
Germans—that desired the same political changes, namely revolutionary change in the 
governance of the GDR. These imagined communities, often expressed explicitly (and 
ironically) with the term solidarity, formed the building blocks of a modern, nation-wide 
demonstration. 
 
In the Dresden Region 
 While authorities in Dresden regularly commented that functionaries and officials 
were caught off guard by the sudden collective action they faced on Wednesday, this 
                                                 
31 “Die Sendungen des RIAS am Dienstag, 16. Juni 1953”: “Wenn Ihr Söhne des Volkes seid, schließt Euch 
an!”  
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would seem to speak largely to the weak inter-governmental communications. Telephone 
calls from the Central Committee in Berlin in the early morning hours warned the police 
in the region that there were forces out of Berlin—probably referring to the Western 
half—that planned to provoke unrest with the norms.32 The chief of police in Dresden 
also received a call at four o’clock in the morning that ordered a state of preparedness 
among all comrades in Dresden due to unrest in Berlin and various other regions.33 This 
suggests that while the party’s intelligence had been outdone by the rival public sphere—
namely RIAS—the likelihood of something resembling a massive, nation-wide uprising 
was not totally out of the question.  
In retrospective testimonies, some conceived of the June 17 events in terms that 
suggest things had been planned or expected. Of course, memories are imperfect 
sometimes apply a teleological reasoning to historical experience so in one way such 
claims must read with caution. Thus, we should maintain a skeptical stance when 
witnesses claimed to have heard rumblings that something was going to happen. For 
example, the party member who later stated that when his wife was on the streetcar the 
previous Saturday, a passenger said to his daughter, “Well, little one, on June 17 this train 
will head for a better future.”34 Or the functionary who confessed that he had heard from 
another colleague at the hospital in Görlitz that “Something big was going to happen” on 
                                                 
32 “Telefonische Durchsage vom ZK am 16.6.53 23.20 Uhr: Mitteilung des Sekretariats des ZK an alle 1. 
Sekretäre der BL (Durchsage von Gen Rüter im Auftrage von Gen. Schirdewan” (SächsHStA 11857 
IV/2.12 Nr. 8).  
33 “Dresden – Einsatzleitung,” BDVP, Dresden, am 20 Juni, 1953 (SächsHStA 23/18 Bl.74). 
34 “Die Kreissekretäre berichteten anlässlich einer Besprechung im Bezirksverband Dresden folgende 
Situation:” Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands, Bezirksverband Dresden, Dresden, am 18.6.1953 
(SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.12 Nr. 8): “Na, Kleine, um 17.06 Uhr fährt der Zug in eine bessere Zukunft.” 
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June 16, but he could not say exactly what.35 And in Meißen, the review noted that 
workers had held an “illegal meeting” and that a worker claimed that he heard from the 
Secretary of State that the time had come for everything to change.36 Such memories are 
probably examples of retrospective determinism but they helped convince the SED that 
the demonstrations had been secretly in the works for quite some time. 
An analysis by the Department of Propaganda and Agitation in Dresden noted that 
those who took to the streets and protested employed, as a rule, RIAS slogans, which 
appealed to the workers. As for the period before demonstrations broke out, the review 
noted that the provocateurs themselves remained out of view, where they operated a 
whisper campaign.37 These records fail to mention the specific content of the so-called 
whisper campaigns, perhaps because the officials were not privy to such insider 
information. Either way, workers met in private spaces where they discussed national 
policy and courses of action and in these spaces, revolution became thinkable. 
 
Focal Points 
Historians recognize large enterprises like Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz and the 
LOWA works in Görlitz as origin points for the demonstrations in the region. Heidi Roth 
has argued that the reason workers in these large-scale enterprises—who enjoyed 
economic privilege when compared to those workers in other sectors of the economy—
rose up first was that they were employed in the largest enterprises in Dresden and had 
strength in numbers. Furthermore, she suggests that these workers had experienced 
                                                 
35 “Situtationsbericht aus dem Bezirk Dresden der Gewerkschaft Gesundheitsw.” Gewerkschaft 
Gesundheitswesen, Bezirkvorstand Dresden, Dresden, den 27.6, 1953 (SächsHStA 11857, IV2.12 Nr. 10). 
“Morgen soll was grosses passieren.” 
36 “Bericht über die durchgeführte Kontrollfahrt in den Stadtbezirken Coswig and Weinböhla.” KDKK-
Meißen an das Sekretariat im Haus, den 18.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857, IV/2.4 Nr. 061). 
37 Abt. Propaganda – Agitation an das Sekretariat, Zur Taktik und Methode des Gegners, Dresden, den 
20.6.1953 (SächsHStA 11857, IV/2.12 Nr. 9 Bl.12). 
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organized labor as an instrument of action and protest over the last thirty years.38 On the 
other hand, Andrew Port has found these explanations problematic. He contends that they 
do not explain why in many other cases these same workers opted not to take part in the 
collective action, concluding that historians should guard against making generalizations 
about what happened on June 17.39 One could add to Roth’s interpretation that workers 
knew they had support not only within their own workplaces, but in Berlin as well, and 
therefore it was extremely likely that a good number of workers recognized that a mass 
movement was developing. One should also point to what are, perhaps, obvious 
circumstances that proved conducive to collective action: these workers represented a 
massive, routinized, and intimate labor force where rumor and secretive news traveled 
faster than authorities could act.40 As noted earlier, RIAS’s role in the events remains 
contentious among historians and witnesses who still debate the extent of the station’s 
role on June 17. Roth has downplayed the role of foreign broadcasting, pointing out that 
demonstrations also occurred in places where the station’s signal was quite weak. While 
she notes that workers in these places listened to RIAS, it remains peripheral to her 
interpretation. Another way to understand what happened in Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz 
and other work places in the region is to consider that the RIAS broadcasts accomplished 
several things.  
First, RIAS had already endowed the demonstrations with national imaginings. 
While the norms still figured into workers’ demands, RIAS had, since its broadcasts of 
                                                 
38 Roth, Der 17. Juni 1953 in Sachsen, 48-50. 
39 Andrew I. Port, “East German Workers and the ‘Dark Side’ of Eigensinn: Divisive Shop-Floor Practices 
and the failed Revolution of June 17, 1953,” in East German Economy, 1945-2010: Falling Behind or 
Catching Up? Ed. Harmut Berghoff (Washington, D.C.: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 120-1.  
40 Consider also, that while a routinized and disciplined labor force represented an arrangement that 
allowed for surveillance and control on one hand (state power), it provided workers with a (potentially) 
powerful position. 
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the Berlin demonstrations, helped change the conversation from one centered on 
localized economic concerns to one with national and international implications. These 
broadcasts in turn stimulated workers’ conversation and helped generate conversations 
and criticism of the government. Thus, smaller workers’ meetings helped individuals 
become aware of a larger dissident community that could take action. So while RIAS 
commentators never actually called for a general strike, they played a central role in 
nationalizing the movement and must bear considerable responsibility for what happened 
on June 17.  
Hans Hundhausen, a worker at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, recalled that during 
the previous week, workers discussed the existing problems in the GDR and railed 
against those in power, but that in workers’ meetings (here meaning unofficial meetings) 
strike threats had been unknown as of the morning of June 17. Reports suggest that a 
“state of angst” existed in the workplace and that “RIAS slogans” had become 
widespread.41 Hundhausen also recalls in his memoir that Berlin had only given the 
“signal” [to strike] and that since the same conditions existed throughout the GDR, the 
work stoppages developed “spontaneously.”42 More revealingly, Hundhausen notes that 
during the morning hours at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, a “whisper campaign” notified 
workers that they should meet at 9 A.M. at the coalbunker.43 This story is corroborated in 
the SED’s record, which suggests that plans for the meeting had been hatched by the 
workers’ beforehand and without official knowledge. One party member [Klengel] 
                                                 
41 Bericht über den Brigadeeinsatz der BPKK in Verbindung der Genossen vom ZK.” [no date] 
(SächsHStA 11857, IV2.4. Nr. 072 Bl.3). 
42 Hans Hundhausen, Der 17. Juni in Sachsenwerk Dresden und der ABUS (Manuscript) (Dresden, 
Eigenverlag, 1994, 14. While many participants suggest the collective actions were spontaneous in nature, 
others disagree.  
43 Hundhausen, Der 17. Juni in Sachsenwerk Dresden und der ABUS, 15.  
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recalled that during the breakfast break, a colleague [Kühn] suddenly declared, “Now we 
are going to a meeting,” authorities later confirmed that the workers had earlier been 
working on a subversive plan of sorts.44 Five days later, the police would report that in 
Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, an address had gone out over the factory radio system that 
morning slightly before workers met in the court of the factory.45 The first secretary of 
the BPO had addressed the workers’ complaints regarding the heightened norms via 
Betriebsfunk and, according to the police report, workers subsequently assembled in the 
courtyard to protest. The regime announced that quotas had been made voluntary, which 
like in Berlin, proved too late.46 It is unclear here whether the whisper campaign or the 
radio address compelled the workers to gather and one must also consider that officials 
might not have been aware of rumors or perhaps that the timing could simply be a 
coincidence. Either way, hundreds (or perhaps even 1000, the exact numbers range, 
depending on which source one wants to believe) of workers now stood in the courtyard 
of Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz at approximately 9:30 in the morning.47 A makeshift 
banner appeared in the assembled crowd, emblazoned with the word “Generalstreik.”48 
Workers demanded discussions with officials, again noting that the regime had made 
                                                 
44 “Leitungssitzung der Grundorganization Mfc /I - Am 22.6.1953, 14.00 Uhr Neue Küche, SED-
Betriebsparteileitung Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, Dresden den 27.6.53 (SächsHStA 12391, SED 
Grundoganization VEB Elektromaschinenbau, Sachsenwerk Dresden Nr. IV/7/463.32) 
45 “Betr.: Bericht über die Bezirk Dresden Stattgefündenen Provokationen und Demonstrationen,” BDVP 
Dresden Operativstab, Genossen Garatschenko, Bezug: Telef. Anforderung vom 22.6.1953, Dresden, den 
22.6.1953 (Bezirksbehörde Polizei 23/18 Bl.49). 
46 “Bericht über die im Bezirk Dresden stattgefundenen Provokationen und Demonstrationen,” Genosse 
Oberstleutenant Garatschenko, Dresden, den 22.6.53 (SächsHStA 23/18 Bl.49). 
47 Hundhausen, Der 17. Juni in Sachsenwerk Dresden und der ABUS, 15-16.  
48 Ibid., 19.  
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mistakes and nothing had been done.49 A number of workers also struck out toward 
Heidenau and the nearby ABUS factory.50 
On the evening of June 16, Wilhelm Grothaus, who would act as a strike leader at 
the ABUS Niedersedlitz (approximately 1.5km from Sachsenwerk), heard what he 
remembered as a call for a general strike by the Berlin construction workers via RIAS 
broadcasts. Again, we should remember that RIAS did not explicitly call for a general 
strike, so he could either have misremembered this point or RIAS’s language could have 
been close enough to such an appeal that the recollection serves to implicate RIAS in 
spreading the demonstrations. Regardless, Grothaus recalled deciding that night that he, 
along with his friends, would call for Dresdeners to strike in solidarity with those in 
Berlin to fight against the “the system.”51 On the morning of the seventeenth, they formed 
a strike committee and convened 1600 workers in the assembly hall where they 
deliberated for (according to official reports) one and a half hours. They emerged from 
this meeting and demanded access to the radio system, which they were unable to use.52 
News did spread, however, with the help of the factory radio system that Otto Buchwitz, 
a member of the Central Committee, and a respected figure with ties to the region, would 
soon speak to workers at the courtyard of the nearby Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz.53 This 
news then drew workers from ABUS to the courtyard. 
                                                 
49 “Situationsbericht über die faschistische Provokation von 17.6.1953,” FDGB-Bezrikvorstand Dresden, 
Statistik/Berichterstattung, Dresden, den 20.6.1953 (SächsHStA 11857, IV2.12 Nr. 10). 
50 Ibid. This criticism had been widespread since the regime announced its new course, demonstrating an 
historical rule of thumb: a reforming regime is a weak regime. 
51 Ibid.: “Das System” 
52 Ibid. The record is not clear why the workers failed to get access to the Betriebsfunk, but one surmises 
that the regime succeeded in containing the conversation. 
53 “Augenzeugenberichte von streikenden Arbeitern: Wilhelm Grothaus, antifaschistischer 
Widerstandskämpfer, Streikführer in Dresden,” in Karl Wilhelm Fricke, ed. 17 Juni 1953: Arbeiteraufstand 
in der DDR, (Köln: Deutschland Archiv, 1982), 114. Fricke points out that Grothaus’s memory is likely 
faulty here since RIAS never officially called for a general strike, but again, one can easily argue the 
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Several thousand had assembled in the courtyard sometime in the early afternoon 
at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz when Grothaus and the workers from ABUS arrived.54 By 
now, the factory leadership at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz had received a phone call from 
the leadership at ABUS and knew of the approaching demonstration column—the 
colleague who answered the phone reportedly saw between five and six hundred workers 
approaching before he even hung up the phone.55 Upon his arrival at 13:30, Otto 
Buchwitz noticed in several places placards calling for a general strike.56 Buchwitz spoke 
to the assembled crowd of the problems surrounding German unity, but was unable to 
garner sympathy from the workers for the regime’s position. He instead found himself 
forced to debate the vastly more popular Grothaus. Grothaus stepped up and articulated 
the demands of the “political struggle:” removal of the regime, elimination of 
communism, release of all political prisoners, free and secret elections, and the 
reunification of Germany. Most importantly, Grothaus’ words, roughly transcribed here 
by a Stasi functionary, reinforced the ascendency of the rival public sphere on the 
morning of June 17: 
Today is the first time in a long time we can again freely and openly 
express our opinion. True, we have a constitution that affords us certain 
rights to speech and freedom of conscience—but that’s only on paper. 
When have we ever been able to actually do so? We had no opportunity to 
do this. The upper-level functionaries are supposed to indeed have their 
ears to the masses, but if they had done that, they would have learned the 
true opinion of the masses. I would like to know, just where they had their 
ears until now. Well, they have been hovering in higher regions [not been 
                                                                                                                                                 
station’s words had such an effect that they might as well have. The ABUS plant is today Sächsischen 
Brücken- und Stahlhochbau. 
54 Ibid., 115.  
55 “Parteiaktivtagung der Bezirksleitung der SED Dresden am 21.6.1953” (SächsHStA 11857, IV/2.2 Nr. 
001). 
56 “Bericht über die Versammlung der streikenden Arbeiter im Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz am 17.6.1953” 
Dresden, den 20 Juni, 1953 (BStU MfS, BV Dresden, AU 239/53 Bl.182-7) available at 
http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/DDRGeschichte/17-juni-1953/Aufstand-in-den-
Bezirken/Dresden/Dokumente/05-bericht.html. 
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listening to the masses], and for that reason, they couldn’t know. I believe 
that there is no one among us who doesn’t want the unity of our fatherland 
and peace, but we reject a unity and regime with moral constraint.57 
 
 The assembled workers greeted the list with applause.58 Grothaus repeated the 
demands, and after Buchwitz claimed that Grothhaus had betrayed the working class, 
Grothaus responded that the only way he could betray the working class, would be to 
“abandon the workers who were now protesting in all cities.”59 Buchwitz urged the crowd 
to return to work, but those gathered announced their plan to march to downtown 
Dresden; they had already received reports—though it is not clear how—that 
demonstrations had begun in the inner city.60 
Similar scenes unfolded in workplaces around the Dresden region. Factory 
courtyards became spaces of civic debate after rumors and reports regarding the “strike 
movement” in Berlin spread among the workforce.61 In places where unrest developed, 
the party continuously noted that various discussions led to work stoppages and, 
according to the Regional Party Control Commission, the “organized work of the 
                                                 
57 “Sinngemässe Wiedergabe der Hetzrede des Grothaus, beschäftigt in VEB “Abus” Dresden-Niedersedlitz 
am 17.6.53 zwischen 15,00 und 16,00 Uhr auf dem Werkhof im N.S.” Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, 
Dresden, den 19.6.53. Pg. 18 (BStU MfS, BV Dresden, AU 239/53): “Heute ist seit langer Zeit zum ersten 
Mal wieder Gelegenheit seine Meinung frei und offen zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Wir haben zwar eine 
Verfassung die uns Rede-und Gewissensfreiheit zuerkennt, aber das steht nur auf dem Papier. Wo konnten 
wir bisher davon Gebrauch machen. Wir hatten ja bisher keine Gelegenheit dazu. Die hohen Funktionäre 
sollen zwar das Ohr an der Masse haben, aber wenn sie das gehabt hätten, dann wüssten sie die wirkliche 
Meinung des Volkes. Ich möchte wissen, wo sie bisher ihre Ohren gehabt haben. Aber sie schwebten ja in 
höheren Regionen und darum konnten sie es auch nicht wissen. Ich glaube, es gibt keinen unter uns, der 
nicht die Einheit unseres Vaterlandes und den Frieden will, wir lehnen aber eine Einheit und Regierung mit 
Gewissenszwang ab.” 
58 Karl Wilhelm Fricke, 17 Juni 1953, 115; “Situationsbericht über die faschistischen Provokation von 
17.6.1953”  
59 Ibid., 115, “Wenn ich jetzt die Arbeiter, die in allen Städten aufgestanden sind, im Stich lassen würde.” 
60 “Situationsbericht über die faschistische Provokation von 17.6.1953.”  
61 Bezirksbehörde der Deutschen Volkspolizei (SächsHStA 23/18 Bl.49; Bl.8). 
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enemies” was palpable even where they were not successful in initiating provocation.62 In 
Görlitz, official analysis pointed to the rumors that had been circulating there in the days 
prior that called for the removal of President Pieck’s images.63 These types of discussions, 
generated by the Resolution of June 11 again, at least according to one report, became the 
topic of debate on the morning on June 17 when groups of colleagues gathered. Before 
the demonstrations began, there were conversations pertaining to the working conditions, 
which had not improved since the announcement of the New Course, but rather, had 
deteriorated.64 In the LOWA factory in Görlitz, 600 employees stopped working at 9:45 
and marched to other factories where workers joined their demonstration. The workers by 
that time, according to police reports, had planned a demonstration to take place at 
Leninplatz, under the slogan, “We declare solidarity with the Workers in Berlin.”65 In the 
nearby VEB Feinmechanik und Optik, the issue of the norms had become a subject of 
serious debate and as such, inspired the workers join in the LOWA workers’ protest 
march.66 
Not all workers chose to take to the streets. In a number of enterprises, workers 
debated the effectiveness of the events in Berlin and Dresden, sometimes electing not to 
strike. The news of unrest at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz reached the gas works in Löbau 
around noon—basically as events unfolded. Those at this factory learned that the workers 
at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz had resolved to strike and had begun marching toward the 
                                                 
62 “Bericht über Verhalten von Partei und Leitungsmitgliedern während der faschistischen Provokation und 
über typische Einzelfälle” BPKK Dresden, Dresden den 28.6.1953 Ull/b. (SächsHStA 11857, IV2.4 Nr. 60 
Bl.6). 
63 “Bericht an die Bezirksleitung über Analyse der Enstehung, der Ausbruch und Entwicklung des 
faschistischen Abenteurs in Stadt Görlitz.” (SächsHStA 11857, IV/2.12 Nr. 9). 
64 Ibid.  
65 Bezirksbehörde der Deutschen Volkspolizei (SächsHStA 23/18, Bl.8). 
66 “Bericht: Die Abteilung Wirtschaftspolitik an das Sekretariat über die Ursachen der entstandenen 
Situation.” Abt. Wirtschaftpolitik, Dresden, den 20.6.53. (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.12 Nr. 9). 
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city center. The news reportedly triggered considerable debate among the workers at the 
gas works whether such measures were necessary. In the end, the workers reached a 
nearly unanimous decision to refrain from demonstrating based on the regime’s 
recognition of its past mistakes.67 
In the VEB Phänomen-Werk 1 in Zittau, a truck factory, 2,000 workers put down 
their tools and demanded that factory leadership immediately organize a meeting in the 
courtyard of the factory. Management here granted permission and promptly fielded 
questions from the assembled workers concerning what was transpiring in Berlin. The 
answers provided, whatever they might have been, failed to pacify the workers. Several 
workers stepped to the microphone where they stirred up the crowd and called for a 
demonstration. Workers also approved a resolution, which, according to party 
functionaries, had been prepared beforehand. The resolution called for the overthrow of 
the regime, increased wages, lowered HO prices, and the release of all political 
prisoners.68 The demonstration never took place, as news of the state of emergency made 
it to the factory.69 
 Some workers learned of others’ demonstrations before arriving to work in the 
early afternoon. In the Oberlausitzer Textilveredlungswerk the early shift went as 
expected. Those who arrived to work the second shift at 2:00 P.M. already knew of the 
events in Berlin and now, Görlitz.70 Before beginning their shift, workers congregated in 
the courtyard in the factory to discuss the news. Functionaries’ attempts to confront the 
                                                 
67 “Betriebsfriedenrat Gaswerk Joliot-Curie Dresden,” 19 Juni (SächsHStA 11857, IV/2.12 Nr. 8). 
68 Volkspolizei-Kreisamt Zittau an die Bezirksbehörde der Deutschen Volkspolizei Operativ-stab, Dresden, 
N 15, 27. Juni 1953 (SächsHStA 23/18 Bl.227).  
69 Ibid. 
70 Industriegewerkschaft – Textil-Bekleidung-Leder, Bezirksvorstand Dresden, Bericht, Dresden, den 29, 
Juni 1953. Görlitz is approximately fifteen miles west of Löbau; Dresden is located 56 miles to the west of 
Löbau (SächsHStA IV2.12 Nr. 10). 
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workers in the courtyard failed as they discussed their solidarity with Berlin and Görlitz , 
and the five-point program for which they now (allegedly, according to the SED) 
fought.71  
In Meißen, discussions in the morning hours at the Kabelwerk factory revolved 
around the heightened norms, which had since been reduced to the previous (accepted) 
levels. Sometime after lunch, a workers’ meeting revealed that workers no longer 
concerned themselves with the norms, but rather, bigger issues, or as one worker put it: 
“Germany.”72 This worker called for a “sympathy strike” for their “brothers in Berlin,” 
which met applause from his fellow workers.73 Still surprisingly, at least to the 
functionaries present, the workers went back to work after this episode.74  
 At one school in Görlitz, a students’ meeting unfolded and a drafted resolution 
that called for East Germans to live in peace with Czechs and Poles, who, like themselves, 
lived under Soviet repression. This, they argued, bound them together more closely than 
the nearby border [the Oder-Neisse] separated the two groups.75 
The organized and deliberate meetings held by workers the morning of June 17 
suggests that the demonstrations had an (at least partially) a deliberate and scripted 
impetus, rather than a spontaneous generation. Critical resolutions and declarations of 
solidarity undermined the SED by not only attacking its program, but by recognizing the 
presence and activity of other dissident movements. Within these discussions, workers 
became involved in critical debates with a national scope. The discussions and private 
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meetings also underscore the deliberations that took place before a consensus was 
reached as far as how those present would act. 
 
Radio’s Reach  
One of the more difficult questions to answer pertains to RIAS and other Western 
stations’ reach on the morning of June 17. In a number of cases, the party later identified 
those who had taken part in the demonstrations as enthusiastic RIAS listeners, such as 
one dockworker (employed in a factory besieged that morning by RIAS rumors/news) 
who demanded the Soviets’ removal from Germany.76 Or consider those workers who 
left a courtyard after a meeting instigated by known RIAS listeners.77 Another noted 
RIAS-listener in Dresden had established himself as a rumor mongerer by informing his 
co-workers of Pieck’s “timeout” and, according to officials there, “probably” spread the 
rumor that there would be a new regime in August. He had heard this from another 
colleague who had, according to reports, either regularly listened to RIAS or knew of an 
“underground movement.”78 While there is little doubt that RIAS could claim a wide and 
enthusiastic listenership in Dresden, such incidents might also shaded by the SED’s 
insistence that the West used foreign broadcasting to help carry out an orchestrated 
rebellion in the GDR. 
When referencing RIAS or others in regard to the events of June 17, functionaries 
often claimed ignorance of the station’s broadcasts, but also recognized the influence and 
tactical advantage they provided critics and dissidents. As one SED official put it: 
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….I must be totally clear and plainly stress that, yes, there were errors, that 
certainly we must discuss, and there were inadequacies in our own 
factories and in the city that were irresponsible. [But] I would like to 
remind everyone that, regarding the conditions on 17 June in Berlin, only 
those who listened to RIAS, NWDR or other western stations were in the 
know. 
 
I myself have a radio, but I can’t hear because of [SED-induced] 
interference. But, when I arrive at work and no one [appears to] know 
anything, and then suddenly everyone is in the streets and martial law has 
already been declared, that’s a problem and the functionaries and the 
factory leaders have already failed. Those who are not informed of the 
truth about events and only find out days later what’s really going on, are 
angry when they don’t learn the true facts from those who are 
responsible.79 
 
In some cases, those who later claimed not to have taken part in the strikes or 
demonstrations merely asserted that the discussions stemmed from the reports that came 
“from outside.”80 For example, at the power plant in Dresden, one functionary claimed to 
recall that in the early morning hours, he overheard a teenager in the coat closet openly 
declare, “Today it’s to be decided whether the East German construction workers will 
strike.”81 In the RFT Funkwerk (a radio and communications firm) in Dresden, 
functionaries noted that “continuous listening in to Western radio stations” along with 
telephone calls and messengers “continuously kept negative forces informed of the events 
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in Dresden and Berlin.”82 Here, these dissident workers who had been listening to 
Western stations (unnamed, but probably RIAS or maybe NWDR) took control of the 
house radio system and tried to seize control of the situation by urging part of the 
workforce to take to the streets. Such efforts reportedly failed after functionaries stepped 
in.83 According to the official report, the Western stations demanded that the workforce 
strike and demonstrate, a request followed by a number of workers and comrades. Other 
groups stayed behind in the factory and in a workers’ meeting, elected a commission 
charged with formulating the demands of the workforce. This led to political demands 
that called for the regime to be overthrown.84 Similarly, in a shop, two men called for a 
staff meeting, apparently with little regard for keeping their intentions secret. Officials 
noted that they shared information gathered from RIAS, including a five-point-program 
that served as a basis for the discussions. The two men reportedly argued that for eight 
years they had been cheated and that it (likely meaning the SED’s brand of socialism) 
was all a scam.85  
The workers’ meetings in the morning and early afternoon of 17 June represented 
the inability of the SED to restrain an emboldened rival public sphere at this point. In 
these spaces, often courtyards, workers did not spontaneously initiate strikes (as opposed 
to the work stoppages necessary to hold such meetings), but rather deliberated and 
debated not only the perceived injustices facing workers, but also the discussions 
pertaining to national issues that the rival public sphere had inspired. By drafting 
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resolutions and proclaiming solidarity with other protest-minded workers, they imagined 
communities of dissidents throughout the Dresden region and the GDR. The methods of 
communication also changed. The whisper campaigns of the early morning hours became 
louder as the number of workers aware of what was unfolding in Berlin, the region, and 
perhaps other locales, grew.  
 
The SED’s Radio Address 
Sometimes rumors and misinformation stemming from the GDR outlets 
influenced participants’ vision of what was unfolding in Dresden. Lothar Besser, a 
student at a vocational school recalled a run-in with two Soviet soldiers, one of whom 
knocked a fellow student from his bicycle with the butt of his rifle. The soldiers 
apparently believed that the demonstrators were American saboteurs, a story spread by 
GDR radio at the time.86 
As the SED’s power and credibility ultimately rested in the appearance that a 
unified community of East Germans supported its existence, GDR presented the uprising 
as the work of outsiders, namely foreign agents and fascists. These forces, according to 
the SED’s official line, now reacted to the SED’s efforts (meaning the New Course) to 
improve living standards.87 Others who might have been skeptical of the news—often 
perceived as rumor—might have been swayed by the GDR’s radio address, which 
admitted that unrest had become widespread. In an unsent letter he composed to a friend 
in Munich, Gottfried Schmidt arrived early to his office and heard discussions 
surrounding the reports from Berlin. This seemed unlikely to him at the time, but when 
GDR radio reported the unrest, he knew something was happening. By early afternoon, 
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reports had trickled in that similar unrest had spread to other cities and telephone calls 
confirmed the rumors.88 
 
The Soundscape of Protest and the Reach of RIAS 
Radio, rumors, whisper campaigns, chants, and a distinct buzz rounded out the 
soundscape of revolt through the morning hours of June 17. The pattern unfolded 
throughout the region and the GDR; radio waves carried the message into private homes 
and establishments and workers and residents spread the news at work in private 
meetings. In these audible spaces, dissidents challenged the regime’s authority and claim 
to the future. Around noon, marching workers had begun to stream into the city center of 
Dresden and the small towns in its orbit. Meanwhile, those outside the factories learned 
of the events that had been unfolding locally and throughout the GDR in a number of 
ways. A number of witnesses note that Wednesday, 17 June 1953 was a beautiful, hot day 
in East Germany and some claim that “something eerie” could be sensed in the air that 
day.89 Others, like housewife Hannelore Kuhn, already knew about the strikes developing 
in Berlin by listening to RIAS, but recalled thinking that Berlin was quite far away and 
Dresden seemed peaceful. Still, everything seemed so quiet that afternoon that she had 
become uneasy. She remembered that the normal cacophony created by the workers—
hammering, knocking, a cement mixer, men on scaffolding—was missing and the 
scaffolds were empty. She then heard a Soviet tank rumble into the intersection, which 
pleased her little boy. Still, Hannelore found the tank a bit unsettling so she walked to the 
park with her son where other mothers watched their children.90 She soon learned that 
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strikes and demonstrations had broken out “everywhere” and the prisons had been 
stormed. Those who were closer to the city center began hearing the chants of protest 
after lunch or an “exceptional din” emanating from the streets.91  
  News reports and the news of news reports—sometimes RIAS, sometimes 
others—helped bring groups and individuals to places of protest. Such information, 
although its origin is unclear, brought Klaus Lindner, for example, to his job at 
Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz early (around noon) on June 17. Upon his arrival he found the 
crowd assembled in the factory yard.92 Elsewhere in Dresden, Siegfried Bannack, a metal 
worker in Dresden recalled the strange feeling in the air as he walked through Platz der 
Einheit (today, Albertplatz) and Nord Platz (Olbrichtplatz today) after work. The usual 
passersby now stood in small groups and spoke insistently to one another. Bannack 
suggests that by this point—probably early afternoon—even those without access to 
Western radio stations knew something unusual was happening as tanks rumbled through 
parts of town. He set off toward home and passed groups of residents in the city 
cloistered together, discussing the news. He ran into a neighbor who explained to him 
that Berliners were striking. Bannack quickly tuned into RIAS, where a reporter in Berlin 
excitedly stated that gunfire had forced him to take cover behind a tipped over 
construction trailer. He immediately called his brother and father from a payphone and 
told them the news before meeting up with a friend.93  
Information spread quickly that morning, often reaching students in the classroom 
in the early morning hours and demonstrating just how quickly the news spread from 
RIAS to public places. In Dresden, for instance, a student stormed into his classroom and 
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informed his classmates that the workforce of a local factory had gone into the streets to 
demonstrate—and that it had something to do with the events transpiring in Berlin. 
“Imagine,” said the student who brought the news, “if our regime has to resign, perhaps 
we are a bit closer to German reunification.”94 The teacher appeared and told the students 
to immediately take the street car home (which probably no longer operated), and to stay 
away from the Postplatz.95 Perhaps not surprisingly, the students headed directly to the 
Postplatz.96 
Radio also informed residents in the Dresden region’s smaller towns of the 
demonstrations and potential for national change. Exactly how many people listened to 
these reports is probably impossible to ascertain, but as in other locales, residents often 
assembled in the streets and began to strengthen their numbers as they marched to the 
town squares.97 Ingrid Anders in Hoyerswerda recalled that everyone in her office had 
grown restless wondering what was going to happen, as they had learned from the radio 
that something was going on in Berlin.98 In Zittau, Gottfried Schinke, a metalworker 
remembered that there was a certain tension in the air. He noted that the adults/senior 
colleagues (he was an apprentice) had apparently heard a lot to talk about that morning as 
they stood around in groups talking amongst themselves. A student in Niesky recalled 
that some reports regarding the actions in Berlin made their way to the town in the 
morning and “awakened hope for a change.”99 In Radebeul, Barbara Mohr, an assistant 
surgeon at the hospital noticed that in the morning hours, as the staff began its 
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consultation hour (Sprechstunde) the waiting room was empty. She went outside the 
hospital with several co-workers and took in the morning sun, but slowly become more 
unnerved as the usual patient load failed to materialize. Finally, someone informed them 
to tune into the radio which was reporting the strikes in Berlin in the Stalinallee along 
with the news that the Russians were soon going to impose a curfew. A nurse who lived 
close by procured a radio and with some difficulty, tuned into a Western station. They 
listened to the movement in Berlin and recalled hearing that the Russians looked to move 
in with tanks.100 
Günter Jarzombek in Löbau had received a call from his colleague in Görlitz in 
the evening on June 16. He had told him that demonstrations had begun in the streets and 
in the Neumarkt. The next morning, Jarzombek called his colleges in Görlitz and asked 
what was going on. His colleagues there told him that Stalin busts and pictures of 
Ulbricht and other leaders were being tossed into the streets.101 Elsewhere in Löbau, a 
curious man first heard it from the local butcher who informed him that something was 
going on in Berlin and that announcements centered around HO prices while reports (of 
an unknown origin) discussed free elections and political prisoners that had been released 
in the GDR. The woman next to him suggested such news could be RIAS-hoaxes. Shortly 
after he came across a meeting in which workers demanded to know what was 
happening—especially in Görlitz where they heard shots had been fired and workers 
were dead.102 By noon in Görlitz, demonstrators had begun to appear at Leninplatz. 
Hartmut Jatzko, then fourteen years old, had been at school reciting the lessons of the 
great October Revolution when the school suddenly sent the students home around noon. 
                                                 
100 Ibid., 332-333. 
101 Ibid., 174.  
102 Ibid., 324-5. 
214 
 
His brother rode by on his bike and shouted that they were “cleaning out the Party 
Palace.”103 Things seemed to be happening quickly, and it took several minutes for the 
young man to understand that a demonstration was unfolding. He tuned into RIAS and 
raised the volume. The station had by now reported that an uprising existed in Berlin and 
other cities. After hearing the news, he immediately headed to the city center.104 Bärbel 
Timm, another student in Görlitz arrived at school to find her classroom empty. She 
returned home early and her father, who lay sick in bed excitedly called Bärbel into the 
room. “Listen to this!” said her father as his radio aired the RIAS broadcasts, “there’s an 
uprising in Berlin!”105 Then her grandmother, who lived in the back of the house called 
him: “Listen—what is that—the clamor outside?”106 Cases also existed in which family 
members living in other cities relayed RIAS news by telephone. Functionaries observed, 
for example, a worker in a textile factory receiving calls from his father, who listened to 
RIAS. He then passed on the information, shouting that, “Yeah, if they want to go ahead 
and allow free elections, then they’ll really get a sense of how things are.”107  
Werner Herbig described a nascent unrest among the population in Görlitz as a 
nascent one, wherein residents had begun to tell each other that things simply had to 
change.108 The workers had grown restless in the area and now an “Uprising was clearly 
in the air.”109 Herbig recalled that RIAS had been hesitant the day before (June 16]) when 
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reporting on the strikes in Berlin, because, according to him, the Americans did not know 
how the Berlin strikes would develop. He tuned in early on the morning of June 17 before 
heading to the police station to pick up his disability pass (he had been shot through the 
shoulder in the war) when the police suddenly distributed steel helmets and sent officers 
into the city.110 
 In a 1983 interview, program director Schütz recalled that throughout that 
Wednesday, RIAS received a continuously growing number of reports that underlined the 
extent of the protests. These reports came from cities and towns, large and small 
throughout the GDR. Schütz noted that the activities in the provinces seemed to reflect, in 
certain ways, what had happened in Berlin. For example, he remembered that when 
demonstrators stormed a prison in one city and freed the prisoners word got back to the 
station where the event was reported. Shortly thereafter, in another town a prison would 
be stormed, suggesting to those at the station that they were indeed responsible for 
inflaming the demonstrations. Unfortunately, no record exists of the information that 
made its way from the regions to RIAS headquarters. Those participants and observers 
who did share information with the station probably did so by telephone.111 
 
Efforts to get Control  
 Hannah Arendt has referred to public places where collective action takes 
develops as “spaces of appearance,” which represent areas of political freedom where 
individuals come together and act in concert. The space of appearance is where 
participants can, through their collective and public visibility, reactivate their citizenship, 
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neutralize inequalities and, at least temporarily, generate political power—a useful 
description for the demonstrations on June 17 in Dresden and elsewhere in the GDR. One 
can recognize that urban marches and the occupation of public space represent key scenes 
in the modern revolutionary script, whether the march to Versailles in October, 1789, or 
through the streets of Dresden in 1848.112   
Such spaces also became official spaces of surveillance, wherein the state 
attempted to disband the groups of demonstrators that had congregated in public spaces 
by forbidding foot and automobile traffic.113 Such a state of emergency had existed in 
Berlin since 1:00 P.M.114 RIAS interrupted their reporting at 1:44 P.M. to announce the 
Soviet Military Commandant’s declaration of a state of emergency in Berlin. In Dresden, 
from 2:00 P.M. on, authorities enforced a similar state of emergency and requested that 
citizens behave peacefully and quietly return to work.115 This categorically forbade 
demonstrations, meetings, congregations, and imposed a curfew on locales such as 
theaters, bars, and museums, that would begin at 9:00 P.M.116 The order, which forbade 
groups of more than three from gathering in streets and spaces and public buildings, 
sought to dissolve the so-called discussion groups that had formed in the streets.117 
Functionaries with megaphones continuously ordered the demonstrators to scatter.118 
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Soviet forces deployed loudspeaker cars to repeatedly broadcast the orders.119 The news 
did little to dissuade demonstrators and potential demonstrators, while functionaries often 
received the information over the radio and had little idea how to act.120 As demonstrators 
continued to stream into city centers in the early afternoon hours, the measures appeared 
futile for the time being. 
 
Spaces of Appearance: Postplatz and Theaterplatz in Dresden  
 
 As workers and residents occupied public spaces, they realized the potential for 
collective action. Significant places where protestors gathered included market squares in 
the city of Dresden and popular urban crossroads and traffic interchanges, most notably 
Postplatz. At the state theater in the heart of Dresden, so-called reactionary elements had 
already begun to challenge the regime and exacerbate a negative mood by spreading so-
called RIAS-slogans among the workforce, according to the regime. During a meeting, 
workers here received word that a large portion of the workforce of Sachsenwerk 
Niedersedlitz and other factories were moving toward the middle of the city. Those 
present drafted a resolution and elected to strike. Workers at the neighboring Zwinger 
Palace had also called a solidarity strike.121 The information received proved correct, and 
workers and residents from the region began converging on the city center, chiefly in the 
Postplatz and Theaterplatz. 
 In Dresden, public transportation had stopped running sometime earlier in the 
morning. Streetcars rested in a long line that extended from the Postplatz over the river to 
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Neustädter Markt.122 Now, public address vehicles allegedly communicated an order that 
groups of more than three persons disband or be shot.123 Trucks, motorcycles, and armed 
soldiers weaved through the crowd in attempts to prevent demonstrators from coagulating 
into a core of greater density and number.124 
 The rumors from the week before, which claimed that the pictures and works of 
socialism’s leading men—Pieck, Grotewohl, Stalin, and Ulbricht were to be removed 
(and often were)—led to the same thing happening in the Postplatz. Next to the Zwinger 
Palace, a large steel frame supported an oversized effigy of Stalin. Demonstrators 
climbed the structure and yelled down to those below: “Should it come down?”125 
According to one witness, this was the moment when things turned rowdy as the crowd 
tore down the image.126 
 A motif of the June 17 demonstrations included the protestors’ desire to connect 
to other dissidents, whether in the same factory, in the same city, or nationally, and 
continue to organize and inspire collective action. With several thousand demonstrators 
occupying the heart of Dresden, a group seized control of the city’s Stadtfunk sometime 
in mid-to-late afternoon (around 4:00 P.M. according to comprehensive FDGB report. 
Stasi reports suggest this happened earlier and Roth makes no mention of the incident). 
According to another witness, this radio system was actually used by the 
Verkehrsbetriebe in a pavilion at the Postplatz.127 An unidentified individual gave the 
announcement that a state of emergency had been declared, but no demonstrators should 
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go home, along with “fascist slogans” and announcements critical of the regime.128 
Instead, the radio announcement invited protestors to a demonstration at Grunaer Street 
(Dresden’s first socialist street!) along with instructions to assemble “not in small groups, 
but in lines.”129 Anti-regime proponents gathered in small groups at the Postplatz and 
continued planning. In one group of youths, word circulated that the demonstration would 
continue on June 18 and that the Fernmeldamt (telegraph building) would be stormed 
then, too.130 Located next to rubble heaps that supplied demonstrators with rocks to 
bombard police forces, the Fernmeldamt (also referred to as Telegraphenamt by 
Volkspolizei) came under attack of the demonstrators. They ripped down the political 
slogans and wrangled with the police.131 Ultimately, the barracked police were able to 
secure the building by firing warning shots as a demonstrator in the crowd with a 
megaphone shouted at the police not to shoot.132 The deployment of the police and Soviet 
forces prevented planned demonstration from fully materializing.133 At this point another 
memorable tone entered the soundscape of the demonstration, as the rumbling of tank 
treads could be heard in the distance. 
 
Radio in Görlitz  
In Görlitz, the soundscape of revolution evolved from whisper campaigns and 
private meetings in the morning to discussion groups in public spaces while assembled 
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Zeitzeugen Berichten, 162. 
133 “Situationsbericht über die faschistische Provokation von 17.6.1953” FDGB-Bezrikvorstand Dresden, 
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crowds sang songs and chanted slogans. As in Dresden, residents, often informed by 
RIAS broadcasts, occupied public squares and the demonstrators’ voices occupied 
audible space, forcing the regime to deploy loudspeaker trucks and disperse the 
discussion groups. Roth notes demonstrators in Görlitz achieved a higher level of 
rebellion, which she attributes to a number of factors, most notable, the city’s location 
next to the Polish border (residents could actually see their old houses across the Oder-
Neisse border!), which had incensed residents for years, housing shortages, and higher-
than-average unemployment.134 While these factors surely contributed to the level of 
unrest in Görlitz, radio transmissions contributed to the popular belief that events in 
Görlitz were part of a national demonstration.  
As students headed home from school in the early afternoon, the chants and calls 
from the city center could be heard in the distance.135 This helped draw thousands to the 
market square where witnesses recalled that they had never seen so many gathered in this 
space.136 An electrician, likely in league with the demonstrators, had connected a 
microphone to the city public address system.137 The system’s speakers hung throughout 
the inner city and early in the afternoon broadcasted the demonstration taking place in 
front of the town hall. Those present discussed how quickly a new and legitimate regime 
could be erected and the possibility of German reunification.138 Demonstrators grabbed a 
table from an Aufklärungslokal, which they then used as a speaking platform for what 
had evolved into a sort of provisionary government.139 Of course by now, the reports 
                                                 
134 See Roth, Der 17 Juni in Sachsen, 245-250. 
135 Lange and Roß, 17. Juni 1953, Zeitzeugen Berichten, 178. 
136 Lange and Roß, 17. Juni 1953, Zeitzeugen Berichten, 168 
137 Ibid., 168-9, 170.  
138 Ibid., 169. 
139 Ibid. See Roth, Der 17 Juni in Sachsen, 258-266. 
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from Berlin had been circulating and the crowd would not settle for small-time demands: 
instead, it seemed to those present that the time had come to remove the ruling regime 
and dissolve its apparatuses.140 A young student elsewhere in the city recalled suddenly 
hearing the “Deutschlandlied” blasting from the speakers: “That truly gave us the feeling 
that things had reached a turning point.”141 Others echoed this sentiment, with one 
participant later claiming that “The highpoint was probably when demonstrators sang the 
great chorus of the true German national anthem.”142 A good number present found 
themselves moved to tears, while for some younger residents, singing the national anthem 
in such a context provided a new type of experience. “It was the high point for me when 
everyone sang the national anthem… I knew such a song existed and was familiar with 
the text and melody because of my mother, but now I truly heard it, meaningful and 
fervent.”143 Benedict Anderson suggests that national anthems, when sung, allow for a 
singular occurrence of community and simultaneity; an impression of unisonance, full of 
national imaginings.144  
 
Rumors  
It remains difficult to determine what, exactly, individuals knew of events outside 
their locales as events unfolded throughout the GDR. As before, rumor often contained a 
certain amount of truth. For example, analysis of June 17 produced by the local SED 
noted that rumors regarding the abdication of the regime and the police (who, it was 
                                                 
140 Lange and Roß, 17. Juni 1953, Zeitzeugen Berichten, 170. 
141 Ibid., 179.: “Das für uns wirklich das Gefühl einer Zeitenwende!” 
142 Ibid., 170. “Der Höhepunkt mag wohl gewesen sein, als der riesige Chor die richtige deutsche 
Nationalhymne sang.” 
143 Ibid., 172.: “Für mich war der Höhepunkt, dass gemeinsam das Deutschland-Lied gesungen wurde. Bis 
dahin wusste ich zwar, dass es dieses Lied gab, von der Mutter hatte ich sicher schon eine Andeutung der 
Melodie und des Textes gehört, hier aber hörte ich es wirklich, inbrünstig und bedeutungsvoll.” 
144 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 149.  
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claimed, stood with demonstrators) helped provocateurs gather support for their cause.145 
In other cases, local news deviated wildly from what historians know to have transpired. 
As one intern in Dresden later put it, “A lot of rumors circulated, but no one truly knew 
what was going on.”146 Of course, the young man does not speak for everyone and many 
likely unknowingly mistook false rumors as true news.  
The SED classified such communications as disinformation. Records and witness 
recollections indicate that a number of residents felt the GDR was in the midst of a 
political turn on June 17. In other words, to a number of onlookers and participants, the 
moment for change had arrived. Werner Stoll, a student at the time, remembers that 
rumors whirred through the decks of the steamboat he traveled on between Riesa and 
Dresden, but always in low voices in order to keep things secret.147 The source of the 
rumors came into focus when the steamboat docked and it became apparent that the 
streetcars and busses no longer ran. Other rumors, which might seem ridiculous or 
innocuous still reveal the confusion and anger present on June 17. Rosemarie Ulbricht, a 
young girl in Görlitz at the time, remembered hearing that a revolution had taken place or 
the currency had been demonetized, prompting her to close her bank account and buy a 
watch before she even saw a protest march.148 An example of a more foreboding rumor 
arose in Görlitz, where Georg Walter arrived early to work and heard right away that a 
dead dog hung in the Obermarkt and underneath someone had written, “That was the first 
                                                 
145 SED Bezirksleitung Dresden, gen. Wolf, “Analyse über die Enstehung, den Ausbruch, die Entwicklung 
des fasch. Abenteurers und seine Liquidierung,” Dresden, den 8.7.1953 (SächsHStA Dresden 11857, 
IV/2.12 Nr. 8). 
146 Lange and Roß, 17. Juni 1953, Zeitzeugen Berichten, 166. 
147 Ibid., 164.  
148 Ibid., 181. 
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dog that died a terrible death!”149 He claims he was never able to confirm the validity of 
this rumor.  
The whereabouts and status of the SED leadership remained a hot topic on June 
17. RIAS addressed this topic sometime in the mid-morning during an interview with 
Otto Nuschke, representative of the Council of Ministers of the GDR and leader of the 
CDU (GDR). When asked where the three leaders were now, Otto Nuschke claimed 
truthfully that Pieck was recovering in the Soviet Union and the other two remained in 
Berlin.150 One might also note that such a question posed by RIAS, in an underhanded 
way, suggested that the SED’s leadership situation remained hazy and seemed to give at 
least some credence to the improvised news that circulated widely enough to prompt the 
question. Indeed, the destruction of the party’s leadership through rumor mongering 
seems to have continued unabated. At the Trust Company in Dresden, the managing 
director was seen removing Pieck’s image from the wall and remarking, “He is dead 
anyways!”151 And in nearby Löbau, reports indicated that images of Pieck, Stalin, and 
Grotewohl were removed at the town pool.152 Elsewhere in Dresden, a functionary at the 
public prosecutors’ office stated that GDR radio carried the news that Pieck was dead, 
Ulbricht had been arrested and that 20,000 workers were now striking.153 Only the last bit 
of information here was true. Of course, this news probably stemmed from RIAS and 
earlier improvised news as the domestic GDR stations mostly played music that day, so it 
                                                 
149 Ibid., 174.: “Das war der erste Hund, der verreckte!” 
150 See: http://www.17juni53.de/audio/track18.mp3 for a recording of this broadcast.  
151 Information, FDGB-Bezirkvorstand Dresden, Statistik-Berichterstattung. Dresden, den 26.6.53, 11 Uhr 
(SächsHStA 11857 IV2.12). 
152 SED Kreisleitung Löbau, an die Bezirksparteikontrollkommission Dresden, Löbau, 21 Dezember, 1953 
(SächsHStA IV/2.4 Nr. 061, Bl.80). 
153 B P O der Bezriksstaatsanwaltschaft, Partei Information, an die SED – Bezirksleitung, Staatl. Organe – 
zu Hd.d.Genin Heinrich, Dresden, Dresden, am 17 Juni 1953 (SächsHStA 11857, IV2.13 Nr. 6). They 
actually referenced Mittedeutschlandrundfunk, which had been absorbed by Berlin radio.  
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is likely this information stemmed from a rumor. 154 In Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz 
workers had continued to discuss the alleged the various fates (death, arrest, abdication) 
of party leadership to the extent that the Party Secretary of the BPO countered these 
“baseless” rumors over the factory radio system, suggesting that functionaries here 
recognized the pervasiveness of improvised news.155  
It seems that no locale was immune to rumor. Rumors also swirled in Oberschule 
West in Dresden. Here, students claimed that the regime had fled, the Russians had 
attacked the Germans, striking was now permitted and democratic rights had been 
introduced, that the Russians had used bloodhounds, and that Otto Nuschke had left.156 
Only the last bit of information had some truth to it: Nuschke had indeed been 
apprehended at the West German border in Berlin—as reported by RIAS at 3:00 P.M.157 
At the trade school in Dresden a rumor circulated that Otto Nuschke had fled to the West 
and Walter Ulbricht had been shot.158 The latter was a persistent (false) rumor appeared 
elsewhere in the June 17 reports. Similar rumors circulated at the schools in Görlitz. 
Erika Morgenstern, a schoolgirl in Görlitz remembered the superintendent storming into 
her classroom and telling students to collect the portraits that hung on the walls. “Should 
these images be thrown away?” she wondered, “but these were the holiness of the 
GDR?”159 In Meißen, party officials found themselves dealing with “enemy activity” that 
spread a number of rumors: war was just around the corner (a potentially true rumor); the 
                                                 
154 See Schlosser, Cold war on the Airwaves, Chapter 5.  
155 “Betr.: Protestversammlung der Werktätigen im Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz anlässlich der 
Normenerhöhung,” Vp.- Amt B an den Chef der BDVP Dresden, VP – Inspekteur Huhn, ND (SächsHStA 
23/18 Bl.233). 
156 “Informationsbericht: Hoch, Fach- und Oberschulen,” Freie Deutsche Jugend, Bezirksleitung Dresden, 
Sekretariat, Dresden, den 17.6.1953 (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.12 Nr. 10). Nuschke was indeed forced into 
West Berlin by the demonstrators against his will. 
157  See http://www.17juni53.de/karte/berlin_2.html.  
158 Ibid. 
159 Lange and Roß, 17. Juni 1953, Zeitzeugen Berichten, 176. 
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regime had fled or been neutralized in some fashion or another (this could be construed 
as correct, at that moment), and that the Americans had already mobilized, presumably in 
preparation for a GDR invasion (false). The later rumor (or hope)—that help from the 
Americans was imminent—also appeared in Görlitz, when a crowd assembled in front of 
the town hall, one of the chants called for the regime to open the western border because 
the Americans were “with them.”160  
Local and national information, appearing as rumors to some, and good news to 
others, even penetrated the walls of the prison in Bautzen. Two prisoners remembered 
sympathetic guards keeping the prisoners abreast of the strikes in the capital as the 
construction workers in Berlin protested the norms: “I could hardly believe 
it…something was up, here we go!” he recalled thinking.161 But it was not clear exactly 
what, aside from a chance for a revolution and it seemed likely that in such a case, the 
Americans would have to intervene. Beck recalled that messages reached the inside of the 
prison on June 17 and informed inmates that the “uprising had spread throughout the 
larger cities in the GDR and even, to some degree, the provinces.”162 News that probably 
stemmed from RIAS broadcasts continued to make its way to the prisoners. By now, the 
guards allegedly stood “on the side” of the prisoners and news continued to detail what 
had become a national uprising, with prisons stormed in Cottbus and protestors fired 
upon in Berlin. Beck recalls wondering how the Allies would react: were they willing to 
risk starting a war? Another prisoner remembered little in the way of sounds from the 
                                                 
160 “Informationsmeldung- Bezirkinspektion Dresden, den 17.6.1953,” Zentral Kommission für Staatliche 
Kontrolle (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.12 Nr. 8). 
161 Lange and Roß, 17. Juni 1953, Zeitzeugen Berichten, 289: “Kaum zu glauben! Endlich-jetzt passiert 
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uprising from outside the prison walls, but rumors circulated throughout the prison. For 
others, the sound of tank treads signaled something was up.163 That evening, inmate 
Hans-Georg Güntzel claimed to recall that prisoners could hear the chants of 
demonstrators calling for freedom. The next morning, prisoners noted that rumors 
continued to swirl through the prison.164 Such rumors—partly true, partly false—would 
continue to beleaguer the SED throughout the following weeks and draw more attention 
from party officials. 
 
Re-writing Revolution: Banners and Placards 
Despite the quasi-makeshift nature of the June 17 events, the methods by which 
demonstrators communicated revolution and power reveal that some protestors probably 
anticipated a public demonstration. This happened in several different ways. The first 
resolutions and lists of demands found inspiration, if not their content, in the demands 
aired in Berlin. Banners and leaflets appeared from the early morning hours, through the 
events of June 17, and into the following week (which will be discussed in chapter five). 
Finally, the destruction of SED slogans, banners, and insignias represented another way 
in which protestors demonstrated power.  
The lists of demands, which had their origin in Berlin, emerged in a number of the 
workplaces in the Dresden region. Subversive, anti-SED ideas that originated as rumors 
and whispers made their way into written form as workers became aware that a local and 
national movement had begun to unfold. As dissidents hoisted or distributed their 
messages, they also continued, as noted in several cases already, to tear down the signs 
(and images) of the SED. These actions, of course, did not go unnoticed by the regime.  
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Written or printed materials appeared early Wednesday morning in a number of 
places, suggesting that at least some East Germans arrived at work with a revolutionary 
mindset and the intent to follow the script from Berlin and protest the regime. Often these 
materials reflected the slogans aired in Berlin over RIAS and expressed by residents in 
the days after the communiqué aired. As early as six in the morning on Wednesday the 
police in Görlitz had come across residents with placards printed using India ink. The 
posters called for a reduction of the workers’ norms, free elections and the removal of 
Grotewohl’s “criminal regime.”165 By seven o’clock, a fifty-centimeter poster hung in 
that town’s post office urging the “People to fight for truly free elections” and the 
removal of the Ulbricht clique.166 
Banners represented another method by which demonstrators publically 
communicated demands for change and connect with, and motivate, other demonstrators 
and potential protestors. Little evidence exists as far as when demonstrators created the 
banners. In their review of the situation that unfolded in Bautzen at Ifa-Phänomen Zittau, 
district leadership tried to pin anti-regime banners that appeared on June 17 on a young 
man known for his anti-Soviet attitude.167 The demands became the slogans of the event 
and participants claimed to easily recall those decades later. “I can still remember the 
banners,” noted one resident in Dresden [Frank R. M.], “We Sachsenwerkers [the 
Sachsenwerk workforce] demand a retraction of the heightened norms” and “down with 
the Ulbricht regime.”168 Workers at the Sachsenwerk and Abus grounds had drawn up 
                                                 
165 [illeg.] Polizei Kreisamt Görlitz, Amtsleiter, Görlitz den 27.6.53 an die Bezirksbehörde der Deutschen 
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166 Ibid.  
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other banners that morning calling for German Unity, freedom, “Ulbricht to the gallows,” 
and “down with Grotewohl.”169 A number of protestors at the Postplatz carried placards 
that called for new elections and those that held such signs, according to one witness, also 
called for representatives to appear in public and answer questions.170 The construction 
factory on Grunaer Street joined the protests and its workers carried banners that called 
for a general strike.171 The scenes were similar elsewhere. In Görlitz the workers carried 
banners thinking the workers of Berlin. They demanded that the HO prices be lowered 
40%, that immediately all-German elections take place, that the Oder-Neisse border be 
abolished, and that the KVP and the regime be abolished.172  
While one analysis by the regional leadership office in Dresden noted that 
surprisingly few leaflets appeared, quite a few letters threatening functionaries had been 
sent, especially in Görlitz.173 Other reports suggest that handwritten leaflets had been 
found containing death threats to local functionaries. Leaflets at MTS Taubenheim 
reportedly called for a “return to fascism” (though this could have been a call for a range 
of more innocuous things) and removal of the hated state-run Konsum stores.174 Meißen 
appears to have been an exception to the rule regarding leaflets. Police records note that 
the “enemy” attempted to incite the population through the spread of inflammatory 
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pamphlets that had been typed up and posted on advertising columns in the city spreading 
rumors concerning leadership and the collapse of the GDR.175 
 
Party Badges 
Dresdeners’ removal of their party badges represented the emblematic destruction, 
or even a reversal, of the SED’s essential political community. Removing one’s badge 
appears to have been a popular form of protest on June 17 and records and eyewitness 
reports suggest that the number of East Germans who removed their regalia was 
significant. On her way to the park, Hannelore had picked up a red SED badge, known 
colloquially as an “existence badge.”176 Later she showed the badge to another woman in 
the park, who pointed out that she had found three such badges already: “They are 
throwing away their existence.” Hannelore remembered thinking that perhaps the GDR 
was at its end, and everything was changing.177 One comrade in the city of Dresden 
noticed that workers who had gone to work as comrades, were suddenly no longer 
comrades and a large portion of the workers had removed their party insignias.178 
Eyewitness Hans Hundhausen recalled that as the streetcars came to a halt, demonstrators 
called on passengers to join the protest and several comrades ripped off their party 
badges.179 This is partially confirmed by an SED situation report that the next day, 
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Dresdeners were overheard discussing the “hundreds of Party badges that remained [on 
the ground] at the Postplatz.”180  
 
Solidarity in the Airwaves  
In the evening, as the demonstrations waned, Western observers and transmitters 
continued to endow the June 17 demonstrations with national imaginings. The FRG for 
instance, called for, “all of us [to] stick together, without differences of political opinion, 
until we reach the great and common goal.”181 While some commentators, either 
mistakenly or as a sort of shorthand, continued to refer to the day’s events as 
predominately a Berlin event, the messengers intended to reaffirm an imagined 
community of all Germans. Furthermore, while listenership is impossible to determine 
with any precision, RIAS’ longstanding popularity and the tumultuousness of the day 
meant that in all likelihood, a good number of Dresdeners tuned in that night.182 
Shortly thereafter, at 20:19 and 20:57, RIAS broadcasted to East Germans the 
speech of Ernst Reuter (mayor of Berlin), speaking at a solidarity demonstration in 
Vienna. Listeners heard Reuter note that, “no power on earth can hold the German people 
permanently in bondage…we are determined to reach our goal…of national unity.”183 In 
the next hour RIAS broadcasted solidarity demonstrations held by the DGB and the SPD 
in West Berlin. The station stressed, too, that the demonstrations had unleashed strong 
feelings of sympathy for the GDR demonstrations along with a keen interest to learn of 
                                                 
180 “Situationsbericht des Genossen Kempt,” SED 8. Stadtbezirk, Dresden, Den 18.6.53, K/Sch 
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what happened in the “free world.”184 RIAS also used the opportunity to position June 17 
as a significant international event in the Cold War, noting that President Eisenhower 
argued the day represented an “extremely momentous event” and a “demonstration of 
communist lies.”185 The station passed on to East Germans that night that an American 
Senator (Alexander Wiley) considered the demonstrations a “symptom of general unrest 
in the communist sphere of control.”186  
RIAS also repeated some of the broadcasts from earlier in the day. One comrade 
in Löbau, the factory foreman, noted to party officials that he did not usually listen to 
RIAS, but that on the evening of the seventeenth he tuned into hear the reports of the red 
flag being torn from the Brandenburg Gate. “I also heard that some police have come 
over to the side of the demonstrators because they were fed up with it all,” he declared, 
“It was really a factual report because you could hear the ruckus on the street, cars 
honking and so forth.”187 The preference for RIAS broadcasts as sources of (trusted 
information) and the lack of faith in GDR news sources, along with rumors and 
misinformation, would continue to beleaguer the SED in the coming weeks. This is the 
subject of the next chapter.  
 
 
 
                                                 
184 “17.6. rk Abgeordentenhaus – Demonstrationen” Approx. screen 330 (DRA Potsdam, B203-00-
02/0001). 
185 Ibid.: “äusserst bedeutsames Ereigni;” “Beweis für die Lügen der Kommunisten.” 
186 Ibid.: “ein Symptom der allgemeinen Unruhe im kommunistischen Machtbereich.” 
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Conclusions 
 While historians are fond of mentioning the ways in which revolution sweeps 
across space like “wildfire,” an examination into the June 17 demonstrations reveals that 
the diffusion of revolutionary ideas unfolded more quickly than anyone could have 
anticipated. In this way, the June 17 events represented a new type of demonstration, 
wherein mass media broadcasted the story in real time and mass demonstrations could 
unfold simultaneously, but not necessarily “spontaneously,” throughout a nation state. 
While historians like to point to the “signal effect” of RIAS, the station also mobilized 
the GDR’s citizenry, stimulated protest-minded conversations in the rival public sphere, 
and provided the revolutionary script. RIAS programming also endowed the 
demonstrations with national imaginings by broadcasting declarations of solidarity. 
Workers and residents listened to radio broadcasts the evening of the sixteenth or tuned in 
Wednesday morning. So-called whisper campaigns, private workers’ meetings, and 
discussion groups that formed in the streets served as places individuals to share 
knowledge or debate politics. In these spaces, individuals shared knowledge of the 
situations and deliberated courses of action. Public spaces became spaces of appearance, 
where individuals, through collective action, openly criticized the regime. Demonstrators 
attempted to connect with other demonstrators through radio—successfully in Görlitz. In 
Dresden, efforts to commandeer the telegraph building failed, though the Stadtfunk 
briefly fell into the hands of protestors. While some historians have argued that RIAS 
created and controlled the narrative of the demonstrations, the prevalence of rumors and 
misinformation indicate that this was certainly not always the case, at least as events 
unfolded. One can be certain, however, that RIAS essentially turned what might have 
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been a localized event in Berlin into a nationwide demonstration, full of national 
imaginings.  
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Chapter Five 
 
 The Embers of Unrest 
 
 
 
“Our press represents an instrument of power, but we must correctly exploit this 
instrument of power.” 
 
-The Socialist Unity Party in Dresden, a week after the demonstrations1 
 
 
Though public spaces had been largely cleared of demonstrators by 18 June, the 
situation remained tense in Dresden. Tanks rumbled through the city and parked in 
strategic places, often outside factories where workers occasionally went on strike.2 
Soviet troops occupied and regulated other strategic points of transmission, exchange, 
and assembly such as bridges, the telegraph bureau, and the Postplatz.3 Soviet 
motorcycles lined the perimeter of the Zwinger, another area that demonstrators had 
occupied the day before.4 But witnesses remember that a relative calm quickly fell over 
the region and as party symbols resurfaced—for example, a bust of Stalin in a 
classroom—the SED appeared to regain its footing. Students recalled that classes 
resumed after a couple days, although instructors avoided discussing recent events. One 
witness described the scene on the streets and in the city squares as normal, aside from 
the occupation.5 Still, in the days and weeks following the demonstrations, protest 
continued, if not in the streets, then through the airwaves and by hearsay and ephemeral 
public exchanges in spaces difficult for the state to regulate. Thus the rival public sphere 
                                                 
1 “Lagebericht vom 24.6.53 – 10,30 Uhr,” SED Kreisleitung Dresden Stadt, Abt. P.u.M, Parteiinformation 
Dresden, den 24.6.53 (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.54): “Unsere Presse stellt ein Machtmittel dar, 
aber wir müssen dieses Machmittel richtig auswerten.” 
2 Lange and Roß, 17. Juni 1953, Zeitzeugen Berichten, 372-4, 376. 
3 Ibid., 373-4.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid.  
235 
 
and the popular opinion it generated continued to undermine and challenge the regime in 
a variety of ways. 
This chapter re-examines the rival and official public spheres and assess their 
roles in the aftermath of the demonstrations. In the weeks following the June 17 
demonstrations, the status and future of the GDR and even the entire Soviet satellite 
system appeared to many to hang in the balance. In this way, the aftermath of June 17 
mostly supports the historical axioms that wars, revolutions, and mass upheavals rarely 
have tidy endings. While governments, media, and military authorities on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain announced or recognized that the nation-wide public demonstration had 
been extinguished nearly as quickly as it had detonated, the situation, as popularly 
conceptualized, often appeared in flux and it seemed that for the time being, the SED had 
been outflanked—with the aid of foreign broadcasting—by an ascendant public. Thus the 
first part of this chapter examines how, through the rival public sphere, participants, 
witnesses, and commentators publicly communicated protest and imagined communities 
of support after the June 17 demonstrations. These communities of support had an 
international dimension, bringing to light the polarized political situation, centered, not 
for the last time, in East Germany. The second half of the chapter will show that the SED 
pushed back by communicating stability and  representing through the official public 
sphere its own imagined communities of support, domestic and international, to enhance 
its legitimacy. Taken together, the evidence presented here amounts to a case study of the 
intersection of distinct Cold War nationalism and internationalism, modern mass 
politicking, and the power of public opinion in divided Europe.  
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Part One  
 
The Rival Public Sphere 
 
 
The Popularity of News Sources 
  In the weeks after June 17, reports from the regional governments to Berlin noted 
that RIAS’s audience throughout the GDR continued to expand, with some listeners now 
even letting the broadcasts blare out of their windows. For example, in the town of 
Werdau (not in the Dresden Region), officials noted that whereas RIAS had previously 
been listened to privately, it could now be heard in public.6 June 17 also emboldened East 
Germans to publicly criticize the regime: consider for example the factory leader who on 
June 18, tuned into RIAS, cranked the volume up for all his co-workers, and announced, 
“Listen to this, the party bigwigs are driving cars while we push bicycles.”7  
 One reason for RIAS’s sustained popularity rested with the weakness of the 
official public sphere, which, in the eyes of many, failed to reflect popular opinion and 
did not deliver credible news. Furthermore, the SED came to the realization that it did not 
have its finger on the nation’s pulse in the wake of the June 17 events.8 Indeed, Berlin 
received reports from every regional office that the population became increasingly more 
likely to dismiss the reporting from domestic radio and press as phony news in the weeks 
                                                 
6 “Betrifft: Situationsbericht aus den Konsumgenossenschaften der DDR zu dem Kommuniqué des 
Politbüros und den Beschlüssen der Regierung vom 17. bis einschließlich 20.6.1953,” Kurt Preikschat, 
Berlin, 22.6.1953 im Verband Deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften e.G.m.b.H. an das ZK der SED, 
Abteilung Information (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 IV/2/5/544 Bl.127). 
7 “Neue feindliche Aktionen und Gerüchte,” Nr.8 Berlin, den 24.6.1953, Rauchbach (SAPMO-BArch DY 
30 IV/2/5 547 Bl.125): “Guck mal, die Bonzen fahren mit dem Auto und wir müssen die Fahrräder 
schieben.” 
8 See for example, “Bericht an das Sekretariat über die Geschlossenheit, Aktivität und Kampfkraft die die 
Partei entwickelte, zur Zerschlagung der feindlichen Aktion.” Abt. Leitende Organe Dresden, den 20.6.53 
(SächsHStA 11857 IV/2/12/009).  
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after June 17.9 In Dresden, in one instance, the party found itself forced to send a 
delegation from a factory to Berlin for clarification on the political situation as they 
refused to believe the official GDR broadcasts.10 Other East Germans blamed East 
German programmers’ decision to play serious music when they simply wanted 
something lighter—which forced them to tune in to RIAS.11 Some listeners complained 
that the foreign broadcasters delivered news quickly while the GDR’s stations lagged 
behind.12 These negative assessments of GDR programming persisted through at least 
mid-July (and probably thereafter), prompting one functionary from Görlitz to write, 
“They [the residents] still say the programming [of GDR radio] has not really changed, 
and it is no wonder that people listen to RIAS.”13 
 The SED’s press fared little better in the aftermath of June 17 and incurred similar 
criticism that found its way back to the regime. On June 19, residents bought up all the 
copies of newspapers, reportedly ripping them from the hands of the sales people to the 
extent that the district asked for extra copies of Neues Deutschland.14 As the regime 
chose not to address the demonstrations on June 18, this likely presented locals the first 
opportunity to see what their government had to say about recent events. Dresdeners 
                                                 
9 “Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Fragen aus den Berichten der Bezirke vom 25.6.1953,” Abteilung 
Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganisationen, Berlin, den 25.6.1953 (SAPMO-BArch DY30 
IV/2/5/547).  
10 Staatliche Organe, Dresden, am 18.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 IV 2.13 Nr. 6). The factory was IFA-Werk II 
in Seifhennersdorf. 
11 “Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Erscheinungen aus den Berichten der Bezirksleitung vom 
28.6.1953,” Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und der Massenorganisationen, Berlin, den 29.6.1953 - 
(SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/547 Bl.183); Bezirksleitung Dresden, Gen. Kröger, 2.7.53, 11:50 Uhr, 
(SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.99). 
12 “Informationsbericht,” Nationale Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, Bezirkausschuss Dresden, 
14.7.53 (SAPMO-BArch DY6 5006).  
13 “Agitationsbericht für die Zeit vom 10.7. bis 16.7.1953. SED Betriebsparteiorganisation – EKM 
Görlitzer Maschinenbau VEB,” Görlitz, dem 16.July, 1953 (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.9.01 Nr. 40 Bl.55): 
“Zum Funk wird noch gesagt, dass er sein Programm noch nicht wesentlich geändert hat und sich keiner 
wundern soll, wenn einer RIAS hört.” 
14 Bezirksleitung Dresden, Genn, Elli Schmidt, 19.6 (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/535 Bl.57). 
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criticized the narratives postulated by their local press, which tended to localize and 
diminish the event. Some complained, for example, that the local press reduced the 
geographic scope of unrest to Dresden and Görlitz while ignoring demonstrations that 
had unfolded in the counties.15 Other condemnations centered on the press’s 
misrepresentation of the current state of affairs and government’s lack of a “connection” 
with workers and rural populations alike. Workers in Transformatorenwerk complained 
about Neues Deutschland’s assertion that “All [East Germans] stood united behind the 
regime;” a dubious claim that proved the regime continued to “whitewash” the situation 
through the official public sphere.16  
The weaknesses in the domestic press meant that Dresdeners, like those in other 
regions, tended to rely on the rival public sphere instead, which of course included news 
from RIAS. Reports from regional authorities to leadership in Berlin noted that in every 
county in the Dresden region RIAS continued to gain listeners.17 Officials in 
Dippoldiswalde confirmed that residents often listened to RIAS and believed the 
reports—a potentially serious problem in their minds. After all, the SED had concluded, 
and not entirely incorrectly, that RIAS had given the signal for the demonstrations to 
begin, and the peace that settled over Dresden could again be shattered should RIAS set 
things off once again. “It is indeed ‘peaceful,’ but one gets the feeling that some are 
merely waiting for a signal to start rioting,” noted one official.18 The belief that the 
                                                 
15 Ibid.  
16 “Lage im Bezirk Dresden,” Telefonische Durchsage BL Dresden (Gen. Wurzbacher), 25.6.1953/17.20 
Uhr/Aufgenommen: genn. Arnold (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.75): “Das ganze Volk steht 
geschlossen hinter der Regierung”; “Schönfärben” – a term that occurs frequently in this context.  
17 “Bericht über den Instrukteur Einsatz im Bezirk Dresden von 7-11 Juli,” Instrukteure Gründen und 
Köhler, Berlin, den 14.7.1953 (SAPMO-BArch Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, DY 6/5006).  
18 “Sondereinsatz für ZK-Berichterstattung,” Kreis Dippoldiswalde, 10-16 Uhr- Gen.Peter, 22.6.53 
(SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.0.01 Nr. 38 Bl.61): “Es ist zwar alles ‘ruhig,’ man hat aber den Eindruck, dass 
einige nur auf ein Zeichen warten, auch mit Unruhen zu beginnen.” 
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demonstrations could and should and might continue, although they had their origins in 
rumor rather than RIAS despite what SED functionaries believed, proved problematic for 
party leaders. In sum, the weakness of the domestic media organs and the strength of 
RIAS together represented a serious threat to the regime’s tenuous hold on public 
tranquility and its ability to regain its political footing. 
 
RIAS’s Interpretation  
RIAS established the popular version of events. The station characterized the 
demonstrations as spontaneous, which became a keyword to designate the event as one 
that represented genuine or authentic protest, rather than the orchestrated demonstrations 
staged by a government.19 On the evening of June 17 and during the days after, RIAS 
continued to frame the demonstrations as popular uprisings motivated by nationalism 
(based especially on the desire for reunification) and a spirit of revolution that reached 
across the GDR and cut across class lines. As the demonstrations had waned in the 
evening of June 17, RIAS had reiterated that, contrary to what SED officials might try to 
promote, reports had streamed in from cities throughout the GDR where citizens had 
demonstrated.20 Interviews with West German political leaders punctuated conversations 
that noted, “the last two days of demonstrations are a grave reminder to the entire world 
that the German Question demands an answer sooner rather than later.”21 On June 18, 
RIAS had broadcasted a commentary by Egon Bahr that continued to reinforce the 
national imaginings that the station had conferred on the June 17 demonstrations. Taking 
                                                 
19 “Der Aufstand der Arbeiterschaft.” See especially pg. 16, “Kommentar,” Egon Bahr. See also the 
evaluation from Matthias Walden (pg. 17-18) which attacks the SED’s claims. 
20 Nachrichten. alt. mat. 18.6/ko. (DRA Potsdam B203-00-02/0001 S.26). Precise time not noted.  
21 Ibid., “Die Demonstrationen der letzten zwei Tage seien zugleich eine ernste Mahnung an die gesamte 
Welt, die Deutschland -Frage einer beschleunigten Lösung zuzuführen”  
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stock of what had transpired the previous day, he stated: “What people in the West had 
probably considered impossible: the working class and people from all strata of society 
demonstrated on their own will. They demonstrated not only against the norms and high 
cost of living [in the GDR], but for something else, too—for their reunification with the 
rest of Germany, for freedom.”22 RIAS also portrayed the demonstrations as a moment 
when residents of the GDR became aware of their ability to effectively test state power: 
“The people have measured their strength against the regime,” claimed the station, “the 
workforce and the masses are aware of their power. They’ve handed the SED the biggest 
defeat of its existence.”23 In the coming weeks, SED functionaries would find themselves 
contending with an active and hostile public sphere despite their efforts to prevent 
dissident exchanges, notably by jamming RIAS and prohibiting public assembly. 
  Dresdeners, and other East and West Germans who tuned in to RIAS between 
7:20 and 7:30 AM on June 18 heard the program “Berlin Speaks to the Zone” transmit 
the sentiment of citizens and governments in the Federal Republic and Western Europe 
where special editions of newspapers reportedly flew off the presses to tell the story of 
June 17. Likewise, they heard that declarations of solidarity for the demonstrators came 
out of the various West German workplaces in telegraph and telephone exchanges. One 
notable trait of broadcasts is the tendency of the commentators to concentrate on the 
Berlin demonstrations, though this seemed to have little to no effect on listeners’ opinion 
                                                 
22 “Der Aufstand der Arbeiterschaft,” 15: “Was wohl kaum jemand im Westen für möglich gehalten hat: 
die Arbeiterschaft und sich anschließende Menschen aus allen Bevölkerungsschichten haben aus eigenem 
Willen demonstriert. Demonstriert nicht nur gegen die Normen und die hohen Lebenshaltungskosten, 
sondern für etwas, für ihre Vereinigung mit dem übrigen Deutschland, für die Freiheit.” 
23 “Der Aufstand der Arbeiterschaft,” 16: “Die Bevölkerung hat ihre Kräfte mit dem Regime gemessen. Die 
Arbeiterschaft und die Bevölkerung sind sich ihrer Kraft bewusst geworden. Sie haben die SED die größte 
Niederlage seit ihrem Bestehen zugefügt.” 
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that June 17 represented a national event.24 And at the same time, RIAS just as often 
noted that the demonstrations took place throughout the “Soviet Zone of Occupation” so 
listeners probably merely considered Berlin the epicenter of events.25 Regardless, RIAS 
transmitted a Cold War nationalism based on empathy and reunification that dominated 
the airwaves before, during, and after June 17. RIAS noted “the sympathy expressed by 
those in the Federal Government, and the parliament of the German Trade Unions 
Federation for the [East Germans’] struggle for freedom.”26 The station broadcasted that 
leaders in Stuttgart passed a resolution that looked to foster human rights in the GDR: 
“The Parliament from Baden-Wuerttemberg salutes in this hour of hardship, those who 
fought for freedom as citizens…in East Berlin and the entire eastern Zone.”27  
 On the morning of June 18, RIAS reported to listeners throughout East Germany 
that an “exceptionally strong echo” reverberated throughout through the world’s media 
and that the GDR dominated the headlines of the world’s press as it had done during the 
blockade.28 The June 17 demonstrations constituted an international media event and a 
sympathetic community of support transmitted public opinion from European and other 
western nations. RIAS broadcasted western communications, sympathies, and reactions 
to the June 17 demonstrations, which represented a distinctly modern and international 
public sphere that challenged the SED’s version of events and the SED’s claims of 
popular support. RIAS described similar scenes throughout Europe where citizens 
                                                 
24 In an interview years later, station director Gordon Ewing noted how much this upset him. 
25 “Sowjetische Besatzungszone” Recall that one tactic employed by RIAS to undermine and challenge the 
legitimacy of the SED included referring to the GDR as “die Zone” or the “Pankower System,” among 
other monikers. 
26 “Der Aufstand der Arbeiterschaft,” 12: “Die von Bundesregierung und Bundestag und vom Deutschen 
Gewerkschaftsbund bezeugte Sympathie für den Freiheitskampf der Ostberliner und der 
Sowjetzonenbevölkerung wurde im Laufe des gestrigen Tages” 
27 Ibid., 12: “Die Volksvertretung von Baden-Württemberg grüßt in dieser schweren Stunde die um ihre 
Freiheit als Staatsbürger und schaffende kämpfende Bevölkerung in Ostberlin und der Gesamten Ostzone.” 
28 Ibid., 12: “Außerordentlich starkes Echo” 
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consumed news that told the story of East Germans’ courage. For example, the station 
reported to listeners that in Holland, the nation’s largest daily newspaper, the socialist 
Het Vrije Volk (A Free People) reported as early as Wednesday afternoon what had 
unfolded in Berlin. Copies of the paper reportedly “sold out in a heartbeat.”29 RIAS 
reported to listeners in the GDR that radio stations dedicated the largest part of its nightly 
news broadcast to the demands for freedom heard in Berlin and East Germany.30 News 
transmitted by outlets in the United States also found its way into Dresdeners’ homes via 
RIAS. “As in Europe the public is focused on the events in East Berlin,” the station went 
on to report that “Radio and TV stations reported intermittingly in several minutes on the 
newest developments in the Soviet Zone.”31 At noon, RIAS reviewed the opinions 
published in the foreign press.32 “Western Europe and the entire world will never be the 
same,” proclaimed the New York Herald Tribune, while RIAS broadcasted the New York 
Time’s commentary which suggested that “the German people will not tolerate 
oppression forever.”33  
 
Making Connections to Women in the GDR 
 RIAS also aimed to create an imagined bond between West and East German 
women in particular by airing the program “Women’s Voices” (“Stimme der Frau”). “In 
these hours we women of West Berlin and the entire free world feel bound especially 
closely with you,” noted the commentator who also stated that “Your husbands and sons, 
                                                 
29 Ibid.: “im Nu vergriffen.” 
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid., 13: “Wie in Europa konzentrierte sich auch in den Vereinigten Staaten das Interesse der 
Öffentlichkeit auf die Ereignisse in Ostberlin. Rundfunk und Fernsehsender berichteten in Abständen von 
wenigen Minuten über die neueste Entwicklung im Sowjetsektor.”  
32 Ibid., 14. 
33 Ibid., 14: “Westeuropa und die ganze Welt werden niemals wieder so sein wie vorher; Das deutsche Volk 
wird Unterdrückung nicht ewig dulden.” 
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and not least, yourselves, have demonstrated against the power that has repressed you for 
years.”34 The station also framed the prior day’s event as a decisive moment when 
women publically announced “where they really stood.”35 West German public opinion 
found transmission inside further commentary by the (female) secretary of the (West) 
German Salaried Workers Union (Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft), who told East 
German women that the organization called on them to “have faith!”36 The program 
noted that they had received word via telegraph that afternoon that the women of West 
Germany were aware of the difficulties and oppression faced by women in the Soviet 
Zone and that they stood ready to take all necessary steps to assist and help those in the 
GDR.37 Another female commentator from the FRG told listeners that the demonstrations’ 
power became evident to her as she read the stories in newspapers. Referring to the 
public actions that unfolded in cities she concluded: “here’s to our courage for 
solidarity.”38  
 
News in Neighboring States 
 In some ways the demonstrations foreshadowed the political events leading up to 
the fall of the Wall in 1989, as the idea of change swirled through the satellite states 
behind the Iron Curtain. Officials in these nations had to deal with this problematic 
information that trickled in through unofficial conduits with care. News of the East 
German demonstrations represented an existential threat to communist party leaders 
behind the Iron Curtain where according to commentators, this news, a concoction of 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 13: “In diesen Stunden fühlen wir Frauen Westberlins und der ganzen Welt und besonders eng mit 
Ihnen verbunden. Ihre Männer und Söhne und nicht zuletzt Sie selbst demonstrieren gegen eine Macht, die 
seit Jahren unterdrückte.” 
35 Ibid., 13: “wirklich stehen” 
36 Ibid., 13,  
37 Ibid., 13. 
38 Ibid., 14: “Auf unseren Mut zur Solidarität!” 
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rumor and foreign broadcasting, typically “spread like wildfire.” 39 On June 18, Czech 
police, for instance, had begun to take precautions against the “provocations” in the 
neighboring GDR.40 The Czech government noted that news had quickly spread into the 
country and some “reactionary elements” and “entrepreneurs” had quickly become 
convinced that the time had arrived for privatization.41 Officials identified the source of 
this news as “Voice of Free Europe” (so probably either Voice of America or Radio Free 
Europe), which had been broadcasting the “most senseless speeches.”42 Indeed, the news 
of unrest in the GDR spawned a number of rumors in Czechoslovakia, one of which held 
that revolution had seized Germany.43 In Poland, state security aimed to prevent unrest in 
the GDR from spilling into their state. At least one report (on June 19) suggested a 
storyline similar to the one constructed by SED authorities: that imperialist agents and 
spy circles from the U.S. and West Germany would attempt to foment unrest, particularly 
in former German territories and Upper Silesia.44  
 
Rumor in Dresden  
 Evidence of the widespread circulation of rumors helps explain Heidi Roth’s 
contention that the Dresden region achieved a higher level of rebellion than elsewhere in 
the GDR, as her study does not analyze public opinion as I do here. As rumors and 
improvised news regarding June 17 swirled through the Eastern Bloc in the weeks and 
months after the demonstrations, so did speculation about events in these neighboring 
                                                 
39 FRG Ministry for All-German Questions, It Happened in June 1953, 3.  
40 See June 30, 1953, Current Intelligence Bulletin by the CIA’s office of Current Intelligence (SC No. 
07069, Copy No. 84), as reproduced in Ostermann, Uprising in East German, 1953, 237, note 136. 
41 Ibid. 237. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid., 238-40. 
44 Order from Polish Minister of State Security of regional Branches Outlining Steps to be taken to Limit 
Spillover of Events in East Germany, 19 June 1953, Warsaw, 19 June 1953 Ministry of State Security No. 
AC-R-1022/53, translated in Ostermann, Uprising in East Germany, 1953, 241. 
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states circulated in public conversations in Dresden, prolonging revolutionary fervor. 
Once again, we can explain these phenomenon as “imaginative works built out of social 
materials,” that help us understand how residents in the GDR, at least in the Dresden 
region, conceptualized the world around them in a turbulent and confused situation.45 As 
noted in previous chapters, rumors regarding unrest, rebellion, and revolution in these 
areas helped create a more volatile situation in Dresden before the uprising and probably 
after, too.  
 Indeed, improvised news that circulated in the rival public sphere exaggerated the 
state of unrest in Dresden, the GDR and the East Bloc states. Locally, the Young Pioneers 
spread the news that the Americans would soon arrive in downtown Dresden and that the 
Red Army had supposedly been driven from the northern part of the GDR (not true). 46 In 
some towns in the Dresden region, residents discussed revolts that had begun in Hungary 
(not true), as refugees from that state who now supposedly began arriving in the GDR 
(not until 1956).47 At least in the Dresden region (and once again, this is probably due to 
geographic proximity), functionaries overheard residents throughout the region 
discussing what they believed to be a revolutionary situation in Czechoslovakia: there 
were reports of numerous dead in different cities, including Prague, which was said to be 
in flames and rumors that along with the Skoda Automotive works, an automobile factory 
that burned as unrest continued to spread.48 The unrest here had ended weeks prior. In 
                                                 
45 Ewing, Rumor, Diplomacy and War in Enlightenment Paris, 11.  
2014. 
46 “Mitteilung von Bautzen, gute Arbeitsmoral,” Staatliche Organe, Dresden am 18.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 
IV/2.13 Nr. 6).  
47 “Lagebericht der Bezirksleitung Dresden vom 22.6.1953 2.35 Uhr.” 
48 “Betrifft: Situationsbericht aus den Konsumgenossenschaften der DDR zu dem Kommuniqué des 
Politbüros und den Beschlüssen der Regierung vom 17. bis einschließlich 20.6.1953,” Kurt Preikschat im 
Verband Deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften e.G.m.b.H. An Das ZK der SED Abteilung Information, 
Berlin, den 22.6.1953 (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/544 Bl.127). 
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Pirna residents demanded that the press and radio of the GDR address this development.49 
Here, residents discussed the causalities there and asked for the newspapers to publish 
information about this.50 Residents in Freital believed an event similar to that of June 17 
had transpired in the CSR and that 800 had died (an exaggeration, but not entirely 
untrue).51 In Löbau, residents claimed according to a “completely reliable source” that 
airplanes were transporting the wounded from Prague and Warsaw to Dresden 
(unconfirmed).52 In towns along the Elbe River, residents wondered about the veracity of 
the information circulating about Czechoslovakia as they had heard bathing in the river 
was forbidden, because after all, rumor had it that corpses had been floating downstream 
from Prague (highly unlikely).53 In other towns, functionaries noted that residents 
believed Warsaw was now engulfed in flames.54 That the functionaries labeled such 
claims as rumor also speaks to the polarization of news, and thus reality, at the time.  
 These rumors, along with RIAS news stories, prompted listeners to imagine 
themselves as part of an international rebellion whose adherents both commiserated in 
their oppression (those in the West who kept them in their thoughts) and joined them in 
the struggle (the eastern bloc residents rumored to be in revolt) for liberation. This 
created a dangerous situation for the SED and thus the week of June 17 became an 
                                                 
49 “Betrifft: Situationsbericht aus den Konsumgenossenschaften der DDR zu dem Kommuniqué des 
Politbüros und den Beschlüssen der Regierung vom 17. bis einschließlich 18.6.1953,” Berlin, den 
20.6.1953, Kurt Preikschat im Verband Deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften e.G.m.b.H. Berlin w.8., 
Stresemanns. 128 an das ZK der SED Abteilung Information (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/544 Bl.121). 
50 “Betrifft: Situationsbericht aus den Konsumgenossenschaften der DDR zu dem Kommuniqué des 
Politbüros und den Beschlüssen der Regierung vom 17. bis einschließlich 20.6.1953.” 
51 Information vom Rat des Bezirkes, 1.40 Uhr, Staatliche Organe, Dresden am 19.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 
IV/2.13 Nr. 06). 
52 “Aus dem Bericht der Bezirksleitung Dresden u.a. wie hervor,” Simon: 22.6.1953, 15.45 (SAPMO-
BArch DY 30 IV/2/5/553): “ganz sicherer Quelle” 
53 “Bericht über die Lage am 4.7.53,” BL – Dresden – Genn.Schulz, 17.00 Uhr (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 
IV/2/5/553 Bl.120). 
54 “Aus dem Bericht der Bezirksleitung Dresden u.a. wie hervor,” Durchgegeben: Gen. Hoffmann, 
Aufgenommen: Genn. Olia 22.6.1953, 15.45 – Simon (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 IV/2/5/553). 
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important moment in GDR history as the SED realized just how weak its efforts to 
communicate with the masses had been. 
 
The Continuation of Dissent 
  While mass political action in the streets dissipated after June 17, protest activity 
continued throughout the GDR in the form of workers’ (anti-communist) resolutions, 
leaflets, rumors, various forms of rabble-rousing (Hetze), letters that threatened officials, 
and, of course, more rumors. While leaflets and other forms of written protest had been 
rare on June 17, they increased in the weeks afterwards and challenged the regime’s 
legitimacy and authority. One should also note that this time lag probably reflects the 
very modernity of the event, as radio broadcasts that shaped the demonstrations largely 
outpaced the ability of demonstrators to produce written communications, though they 
certainly appeared on June 17.  
Resolutions from workers’ meetings continued to serve as a form of expression in 
the rival public sphere. On June 18 and 19, workers in the region continued to hold 
private meetings where they drafted, read, and dispatched letters demanding various 
actions by the regime. For example, in Radebeul, workers called on the SED to lift the 
state of emergency, arrange for all-Germany elections, and release the prisoners taken on 
June 17.55 Nearby workforces gathered and drafted similar lists of demands that they then 
forwarded to the regime. In the countryside on June 19, officials discovered leaflets that 
read: “Our general strike must continue until the political prisoners are free; until the 
regime is removed from power, free elections are introduced. If we don’t succeed the 
                                                 
55 “Resolution,” Das Gewerkschaftskollektiv Rapido Radebeul an die Regierung der DDR Berlin. 18.6.53 
(SächsHStA 11859 Nr. 140).  
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party big wigs win and our sacrifice will have been in vain.”56 Polish authorities shared 
information with their East German counterparts regarding leaflets that appeared near the 
border suggesting that the GDR was the intended target for the balloons that carried them. 
One such leaflet supposedly read: “Through this leaflet we pronounce our slogans, we are 
known throughout the entire world, in Germany, in Russia, etc. Down with communism, 
fight the Party and socialism. Pass this on and take action. More leaflets to follow.”57  
 In Dresden and other cities including Berlin, Magdeburg, and Potsdam, residents 
argued that the strikes were not over yet and a general strike was still to come. In Dresden, 
some contended that the regime had only changed course to calm down the population 
and that the money to keep up such programs simply did not exist.58 Indeed, one of these 
seemed to be a popular belief that the seventeenth had merely been the opening salvo in 
what was to be the eventual destruction of the regime.59 Although Heidi Roth and others 
note that work stoppages continued sporadically for some time throughout the GDR, the 
Dresden region had, more or less, gone back to work in the week following the 
demonstrations. But workers still continued to publically criticize the regime by forming 
discussion groups and composing resolutions that they then forwarded to local or national 
authorities. 
                                                 
56 “Tel. Durchsage von der Bl. Dresden am 19.6.53 um 19 Uhr, Aschwemmer/Wagner (SAPMO-BArch 
DY30 IV/2/5/535 Bl.56.): “Unser Generalstreik muss weitergeführt werden, bis die pol. Gefangenen frei 
sind; bis die Regierung abgesetzt ist, freie Wahlen durchgeführt sind, Wenn wir nicht durchhalten, siegen 
die SED Bonzen und unsere Opfer sind umsonst.” 
57 “Mitteilung der Bezirksleitung Dresden vom 22.6.53 030 Uhr” (erhalten vom Operativsstab Zittau) 
Genn. Büsner Reitz (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 IV 2/5/553 Bl.1): “Durch dieses Abzeichen geben wir unsere 
Parole, wir sind in der ganzen Welt bekannt, in Deutschland, Russland usw. Nieder mit dem 
Kommunismus, Kampf gegen die Partei und Sozialismus. Gebt dieses Flugblatt von Hand zu Hand weiter 
und handelt danach. Weitere Flugblätter folgen.” 
58 “Neue feindliche Aktionen und Gerüchte,” Berlin, den 24.6.1953, Rachbach. (SAPMO-BArch DY30 
IV/2/5/547 Bl.25). 
59 Dresden, 22.6.53, 6:40 Uhr, Franzski/Wagner (SAPMO-BArch DY30/IV/2/5/553 Bl.17). 
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 Authorities charged with surveying the public mood took stock of the general 
attitude and conversations held by residents. Confusion still reigned in places, they found, 
and at least one worker claimed to have heard radio reports of the regime’s demise, 
declaring in response “It’s high time the regime is gone.”60 More typically, general 
reports noted that many expected the New Course to be put in place quickly and in an 
“un-bureaucratic manner,” so that faith in the regime could be restored.61 In some places, 
such as in the countryside around Dresden and in Freital, officials noted that many 
workers refrained from discussing politics, which the report suggested likely stemmed 
from fear of arrest.62 In general, the population appeared to profess little faith in the 
regime and officials noted that it seemed like supposed party members had been working 
more for the enemy than the regime might have previously thought.63 Central to the 
argument here, a report from June 24 that noted that the local population was less 
concerned with the recent decrees of the Central Committee and the most recent 
resolutions of the regime, and more concerned with the events of recent days and the 
“rumors spread by enemies.”64 Even almost two weeks later, officials commented that the 
population remained critical of the regime and especially the sentiment that the regime 
had no real connection to its citizenry as lowly party members got lost in the 
                                                 
60 “Betr.: Bericht über die durchgeführte Kontrollfahrt in den Stadtbezirken Coswig und Weinböhla.” 
KPKK Meißen an das Sekretariat, im Haus, 18.6.53. (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.4 Nr. 06 Bl.81): “Es würde 
die höchste Zeit, dass die Regierung weg ist.” 
61 Dresden, 22.6.53. 6.40 Uhr Freitag, Franzski/Wagner (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV 2/5/553 Bl.17).  
62 Ibid.  
63 “Lagebericht vom 24.6.53-10.30 Uhr,” SED Kreisleitung Dresden Stadt Abt. P.u.M, Parteiinformation, 
Dresden, den 24.6.53. (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV 2/5/553).  
64 “Bericht über die Stimmung der Bevölkerung zum Beschluss der 14 Plenums des ZK sowie den 
Beschlüssen der Regierung - Dresden, Bericht über die Lage im Bezirk,” Dresden, 24.6.53 – 17:30 Uhr 
(SAPMO-BArch DY 30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.63). 
250 
 
paperwork.65 In other words the regime lacked a true democratic connection, a feeling 
shared by one worker in Gröditz who argued that “we have a dictatorship from above, not 
a dictatorship of the proletariat.”66 This repeated the criticism of the SED explored in the 
run-up to June 17, that the party had become distant, not to mention corrupt and bankrupt.  
 If our digital-age contemporaries refer to a story (or any such item transmitted 
electronically) that spreads rapidly and widely as something that “goes viral,” then the 
stories, true or not, surrounding the event of the June 17 proved hardy and potentially 
dangerous contagions that further threatened an already weakened regime. Indeed, 
improvised news, whether totally fabricated or mostly accurate, found a place in official 
SED records in Berlin. Thus, the participants in the rival public sphere gained a unique 
form of indirect political participation.  
 
Desire to re-create the Space of Appearance 
One particularly resilient, and for the SED distressing, rumor in the days and 
weeks after the uprising was popular view that another massive demonstration lurked just 
around the corner.67 This represents a larger theme running through this study that East 
Germans desired to reestablish contact with what they imagined—especially now owing 
to June 17—as a vast community of dissidents.  
Already during the afternoon and evening hours of June 17, protestors in the city 
of Dresden had openly called for the demonstrations to continue the next day, as did 
workers in Kamez, who had planned intra-factory demonstrations for 10:00 A.M. on June 
                                                 
65 “Betr.: Bericht über die durchgeführten Mitgliederversammlungen, Belegschaftsversammlungen usw.” 
Durchsage der Bezirksleitung Dresden, 30.6.53, 11,45 Uhr Genn. Hoffman/Klauder (SAPMO-BArch 
DY30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.89).  
66 Ibid.: “Wir hatten keine Diktatur des Proletariats, sondern Diktatur von oben.” 
67 This is an idea that the public abandoned, but the SED did not. 
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18.68 Sometimes workers spoke only of further demonstrations to support the workers in 
Berlin, while a number of rumors proclaimed that a sort of Sorelian general strike would 
commence the following day. In the town of Kamenz, for instance, word had already 
arrived at the central leadership in Dresden on June 17 that another demonstration for 
June 18 had been planned under the slogans “free elections” and “lowered prices.”69 In 
the village of Großenhain, rumor spread in one factory that workers in Wismut had 
formed a marching column and headed toward Dresden, where they would topple the 
local party regime.70 Reports appeared Sunday, June 22, that on the following day 
workers in a number of larger factories in the region (Elbtalwerks, Pirna Sachsenwerk NS 
und Kunstseidenwerk Siegfried Rädel, Kreis Zittau at the Phänomen Werk) would 
resume strikes if political prisoners were not released.71 Such rumors also appeared in 
Dresden and Sebnitz (Sachsenwerk Radeberg).72 It seems that some residents were 
willing to at least attempt to take matters into their own hands; on June 23, for example, 
“unknown elements” called the Fernmeldeamt and informed them that the strike in 
Dresden was to begin at 2:30.73  
Reports from regional governments throughout the GD around June 25 noted 
rumors of a renewed general strike expressed the sentiment that the revolution had not yet 
                                                 
68 Bezirksleitung Dresden 22.15 17.6.1953 Rachbach (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/535); Bezirksleitung 
Dresden, 18.6.53 3.40 Uhr (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/535). 
69 Ibid.  
70 Bezirk Dresden, Genossin Schwemmer; Angenommen: Genn. Barth. 20.6.1953, Müller, 1.05 Uhr 
(SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/535). 
71 “Lagebericht der Bezirksleitung Dresden vom 22.6.1953 2.35 Uhr Durchgegeben,” Genn. Büsner - 
aufgenommen: Genn. Reitz, Lage um 22.Uhr. Bl.2 (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/553). 
72 “Bericht über die Lage im Bezirk Dresden am 22.6.53,” SED Bezirksleitung Dresden, 23.6.53 – 
Reimann, Um 6.45 Uhr (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.32).  
73 “Neue feindliche Aktionen und Gerüchte,” 6.23.1953 – 10,55 Uhr (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/547 
Bl.101). This may have resulted from confusion regarding the Trauerkundgebung RIAS broadcasted that 
afternoon—more on this below. 
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ended.74 Dresden was no different. The supposed dates for the new strikes varied by 
region. In one county, a rumor circulated that the general strike would break out on June 
25 and the regime would fall.75 It remains difficult to discern where these rumors started, 
though a report produced by the department of press and radio regarding enemy radio 
activity on June 27 suggests that NWDR may have been responsible. The report claimed 
that the station broadcasted throughout the GDR that on June 25 in Dresden (along with 
several other cities), new demonstrations were to have taken place. But was the station 
simply passing on a rumor that developed within the GDR and communicated by a 
source? This is more likely.76  
 
Atrocities and National Imaginings  
 In the weeks following June 17, improvised news circulated in the GDR of 
atrocities not only in the GDR, but throughout the Eastern Bloc. It remains unknown 
exactly how many died in the events, but the number is at least 55.77 The situation was 
even more unclear in Dresden in the weeks after June 17, though the public knew that 
there had been death and violence. Officials, for instance, noted one slogan in Para (Riesa 
County): “We won’t forget the blood of workers that flowed on June 17; we’ve long 
since given up on the government.”78 Leadership in Berlin received reports that in some 
counties, RIAS had allegedly spread the “rumor” that Soviet tanks had repressed East 
                                                 
74 “Neue feindliche Aktionen und Gerüchte,” Berlin, den 25.6.1953 (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/547). 
75 “Die Ausdehnung dieser feindlichen Aktionen auf das Gebiet der Republik,” Abt. Leitende Organe der 
Partei und der Massenorganisationen, Berlin, den 24.6.53, (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/547 Bl.138). 
76 “Neue feindliche Aktionen und Gerüchte,” Berlin, den 25.6.1953 (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/547). 
77 “Tote des 17. Juni 1953” at http://www.17juni53.de/tote/recherche.html.  
78 “Bericht über den Instrukteureinsatz im Bezirk Dresden vom 7.-11. Juli,” Instrukteure Gründen und 
Köhler Berlin, den 14.7.1953 (SAPMO-BArch DY 6 5006): “Das Arbeiterblut das am 17. Juni geflossen 
ist, werden wir nicht vergessen, die Regierung haben wir jedoch schon lange vergessen.” 
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German workers (this was true, of course).79 Workers in Dippoldiswalde heard that 
twelve of their colleagues at Wismut had been shot.80 Functionaries in Dresden who had 
been stationed aboard ships traveling the Elbe River overheard discussions of those that 
had been killed in Dresden (there are two known deaths) and other cities, while in the 
countryside around Görlitz residents discussed the alleged massacre of political prisoners 
in a Gestapo-like fashion in Dresden and other cities (this probably did not happen 
though there were, of course, hundreds of arrests).81 Sometimes acts of later protest 
pointed to atrocities. In the week after the demonstrations, young people in Görlitz wore 
white armbands in public, although officials in the area argued these had nothing to do 
with the wounded (their reasoning here is unknown).82 This is part of a general belief in 
Dresden and perhaps elsewhere in late June that rebels had been shot. Understandably, 
East Germans demanded answers. District reports from Dresden to Berlin note, for 
example, that a number of residents from Löbau requested information regarding what 
had happened in Görlitz and other cities. Residents of Bischofswerda, for instance, had 
heard that fifty people had been shot in Dresden (an exaggeration) and sought to learn 
more about events in the regional capital.83 In all, these tales paint a picture of a confused 
scene in which popular sentiment found expression in violent and turbulent tales. At the 
same time the situation reminds us that neither the official public sphere nor the rival 
                                                 
79 “Neue feindliche Aktionen und Gerüchte,” Berlin, den 25.6.1953 (SAPMP-BArch DY 30/IV/2/5/547). 
80 “Neue feindliche Aktionen und Gerüchte,” Rauchbach, Berlin, den 24.6.1953 (SAPMP-BArch DY 
30/IV/2/5/547). For the most up-to-date list of those who died on June 17, see 
http://www.17juni53.de/tote/index.html which offers a biography of each known casualty.  
81 “Lagebericht der Bezirksleitung Dresden vom 22.6.1953 2.35 Uhr,” Durchgegeben: Genn. Büsner – 
aufgenommen: Genn. Reitz., Lage um 22.Uhr,” Bl.12.; http://www.17juni53.de/tote/index.html  
82 “Lagebericht des Bezirkes Dresden – 18.00 Uhr,” Bezirksleitung SED Dresden, 22.6.1953 – Simon. 
(SAPMO-BArch DY 30 IV/2/5/553). 
83 “Bericht über die Stimmung der Bevölkerung zum Beschluss des 14 Plenums des ZK sowie den 
Beschlüssen der Regierung.” Dresden, Bericht über die Lage im Bezirk, 24.5.53 – 17:30 Uhr. (SAPMO-
BArch DY 30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.61). 
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public sphere had a monopoly on truth or totally controlled the story of the June events. 
Alternative news concerning atrocities, factual or not, only added to the SED’s growing 
list of items that would require political attention. 
 As perhaps the most famous non-official in the June 17 story, West Berlin 
resident Willi Göttling achieved notoriety among communist officials and provoked 
sympathy among West and East Germans alike. Göttling demonstrated with East 
Berliners on June 17 before East German police arrested him in the early afternoon.84 
Sentenced to death by the Soviet Military Commander of East Berlin, General Dibrowa, 
for organizing the provocation that had taken place, radio reported that his execution took 
place on June 18.85 GDR officials also transmitted news of the sentence by leaflet in 
Dresden, though with presumably different intentions and the expectation of different 
reactions.86  
 RIAS used Göttling’s execution to emphasize, in its words, the all-German 
“solidarity” evident in the demonstrations, noting that this word probably seemed 
“suspect” to listeners in the Zone: “How often has the East German regime spoken of 
solidarity [in the past],” stated an evening report, “how often has this word sounded 
absurd…. Solidarity cannot be commanded,” the station continued, “genuine solidarity 
manifests itself in a spiritual bond…and it’s been a pleasure to report to you [East 
Germans], such demonstrations of solidarity that were not organized by any 
government.”87 The SED, according to RIAS, had been calculating the construction of 
                                                 
84 “Willi Göttling, 14.4.1918 - 18.6.1953, hingerichtet am Nachmittag in Ost-Berlin an unbekanntem Ort,” 
http://www.17juni53.de/tote/goettling.html.  
85 Ibid.  
86 “Bericht über die Lage im Bezirk Dresden am 22.6.53,” SED Bezirksleitung Dresden, Reimann, 23.6.53, 
Um 6.45 Uhr (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.32). 
87 “Berlin spricht zur Zone,” Hauptabteilung Politik, Nr. 1022, Sonnabend, den 20 Juni, 1953, 19.40-20.00 
Uhr (DRA Potsdam Mikrofilm F0055): “Und nun ein Wort zu den Solidaritätsaktionen….Wie oft hat das 
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solidarity based on “mere words,” rather than active aid, and proclaiming solidarity based 
on artificial compassion, rather than authentic connections.88 The family of Willi Göttling, 
since his recent execution, had become a beneficiary of such genuine solidarity, receiving 
aid, according to RIAS broadcasts, from supporters within hours of his execution.89 
While it remains a bit unclear why the SED helped publicize Göttling’s execution, the 
SED-issued leaflets circulating in Dresden proclaiming that all workers found the death 
sentence justified suggest that the SED aimed to drum up and publicize support for his 
death sentence.90 At least some residents in the Dresden region disagreed after coming 
across the leaflet, claiming to authorities that it would have made more sense had General 
Dibrowa been shot.91 
 In addition to the continuous reports of West German solidarity demonstrations 
broadcast from RIAS, the station helped East Germans collectively and subversively 
mourn the victims of June 17 as part of an imagined community with the West. The 
obsequies and moments of silence (Trauerfeiern and Gedenkpausen) that paid respect to 
the victims of June 17 created moments of national and international imaginings, 
transmitted to all Germans. On Tuesday, June 23, between 3:00 and 3:46 P.M., RIAS 
broadcasted the demonstration of sorrow from Rudolph-Wilde-Platz in Berlin-Schönberg 
to memorialize the victims of the June 16 and 17 demonstrations.92 A contribution from 
                                                                                                                                                 
Regime von Solidarität gesprochen, wie oft hat es dieses Wort ad absurdum geführt….Solidarität aber kann 
nicht befohlen, kann nicht erzwungen werden. Wirkliche Solidarität…sich nicht in sentimentalem 
Mitgefühl oder Mitleid, sondern in einer geistigen Verbundenheit….Es ist eine angenehme Pflicht, von 
Solidarität-Kundgebungen zu berichten, die keine Behörde, keine Organisation zu veranlassen brauchte” 
88 Ibid.: “bloßen Worten” 
89 Ibid.  
90 “Bericht über die Lage im Bezirk Dresden am 22.6.53 – Feindargumente und Feindtätigkeit,” SED 
Bezirksleitung Dresden, 23.6.53, um 6.45 Uhr (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.32).  
91 Ibid.  
92 “Der Aufstand der Arbeiterschaft.” Rudolph-Wilde-Platz was re-named Joseph-F.-Kennedy-Platz in 
1963. The U.S. president gave his “ich bin ein Berliner” speech here. 
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the program Zeit im Funk described the previous week’s uprising in heroic, national 
terms, noting that the “uprising of the entire German population [of the GDR] had 
claimed victims.”93 The number of demonstrators murdered by the Volkspolizei or the 
Soviet Standgerichte remained, according to the commentator, unknown at that point, but 
the moment had arrived for Germans to pay their last respects.94 Tens of thousands West 
Berliners converged on Rudolph-Wilde-Platz, forming a “sea of people.”95 Konrad 
Adenauer spoke and paid tribute to the unknown demonstrators: 
 Our hearts are full of sorrow as we think of our dead, those deceased, who 
gave their blood for freedom—whose blood was spilled by a brutal and 
cruel ruling regime, in order to preserve their reign of tyranny. Millions of 
Germans mourn with us and so do those [people] in other lands, who 
despise slavery and love freedom…. From a wave of unrest at the 
construction site at Frankfurter Allee came a tremendous wave of anger, 
the desperateness, that spread over the entire region, over East-Berlin, 
over Magdeburg, Brandenburg, Leipzig, Chemnitz, Dessau, and Gera, 
over the area of the uranium mining sites, through the population of the 
countryside in Saxony and Mecklenburg—it moved through the entire 
Soviet Zone….The entire German people behind the Iron Curtain have 
called on us not to forget, and we swear to them in this solemn hour: we 
will not forget. We will not rest—I pledge this for the entire German 
people—until they again have freedom, until all of Germany is again 
united in peace and freedom.96 
 
                                                 
93 Ibid. pg. 35.: Dieser Aufstand des ganzen deutschen Volkes im Sowjetsektor und der Zone hat Opfer 
gefordert. 
94 Ibid.  
95 Ibid.: “Meer von Menschen” 
96 “23. Juni 1953: Ansprache bei der Trauerfeier für die Opfer des Aufstandes vom 17. Juni vor dem 
Schöneberger Rathaus in Berlin,” available online, http://www.konrad-
adenauer.de/dokumente/reden/ansprache-berlin. “Unsere Herzen sind von Trauer erfüllt, da wir unserer 
Toten gedenken, der Toten, die ihr Blut dahingaben für die Freiheit, deren Blut von brutalen und 
grausamen Machthabern vergossen wurde, um ihre tyrannische Herrschaft aufrecht zu erhalten, Mit uns 
trauern Millionen Deutscher, mit uns trauern alle in anderen Ländern, die die Sklaverei hassen und die 
Freiheit lieben....Aus einer Welle der Unzufriedenheit an der Baustelle in der Frankfurter Allee wurde eine 
ungeheure Woge der Erbitterung, der Verzweiflung, die über das ganze große Gebiet, über Ost-Berlin, über 
Magdeburg, Brandenburg, Leipzig, Chemnitz, Dessau und Gera, über das Gebiet des Uranbergbaus, über 
die Landbevölkerung in Sachsen und Mecklenburg, wie überhaupt über die gesamte Sowjetzone 
hinwegging….Das ganze deutsche Volk hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang ruft uns zu, seiner nicht zu 
vergessen, und wir schwören ihm in dieser feierlichen Stunde: Wir werden seiner nicht vergessen. Wir 
werden nicht ruhen und wir werden nicht rasten - diesen Schwur lege ich ab für das gesamte deutsche Volk 
-, bis auch sie wieder Freiheit haben, bis ganz Deutschland wieder vereint ist in Frieden und Freiheit.”  
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Jakob Kaiser, Minister for All-German Questions, and West Berlin mayor Ernst Reuter 
spoke thereafter. The crowd sang Guten Kameraden, which rang from the square, and 
thanks to RIAS, “out into the world.”97 The moment, noted RIAS, “was recorded and 
carried on, to Magdeburg and Chemnitz, to Schwerin and Görlitz, to Frankfurt and 
Dresden.”98 At the border between the two Germanys, the song would be intercepted at 
the “hermetically sealed” border, thanks to the “merciless” martial law put in place by the 
Soviet military commanders.99 Still, the station stated that, “here too, the song would be 
heard—the song that accompanied the victims of June 17 on their final journey.”100 At 
that moment, Germans in the east and west simultaneously listened on the radio to those 
in attendance share moments of silence and song. Certainly, it would be difficult to 
envisage a scene more beset with national imaginings.101  
 In the Dresden Region, it is challenging to estimate just how many workers or 
individuals remotely took part in the RIAS-led national mourning demonstration as most 
listeners probably did this in private. Thus, evidence is scant, though general listenership 
levels would suggest that a significant number of Dresdeners had their radios tuned in for 
the broadcast. Also, SED officials did occasionally note when workforces listened to 
RIAS for these moments of silence. In Niesky, for example, we know workers 
simultaneously took part in a sympathy demonstration for the victims of June 17 on June 
                                                 
97 “Der Aufstand der Arbeiterschaft”: “hinaus in die Welt.” The song is also known as “Ich hatt’ einen 
Kameraden.” 
98 Ibid.: “wurde aufgenommen und weitergetragen, nach Magdeburg und Chemnitz, nach Schwerin und 
Görlitz, nach Frankfurt und Dresden.” 
99 Ibid.: “hermetisch abgeriegelt”; “erbarmungslos” 
100 Ibid.: “Aber es wurde auch hier gehört – das Lied, das die Opfer des 17. Juni auf ihrem letzten Weg 
begeitete [sic].”  
101 See Anderson, Imagined Communities, 7-10. 
258 
 
23 at 3:00.102 And at the leatherworks in Zittau, the RIAS Trauerkundgebungen blared 
from the communal radio, despite the presence of the factory workforce leadership.103 A 
similar situation occurred at VEB Fortschritt, where authorities noted that a moment of 
silence was held for the “so-called victims” (in SED parlance) of June 16 and 17.104 At 
the Feinmaschinenbau in Dresden, officials recorded a moment of silence for the victims 
of June 17.105 And on June 22 in Riesa, workers had discussed a sympathy strike based 
on the “commemoration hubbub,” which authorities noted, they prevented from 
occurring.106 For those who did listen, the broadcasted mourning demonstration 
transmitted a moment of national and international imaginings that contributes to our 
understanding of the role of nationalism and June 17, 1953. 
 Ten days later on July 3, RIAS broadcasted that the Bundestag was to meet and 
consider a proposal that would officially proclaim June 17 as the “Day of National 
Unity.”107 On August 7, the Bundestag made the resolution law, and June 17 became the 
official “Day of German Unity” until 1990.108 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
102 “Neue feindliche Aktionen und Gerüchte,” Berlin, den 24.6.1953, Rachbach. (SAPMO-BArch DY30 
IV/2/5/547 Bl.25).  
103 “Bericht über die Kreisparteiaktivitagung in Zittau am 24.6.1953,” Referent im Auftrage der SED 
Bezirksleitung Dresden: Genosse Walter Vogt, FDGB Bundesvorstand, Sektorenleiter kulturelle 
Massenarbeit. (SächsHStA 12465 Nr. 463 S.2).  
104 “Weitere feindliche Aktionen und Gerüchte” (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/547 Bl.165): “die sogenn. 
Opfer” 
105 Abschulßanalyse über die Ereignisse des 16., 17., 18.6.1953 in Dresden (SächsHStA 12465 Nr. 454). 
106 “Tagesbericht der Bezirksleitung Dresden,” BL Dresden, Durchgegeben von Genossin Hoffman; 
Aufgenommen vom genossen Franzki, BL Dresden (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.23): 
“Gedenkrummels Westberlins” 
107 “RIAS Nachrichten, 7.3.1953 8.30 h,” Staatl. Rundfunk-Komitee Abt. Information (SAPMO-BArch DY 
34 Nr. 19006 Bl.452): “Tag der deutschen Einheit” 
108 “Law on the Day of German Unity” from the ‘Federal Law Gazette’ Part I, No. 45 of August 7, page 
778,”  FRG Ministry for All-German Questions, It Happened in June 1953, 55. 
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Public Opinion in July and August 
 Public polling conducted by DIVO- Gesellschaft für Markt- und 
Meinungsforschung m.b.H., Frankfurt am Main, the German survey organization under 
contract with the Reactions Analysis Staff of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany-
Office of Public Affairs sheds some light on the thoughts of East Germans following the 
June 17 events.109 These results should be read with caution because they reflect the 
views of interviewees who had fled to the Federal Republic from the GDR and such 
individuals may have been more likely than the average East German citizen to hold a 
negative view of the GDR and a positive view of the West. The institute conducted these 
interviews between August 6 and August 15 at three food distribution points in West 
Berlin and interviewees represented all regions of the GDR.110 Most East Germans 
showed up at these food distribution points after learning of the program through RIAS 
announcements and 75% of those surveyed knew that the food came from the United 
States. The majority of these participants felt that the food represented humanitarian 
concerns rather than political gamesmanship.111 So while problematic (though what 
survey is not?), these statistics offer some insights into the general, national public 
opinion that can be weighed against rumor and the “official” public opinion in the GDR 
and the Dresden Region.  
 East Germans including those from Saxony and the Dresden region, were, by and 
large, pleased with the way the West acted with regard to the June 17 demonstrations. 
Only 23% of East Germans polled felt that the West had acted incorrectly. Residents of 
                                                 
109 “East Zone Views on the June Riots, Food Aid, and Current Political Issues,” Report No. 185, Series 
No. 2, August 27, 1953, HICOG 185, U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research and Analysis: Research 
Reports on German Public Opinion, 1949-1962 (NARA RG 306, A1 1005, Box 5). 
110 Ibid. The West provided food aid for East Germans after the demonstrations—mostly in Berlin.  
111 “East Zone Views on the June Riots, Food Aid, and Current Political Issues.” 
260 
 
the Saxon region (from a sample of 67 cases/interviews) largely (76%) felt that the West 
had done nothing wrong. This probably meant that the United States they had not acted 
incorrectly, raising hopes or choosing not to intervene before or during the Uprising. This 
is likely related to the popular opinion found in the surveys that two-thirds of East 
Germans interviewed felt that the demonstrations (referred to as riots in the study on this 
occasion) had achieved positive results. Again, a sample from the Saxon region (140 
cases) found that 75% of the interviewees—this is 5-10% above average when compared 
with the other four areas in the GDR—felt June 17 had achieved some positive outcomes. 
While reference to what these positive results constituted is not broken down by region in 
the survey, interviewees argued that the demonstrations provided a referendum on the 
SED that allowed or encouraged the population to become more outspoken (35%). 
People also became more hopeful (16%) that the government would have to be more 
willing to accommodate demands in the future, that consumer goods would receive more 
attention, and that the world now understood what East Germans thought (5% of 876 
cases divided almost evenly between males and females).112 A majority (63%) of the 
interviewees felt that nothing had gotten worse since June 17, which perhaps suggests 
that a good number of East Germans believed the political landscape remained far from 
settled. 
  
                                                 
112 Ibid, 4. 
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Part Two 
Representing Publicness 
 
 In the wake of the June 17 events, the SED looked to reestablish its authority 
while coming to terms with the failures and shortcomings of its media outlets. First, the 
media in the GDR broadcasted, at least in the days immediately following the 
demonstrations, a message of peace and order. Additionally, the SED hastily put together 
a public relations campaign whereby the imagined GDR community, represented by the 
SED—and at the time quite obviously in tatters—would be reconstructed in several ways. 
These included: 1) constructing an official storyline for what had occurred on June 17 
that painted the demonstrations as the work of outsiders; 2) publicizing domestic and 
international communities of support; and 3) attempting to re-establish, through mass 
media, a connection with the citizenry of the GDR.113 As one party secretary noted in the 
aftermath of June 17, “Our press represents an instrument of power, but we must 
correctly exploit this instrument of power.”114 Indeed, the realization that the party had 
indeed failed to use the press to its fullest extent became a focal point for the regime in 
the months after June 17.  
 
The SED’s Interpretation (X-Day) 
 While RIAS and other western commentators branded June 17 as a country-wide 
demonstration with popular support that stemmed from national imaginings and disdain 
                                                 
113 Heidi Roth’s survey of the official demonstrations that followed June 17 examine events in Leipzig, 
which unfolded similarly to those in Dresden (see Roth, 17 Juni 1953 in Sachsen, 410-413). For her survey 
of the mass-political work see pgs 414-30, wherein she  again primarily focuses on Leipzig with little 
discussion of mass media and the international and national dimensions of the situation. 
114 “Lagebericht vom 24.6.53 – 10,30 Uhr,” SED Kreisleitung Dresden Stadt, Abt. P.u.M, Parteiinformation 
Dresden, den 24.6.53 (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.54): “Unsere Presse stellt ein Machtmittel dar, 
aber wir müssen dieses Machmittel richtig auswerten.” 
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for the socialist system, the SED countered by publicizing popular opinion that helped re-
legitimize its rule. One method employed by the SED included crafting a version of 
events that cast demonstrators as outsiders.  
After June 17, GDR radio worked to re-establish the country’s national 
community by presenting demonstrators as foreign agents, sometimes in imaginative 
ways. Thus, at 9:55 in the evening of June 19, Radio Berlin interviewed a woman from a 
publishing house in the city who recounted the events for listeners. She recalled how 
“construction workers” (quotes in original used for inference) rushed to disperse before 
the approaching tanks and one of these “construction workers” lost his construction pants 
because they were too big. As soon as this happened, his “western style” pants under his 
worker garb became visible. This could be explained according to the broadcast, by the 
fact that the American clothing distributor in Berlin had supplied the western agent with 
the wrong size pants. Thus the true identity of June protestors became clear for the 
witness at this moment.115 
 Another explanation offered by the SED over the airwaves for the mass 
demonstrations insinuated that confusion probably led to the sheer number of individuals 
in public spaces. For example, GDR radio interviewed one worker from Hennigsdorf who, 
when asked whether he had taken part in the demonstrations, stated that he was 
discussing events with his colleagues, when someone, from somewhere, called over and 
claimed everyone was taking to the streets to protest for “peace and the like.”116 Thus the 
interviewee and his cohort joined the protestors without actually knowing what the 
                                                 
115 “Zu den Ereignissen vom 16. und 17. Juni 1953 und den dazu erfolgenden Stellungnahmen und 
Maßnahmen,” 7.1.1953 (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 4/2/5/542 Bl.170).  
116 Ibid.: “für Frieden u.ä.” 
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demonstrations were all about!117 While the veracity of the specific story is questionable 
(some individuals probably did get caught up in the confusion of June 17), it shows the 
need of the SED to publicize and represent the existence of its popular support by placing 
the responsibility for the demonstrations on a few bad apples and western agents.  
 In the days and weeks after June 17, GDR radio also attacked RIAS for its 
involvement and distortion of events. On June 21, Radio Berlin broadcasted: 
“X-Day….Western intriguers, under U.S. leadership, had thought the 
moment favorable and had struck at the GDR, since they could no longer 
tolerate its shining example of prosperity, progress and humaneness. The 
spearhead of the fascist adventure, meant to be another Sarajevo, which, it 
was hoped, would touch off a mass attack not only on the GDR, but on the 
Popular Democracies in general, was of course, RIAS, which, throughout 
the demonstrations, steadily issued directives to its agents at work in the 
East Sector, which were composed of Jakob Kaiser and Ernst Reuter terror 
bands trained in the postwar years with the aid of American 
subvention…118 
 
The SED and leadership in Moscow broadcasted a version of events that also attacked 
the Western—above all U.S. and West German—presses at the same time. On June 23, 
Radio Berlin publicized the story that appeared in Pravda describing the West’s 
“propaganda campaign” to obscure and cover up, for the public, what had really 
transpired in Berlin while at the same time the article ignored the national dimension of 
the demonstrations. The Pravda article also noted that the alleged Western plot stemmed 
from the provocateurs’ fear of a peaceful solution to the German question and their desire 
to worsen relations between East and West Germans. This was all quite typical of the 
general approach behind the Iron Curtain.119  
                                                 
117 Ibid.  
118 RIAS News Clippings, Radio Scripts, Magazine Articles 1953, 1/6 (G. A. Ewing Collection, G. C. 
Marshall Foundation, VMI). 
119 Verlesung des Leitartikels aus der Prawda, DDR-Rundfunk. Available at 
http://www.17juni53.de/material/otoene_4.html 
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 GDR radio also claimed on June 24 that demonstrators had, as early as June 13, 
collaborated to outline a plan of attack, though such a meeting does not appear in any 
historical record discovered thus far.120 Still, as discussed in the previous chapter, though 
RIAS did not explicitly call for a mass-demonstration or uprising, this is essentially what 
happened. Also notable here is the SED’s claim that the goal was to destabilize the region, 
which, as we have seen, in popular opinion seems to have actually been the case. The 
station argued that “throughout the night from June 16 to 17, RIAS broadcasted directives 
on positions and meeting places for agents who were sent to the democratic sector.”121 
Such accusations by the SED are invariably dismissed by historians, but deserve a second 
look. As noted in the previous chapter, June 17 represented a new type of mass 
demonstration, supported by radio which, by transmitting a dissident voice into volatile 
spaces did function as an agent of unrest. The SED’s inaccurate claim that there existed a 
vast conspirator network of agents deployed to undermine the GDR reflected the inability 
of the SED (and most nearly everyone else, to be fair) to understand a fundamental shift 
in how a modern protest, aided by modern communications networks, might unfold.122 
 
Crumbling Communities  
In Dresden following the events of June 17, the SED found itself forced to deal 
with an alarming number of individuals leaving the party and party-sponsored 
organizations that formed the building blocks of the socialist state. By June 24 it had 
become apparent to party leadership that comrades had begun to distance themselves 
                                                 
120 Ibid.  
121 Ibid.  
122 “Betrifft: Störungen unserer Frequenzen.” Techn. Direktion, Aktenvermerk, Verteiler: Mr.Taylor, Mr. 
Ewing, Herr Schütz, 22 Juni, 1953 1/8 RIAS Special Reports (G. A. Ewing Collection, G. C. Marshall 
Foundation, VMI).  
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from the party, often choosing not to wear their party insignias.123 Leadership in Sebnitz, 
for instance, noted that a number of party members always claimed that they had lost 
their party emblems or forgotten them at home.124 Functionaries also noted that in several 
counties, including the city of Dresden and Riesa, the Society for German-Soviet 
Friendship was losing members.125 The statistics that came in from the counties began to 
back up these observances. The number of persons officially tallied as leaving the party 
around June 24 included: 
Dresden – City 46 
Zittau 35 
Dresden Countryside 9 
Riesa 12 
Niesky 1 
Görlitz Land 6 
Görlitz Stadt 5 
Sebnitz 14 
Löbau 1 
Bischofswerda 3 
Dippoldiswalde 7 
Kamenz 1126 
 
 Using a small SED sampling from Riesa County we find examples of reasons 
members gave for leaving the party included excuses ranging from health considerations 
to miscommunication and confusion regarding the party’s future plans.127 Following June 
17, communal farmers in the countryside began to leave the LPGs, or at the very least, 
publically declared their intention to leave. For example in LPG Kreckwitz in Bautzen 
sixteen of forty-eight farmers announced their withdrawal from the unit, leading officials 
                                                 
123 “Bericht über die Stimmung der Bevölkerung zum Beschluss des 14 Plenums des ZK sowie den 
Beschlüssen der Regierung,” Dresden, 24.5.53 – 17:30 Uhr (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.61) 
124 KL. Sebnitz, Gen. Kunert , 18.25 Uhr, 22.6.53 Ka/Di (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.9.01 Nr. 38 Bl.59). 
125 “Bericht über die Stimmung der Bevölkerung zum Beschluss des 14 Plenums des ZK sowie den 
Beschlüssen der Regierung,” Dresden, 24.5.53 – 17:30 Uhr. 
126 “Lage im Bezirk Dresden,” Telefonische Durchsage BL Dresden (Gnn. Wurzbacher), 25.6.1953/17.20 
Uhr/Aufgenommen: genn. Arnold (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.75). 
127 Much of this could be tied to the New Course.  
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there to believe that class enemies had been at work, indeed leadership was shocked 
because in the past this LPG had been well supported and already had a radio system in 
place broadcasting the party’s messages.128 That party leaders found their organizations 
losing members and sought at least one quick fix in published propaganda. Consider, for 
instance, the newspaper headline that boasted, “Party-less colleagues strengthen[ed] the 
SED with their entrance into the party of the working class.”129 This type of news became 
part of a larger effort to represent a community of support through the official public 
sphere that demonstrated the regime’s popular support and legitimacy.  
 
Transmitting Stability 
 Whereas RIAS, dissidents, and demonstrators had transmitted the idea of 
revolution and popular protest, the SED’s effort to communicate a state of calm became 
one of the GDR media’s essential tasks in the days following June 17. Internally, the 
regional leadership in Dresden received news from Berlin that the workforces in all 
public institutions and workplaces had returned to their respective jobs and that the 
fascist provocation had been terminated. Regional leadership then transmitted the news 
via telephone to local party secretaries.130 Not until Friday, June 19, however, did the 
local and national media apparatuses began to cover the demonstrations in any depth.  
  Nationally, on June 19, Neues Deutschland proclaimed that workplaces in Berlin 
had resumed normal operations and it was becoming apparent that even those workers 
                                                 
128 “Bericht Monat Juni 1953,” Bezirksparteikontrollkommission Dresden, Dresden, den 13.7.1953 Be/Ko. 
(SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2.4.025 Bl.155). 
129 “Aufruf der größten Granitewerke der DDR,” Sächsische Zeitung, 20 Juni, 1953 (SAPMO-BArch, 
Bibliothek): “Parteilose Kollegen stärken die SED mit ihrem Eintritt in die Partei der Arbeiterklasse.” 
130 Bezirksleitung Dresden der SED (gez. Brosselt) Sekretariat, Mitteilung an alle Genossen 
1.Kreissekretäre, Dresden am 18.6.1953 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2.9.01.40 Bl.7). 
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who had participated in the demonstrations now felt shameful of their actions.131 Even 
those workers at the Stalinallee in Berlin, the origin of the demonstrations, had, after 
lengthy discussions, reportedly opted to begin working again. The local press in Dresden 
echoed the stories of Neues Deutschland, informing local residents that the fascist agents 
had been defeated and that in Berlin, life had “again taken on its normal course.”132 The 
article called on residents to help get the situation back to a normal state of affairs by 
countering those who attempted to incite unrest and supporting the efforts of the 
apparatuses of state power in re-establishing peace. Only in this way could East and West 
Germany be re-united.133 The local news reported that an overwhelming number of 
workers had heard the regime’s appeals, and that even those who had taken to the streets 
on June 17 had done so in a misdirected quest to express their requests to the regime.134 
Out of Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, an epicenter of unrest in Dresden two days prior, 
appeared reports in the Sächsische Zeitung that the “first requests of all honest mates is to 
again carry on working in an orderly manner.”135 The effort to transmit peace continued 
into the next week, with stories of workers distancing themselves from the provocateurs 
and unmasking or arresting foreign agents sent to disturb the peace.136  
 
                                                 
131 “Berlin geht wieder in die Arbeit- Die Werktätigen verurteilen die faschistischen Provokationen,” Neues 
Deutschland, June 16, 1953. 
132 “Werktätiges des Bezirkes Dresden!” Sächsische Zeitung, June 19, 1953 (SAPMO-BArch, Bibliothek): 
“das Leben hat wieder seinen normalen Gang genommen.” 
133 Ibid.  
134 “Den Provokateuren die gebührende Antwort erteilen – Werktätige unseres Bezirkes sagen Ihre 
Meinung – Berechtigte Wünsche so schnell wie möglich erfüllen,” Sächsische Zeitung, June 19, 1953 
(SAPMO-BArch, Bibliothek). 
135 “Einige Lehren an den Vorgängen im Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz,” Sächsische Zeitung, June 19, 1953 
(SAPMO-BArch, Bibliothek): “Die erste Forderung aller ehrlichen Kumpel ist die Arbeit geordnet 
weiterführen” 
136 “Werktätigen bekunden ihr Vertrauen zur Regierung – Sie distanzieren sich von der Faschistischen 
Provokation – der friedliche Aufbau wird fortgesetzt;“ Sächsische Zeitung, June 22, 1953; “Interessen der 
Werktätigen im Mittelpunkt – Mit Provokateuren und Unruhestiftern wollen wir nichts zu tun haben;“ 
Sächsische Zeitung, June 24, 1953 (SAPMO-BArch, Bibliothek). 
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The Propaganda Plan  
On June 21 and 22, in the Dresden Region, officials from the counties along with 
representatives from major workplaces that had experienced unrest met to discuss what 
had transpired. Through such meetings and the reports they produced as well as the 
general self-reflection the SED found itself forced to undergo, party leaders came to 
understand that prior to June 17, the press had no real connection with the workers and 
had been, along with radio, largely ineffective in shaping general support for the regime. 
This predicament was, of course, compounded by RIAS’s continued popularity. The 
party leaders would also come to the realization that they had failed to understand what 
workers actually discussed and what motivated them.137 As the reports from the Regional 
Party Control Commission (BPKK) noted almost one month later, functionaries simply 
did not know the true mood of the population.138 Fixing the problem would require 
“comprehensive and optimistic” campaigning which began in the days after the public 
demonstrated their distaste for the SED’s brand of socialism.139  
 In the month or so after June 17, mass political work became a top priority. 
Previously, such work had been the charge of the Instrukteuren, but now all available 
personnel in each county had been deployed to carry out this extensive task. The primary 
goals included explaining the New Course while publicizing the official version of June 
                                                 
137 “Mitteilungen der 1. Sekretäre der Bezirke über die Lage in der Partei und über besondere 
Vorkommnisse,” 22.6.1953, 18.00 Uhr, Aufgenommen Gen. Kühne – Lenz-Reek Dresden durchgegeben 
Gen. Brotz (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/547); “Teilbericht über Instrukteuereinsatz des Sekretariats der 
Brigade Bauer vom 22.-27.6.53 in Görlitz,” Org.-Instrukteur-Abt., Robert Bauer, Berlin, den 29. Juni 1953 
(SAPMO-BArch DY 34 25111); “Lage im Bezirk Dresden Telefonische Durchsage” BL Dresden (Gnn. 
Wurzbacher) 25.6.1953/17.20 Uhr/Aufgenommen: genn. Arnold (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 IV/2/5/553 
Bl.75); “Tel. Durchsage von der Bl. Dresden am 19.6.53 um 19.00 Uhr,” Schwemmer/Wagner (SAPMO-
BArch DY 30 IV/2/5/535). 
138 “Bericht Juni 1953,” Bezirksparteikontrollkommission Dresden, Dresden, den 13.7. 1953, Be/Ko., 
(SächsHStA11857 IV/2.4. Nr. 025 Bl.164). Bezirksparteikontrollkommission (BPKK). The BPKK replaced 
the Parteikontrollkommission in 1952 and reviewed the behavior of party members and candidates. 
139 Mitteilungen der 1. Sekretäre der Bezirke über die Lage in der Partei und über besondere 
Vorkommnisse”: “umfassenden und optimistischen Agitation” 
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17. All such units received instructions for this mass political work along with weekly 
information from regional party leadership in Dresden concerning the argumentation of 
this program along with the special articles in the press and radio reports. The SED held 
running agitation seminars in which they distributed such information to hundreds of 
propagandists in each location.140 By mid-July, thousands of propagandists would be 
working daily throughout the Dresden Region.141  
 To communicate its intentions, and specifically its meeting on June 21 (14. 
Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED) and the resolutions pronounced therein, the 
Central Committee of the SED employed various methods designed to re-establish and 
represent in the official public sphere its communities of support in national and 
international realms.142 In the week following the demonstrations, the Central Committee 
conveyed these propagandizing tactics to regional leadership for the immediate future, 
calling on all forces to implement the New Course. This tactic, according to Party 
leadership, represented the regime’s most powerful weapon to prevent future 
provocations on German soil. These instructions called for expressions of gratitude for 
the Soviet forces’ intervention, vigilance to identify those who might look to initiate 
unrest; the uncovering of enemies who sought to turn Germany into a “Korea,” and open 
communications between the Party and the workforce. The last program would, for 
example, be realized in a simulated public sphere through GDR radio with the program, 
                                                 
140 “betrifft: Bericht über die Agitationsarbeit seit dem 17.6.1953,” SED Bezirksleitung Dresden Abt. 
Propaganda u.Agitation an Bezirksleitung Dresden, Genossen Subkow, Dresden, 13.7.53. (SächsHStA 
11857 Nr. IV/2.9.01.40 Bl.52).  
141 Ibid. The number was probably well over 10,000. Over 7,000 such persons existed in the counties that 
reported numbers—a group that excluded the city of Dresden, the Görlitz countryside, Meißen, Sebnitz, 
Großenhain, and Zittau.  
142 “Erklärung des Zentralkomitees der SED: Über die Lage und die unmittelbaren Aufgaben der Partei,” 
Neues Deutschland, 23 Juni, 1953. In this meeting the party laid out the official story behind the uprising 
and confirmed the implementation of the New Course that they had announced on June 11.  
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“Workers ask – Propagandists Answer,” that aired in the morning and evening hours. The 
Party also requested that local governments expand existing visual propaganda in the 
cities, villages, and factories.143 In Dresden, the SED printed the resolutions of the 14. 
Tagung, which essentially confirmed the implementation of the New Course and 
condemned the demonstrations in leaflets that the Party then distributed to the counties, 
factories, housing communities, and villages. Posters accompanied the leaflets and those 
factories that published their own newspapers printed extra copies that they circulated 
among workers. Audibly, the loudspeaker systems in factories and towns received and 
broadcasted the declarations of the Central Committee at regular intervals.144  
 On June 18, the Central Committee had sent out a request to all counties asking 
that the regional governments send to Berlin examples of positive declarations and 
resolutions they had received from workforces and residents. The committee further 
requested that all written enemy transmission be sent to Party Information.145 Press and 
radio would publicize these positive declarations from the workforce and elsewhere in 
Dresden with the intention of reaffirming the SED’s imagined communities of support.146  
 The official line included news that, as early as June 17, at least one factory 
loudspeaker system had broadcasted on the hour the resolutions drafted by workers who 
protested against the day’s demonstrations and those who had participated in them. This 
announcement described the demonstrations as “riots” and demonstrators as the 
                                                 
143 Sekretariat - ZK - FS 252 v. 25.6.53 21.00 Uhr (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2.9.01.40 Bl.23).  
144 Sekretariat an alle Kreissekretariate Betr.: Auswertung der 14. Tagung des ZK, Dresden, am 22.6.1953 
(SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2.9.01.40 Bl.21).  
145 “Mitteilung des Zentralkomitees: Durchsage an alle Kreise” 18.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. 
IV/2.9.01.40 Bl.11).  
146 Sekretariat an alle Kreissekretariate Betr.: Auswertung der 14. Tagung des ZK, Dresden, am 22.6. 1953 
(SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2.9.01.40 Bl.21). 
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“mob.”147 Sometimes, workers just wanted their colleagues to start working again. In 
Freital at the Edelstahlwerk, some of the one-thousand-man workforce composed a 
resolution which they requested be played on the loudspeaker, that those who continued 
to strike, even on June 18, resume working.148 Other written resolutions, such as one 
drafted at Stadt-und Kreissparkasse Dresden, placed the authors in the socialist camp in 
the larger Cold War and expressed their anger against the “machinations of the West 
German provocateurs” and their faith in the SED and its ability to prevent war.149 After 
the June 17 unrest, government agencies such as the city council in Dresden drafted 
resolutions reaffirming the faith employees had in the regime’s ability to recognize its 
mistakes while condemning the demonstrators as enemies of the state.150 So, too, did the 
workforces of the Dresden libraries, which in its resolution—a product, so they claimed, 
of “free and open debate”— thanked the majority of the population, the police, and the 
Soviet Occupation Forces that prevented the fascists from starting a third world war.151 
Some workforces transmitted declarations of solidarity or confidence in the regime 
directly to the Central Committee in Berlin via telex, such as the stoneworkers at the 
granite works in Demitz-Thumitz (55 kilometers from Dresden), who proclaimed their 
solidarity and faith with the SED on June 19.152 The party received a number of such 
                                                 
147 Bezirksleitung Dresden, Rauchbach, 17.6.1953, 22.15 (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/535). 
148 Telef. Durchsage der BL Dresden – Durchgeg.: Krautmann, Lipfert/Strehle, 18.6.1953, 18.30 Uhr/19.55 
Uhr (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/535). 
149 “Entschließung,” Stadt- und Kreissparkasse Dresden, Dresden, am 18.Juni,1953, gez.: Grebedünkel; 
SED-Betriebsgr. Piefke; Betriebsleit. Hausmann (SächsHStA 12461 Nr. 461). 
150 “Resolution,” Der Rat der Stadt Dresden, Dresden, 20.6.1953, Betriebsgewerkschaftsleitung 
(SächsHStA 12461 Nr. 461). 
151 “Entschließung” (SächsHStA 12461 Nr. 461): “in freier und offener Stellung genommen.” 
152 Belegschaft 670 Entschließung der Größtengranitwerke der DDR in demitz-puhmitz kreis 
Bischofswerda, Sachsen. Fernschreiber Zentralkomitee der SED Eingangs-FS.v. 19.6.53, 3.30 Uhr, 
Aufgen.: [illeg.] (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/545 Bl.89). 
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declarations, with the press department in Berlin processing examples from around the 
GDR.  
 In the weeks following the uprising, the SED transmitted these types of solidarity 
declarations through the press to re-establish its legitimacy by publicizing an imagined 
community of support. Press stories of the peace that settled over the GDR accompanied 
these declarations of faith in the regime as the SED countered the imagined community 
of dissent so successfully established by RIAS.  
 The regime’s efforts to publicize transmissions of support began within days of 
the June 17 unrest, with the announcement on the front page of Neues Deutschland that 
“A wave of declarations of faith,” or Vertrauenskundgebungen, had reached the 
regime.153 In the large workspaces in the Dresden Region, factory radio systems 
broadcasted workers professing their faith in the regime.154 Declarations of solidarity 
with the regime went out over the domestic airwaves in the late evening on June 19.155 
The party used similar tactics in the local papers to create the impression that popular 
opinion remained on its side. Nationally, Neues Deutschland published stories in which 
workers from around the nation expressed their political support, such as in a cable 
factory in Oberspree. Here, “97-percent of employees worked,” while one of these 
workers declared, “I stand behind the resolutions of our Regime—[the] provocations 
were anti-worker.”156 Other workers opined that the SED had earned the trust of the 
                                                 
153 “Eine Welle von Vertrauenskundgebungen zu unsere Regierung” Neues Deutschland June 20, 1953. 
154 Lagebericht vom 24.6.53 – 10,30 Uhr, SED Kreisleitung Dresden Stadt, Abt. P.u.M., Parteiinformation, 
Dresden, den 24.6.53 (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.54). 
155 “Zu den Ereignissen vom 16. Und 17. Juni 1953 und den dazu erfolgenden Stellungnahmen und 
Maßnahmen.” 7.1.1953 (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/542 Bl.170).  
156 “Wir stehen hinter den Beschlüßen unserer Regierung,” Neues Deutschland, June 20, 1953: “arbeiten 
heute 97 Prozent aller Belegschaftsangehörigen; Ich stehe hinter den Beschlüßen unserer Regierung, diese 
Provokationen waren Arbeiterfeindlich.” 
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workers through its actions while some expressed their approval of the regime’s decision 
to call on the Soviet forces.157  
 The press in Dresden followed this example and ostensibly surveyed the local 
workforces for opinions they could publicize to create the illusion of a community of 
popular support. For example, a lead article in Sächsische Zeitung of June 24 noted that 
“In numerous personal opinions the workers in our region offer the impression that 
because the party openly admitted its mistakes, faith of the population in the 
regime…continues to grow.”158 The reporters here, who had the chance to chat with some 
of the workers at the Transformatoren und Roentgen Werkes Dresden, explained that 
such opinions, that they characterized as “the honest opinion of the majority of our 
workers,” conveyed the messages that workers wanted nothing to do with the 
demonstrators of June 17. But the article also conveyed the observation that workers did 
want the party to concern itself more fully with their needs. Indeed, the Party addressed 
this desire in the second set of resolutions taken up in the fourteenth meeting of the 
SED.159     
 
International Community and Support  
 As RIAS broadcasted declarations of solidarity from throughout the western Cold 
War community, the SED followed suit, with the regime’s media instruments 
representing an international community of supporters in the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern Bloc through the official public sphere. The propaganda instructions for the week 
                                                 
157 Ibid.  
158 “Interessen der Werktätigen im Mittelpunkt,” Sächsische Zeitung, 24 Juni, 1953 (SAPMO-BArch, 
Bibliothek): “In zahlreichen persönlichen Stellungnahmen bringen immer mehr Werktätige unseres 
Bezirkes zum Ausdruck, dass durch das offene Bekennen der begangen Fehler das Vertrauen unser 
Bevölkerung zur Partei der Arbeiterklasse und zur Regierung ständig wächst.” 
159 Ibid.: “Interessen der Werktätigen im Mittelpunkt – Mit Provokateuren und Unruhestiftern wollen wir 
nichts zu tun haben”; “ehrliche Meinung des größten Teiles unserer Arbeiter” 
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of June 29 asked for the local (county) SED leaders in Dresden to consider the 
“continuous revelations” concerning the background of June 17 (more on this shortly) 
and the “effects on the global public.”160 These instructions noted that the destruction of 
the fascist provocation represented a victory for socialist nations and the establishment of 
peace. The regime publicized that the “countless solidarity demonstrations throughout the 
world, and above all those of the Soviet workers, show that the German people are not 
fighting for peace and unification alone.” 161 This all formed a crucial part of the 
propaganda campaign in the summer of 1953 and served to counter the power of the rival 
public sphere.  
This part of the SED’s public relations campaign focusing on a strengthened 
international community played out in the national and local presses. Neues Deutschland 
claimed that despite fascist mercenaries in the GDR, things fell through for the western 
provocateurs because of the Soviet army and the “democratic strength” of the East 
German people. As a result, the German-Soviet relationship had been strengthened.162 
Editors translated Pravda articles that spoke to the “voice of millions of Soviets,” who 
revealed in their speeches and discussions the “powerful growth of the world-wide peace 
movement.”163  
 In Dresden, the editors at the Sächsische Zeitung published a range of articles that 
reinforced Cold War German nationalism and the connections that theoretically bound an 
                                                 
160 “Hinweise für die Kreisleitung zur Ausarbeitung ihrer Argumentation,” 29.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. 
IV/2.9.01.40 Bl.29): “LaufeNeues Deutschland e Entlarvung;” “Wirkung auf die Weltöffentlichkeit” 
161 Ibid.: “Unzählige SolidaritätskuNeues Deutschland gebungen in der Welt, vor allem die der sowj. 
Werktätigen, lassen erkennen, das deutsche Volk im Kampf um Frieden und die nationale 
Wiedervereinigung nicht allein steht” 
162 “Die deutsch-sowjetische Freundschaft wächst und erstarkt,” Neues Deutschland, 30 Juni, 1953: 
“demokratischen Kräften” 
163 “Die Stimme der Millionen Sowjetmenschen (Leitartikel der ‘Prawda’ vom 27. Juni),” Neues 
Deutschland, June 28, 1953: “mächtige Anwachsen der Friedensbewegung in der ganzen Welt” 
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imagined community of citizens on the socialist side of the Iron Curtain. Readers learned 
that, “the entire Eastern Bloc press conveys the firm solidarity of the working classes in 
those nations, which have been conveyed through their letters.”164 Bulgarians learned that 
those forces that worked to shatter the peace grew in proportion to the strength of the 
socialists, while Hungarians learned through Szabad Nep (“A Free People”—the official 
organ of the Hungarian Working People’s Party) that the connection that bonded the 
masses, the state, the party, and the workers demanded constant attention.165 In Budapest 
at the Waggonfabrik – Wilhelm Pieck, the workers drafted a letter in which they vowed 
that the “fascist attack” had affected not only the German people, but all peace-loving 
people.166 The declarations of solidarity went the other way, too. For instance, the SED 
publicized through ADN (and the Sächsische Zeitung) a letter composed by the workers 
in Freital thanking the Soviet workforce for their “brotherly bond” in the struggle against 
fascism. They directed the letter to the workers at the Stalin Automobile Works in 
Moscow: “The solidarity demonstrations of the entire Soviet people give us new power 
and strength in our the national struggle for the establishment of a unified Germany…in 
total confidence of the SED and to the regime the defeated enemies of our democratic 
order will be granted no respite .”167 
 
                                                 
164 “Der 17. Juni – Eine Warnung für alle – Die Ereignisse des ‘Tages X’ im Spiegel der ausländischen 
Presse,” Sächsische Zeitung, 1 Juli, 1953 (SAPMO-BArch, Bibliothek): “Die gesamte volksdemokratische 
Presse vermittelt den Werktätigen ihrer Länder, die in Briefen ihre feste Solidarität mit den Arbeitern der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zum Ausdruck bringen.” 
165 Ibid.  
166 “Budapester Waggonfabrik‚Wilhelm Pieck solidarisch mit deutschen Werktätigen,” Sächsische Zeitung 
7 Juli, 1953 (SAPMO-BArch, Bibliothek). 
167 “Wismutkumpel danken Sowjetischen Werktätigen,” Sächsische Zeitung, 10 Juli, 1953 (SAPMO-
BArch, Bibliothek): “Brüderliche Verbundenheit….Die Solidaritätskundgebungen des ganzen 
Sowjetvolkes geben uns neue Kraft und Stärke in unserem nationalen Kampf für die Herstellung der 
Einheit Deutschlands….Im vollen Vertrauen zur Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands und zu 
unserer Regierung werden wir den geschlagenen Feinden unserer demokratischen Ordnung keine 
Ruhepause gönnen” 
276 
 
Protests and their Transmissions 
Using a trick out of RIAS’s playbook, the SED publicized public protest in 
domestic locales, too.168 The arrangements for such events began during the week after 
June 17 and, it appears without irony, that the SED in Berlin carefully planned out a 
demonstration for Friday June 26. Neues Deutschland, along with GDR radio, announced, 
for example, that a demonstration in Berlin had been scheduled for the afternoon and 
would support the regime’s reform package and its efforts to raise living standards while 
providing evidence of workers’ faith in the regime.169 The official coverage of the 
protests noted that demonstrators filled the streets, chanting “Long live Wilhelm Pieck 
and the GDR” and listened to Otto Grotewohl’s version of X-Day, which recounted 
Western provocateurs in “cowboy pants and Texas-style shirts” who wanted to disrupt 
international developments pertaining to Germany.170 Pieck himself showed up, too, 
along with Wilhelm Zaisser. The article that appeared in Dresden in the Sächsische 
Zeitung noted that despite the pouring rain, 70,000 Berliners took to the streets to show 
support.171  
 Beneath that headline appeared a call for a large-scale youth demonstration on 
July 1 at Karl-Marx-Platz in Dresden. According to the local media in Dresden, five-
thousand youths, including many from the Free German Youth, appeared in the streets on 
Wednesday, July 1 to “express their solidarity with the Party of the working class and 
                                                 
168 For similar examples of such events in Leipzig and Karl Marx Stadt, see Roth, 410-413. 
169 “Am Freitag Demonstration der Werktätigen!” Neues Deutschland June 25, 1953; “Zu den Ereignissen 
vom 16. und 17. Juni 1953 und den dazu erfolgenden Stellungnahmen und Maßnahmen,” 7.1.1953 
(SAPMO-BArch FDGB DY30 4/2/5/542 Bl.170). 
170 Ibid.: “Cowboyhosen uNeues Deutschland Texashemden” 
171 “Trotz strömendem Regen kamen 70,000 Berliner zur Kundgebung,” Sächsische Zeitung, 30 Juni, 1953, 
(SAPMO-BArch, Bibliothek). 
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[the] regime.”172 Of course, one wonders about the true mood of those who demonstrated 
in support of the regime, as the demonstrations, were of course, planned by the party and 
local workplaces. Through “investigative” or internal conversations with the SED’s youth 
leadership from the day of the demonstrations, it became apparent that apathy pervaded 
the organization while conversations with the youth who attended revealed that they did 
not really have any faith in the regime, either. Still, a good number did show up at the 
rally and most seemed to actually listen to the speeches, but a good portion of the youth 
merely chatted with one another, paying little attention to the regime’s theatrics.173  
 The Sächsische Zeitung also described the demonstration and loyalty rally (a two 
part affair in the minds of the SED) that moved through Görlitz on Friday, July 4, as a 
“powerful” event that drew not only thousands of comrades to Leninplatz, but “many 
party-less workers, too.”174 Party leaders rehashed the official story, wherein American 
imperialists and their German lackeys hatched X-Day. Hidden behind the theatrics 
masquerading as a public outpouring of support, participants aired grievances and 
functionaries bemoaned low turnout. Workers at Görlitz Maschinenbau, for example 
argued that it was much too soon for such an event and that the regime would have to 
prove through action, rather than rhetoric, that it could earn the workers’ trust. Others 
contended that they had just demonstrated against the regime and refused to demonstrate 
in support of the regime less than two weeks later. It must have seemed ridiculous, after 
all. Perhaps even more alarming than these workers’ lukewarm enthusiasm for the 
                                                 
172 “’Wir helfen den neuen Kurs verwirklichen!’” Sächsische Zeitung, 3 Juli, 1953 (SAPMO-BArch, 
Bibliothek): “um ihre Verbundenheit mit der Partei der Arbeiterklasse und unserer Regierung zu 
bekunden.” 
173 “Betr. Sondereinsatz zur Jugendkundgebung am 1.7.53.” Eva Kölbl, Prop/Agit. an die Abt. Leitende 
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174 “Die Aermel hoch und ran an die Arbeit,” Sächsische Zeitung, 6 Juli, 1953 (SAPMO-BArch, 
Bibliothek).  
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government’s efforts was the pervasive belief among these workers that revolution and 
unrest had engulfed the neighboring Eastern Bloc nations.175  
 
Recognizing the Power of Rumor 
 As noted in section one, while rumors functioned as an alternative form of 
political participation for those who spread them, they represented deliberate “enemy 
activity” to the SED. An analysis published by the NDPD entitled “The Provocation of 
June 17 and its Background –‘Messenger of the Enemy,’” noted the power of rumor 
during the unrest and reflected a larger body of concerns coursing through the party. The 
essay referenced nineteenth century French painter Honore Daumier’s Crispin and 
Scapin, which, in the writer’s mind perfectly characterized the hideous nature of rumors 
that served the politics of dissention and war mongering: the rumor existed in the arsenals 
of those who sought to ruin society. The article suggested that one could identify the 
victims of rumors in and around June 17, for example, the single woman who purchased 
seventy-two loaves of bread with her meager savings (for fear of revolution, shortage, or 
currency reform? The article is not clear here). Furthermore, this was not the first time 
rumor had incited financial panic although in the minds of SED functionaries, this could 
have turned into a larger run on the banks. In Dresden, and probably elsewhere, rumor of 
currency reform following the announcement of the New Course had prompted 
speculation and irregular purchases.176 According to this piece, the rumor had presented 
                                                 
175 “Agitationsbericht für die Zeit vom 3.Juli bis 9. Juli 1953,” SED Betriebsparteiorganization, EKM 
Görlitzer Maschinenbau VEB, Görlitz, den 9. Juni, 1953 (SächsHStA 11857 2.0.01 Nr. 40 Bl.48-49). 
176 See chapter three. 
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another set of challenges and helped spread “X-Day.”177 The arguments presented by the 
NDPD also reinforce interpretations of the rapid pace at which the June events developed 
(and ended) that proved essential to the very modernity of the June 17 demonstrations: 
“Just as the Schwindelkurslüge [of 1951—the so-called “currency reform lie”—a rumor 
which supposedly began in the West] unraveled literally overnight, so too failed in just a 
few hours the lies and rumors that had psychologically prepared X-Day.”178 Or, to return 
to one of the central arguments presented in chapter three, public discussion, prompted 
and aided by illicit foreign broadcasting had created a space where revolution became 
thinkable in a hitherto impossibly short period of time. The analysis presented by the 
NDPD continues along familiar, though certainly not identical lines, to what has been 
presented here, framing RIAS as a conversation starter: “only because they believe the 
rumors from RIAS and the Western muckraking press and fomenting rumors,” were the 
provocateurs successful in attempting to begin a third world war.179  
 In Dresden, the rumor issue appeared as a lesson for readers in the Sächsische 
Zeitung under the heading “How Rumors Develop.”180 In the story, the reporter visits the 
office responsible for distributing passes for international travel. A young woman exits 
the building and is quite upset, complaining that things should have improved by now. It 
turns out that she had applied three months ago for her pass, and the application still 
needed to be checked. But, she had heard from the radio (it is unclear which station, 
                                                 
177 Mit Nationalem Kurs National-Demokratische Hefte, Heft 38, Die Provokation des 17 Juni und Ihre 
Hintergründe, NDPD, Herausgegeben von der National-Demokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Originally 
published in “National-Zeitung” June 25, 1953 (DRA Potsdam). 
178 Ibid.: “Wie so buchstäblich über Nacht die Schwindelnkurs Lüge zusammenbrach, so fielen auch die 
Lügen und Gerüchte, die den “Tag X“ psychologisch vorzubereiten hatten, wie das ganze Unternehmen der 
Feinde des Friedens am 17. Juni in wenigen Stunden sich zusammen.” 
179 Ibid.  
180 “Ein Besuch bei der Interzonenpaßtelle in Dresden,” Sächsische Zeitung, June 26, 1953 (SAPMO-
BArch, Bibliothek): “Wie Gerüchte entstehen” 
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though RIAS’s coverage of this issue—see chapter three—makes it the prime suspect) 
that it only took two days—which was not officially true. The moral of the story: radio 
could mislead the GDR’s citizenry through disinformation and create confusion.181 In 
others words, the SED recognized that rumors mattered. 
 
Atrocities  
 While RIAS and other western outlets and politicians used the execution of Willi 
Göttling as an atrocity that spoke to the inhumanity of the GDR’s brand of socialism, the 
SED used the execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg as an occasion to publicize the 
brutality of the West. Tried as spies who conspired to sell secrets to the Soviet Union, a 
jury found the couple guilty of espionage and executed them at Sing Sing correctional 
facility in New York on June 19, 1953.182 The SED, which had been using the case as 
anti-U.S. propaganda for months, organized local memorials on June 20, with workers in 
a number of factories in Dresden drafting protest resolutions that linked the execution 
with the recent “failed fascist putsch attempt.”183 Neues Deutschland reported on Sunday, 
June 21 that, “screams of fiery outrage,” could be heard through the entire world as 
protests broke out in front of the White House. In a protest telegram to President 
Eisenhower, the World Federation of Trade Unions spoke for workers around the globe, 
expressing their outrage at the execution.184 ADN carried articles from Pravda that argued 
that “the blood of the Rosenbergs” bound all of human kind while the news triggered 
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182 Sam Roberts, “The Rosenbergs Revisited,” New York Times, October 8, 2010. 
183 Bezirksleitung Dresden, Genn. Trautmann, 20.6.53, 24.20 Uhr (SAPMO-BArch DY30/4/2/5/535): 
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protests that shook New York, London, Rome, and Paris.185 Other news reports showed 
the same purpose: coverage of protests in Sidney in front of the U.S. embassy against 
America’s alleged slide into dictatorship appeared on June 24 in Neues Deutschland and 
reported that the “Finnish public protested in numerous telegrams and letters to the U.S. 
embassy,” strove to create the impression of an international community of protestors 
bound in solidarity against a mutual, inhumane enemy.186  
 
Sie sind Helden 
 While rumors and dissident public opinion held that the SED leadership trio, 
Ulbricht, Grotewohl, and Pieck, were either dead, arrested, or on the run, the party looked 
to rehabilitate the images of these three in the weeks after June 17. During this period, the 
party commenced this effort by simply putting their portraits back onto the walls where 
rumor had led to their removal.187 The media organs then aimed to represent through the 
official public sphere the broad support these three men still enjoyed—or at least the 
image of popular support. Neues Deutschland publicized (via ADN) laudatory letters—
socialist fan mail, really— received by Otto Grotewohl from around the GDR in the wake 
of June 17, which served as “Mark[s] of confidence from all strata of society.”188 Pieck 
addressed Dresdeners on the front page of the Sächsische Zeitung on June 29 via 
telegram, in an article that noted that he was still recovering in the Soviet Union, 
reinforcing the SED’s narrative of events and calling for national unity.189 One day later, 
on his sixtieth birthday, a representative filling in for the absent Pieck, bestowed the 
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prestigious title “Hero of Labor” (Held der Arbeit) upon Walter Ulbricht in recognition of 
his service to the construction of an “economy of peace” and a “unified, democratic 
Germany.”190 Pieck himself recorded a speech in the Soviet Union that GDR radio 
broadcasted. Like Grotewohl, he mentioned the numerous faith declarations and “marks 
of confidence” that he had received and that since June 17, he had felt an especially close 
bond with citizens of the GDR.191  
On Friday, July 3, a memo detailing propaganda tactics called for county 
leadership to broadly popularize Ulbricht’s speeches. Propagandists received instructions 
to discuss Pieck’s speech with factory workers and organize letter writing campaigns. In 
an effort to create the impression—true or not—of positive popular opinion, agitators 
received orders to collect commentary from workers of all levels and publicize such 
opinions on factory bulletins and over the factory radio systems. Excerpts from the 
speech were to accompany Pieck’s images as part of the larger visual propaganda effort, 
while radio systems were to broadcast the speech into communal listening spaces during 
work breaks. Outside of the factories, functionaries found themselves charged with 
carrying out the above duties in enlightenment offices and in communal living spaces 
where letter writing campaigns were to be held.192 These communications functioned as a 
machine for manufacturing public opinion for the official public sphere that established 
legitimacy in the form of the support of GDR leadership of an imagined national 
community. 
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 Early results of this public relations campaign proved disappointing for the 
regime. In almost every area of the Dresden Region residents maligned Ulbricht’s 
newfound status as labor hero.193 In various locales, the “mood of the people was against 
Ulbricht” and discussions amongst workers revealed curiosity regarding the timing of his 
designation as Hero of Labor.194 Workers at Spinnerei und Weberei in Ebersbach wanted 
to know why Ulbricht had not only been honored as a Hero of Labor, but why he had 
been paid DM 10,000 for all the errors that the party made on his watch. And these 
workers demanded Ulbricht appear in Dresden so they could “give him a piece of their 
mind.”195 In a printing house in Görlitz, workers wondered why the party chose not to 
make Pieck’s whereabouts public knowledge for so long, as it only encouraged the 
rumors. Rumor—probably false—circulated in Sebnitz that Pieck had not actually spoken 
on the radio and someone had impersonated him.196 One can probably construe this as a 
representative example of public opinion as the workers here (2,500) came from twenty-
five localities.  
 
Conclusions 
 On June 17 the SED had found itself outflanked by the rival public sphere and it 
continued to struggle mightily in the aftermath of this challenge. In some ways, June 17, 
as a modern mass demonstration, did have a tidy ending: the SED, with Soviet help, 
effectively and quickly cleared the streets of public protestors on the afternoon and 
evening of June 17, removing a national conversation from public space and neutralizing 
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what had become, in Arendtian parlance, spaces of appearance. Despite some 
demonstrators lingering in the streets that night and sporadic strikes and work stoppages 
in the weeks that followed, the SED effectively confined mass protest to a single day. On 
the other hand, the spirit of June 17 carried on into the next weeks in the rival public 
sphere and many felt that revolution continued and the future of the GDR remained in 
doubt. RIAS, like rumor, made some sense of a confused situation, undermining the SED 
and endowing June 17 with national and international imaginings. Those who gave their 
lives on June 17 offered the most hallowed method by which to do so and the mourning 
ceremony in West Berlin epitomized the power of radio in a national moment of silence. 
RIAS also underscored the notion of solidarity as a key component of June 17, and more 
importantly, bluntly noted the difference, in its opinion, between fabricated (through the 
official public sphere) and authentic (in the rival public sphere) bonds of solidarity. The 
station’s broadcasts also demonstrated the international dimension of post-war German 
nationalism, whereby western nations commiserated with (East) German suffering. The 
SED offered an alternative explanation for June 17 that became part of a larger public 
relations effort to re-establish the appearance of national and international communities 
of support desperately needed to legitimize its rule. The party employed its media 
apparatuses to publicize staged solidarity rallies and what sometimes amounted to 
Potemkin protests. Efforts to rehabilitate the SED’s leading men also proved quite 
difficult, with Dresdeners unwilling to accept Walter Ulbricht as a Labor Hero, 
considering his accomplishments and failures—real or rumored. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
The June 17 events of 1953 followed the modern revolutionary script but 
introduced a new wrinkle: the electronic transmission of protest that rapidly mobilized 
the masses and fueled a nationwide demonstration. This study has suggested that June 
1953 thus constituted the first modern, radio-driven demonstration, whereby protest on a 
nationwide scale unfolded nearly instantly. We have also seen that the occasion had roots 
not only in the GDR’s short-term economic decisions and political maneuvering, but in a 
rival public sphere that had allowed private citizens to become collectively ascendant and 
challenge the legitimacy of a regime that struggled to project its authority. 
Indeed, the Soviet intervention revealed the real basis of the SED’s power, and 
the optics of the event were quite horrible. But the (open) threat of force could never be 
suitable for a regime that based its legitimacy on humane philosophical underpinnings. 
We also should remember here that the Stasi prior to the June events had not yet become 
the omnipresent force of the later decades and the first bricks of the Wall were still eight 
years away.1 And we should also consider that East German communists’ alliance with 
Stalin took place under circumstances in which his armies had done the heavy lifting to 
stop Hitler and the Soviet leader had only months prior been an ally of the SED’s 
American antagonists. So on one hand, the SED truly did have the people’s best interests 
in mind and believed that their time had arrived. This mindset must have certainly been 
especially strong in Dresden, at least in the early days, when the desolate Old City and 
toppled Church of our Lady served as daily representations of its two greatest enemies. 
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Finally, Walter Ulbricht, Otto Grotewohl, and Wilhelm Pieck were Old Communists. 
They, and others like them, had dedicated their lives to a cause and had a myopic vision 
for its course in their later years (more on this later).Thus the SED’s confidence in the 
virtue of its positions and unwavering faith in its policies should not surprise us.  
This righteousness manifested itself in the official public sphere, a projection of 
the party’s collective opinion. And since the SED philosophically conceived of itself as 
the embodiment of working class interests, its positions were that of the public, or at least 
the largest and most important part of it. That some of the GDR’s citizens still had not 
gotten with the program simply represented false consciousness or lack of 
enlightenment—issues that could and would be overcome. Indeed, the new Dresden 
could now exist not only as a representation of western (meaning fascist and capitalist) 
crimes, but as a didactic tool to get such a process underway, too. Consider for example 
the Church of our Lady, which remained a symbolic memorial to war until reunification, 
or stories and pictures of Stalin Avenue, the avenue that embodied monumental planning 
built along socialist principles. Such projects and the greater East German habitat 
therefore functioned as a visible element of the official public sphere and the party’s 
confidence in its objectives. The official public sphere also found expression with 
Sichtwerbungen, such as banners, “friendship corners,” and “public” declarations. The 
inference here by placing quotation marks around the word public is intentional: the party 
looked to establish the appearance of public support by encouraging the displays of 
support for its programs and faith in the socialist purpose. As some have pointed out, this 
amounted to a world of appearances that belied the true political feelings of the 
population. Undoubtedly, some of those volunteers that hung a banner of support from 
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their window decrying RIAS or western warmongers did in fact harbor feelings that 
aligned with those of the regime. But since displays of opposition obviously did not exist 
in the official public sphere, it is of course impossible to determine the authenticity of the 
displays, which, of course, leads to monikers like “phony public sphere.”  
Because there existed only one public entity—the authoritarian regime—this 
study has suggested that the arrangement in the GDR and other Soviet-type states was 
reminiscent of the absolutist early modern European state. As with Louis’ Versailles and 
Augustus’ Zwinger (note the word here has a root in zwingen, to force or compel), the 
SED looked to re-present power before the people. The politics of display noted above 
stood in here quite nicely, and one could argue that the Stalin Allee was similar to the 
early modern palace in that it was a sort of “people’s palace.” Or perhaps consider the 
Palace of the Republic, the seat of the East German congress that was open to the public 
for entertainment from the late-1970s. Furthermore, as in the early modern system, the 
hidden uncertainties of the regime led to greater displays of power. Of course there were, 
as noted, several important differences. The early modern regime looked to impress 
distance upon its subjects while the SED, as a socialist regime, looked to create the 
feeling of closeness. But, as we have seen, such efforts found little success in the early 
1950s. To this point, consider that following the Hungarian Uprising of 1956—more on 
this shortly—the leaders of the SED, in a panic, packed up and moved to the outskirts of 
Berlin to distance themselves from any possible unrest. The compound, known as die 
Waldsiedlung (forest settlement) built near Wandlitz to house the leading statesmen 
certainly revealed the party’s doubts—and fears.2 
                                                 
2 Andreas Malycha, Die SED in der Ära Honecker. Machtstrukturen, Entscheidungsmechanismen und 
Konfliktfelder in der Staatspartei 1971 bis 1989 (Berlin: de Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2014), 20-3. 
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A significant difference between the representative culture of the early modern 
period and that which existed in the GDR relates again to distance. As pointed out earlier, 
the modern state extended beyond the scope of physical representations and political 
communities emerged as imagined communities: states now projected through media 
apparatuses what we could not experience or see in person. In the GDR, the SED used 
radio as part of the official public sphere to extend its representation, and thus its 
authority and legitimacy, to the entire nation. Radio had played an important role in the 
Nazi seizure and maintenance of power and this did not go unnoticed by the socialists. 
The Party carried out what they considered a propaganda makeover that would broadcast 
the exact opposite of what the National Socialists’ efforts delivered: the truth. Thus they 
wasted little time getting their message onto the airwaves.  
A central argument in this study has revolved around the idea of an imagined 
community. To this end I have modified Benedict Anderson’s original thesis (though I 
am certainly not the first to do so) to suggest that radio played a similar role to print 
capitalism in socially constructing a particular type of GDR nationalism. This nationalism 
that existed on the radio (and in print) found inspiration and direction in the 
internationalism of the post-war period. Therefore, Benedict Anderson’s idea of a fixed 
national boundary gets pushed to the wayside here and we might better understand the 
imagined community broadcasted as one that integrated East Germans in to the Eastern 
Bloc politically and culturally. The SED broadcasted this internationalism as a solidarity 
or Verbundenheit between East Germans and Soviet and Eastern Bloc peoples, and 
celebrated the successes of the Red Army and instructed the GDR in Soviet cultural 
happenings. East German nationalism on the radio also projected an all-German 
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community based on working class solidarity. Broadcasters recorded workers’ 
demonstrations in the Federal Republic and transmitted such protests to the GDR and 
listeners in the West in an attempt to undermine the government there and foreshadowing 
the vastly more effective transmission of protest in June of 1953. The delivery system for 
such programming in the GDR was extensive and pervasive. The Betriebsfunk system 
meant that the Party essentially had a captive audience and the Stadtfunk system allowed 
it to audibly project its authority into those spaces where people naturally congregated, 
like the Postplatz.  
The SED also employed organized and choreographed demonstrations as a way to 
represent publicness to its citizenry. The party regularly announced and held rallies that it 
then later publicized to represent its popular support. Stalin’s death afforded a notable 
and unique opportunity to do so. Using the occasion to stage synchronized rallies wherein 
attendants and those listening on the radio could imagine themselves as part of a larger 
community of mourners produced an occasion full of international imaginings.  
This study has also suggested that a rival public sphere developed alongside the 
representative culture embodied in the official public sphere. This political publicness 
existed in the form of improvised news and foreign radio broadcasting. We have also 
seen that while modern dictatorial regimes such as the SED attempted to fashion 
totalitarian states, radio broadcasting and the widespread ownership of receivers created a 
breach in their communications fortress. This was not unlike the pamphlets from the 
Netherlands that made it into France or the alternative media (backdoor news) in China 
that undermined/undermines the regimes those respective states. Nor was it unlike the 
radio programming during World War II that aimed at destabilizing home fronts. 
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However, RIAS was also quite different from anything that had come before by virtue of 
its location in the “other half” of a divided Germany. The station existed as a pillar of the 
rival public sphere and continuously, and quite often, successfully, called into question 
the SED’s agenda.  
RIAS programming, like that of its rivals in the GDR, pulled listeners in the two 
Germanys into aural communion to form an imagined community of all Germans. 
Political shows kept East Germans abreast of governmental developments in the FRG and 
these extended to all segments of society. Such programming offered East Germans 
alternative news to that which was available in the official public sphere while at the 
same time challenging the political positions of the SED at every step. These broadcasts 
also chipped away at the SED’s prestige and thus its legitimacy. On this point, it is 
important to note that RIAS openly campaigned (like the GDR) for a reunified Germany 
and envisioned reunification proceeding under West German control (as it did in 1989). 
Thus, RIAS’s decision to refer to the GDR as “the Zone” in lieu of its official name 
probably reinforced the belief in this period that the division was only temporary. Talk, 
though, is only important if someone is listening, and in the case of RIAS, it certainly 
enjoyed greater listenership in the period leading up to the June 1953 events than did the 
GDR’s stations. 
Perhaps the most important development—and an overlooked one—was RIAS’s 
ability to inspire action. After the SED dismantled or co-opted workers’ traditional 
associations of collective deliberation and political action, RIAS filled in as a virtual 
forum and helped workers organize in opposition to the regime. The campaign surveyed 
in chapter two showed that communication went both ways, which RIAS receiving 
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information from the workers in the GDR and then broadcasting ideas about how workers 
might resist the regime. The activities here speak volumes about the station’s motivations 
and power behind the Iron Curtain, as workers’ actions revealed widespread listenership 
and the ability of the station to shape action on the ground. First, RIAS allowed informed 
workers to present a unified front in different locales—foreshadowing its role on June 17. 
Indeed, the station internally boasted of its newfound faculty to turn individual resistance 
into mass resistance that could develop so quickly as to paralyze briefly the state; one that 
they continuously derided as illegitimate.  
This study has suggested that rumors constituted the second-most important 
element in the rival public sphere. Naturally, foreign radio broadcasting, which delivered 
news unavailable in the official public sphere and was thus probably unknown to the 
functionaries tasked with recording public opinion, tied into the formation of “rumors.” 
Therefore, in some cases, these rumors were true or at least partially true, despite the 
regime’s record often categorizing them as false or dis-information. A notable example of 
this included the pervasive stream of improvised news related to the strikes in Pilsen in 
the period before June 17. The SED obviously had little interest in making such unrest 
the talk of the town, thus, outside sources—probably RIAS—delivered the news in and 
around Dresden. Improvised news of the uprising, which actually was a violent event, 
kept the event in the news cycle of the rival public sphere and helped de-stabilize the 
situation even further in the weeks prior to the June events. While reports regarding the 
Pilsen uprising circulated in the region in the form of (often accurate) improvised news, 
many stories strayed from the truth. The rumors that the regime had stepped down or 
fled—and often in some dishonorable way—show that bits of true news became the 
292 
 
social materials out of which residents constructed sometimes-alternative or hope-filled 
realities. This is significant, and offers a key insight into the event: what participants 
knew or thought to be happening is often quite different from what historians know or 
think they know to have happened. The polarized news outlets almost certainly 
contributed to the proliferation of improvised news and one has to wonder if the medium 
contributed here, too. After all, it took some effort to tune into foreign radio stations due 
to jamming and the need—sometimes, though not always—to do so secretly meant that 
residents might have been more likely to have heard bits and pieces of stories through 
static or low volume. These may have been moments of improvisation. 
After the announcement of the New Course, the rival public sphere, to paraphrase 
Tim Blanning, had developed its own power and it was in these spaces that revolution 
became thinkable. The story by now seems vaguely familiar: financial crisis had 
weakened the regime’s position and its public calls for reform had heightened 
expectations. Rumor had damaged the leadership’s prestige and improvised news 
suggested that the authorities had moved violently to put down revolutionary fervor 
nearby.3 While the events of June 17 were not, of course, inevitable, the stage had 
certainly been set.  
                                                 
3 I allude to France in 1789, where upheaval destroyed traditional information barriers like the Church, and 
as a result, rumors circulated unchecked in the early years of the Revolution. In his classic work, The Great 
Fear: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France (1932), Georges Lefebvre traced the spread of rumor, panic, 
and unrest that traveled along rural and military roads, beginning on July 20 and continuing through August 
3. Lefebvre followed the spread of the rumors and unrest in concentric circles, where the peasants reacted 
violently as “news” regarding brigands reached the local town or village. Supposedly, the nobility had 
instructed these brigands to destroy crops and put down revolutionary fervor. Of course, we now know 
there were no brigands, but the peasants rebelled anyway with the rumors taking on a life of their own.  As 
another historian put it, “the reign of rumor had begun.” (see Jordan, David P., “Rumor, Fear, and Paranoia 
in the French Revolution,” Oxford Scholarship Online. May 2010). What turned out to be misinformation 
helped give birth to the Terror, as well, after rumor of a military coup and food riots, supposedly redirected 
by aristocrats, made their rounds. Even the end of the Terror had some basis in rumor: gossip purported that 
Robespierre was planning to marry Louis’ daughter and proclaim himself king.  
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The analysis of the June 17 events presented here proposed that the occasion was 
not a truly spontaneous one, which in a way puts it at odds with the entire historiography 
minus the public interpretation of the SED. While that overtly political interpretation 
falsely accused “western agents” of hiding in the GDR and springing to action on the 
morning of the seventeenth, one must admit that the reasoning behind such a story is not 
unreasonable when one considers two factors. In the long term, RIAS had pushed for 
mass mobilization against the regime and its programming—consider again the campaign 
against the collective contracts, which aimed to arm workers with a unified argument 
against the regime. And recall RIAS’s own assessment from that event in 1952: “Last 
year RIAS almost singlehandedly solidified anti-communist resistance in the Soviet Zone 
and turned individual resistance into mass resistance. I think we all ought to recognize 
this fact and implore RIAS to maintain this policy.”4 Of course, the SED was not privy to 
this internal report and this is not to say that RIAS planned the June 17 demonstrations, 
but the station was certainly aware that it had the power to dramatically shape the 
situation. Thus, when the spontaneous (and even these had been discussed among the 
construction workers over the weekend) demonstrations of June 16 broke out in Berlin, 
simply by covering them the station gave the entire population a “unified argument” and 
a script to follow the next day. 
That the commentators did not call for a general strike—a point they made in 
interviews after the fact—does not seem to have mattered much. They came close enough 
and listeners heard what they wanted to hear. As we have seen, some recalled hearing the 
station call for a general strike, though their memories prove faulty in this case. One 
                                                 
4 “Zur Information der Korrespondenten,” Berlin 24. April 1952, Release # 1630, Office of the United 
States High Commissioner for Germany Berlin Element, Information Branch (DRA Potsdam F304-01-
04/0004). 
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might note, though, that RIAS remarked that one of the protest’s slogans had been 
“Tomorrow it continues.” This study has suggested that by merely reporting the day’s 
events, the RIAS broadcasted a script for the next day and it is little surprise that things 
played out the way they did on June 17. Indeed, the protestors marched through the 
streets and declared their solidarity with the Berlin marchers, chanted similar slogans, and 
made analogous demands, essentially enacting the script they had been given. Yet radio 
had ushered in a new era of public protest that day. Participant Rainer Hildebrandt’s 
observation that a “leaderless” uprising had now become possible and that we had 
entered a new era where ten thousand protestors could be in the streets within hours was 
an astute one indeed.5 
Finally, this study has attempted to contribute to our understanding of 
nationalism’s role in the June 17 demonstrations and has suggested that radio’s centrality 
in the event sheds light on this debate. Certainly, RIAS endowed the demonstrations with 
national imaginings on the night of June 16 and helped turn the workers’ protests into a 
movement that spoke to national questions and alluded to national unity. For example, by 
reporting that with a sound truck demonstrators had declared, “If you are a son of the 
nation [Volkes], join us!”6 Such slogans, heard by workers around the GDR that evening, 
help explain why things moved beyond economic issues so quickly. This inquiry into the 
question of nationalism has also shown that in the aftermath of the June 17 
demonstrations, RIAS allowed for moments of national imaginings. Most notable among 
these was the demonstration of sorrow held in Berlin to pay tribute to those (unknown) 
victims of June 17. RIAS’s transmission of the occasion, with the crowd and listeners 
                                                 
5 Hildebrandt, “17 Juni: Großer Tatsachenbericht.” 
6  “Die Sendungen des RIAS am Dienstag, 16. Juni 1953”: “Wenn Ihr Söhne des Volkes seid, schließt Euch 
an!” 
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sharing moments of song and of silence, represented an instance full of national 
imaginings.  
 
Take Two: Hungary, 1956 
 
 The new stage of the revolutionary script—coordination in strata of 
communication outside of government control such as electronic mass media—has 
played out in the second half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first.  
Just over three years after East Germans took to the streets to protest the Soviet-
style regime, Hungarians did the same. Events here followed a strikingly similar script: 
an ascendant public, encouraged by foreign broadcasting and improvised—and mostly 
accurate—news of unrest in a neighboring state, took to the streets and challenged the 
existing order. 7  
As in the GDR, Western foreign broadcasting penetrated the Hungarian 
Communist Workers’ Party (HCWP) of Hungary’s broadcasting landscape. The United 
States, with RFE and VOA, beamed messages of hope to Hungarians who tuned in with 
specially modified radios. Indeed, in the 1950s, the United States’ very public liberation 
                                                 
7 For English-language surveys of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising, see: Charles Gati, Failed Illusions: 
Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2006); Terry Cox, ed., Hungary 1956- Forty Years On (Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1997); Johanna 
Granville, The First Domino: International Decision Making during the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004); Sandor Kopacsi, In the Name of the Working Class: The 
Inside Story of the Hungarian Revolution (New York: Grove Press, 1987); Tamas Meszerics, 
“Independence Before all Else: Hungarian anti-communist resistance in the East European context, 1945-
1956,” East European Quarterly 41 (2007); 39-59; Victor Sebestyen: Twelve Days: The Story of the 1956 
Hungarian Revolution (Random House, 2006); Malcolm Byrne et all, eds., The 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution: A History in Documents (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2002); Paul 
Kecskemeti, The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press, 1961); Much of the following section is taken from my own research on the events in 
Hungary and based on the 1956 Hungarian Refugee Interviews from the Columbia History Research 
Project Hungary and U.S. State Department documents. See Michael Pulido, “Transmitting a Revolution: 
Mass Communications and the 1956 Hungarian Uprising” (master’s thesis, University of North Carolina, 
Wilmington, 2007).  
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rhetoric had implied assistance, and Hungarians took this idea to heart.8 Of course, the 
U.S. had stayed on the sidelines in 1953, and privately President Dwight Eisenhower 
(along with those who crafted foreign policy) had accepted that John Foster Dulles’ 
“rollback” and the “liberation of captive peoples” was simply unrealistic.9 Still, 
Hungarians listened to RFE and VOA broadcasts that encouraged hopes of liberation, and 
years of broadcasting had heightened expectations among the population, whether these 
ideas were realistic or not. Indeed, from these stations’ broadcasts, listeners gathered that 
they had a powerful ally on their side that was willing to come to their aid should they 
actively resist Soviet domination. Furthermore, for five years, these transmissions had 
stimulated conversations among listeners in a rival public sphere that often led to 
discussions regarding the possibility of an armed uprising, with help from the West. In 
short, RFE and VOA helped make revolution thinkable.10  
American efforts to challenge the communist regime in Hungary developed 
beyond radio, too. For example, from late 1954 until the middle of 1955, Operation Focus, 
an extension of RFE, dropped millions of leaflets over Hungary. The government 
intended for these leaflets, an extension of American foreign policy, to stir resistance 
activity and ultimately help Hungarians force concessions from the government. There is 
evidence that these leaflets held significance for Hungarians who deduced from their 
appearance that they had a powerful ally on their side. These leaflets then circulated 
among the population prompting conversations in the rival public sphere pertaining to the 
                                                 
8 Gati, Failed Illusions, 69-74.  
9 Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne and Janos M. Rainer, eds., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in 
Documents (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2002), 2-3 
10 Michael Pulido, “Transmitting a Revolution: Mass Communications and the 1956 Hungarian Uprising.”  
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possibility of action; some Hungarians even spoke of reviving the revolutionary script of 
1848-9.11  
As in the GDR, American broadcasting had stimulated the growth of a rival 
public sphere in Hungary. When RFE aired Khrushchev’s secret speech in 1955 and 
Matyas Rakosi found himself forced to resign, the government appeared to falter and the 
rival public sphere became ascendant. Hungarian students became aware of unrest in 
Poland between October 19 and 22 via RFE broadcasts—a situation not unlike that which 
unfolded in the GDR in regard to the Pilsen rebellion. In an effort to show solidarity with 
the Poles, students in Szeged began demonstrating, which in turn inspired similar 
demonstrations in Budapest. In the capital on the evening of 22 October, students drafted 
a list of demands, just as dissidents had done in 1848 (and in numerous other instances, 
including June 1953). Radio broadcasts on 23 October shaped the collective action of the 
opposition and directed mass gatherings that formed the basis for a popular uprising in 
Budapest. When students attempted to broadcast their demands over the airwaves the 
night of 23 October, a contest as to who controlled Hungarian media ignited the 
demonstration. News of the outbreak of violence spread throughout Budapest, and what 
began as a skirmish became a city-wide uprising. Through radio transmissions, leaflets, 
and posters, the revolution coagulated in the capital. Fighting factions communicated via 
shortwave broadcasts, many of which were relayed by RFE from one group of Freedom 
Fighters to another. Copycat lists of demands circulated among the population while 
posters and the written word verified the veracity of claims made by radio.12 News of the 
demonstration went out over the radio on October 23 and participation exploded. As in 
                                                 
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid.  
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the GDR, radio fostered collective activity and calls for solidarity drove the movement. 
For instance, coalminers, who had gone on strike immediately after hearing of the events 
in Budapest, refused to resume work “as long as Russian soldiers were murdering their 
brothers in Budapest.”13   
By the morning of October 24, news of revolution had already spread outside of 
Budapest and inspired Hungarians throughout the nation to follow the lead of the capital. 
On 24 October, workers and students hundreds of kilometers from the hostilities in the 
capital city were brought into the fold via radio transmission. When those outside of 
Budapest heard the news of the violence, they immediately felt the pull of national 
imaginings and communities throughout Hungary rose up against their foreign occupiers. 
The Sixteen Points inspired similar lists of demands and unified the aims of the 
movement. The popularity of Western broadcasting stations contributed to Hungarians’ 
recognition of shortwave radio as an effective means of broadcasting and the regime’s 
opponents had become adept at utilizing the potential of this type of radio. This meant 
that Revolutionary radio operators transmitted local news and leveraged the leadership of 
the Revolution. The desire to listen to Western broadcasting meant that the majority of 
Hungarian households had procured (or had altered) a set to receive shortwave 
broadcasts—those transmitting the revolution had a large audience.14 
 This rapid swelling of the uprising has become one of its defining characteristics. 
Authorities on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, such as Charles Gati, maintain that the 
revolution was spontaneous. Paul Kecskemeti agreed, appropriately titling his book The 
Unexpected Revolution. Indeed, events took western governments by surprise. But as 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 90.  
14 Ibid.  
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with 1953, spontaneity was only one part of the revolutionary equation: the rapid 
explosion primarily stemmed from the communications infrastructure in place and an 
energized rival public sphere. The swift unification of the uprising can also be explained 
by the communities formed through Western broadcasting between 1951 and 1956, 
primarily RFE and VOA. These broadcasts had fostered the establishment of 
independence-minded communities, bound by the belief in Western assistance. When 
news of the first shots aired, Hungarians felt that those in their communities harbored the 
same thoughts of liberation and shared similar faith in their imagined Western allies. 
Through their calls for help, Hungarian freedom fighters who manned shortwave radio 
stations affirmed this pre-existing faith in the West.15  
After Soviet forces crushed the revolution on  November 4, 1956, the popular 
belief held by Hungarians that the West would come to their aid proved to be deceptive—
a recurring theme for Eastern Bloc residents. In Hungary the revolutionary script seemed 
familiar here, too: as in 1848, Western Europe had professed the desire for Hungarian 
self-determination, yet in reality, held little interest in intervening in a meaningful way. 
Soviet troops capitalized, ending another battle between the two sides for independence. 
This was also the second time the Soviets used force to quell unrest in one of their 
satellite states—but this time they hesitated.16 
 
Take Three: East Germany, 1989 
 
 The Soviets’ suppression of the East German demonstrations and the Hungarian 
Uprising confirmed Soviet rule of Eastern Europe and proved that the West, and 
especially the United States, with its posturing and rollback rhetoric had no intention of 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid.  
300 
 
intervening behind the Iron Curtain. But, each time the Soviets deployed tanks it created 
a public relations debacle that damaged their diminishing prestige. The Warsaw Pact 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to restore hard-line rule after eight months of reforms 
under Alexander Dubcek aimed to soften the nature of Czech socialism meant that 
stability and legitimacy existed only in appearance in the Eastern Bloc states. And this 
was true of all the satellite states: by 1968, the native governments lacked the genuine 
legitimacy that would have been necessary for their political survival without Soviet 
backing.17  
 Mary Fulbrook challenges the notion that Soviet-style totalitarian regimes stood 
directly opposed to “the people.”  In her effort to capture the normality of everyday GDR 
life, she has more recently proposed the elegant term “participatory dictatorship.” 
Essentially, she argues that while only a few had true power, almost everyone, in some 
way or another, participated, whether through direct involvement or through various 
forms of protest. Fulbrook thus rejects the totalitarian model that this study has presented, 
though that may be largely due to the periods under study. Certainly, this analysis covers 
a period wherein East Germans experienced the aftermath of war and Stalinism, rather 
than the consumerist socialism and stability of the later decades. And of course, 1953 had 
something to do with that, as the regime opted for a program of repression and expansion 
(a strengthened secret police and greater party discipline) and retreat (they never again 
ignored consumer demands as they had between the summer of 1952 and the June events). 
                                                 
17 Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler, The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact 
Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2010), 35-6. 
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In short, life probably became much more normal for most East Germans after 1953 and 
before 1989.18 
 The very unexpectedness of the 1989 revolutions seemed to endorse the stability 
of the state, though some have argued that revolt was never far from the surface. There is 
certainly ample evidence to back up either argument, but observers in the 1980s could see 
that the regime had in many ways become ossified. Indeed, Erich Honecker and others 
remained mentally grounded in the pre-war period, promoting cheap streetcar tickets 
while consumers wanted blue jeans. Honecker’s decision to embrace East-West détente 
only exacerbated his difficulties. His need to differentiate the GDR from the FRG in a 
favorable light proved an unfeasible goal. In the later period then, party, and thus the state, 
had become thoroughly outmoded. And even if mass revolt was not lurking right below 
the surface, the public certainly had its power. Sure, there the GDR produced some 
homegrown favorites (die Puhdys; Unser Sandmännchen), but on balance the little 
republic could not compete with Western music and fashion and this put the party at odds 
with the rival public sphere, which by the 1980s had become the supreme arbiter in 
matters of good taste (to paraphrase Tim Blanning, yet again).19 In 1989, the rival public 
sphere became the ultimate arbiter in matters of politics, too.  
Rolf Steninger argues that 1989 represented the completion of 1953, which, in his 
mind, constituted an unfinished revolution. He points to the nearly identical slogans 
expressed in Leipzig 36 years later—Wir sind ein Volk; Free and Secret Elections; 
Freedom of the Press—and contends that the only significant difference between the two 
events was the Soviets’ decision to stay out. Of course, international developments set the 
                                                 
18 Fulbrook, The People’s State; Kowalczuk, 17. Juni 1953 - Volksaufstand in der DDR, Kowalczuk, Mitter 
and Wolle, eds. Der Tag X - 17. Juni 1953. 
19 See Epstein, The Last Revolutionaries and Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture.  
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stage here, too, as political transformations in the Soviet Union represented decisive 
factors leading to the peaceful revolutions in Germany. Hungary and Poland, too, with 
their successful efforts to liberalize their governments, demonstrated that the Soviet 
Union would tolerate liberation in the Eastern Bloc. Perhaps most importantly, 
Gorbachev’s policies of Glasnost and Perestroika horrified SED leadership and when the 
Soviet leader decided to allow revolution to take place elsewhere in the Bloc, it became 
thinkable in the GDR.  
 Historians like Ray Rühle and Peter Hohendahl have argued that revolution 
became thinkable in emergent public spheres—the former points to a church-based 
publicness and the latter posits that the actors in a “revolutionary public sphere” 
overthrew the “state public sphere.”20 As this study has built upon their ideas, the model 
these authors present does not look radically different than what I suggest happened in 
1953. But did the actors of 1989 follow the same script as those in 1953? For one thing, 
the actors were different. New modes of political and social protest, especially in the 
1980s, replaced the East German social democratic tradition of the 1950s and 60s. Avant-
garde artists, bohemians, environmentalists, along with other purveyors of counter-
culture matured into a sort of intellectual proletariat. These dissidents found space in the 
Protestant Church, and armed with samizdat leaflets, became emboldened and moved 
outside of their initially limited spheres of protest. Largely responding to historian Linda 
Fuller’s assertion that 1989 was the work of intellectuals, Gareth Dale argues that this 
“intellectual proletariat” along with traditional workers, laid the foundation for mass 
protest in 1989. In this way, he sees 1989 as a continuation of the 1953 revolts, as both 
                                                 
20 Ray Rühle, Entstehung von politischer Öffentlichkeit in der DDR in den 1980er Jahren am Beispiel von 
Leipzig. Peter Hohendahl, “Recasting the Public Sphere.” 
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were products of the working class, though the latter protests lacked the strikes that 
activated the former.21 
 So while protestors were less likely to have been dressed in the blue work suits of 
the 1953 event and the issues were broader, we still find an ascendant public, a weakened 
and reforming regime in the Soviet Union that directly affected the policies of its satellite 
states, unrest in a neighboring state, and a media that had been covering events for 
months. Indeed, television broadcasted images of refugees streaming out of the GDR (by 
way of Hungary) or crowds gathered in Leipzig, Berlin, and Dresden for the organized 
Monday demonstrations. In this way the media, especially that in the West, shaped and 
propelled the events.22 When a group of journalists asked SED official Günter 
Schabowski about the rumored removal of travel restrictions, he mistakenly informed the 
press that the borders had been opened. While the wall probably would have come down 
eventually, this bit of misinformation, amplified by TV and radio outlets, almost certainly 
hastened the course of events.23 
                                                 
21 Gareth Dale, Popular Protest in East Germany; Ray Rühle, Entstehung von politischer Öffentlichkeit. 
22 Thomas Großmann, Fernsehen, Revolution und das Ende der DDR (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2015).  
23 Antonia Kleikamp, “Der Mann, der die Mauer öffnete” Welt, January 2, 2014.  
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